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INTRODUCTION
Recognizing the Human in the Humanities
David Bleich
Deborah H. Holdstein
In the 1996 issue of PMLA considering “the personal” in scholarship, Michael
Bérubé suggests that scholarly use of personal narrative represents “some kind
of generic violation of scholarship in the human sciences.” But he concludes
that “as long as the scholarship in question concerns humans and is written by
humans, readers should at least entertain the possibility that nothing human
should be alien to it.” This conclusion, so self-evident, is only now becoming
acceptable in the humanities—that is, to admit the full range of human experience into formal scholarly writing.
The study of language and literature without reference to its roles in scholars’ lives and communities has been the most common academic practice; such
study is also academic in the pejorative sense of its being “not practical” or
moot or removed from real life. The adjective “academic” has meant, among
other things, that scholarly writing about language and literature assumes that
the subjectivity and social memberships of scholars are not factors in their
humanistic knowledge in the same sense as physical scientists assume that
their subjectivities are not factors in their knowledge of science. Because
humanists have used the scientiﬁc sense of objectivity to conceptualize their
own work, and because humanistic scholarship does not have as great an economic and physical consequence as science, humanities have come to seem less
important as subject matters than science, law, or business.
This volume collects essays that, taken together, try to show how fundamental it is in humanistic scholarship to take account, in a variety of ways and
as part of the subject matter, of the personal and collective experiences of
scholars, researchers, critics, and teachers. The volume advances the view that
humanistic inquiry can not develop successfully at this time without reference
to the varieties of subjective, intersubjective, and collective experience of
teachers and researchers. We of course do not think that such reference is a
requirement or that it should appear in every study; rather, that regardless of
the announced level of subjective involvement of the scholarly author, both
authors and readers need to have on their hermeneutic agenda, as readers and
as writers, the task of locating scholarly authors through personal and social
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criteria. This presupposition may then apply to different authors in different
degrees, as it does in this volume: authors choose how to identify themselves.
But in each case, we readers and interpreters have at least before us the issue of
the subjective and intersubjective situation of the author(s) as part of the subject matter.1
To one degree or another, scholarly authors’ lived experiences are already
part of the different subject matters in the humanities. However, the conventions of writing urge writers away from the citation or use of these experiences.
In secondary and postsecondary writing pedagogy, authorial detachment is
part of the curriculum; self-inclusion, particularly the use of the “I,” is strongly
discouraged. Students are not taught that sometimes the ﬁrst person is effective, or that one’s own experience may well matter in one’s way of announcing
knowledge, but that it is actually not acceptable to use the I or to fold in personal experience in substantive ways in academic writing. In this way, matters
of writing pedagogy are closely related to matters of writing conventions in the
humanities. Humanists are often unconscious to a great extent of just how
coercive these conventions are. While many may wish to use self-reference and
self-reﬂection, combining the genres of scholarship with the genres of personal
experience and observation is conﬁned to texts that are prominently marked
“memoir,” “autobiography,” or other life-writing genres. One may include reference to scholarly work in life-writing, but one cannot include life-writing in
scholarly work. This is the conventional means of minimizing the human presence in the humanities.
The foregoing description represents what motivates our effort to bring out
this volume. But we did not anticipate how, exactly, it would materialize. We
had a call for papers, and we had a zone of interest which we know has been
growing in the past two decades. We waited for the essays to arrive and to see
what they said. We sorted the proposals and the essays until we thought that
each essay contributed something distinctive. Our last step was to face the
issue of how the essays added up to a comprehensive perspective, to a vision
that could provide guidance to other teachers and scholars. We thought that
unless contributors wrote about what they themselves thought were the
important issues, we would not be able to “add up” anything that truly
reﬂected our constituency, or that would speak to the many colleagues and disciplines beyond our own. We tried to withhold judgment about what we
wanted to accomplish in collecting these essays, rather than decide beforehand
and instruct potential contributors on what we envision. We understood the
risks of this procedure, but we thought it was more in keeping with our sense
of ourselves as students: learning from our contributors. After collecting the
essays we were able to sample what our colleagues were thinking, and then to
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decide, on the basis of their work, how the issues that they raised connected to
the ones with which we started.
These issues are reﬂected in the ﬁve divisions of the volume following the
introduction. Each division characterizes what we think is the principal choice
by the authors on how they could best contribute to our topic. By juxtaposing
each individual essay with others, we give each an accent beyond what the
authors may have foreseen or intended. The volume’s title reﬂects our sense of
how the essays, taken together, add up to a picture of part of our profession, to
a view of how we are changing, and to a set of advocacies of how we might
change further. In addition to what our title actually says, here are a few other
general issues, touched on to one degree or another by all the essays, which
have emerged in our reading and interpreting these essays and that we think
are also marked by the title.
The inseparability of teaching and scholarship. Readers may notice how
many contributors treat teaching and scholarship as aspects of a single process.
Including personal experiences and narratives in the presentation of scholarship lends scholarship its pedagogical authority: it is not just plain “knowledge.” It is knowledge derived by someone and told to someone. It is
knowledge that this person found in this community or society and is sharing
with this other group of people. Contributors to this volume take pains to
account for how they are situated, and, therefore, how their claims may then by
taken up and evaluated by us readers. Scholarship that is “from” and “to”
someone is, yes, “personal,” but its personal location is only a feature of something that can be taken up in collective contexts and in non-personalized
senses. Teaching that takes place in particular locations is “local” teaching, but
it is also teaching that tells us the character of knowing, especially the knowing
of language and literature. If the scholarship is about Joyce Carol Oates or
Anne Sexton because Brenda Daly and Paula Salvio chose these authors, it is
also about other authors who are read by other students and researched by
other scholars. The persons, the scholarship, and the teaching are combined.
The connections of personal experiences with the subject of language and literature. Peter Elbow has asked, “What is English?” Our answer has been that
“English” is both “our” language and the subject of language and literature.
These essays say, in part, that we must be aware that we are studying our language—the language of a speciﬁc society that is host to many cultures and
many values, but that we are also studying something that all people have, language and literature. Contributors to this volume come from many (though not
all) zones of American society represented in the academy. Yet each is committed to “English” the subject, each speaks “English” the language, and many speak
other languages, know other subjects and cultures, and bring their special
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knowledge to bear on the study of language and literature, as do Susan
Handelman, Katya Azoulay, Victor Villanueva, Morris Young, and Chris
Castiglia. Yet many other contributors also bring special perspectives on English
the language and English the subject—those of profession, gender, history, pedagogy, to name a few. Almost every essay raises this issue: how English is both
our language and a subject matter that extends to all language and literature.
The connections of literature and composition studies. This has been a continuing problem in “English” for perhaps a century and a half in modern times.2
Yet most contributors to this volume have not subscribed to this division of
subject matter and academic interest. To them, writing, language, language
use, and literature have been part of one picture that has made a point of recognizing the human in the use and study of language and literature. Richard
Ohmann’s several works, for example, have presupposed a uniﬁed subject. In
his contribution, he adds his own responses to teaching and to university
administration, and suggests thereby what may be new relations of language
and society, of English and America. Victor Villanueva, a teacher and administrator of English and Spanglish, is someone whose story and whose memory
may itself fall among literary genres. Essays like Rachel Brownstein’s take over
the “student” genre, while her students take over oral genres, and the classroom
account she gives can count as an ethnographic genre. Most of the contributions to this volume are not easily identiﬁed generically because they cross
genre boundaries and show by repeated example how the many genres of
“writing” speak against a propadeutic subject of “composition” as being distinct from a scholarly and culturally privileged subject of “literature.”
Taken together, the essays in this volume fall into the category of “scholarly
writing.” Yet, they also create new subcategories of scholarly writing as they
change the received genres. The essays have a social character, yet they are all
still personal, even those, such as Willard-Traub’s and Gray’s, which seem to
use more traditional scholarly conventions of writing. Their subject matters as
well as their styles change their genres and form the basis for new pedagogical
initiatives—ones that permit the risks, the personal reﬂections, the experiments, the errors, the awkward moments characteristic of real teaching and
real research. Narratives such as Joycelyn Moody’s challenge the customary
conventions of teacher-student interaction in her “diary,” yet the total effect of
such an essay is to invite other such diaries that tell of the real levels of relatedness between students and teachers. This is a “scholarly” diary that speaks with
a personal, individual, human, voice to those of us who are listening.
This volume continues and extends the efforts of a group of scholars who
have begun to introduce their own lives and experiences as social factors in the
scholarship of language and literature. In particular, these authors view their
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personal and social circumstances as part of their subject matter—whether
implicitly or explicitly. Robin Lakoff ’s Language and Women’s Place (1975)
includes a discussion about the “place” from which she begins her thinking
about language use. Lakoff ultimately expands this sense of place to include
psychotherapy, the law, the culture of beauty, and the academy. In each instance,
however, Lakoff explicitly describes her vantage point in terms more personal
than those of a great majority of other scholars. Similarly, Adrienne Rich’s collection, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence (1979), and Diane Freedman, Olivia Frey,
and Frances Zauhar’s volume, The Intimate Critique: Autobiographical Literary
Criticism (Duke UP, 1993), examine even more closely the embedded self
within scholarly work. Patricia Williams’ The Alchemy of Race and Rights (1990)
is an especially persuasive instance of how important it is to refer to one’s own
experience in discussing something as broadly applicable as the law. Scholarly
uses and examinations of personal experiences help to articulate relationships
among a variety of disciplines, as well as interestingly unarticulated links
between composition studies and literary studies.
We see this in the work of one particular scholar: Jane Tompkins’s
“Sentimental Power: Uncle Tom’s Cabin and the Politics of Literary History”
(1981) examines how her own otherness led to her critical assessment of the
same in the work of Harriet Beecher Stowe. Tompkins’s rhetorical strategy features aspects of her own life as the introductory portion to more traditional
forms of academic argument. Most recently, in A Life in School (1996), Tompkins
examines her own life as the context for her scholarly work. Nancy K. Miller’s
work is also noteworthy, particularly Getting Personal: Feminist Occasions and
Other Autobiographical Acts; Janet Varner Gunn in Autobiography suggests a perspective having to do with “taking oneself up and bringing oneself to language”;
Shari Benstock asks, in “Authorizing the Autobiographical,” how writing mediates “. . . the space between ‘self’ and ‘life’ that the autobiography would traverse
and transgress.” Benstock suggests that “. . . the place to begin our investigation of
autobiography might be at the crossroads of writing and selfhood.”
Composition studies has continued to delineate these personal-scholarly
contexts since its emergence as a formal discipline in the late 1960s and early
1970s, examining both writer and students of writing. Deborah Brandt details,
for instance, the acquisition of literacy among workers and the social forces
that contextualize multiple literacies. Victor Villanueva, Jr., in Bootstraps: From
an American Academic of Color (NCTE, 1990), examines how his “position” in
the world provided the pedagogical and philosophical contexts for his work in
composition. NCTE has also published Teaching in College English and English
Education (1998) a volume in which editors Richard Larson, Thomas
McCracken, and Judith Entes feature work by scholars writing about how they
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came to be postsecondary teachers of literature and composition. These very
few examples from literary and composition studies suggest that such substantive accounts of the “inner” academic life provide appropriate and rich contexts for further study and analysis—and for interaction between these two
areas of inquiry.
Personal writing has become a collective interest as a necessary context for
scholarship and pedagogy. The 1996 issue of PMLA, cited above, provides
potentially productive links between the literary scholars featured in PMLA
and the work of composition scholars. For instance, Donald Palumbo-Li notes
that the “racialized personal in scholarship” inevitably contributes to the creation of the personal, along with the “consequences of institutional change.”
He notes, “If we value the humanistic enterprise precisely because it allows us
to explore our humanity, the link our particular lives have with others, then
the minority scholar has a particular set of negotiations foisted on him or her,
for the appearance of race in the university is an unstable one.”
Cathy Davidson furthers the debate to embrace issues of genre (not unlike
the work of Diane Freedman in An Alchemy of Genres: Cross-Genre Writing by
American Feminist Poet-Critics (1992). She points out that “the conventions of
genre for personal writing are every bit as scripted as the conventions of
scholarship . . .” She notes that she makes the same kinds of aesthetic judgments about personal writing “. . . as I do about novels, plays, short stories,
essays, or articles in PMLA.” Concludes Davidson, “Whether we put ourselves
in or think we are leaving ourselves out, we are always in what we write.”
Davidson here teases out multiple layers of the personal—the actual use of
the personal in literary criticism as well as the inescapable “I” that must be
part of even the most allegedly “impersonal” scholarship. If, indeed, “The politics of multiculturalization involve a rethinking of every participant’s personal place,” as Palumbo-Li attests, then Sylvia Molloy’s view, “that the use of
the personal is a decidedly political act,” seems a logical, concurrent step.
Molloy believes that a use of the personal is “. . . the only way at times to draw
attention to the necessary duplicity of all texts and discourses.” While Molloy
realizes “the enormous responsibility of the personal,” she acknowledges that
it can become “too easy, too close to commodiﬁcation in a safe academic setting.” As such, it needs “rethinking.” Molloy acknowledges that personal
“intrusions” can be “jarring or at least cause discomfort and because they
effectively call attention to seams, gaps, differences that a general, impersonal
discourse would ignore.” In view of both the problems and new opportunities
it offers, personal-scholarly writing represents a new direction for academic
work. It is clear that “old” directions remain, with only new moves, new gestures, when added to what has been done, suggesting new directions.
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Perhaps an appropriate place to start understanding these new directions,
new gestures, in a detailed way is to pay attention to our own stories as editors.
We are not conﬁding or confessing anything to you, our colleagues, but we
provide a different level of justiﬁcation for opening this path more energetically. We consider it essential to show that our own lives have led us to this
point of commitment and self-inclusion, yet still with circumspection at each
point in the process. We have lived as if included in all other areas, but as
scholars and teachers, we have written (before now, and very often) as if we
were not a part of the groups to which our thoughts are directed and about
whom we want to know. We had attempted to remove ourselves from our
scholarly writing as if to suggest, by the absence of the personal “I-voice,” that
we were members of that rhetorically conventional and established group. We
aim now to participate in the work of those whose thoughts collected in this
volume by assuming the ﬁrst person and observing what emerges. We want to
test what some of the writers in this volume suggest, either through demonstration or declaration, that including reference to personal experience or even
acknowledging it causes discomfort for them and for others. But we also want
to feel the authority that may come from an elaborated and developed style of
personal candor, and we want to propose understanding that is more helpful
because more clearly anchored in human experience.
DEBORAH H. HOLDSTEIN

For some of us, I think, using the personal in academic scholarship provokes a profound sense of unease. As I reread this ﬁrst sentence, I am struck by
my need to make a personal statement by saying “for some of us” instead of
“for me.” I suppose I could be personal—sort of, by not focusing entirely on
myself but meaning myself. Perhaps I am all too in touch with my inner adolescent, the one who is told by adults, “It’s not about you; it’s not you who’s
important. It’s the community.”
I believe completely Cathy Davidson’s assertion, noted above, that
“Whether we put ourselves in or think we are leaving ourselves out, we are
always in what we write.” Perhaps, then, for me, it’s a matter of degree. While
we might very well “be” in what we write, the varieties of academic rhetoric,
however only allegedly objective, still, to me stand apart from the truly personal, in which narratives involving one’s life are revealed within or instead of
more conventional academic forms. I cannot legitimately rail against androcentric, academic argument; I am not entitled to do so, as I have not yet dominated it. The conventions of academic argument, I fear, might exceed my
grasp. David Bleich, like Richard Ohmann in this volume, has thoroughly mastered (deliberate word choice) the various rhetorics of academe; indeed, he has
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improved them, shaped them, reshaped them. He has earned the right to be personal and given his authority within the profession, he is undiminished by its
use. His credibility as a scholar remains.
Perhaps, too, I’m convinced that if something comes readily to me—as it
has often seemed when I’ve written about family stories—that it cannot
demonstrate the same degree of discipline, of accomplishment, as that which
comes at greater effort. If that is the case, then, I am obligated to attempt those
things that come less easily. Don’t we, shouldn’t we, exhort our students to
strive for that which seems difﬁcult, challenging? The so-called conventional,
scholarly essay represents a form of that personal exhortation for me. Aren’t
the scholarly excavations required towards acceptable scholarship, paradoxically, among the most personal of ventures towards collective acceptance?
As Susan Handelman asserts, “knowledge has a face,” but “the individual,
‘confessional voice’ is not such a major component of classical Jewish discourse, in part because Judaism is not a ‘confessional’ faith. . . . but instead a
covenental membership in a People with a collective history, fate, and destiny.”
While several of our contributors point out that the “community” or collective
nature of academe doesn’t really exist—that we prize the individual, privatized
work of the “solitary scholar”—there are nonetheless sets of scholarly conventions within each discipline that suggest membership. Perhaps I ﬁnd my voice
as an academician tempered by what I perceive to be the various histories and
expanded canons of my ongoing academic experience, a voice that ﬁnds comfort only if the confessional is balanced by near-universally agreed upon conventions of scholarly work. I think of a personal favorite, the Jane Tompkins
essay on Uncle Tom’s Cabin cited above, which, at the time of its publication in
1981 dared to break the rhetorical conventions of academic prose by beginning as follows:
Once during a difﬁcult period in my life, I lived in the basement of a house on
Forest Street in Hartford, Connecticut, which belonged to Isabella Beecher
Hooker—Harriet Beecher Stowe’s half-sister. This woman at one time of her life had
believed that the millennium was at hand and that she was destined to be the leader
of a new matriarchy. When I lived in that basement, however, I knew nothing of
Stowe, or of the Beechers, or of the utopian visions of nineteenth-century American
women. I made a reverential visit to the Mark Twain house a few blocks away. (20)

Tompkins’s essay uses the personal as a touchstone for what is ultimately a
strongly argued, scrupulously researched, scholarly work about the value of
“sentimental ﬁction” by women bringing note to an era more readily associated with Whitman and Twain. I often use the Tompkins essay as a model with
students to discuss the rhetorical conventions of academic writing, praising
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her impeccable, useful contrast between personal narrative and intellectually
strenuous argument. [I contrast her essay with an equally useful piece of conventional academic argument: Edward Hirsch’s award-winning essay in
PMLA, “The Imaginary Irish Peasant,” notable as an example of excellent, traditional academic scholarship as well as for its clarity. (And the latter leads to
an entirely different discussion which I will not take up here.)]
In each of these essays, I admire the hard work, the discipline, the reconﬁguring of the self into an academic self that must take place for such difﬁcult
work to occur. As the daughter of immigrants, I was encouraged to listen to
popular music and to watch television as ways to make certain, my parents
believed, that I would be completely, fully “American.” While there are limits to
the possibilities for any objectivity in language, I still believe, more often than
not, that being “too” personal is a luxury, the privilege of those who have
somehow arrived. (Conversely, and in other hands, when the confessional
appears in the guise of the academic, it might be seen as the mark of the naïve.)
A number of our contributors discuss the various “selves” of scholarship and
teaching; certainly there are ways to be multiple selves that are true to who we
are: for instance, the George Will I would rather not read as a political columnist, is, alas, the same, wonderful George Will who writes about baseball.
Similarly, I do not become any less the working-class, Jewish girl from New
York if I successfully achieve the conventions of academic prose. I do not
assimilate away (even if I want to) by achieving the difﬁcult.
As context for what to me is a hard-won place in the community (or, as you
wish, non-community) of academe, I often tell the story of one of my high
school English teachers, Mrs. Ludwick. On the ﬁrst day of honors English class
during my Junior year in high school, she held up a cartoon from The New
Yorker—a magazine that other people’s parents read instead of Life and
Reader’s Digest—that featured three witches around a cauldron. The actual
caption escapes me now, but I recall her saying, “If you have not read
Shakespeare’s Macbeth, you would not understand to what this cartoonist was
alluding. You would not be a cultured person.” (That she said “Shakespeah,”
cahtooonist,” and “allooding,” did not escape my adolescent notice, providing
an interesting contrast to her well-meaning notions of “cultcha.”) She concluded, as if to set the major goal of the rest of the year, “It is my job to give
your culture.” (“Cultcha”) And in her way, Mrs. Ludwick was right: the culture
with which she hoped to inoculate us was the culture of T. S. Eliot, to me and
to my other white ethnic and African-American counterparts, “the other”—to
us, the unattainable, something to which we could aspire. In a curriculum that
had also featured The Autobiography of Malcolm X, a book I might add, to
which we could “relate,” it was Eliot and company—and we thought of
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Richard Wright as part of the same company—whose oeuvre we had to work
to attain, to dominate, to prove ourselves additionally capable of interpreting
simply because these writers were in every way, shape, and form, the “not us.”
That I work mostly in composition and rhetoric—and often in technology—
enhances my desire to dominate conventional academic prose. Many of us
remember the typical essay in College English during the 1960s that always
seemed to begin like this: “I walked into my Dean’s ofﬁce, put my feet up on his
desk, and told him ‘We need to do something about the ways our freshmen
write’.” To this day our colleagues with credible scholarship in conventional
terms struggle to achieve tenure in a profession that views with skepticism some
research in composition studies, judging the work undisciplined and self-indulgent (despite a growing body of work to the contrary). Too often, despite the
increasing prominence of composition and rhetoric, there are those who wait for
the moments at which compositionists might recede into what is in the view of
some the uncritical, unexamined storytelling—the (gasp) “personal”—that
makes the ﬁeld suspect to begin with.
But just as we tell our students that there are different occasions for writing,
so too are there different occasions for us: the conventions of the scholarly
review in Genre, say, are different from the scholarly review in The New York
Review of Books. These, in turn, differ from scholarly essays in College English,
PMLA, and American Literature, which, in turn, differ among themselves
within certain unarticulated but deﬁned parameters. Perhaps, then, that which
we already know is a compromise mediating my discomfort: that like anything
else, the place for the transparent personal within scholarship is a matter of
degree, its prominence varying among and within academic genres. In all,
however, I remain wary of those colleagues who encourage the wholly, transparently personal from their students to the neglect of conventional
rhetorics—of the sort these colleagues themselves have mastered. In doing so,
and in the guise of “empowering personal voices,” they hypocritically deny students access to the same privilege, deny them the potential to change academic
conventions from within.
D AV I D B L E I C H

I remember learning academic writing. It was in college, and I had to write
my bachelor’s thesis. I read all the criticism on T. S. Eliot’s plays. I had read so
much that, unconsciously, I had assimilated the cadences and styles of the
commentators on Eliot and his work. I did not know this had happened, but
when I sat down to write the last draft, the language came out in the form of
“Eliot criticism.” For me, this was a genre in itself. A year later, I had the chance
to get a job at McGraw-Hill as an entry level editor. The test for this job was to
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write as if I were a reporter and “report” on the advance presentation of a new
kind of railroad system. After studying the imaginary “announcement” by the
company, I wrote a newspaper story about this new system. I had assimilated
the language of the promotion and converted it into journalese: my story
sounded exactly like a newspaper story, and I was offered the job.
It was not until having to write my dissertation and announce a professional identity—how I would say who I am to people who would hire me on a
career basis—that I observed my own absence from the scene of writing. It was
during this time that I had become interested in the subjectivity of reading.
Yet, the subjectivity of writing seemed still to be a forbidden topic. Then, and
now, many consider subjectivity a zone of insubstantiality. Although readers’
responses are treated somewhat more respectfully, there are still few, if any,
accepted languages for announcing the subjectivities that emerge in reading
and for translating them into other genres and styles of language. But in writing, the problem is more acute, as, despite the increasing numbers of people
wanting to write as if they were part of the ﬁeld of observation, it is still a
choice that rarely leads to the same respectful response as does the voice of the
detached scholar.
In college, when I learned the voices of the critics by reading studies of
Eliot, Chaucer, Shakespeare, and others, the professional status of my choice of
dissertation led me to utopian literature, a ﬁeld whose idealism I could at once
criticize and admire. However: I felt and knew that my deeper relation to this
subject matter was out of bounds for a scholarly project. This meant: the subject
that I chose to launch my professional identity had to be presented without
reference to my privately acknowledged sense of its importance to me. At that
moment, in the mid-sixties, I suppressed my wish to face this problem of formal academic writing until perhaps ﬁfteen years later, when I turned actively
toward the profession of writing pedagogy and tried to work within its space
to face the more general issues of how the use of language can help to bring us
more together with each other in academic life.
In case any readers of this volume want to know, my dissertation is available
in the libraries as Utopia: The Psychology of a Cultural Fantasy, published by
the UMI Research Press sixteen years after it was written, thanks to the generosity of Professor Robert Scholes, who picked it out of oblivion and recommended its publication. Its idea is that utopian authors have not advanced past
adolescence, and the lack of literary quality or power found in most utopian
novels derives from the adolescent fantasy of dominion over society being
given to them by benevolent parents, fathers, circumstances. I used this idea to
relate Thomas More to Edward Bellamy and H. G. Wells; I claimed that their
lives were incomplete and in major ways, juvenile. They were boys, good rather
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than evil, whose gang psychology was translated, if fatuously, into being the
gang-leaders of a peaceful and benevolent society.
Perhaps I could not say then about this piece of scholarship and criticism
what I can say now: it was my moment of trying to grow beyond adolescence by
criticizing the adolescence of others. However, during the writing of this dissertation, I was enjoying an adolescence I had previously missed having gone to allmale schools—high school and college. Was it hypocritical to have experienced
this counterpoint: above adolescence in my dissertation, adolescent in real life?
Perhaps it was; perhaps many academic statements, claims, advocacies are subject to the same intrapsychic trope. Yet it is also true that each zone of my mind
had an appropriate public context. The question is: how full a picture of adolescence (for example) is available to the scholar not aware of his or her own implication in the issue? Had I been examining the psychology of these authors with my
own situation more clearly in view, might I not have written about them with
more sympathy, perhaps even with more alertness to the gender issues they raise,
and which I had to raise when preparing the piece for publication? Doesn’t the
author’s awareness of self play a role in how the writing is done, what stances to
take as a public ﬁgure, and particularly, what tone and attitude as a person
among others to take? Might I not have noticed earlier in life the endemic arrogance of the academic posture, an arrogance that is generated by the convention
of detachment, learned in postsecondary writing courses? Might I, like many in
my position, also have learned to notice my male adolescence with more perspicacity and to understand its socially given expectations? Might I have related
these expectations to the postures I felt myself taking as an academic writer?
Might I have become aware sooner of how fully expectations of masculinity have
guided many academics, including many women, to write dishonestly—that
is—without regard to who they believe they are in society?
So for me it is no longer personal to be personal—it is fundamental. Once I
include myself in the “audience” my contribution changes: my words lose their
hortatory status, and take on instead the role of invitation, contribution, membership, and studenthood. I am no longer bound to argue, to make points and
cases, or to think that whoever reads my work must be persuaded. I am, rather,
more conscious of being among others with comparable, though not identical,
interests. Writing and speaking among others is different from doing the same
things as performances. It is not just personal or just performing; it is a wide
variety of stances that become available, once at least some terms of personal
commitment are included, some aspect of one individual history as a living
being and a social constituent, is invited into scholarly discussion.
This is how I feel in the presence of the other contributors to this volume. I
feel ready to take up their formulations seriously and perhaps to overtake them,
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to “steal” them and place them into my own vocabularies. I feel authorized to
traverse the differences that there obviously are between me and them. My individual voice provides a basis for hearing other individual voices as having struggled with similar counterpoints, similar previously private misgivings. Each of
our formulations justiﬁes all the others, and, gradually, the collection of individuals in this book come somewhat closer to one another and seem, when
viewed from a greater distance, to be the beginning of a new community.
Certainly, in my responding to Deborah’s invitation to collaborate with her
on this volume, a ﬂedgling new community was formed. Our relation to one
another began to change from what it was in the past. We worked in this “project” but the interaction brought other issues before us, issues of interpersonal
style as we tried to guide our differences toward complementarity that will
help us and other contributors. We have not worked through or deﬁned in any
formal way what our differences are, and we have not formulated how our
strong common cultural ties as Jews with immigrant parents growing up in
Queens played a role in putting together this volume. At this time, I can’t say at
length how these common values work, but one thing is clear, I think: we have
recognized the inseparability of individual from collective experience as a
value taken from our parents and our culture. We have recognized how our
talk shifts peremptorily from the private and hidden to the personal and
shared, to the individual and the published. We take these common moves
routinely in our discussions of essays and values, and we communicate with
one another because we have noted this sense of common style, attitude, and
public purpose. We engage in this volume because, perhaps, we want to eradicate people’s feeling of exclusion, especially on the basis that their personal history departs from what was previously understood as “normal.” We re-direct
our historic opposition to exclusion in this local context, and we are grateful
for the chance to pursue this purpose in the form of a scholarly enterprise.
I D E A L S A N D C AU T I O N S

Our individual reﬂections, above, have already presented both our ideals
and our cautions. From Deborah we heard how if this new direction in language and literary studies proceeds, little is accomplished if it is merely a new
venue for the already conﬁdent. From David we heard how if the ideals of
scholarship as now received are presented to the next generation, little is
accomplished. In the ﬁrst section, there are two wide-ranging reviews of this
balance of values.
Margaret Willard-Traub’s essay is part of the theoretical consideration of
new approaches to self that don’t censor it as a living idea. She focuses speciﬁcally on how feminist theory in literature and writing has begun to affect the
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“scholarly self,” the voices we hear in reading our colleagues work, in rethinking how we are going to interact, in classrooms and in conferences, without the
traditional tropes of academic egolalia. This essay, both critical and reﬂective,
engages the provocative work of such ﬁgures as Ruth Behar, Nancy Miller, and
Jane Gallop, and she provides guidance about how personal accounts do,
could, and should lead us to issues of collective concern, without, however, letting the special identities of the personal narratives disappear. In particular,
her discussion of loss, like Salvio’s, leads toward the view of how academic genres are changing toward more active self-inclusion, and that these new genres
are the signs of new social relations less prone to posturing, to idle abstraction,
and more oriented around the unity of teaching and scholarship. In this
process, she and Salvio are trying to teach how not to avoid pain and frustration in our attempts to tell, teach, study, and share the truth.
Jeffrey Gray, in reviewing a range of work in postmodern and postcolonial
literary theory, considers an issue posed and implied by many contributors and
those doing related work: how is it that personal styles, tropes, awarenesses and
identities continue in our discussions in spite of the critique of the unitary self
in postmodern thought? In spite of the proliferation of anti- essentialism, antifoundationalism, fragmentations-of-self ideas that people entertain, postmodern theory seems still to retain a dimension of liberal humanism. The language
of self and individual consciousness, he suggests, is not going out of style.
Rather, in its place in language retains, with other ideas, a pragmatic reality in
our lives. Other essays in this volume have shown the dimensions of this reality.
Juxtaposed to one another, these essays portray the issue of scholarly selfinclusion in its resistance to being dogmatized. As humanistic scholars gradually acquire the courage to disclose their stakes in their new understandings of
the subject matter, they also recognize how much more latitude the subject
gives to write from a variety of sites in the profession and in society. In the next
section two unusual sites are considered.
S E L F- I N C LU S I O N I N L I T E R A RY S C H O L A R S H I P

Brenda Daly’s essay is, in part, an answer to the cautions of Deborah
Holdstein and Jeffrey Gray. Daly’s site is deﬁnitely one of the more dangerous
ones in the academy and in society. We are ﬁrst beginning to face the common
occurrence of the incestuous derogation of women’s and children’s lives.
Brenda Daly’s lifetime scholarly achievement has helped to open this path for
this part of social experience and she has showed how it may enter the curriculum while we stay alert to its risks. While “radical introspection” may have
been a part of classical Greek society, it has, today, a new meaning, one that
could be taken up by all people, not only the privileged.
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Before feminism became a factor in academic life, the genre of autobiography existed and was treated with respect—provided it knew its place. As
Deborah Holdstein has observed, only some have been permitted the luxury of
“writing my autobiography”: these were the writers, critics, and travelers who
already reached a relatively advanced age, had many public accomplishments,
and now in a leisurely sense, they could “look back,” make assessments, tell
their stories. Brenda Daly’s essay tells us how this can no longer be the case.
Daly’s writing says that a person’s life can never again be a mere curiosity—the
things that happen to us, our struggles, our accession to the privileges of academic life, our pre-academic family life, these too are fundamental. She suggests
how these events teach us how to read, how to choose what we read and what
we announce in our curricula. Daly’s story is one of family concealment that
leads to personal concealment. The processes of suppression and repression of
the dangerous truths about some families’ lives have been especially damaging
to the ability of women to have lives of candor in public and in private. It is as
if, in childhood, and unbeknownst to many women, the gift of self-esteem has
been taken away, and as they grow into adulthood, are left to comprehend how
this happened. Daly’s story is, luckily, one of recovery from this near-permanent removal of self-esteem. She suggests how scholarly reading and criticism
meant recovery for her and a path toward contact with student who may also
have had to conceal the fundamental experiences of their lives. Daly shows that
the one window of hope for her and others like her was the chance to publish
in self-disclosing genres, to bring to light, to announce to others that, yes, “It
really did happen,” much as Patricia Williams’s sister urges her (in The Alchemy
of Race and Rights) to say “it happened” just because there will be a mendacious chorus saying “it didn’t happen.”
Paula Salvio achieves a similarly compelling synthesis of perspectives and
genres. Dealing with a situation of the loss of a beloved parent whose loss is also
resented because it was unnecessary and paradoxical, Salvio folds her story into
that of Anne Sexton. Salvio’s story follows her sense of loss and resentment into
her scholarship and her teaching, and in the process, urges us to anticipate our
unconscious responses to the literature we teach. Many of us literature teachers
teach what we love. But the terms of our love of particular works are usually
seen as not requiring any formal examination or social reference. Salvio, however, shows that whatever our attachments to literature and to writers, the fact
that there are such attachments means that their roots in our life histories are
signiﬁcant, and that looking for them, ﬁnding them, and disclosing them as part
of both the pedagogical and scholarly processes enriches these efforts for students and teachers. Sure, there is pain and discomfort for both Daly and Salvio.
Yet one “fundamental” feature of our professional commitment is examining
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the unexamined for what it will teach us and future generations. Daly’s and
Salvio’s essays show emphatically the seriousness and necessity of personal
courage to disclose issues that younger, less able, less experienced, less comprehending people don’t yet know to pursue. Their work shows teaching and scholarship at its deepest and how personal inquiry is a necessary part of them both.
T E A C H I N G A N D S C H O L A R S H I P FA C E T O F A C E

Daly and Salvio show that including themselves in literary teaching and
scholarship involves “facing” the forgotten, repressed, and suppressed in their
individual histories of experience: they look memories and moods in the face
by recording, narrating the movement between self and text, self and author,
self and co-reader. Susan Handelman shows how, through Jewish history, the
relation of teacher to student has always had a similar “face-to-face” status, that
student and teacher face each other in the same sense that each of us “face”
experience and history. This is not the case for the history of our own society,
but, most of us would agree, that, as Richard Ohmann and most other contributors acknowledge, the individual facing oneself cannot be taken out of any
teaching. In fact, we might as well admit, we have given the one-to-one tutorial
the status as an ideal teaching unit, and this ideal materializes in the dissertation phase of doctoral study. Handelman shows how serious an ideal this is: it
is not just a tutorial—it is “eye contact,” the necessary face-to-face that must be
part of the process of teaching and learning. Handelman documents this
necessity in the long tradition of Jewish scholarly commentary. At the base of
historic Jewish inquiries into what laws shall hold society together is the experience of face-to-face learning.
One cannot help but notice the connection between Handelman’s ideal and
the very differently put discussion of Madeleine Grumet, who, earlier in her
career, stressed the connection between the bonds of parent and child and the
bonds of teacher and student. In both Handelman’s and Grumet’s ideals, personal experience is already collective, already made up of two people facing
each other, learning from that juxtaposition. Some language philosophers such
as Lev Vygotsky and George Herbert Mead have described how language
begins through one’s experience with two or more people; social processes
then create individual language capability as a phase of the socialization
process. This is the similar weight of Handelman’s contribution: there is a certain primoridiality of the face-to-face, the foundation of the wider collective,
the source of our sense of the individual.
A great deal of academic editing in the humanities renders this face-to-face
category a problem. In the rapidly growing practice of anonymous review, the
editor “faces” the author and the reviewer, but the latter two don’t face each
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other. Louise Z. Smith considers how these editing practices affect the process
of moving the individual voice to face the public. Different relationships
between author and reader are implied by the different modes of personal
address—the personal and impersonal “you” that may be discerned in many
essays written in personal modes. Smith is particularly concerned that when
the more familiar “du” mode is used criticism crosses over into exposé—a sudden devaluation of the very act meant to make abstractions feel more consistent with experience. While agreeing that personal address is inescapable, and
that there are instances of personal criticism that are not self-indulgent, for an
editor to face authors as persons is a challenge. Smith relates the needs of the
editor of a large, high-circulation journal (College English) to the needs of the
profession to begin to include reference to personal experience. In the context
of editing, she observes, practices like double-blind review, while helpful to
those getting started, still do not remove the editor from interacting with contributors in the traditional person-to-person mode. Her experience could be
an instance of Jeffrey Gray’s—and Cathy Davidson’s (cited by Holdstein,
above)—similar observation that the person—the single face, the single voice,
the active subject—is going to be there in some form, regardless of political
change or intellectual fashion. Smith’s account alerts us to how, if we take into
account the continuity of day-to-day experiences, we necessarily write our
scholarship through the combination of personal and collective values, modes
of interaction, ways of speaking, styles of writing.
T E A C H I N G A N D S C H O L A R S H I P, P U B L I C A N D P R I VAT E

The scholarly tutorial (such as obtained in dissertations and “independent
study” arrangements for students) and the double-blind review are extremes
of pedagogical and scholarly interpersonal relations which occur in lesser
degrees and in mixed forms in other social relations in the academy. These
relations include the identiﬁed ones of journal reviews, academic conferences,
department meetings that review curricula.
Madeleine Grumet’s commentary on how the interest in autobiography has
evolved and on how the genre has varied suggests its broad range of application
in the teaching and scholarship. Coming from a basic sympathy with the practices of family, children, and rational subjectivity, Grumet reﬂects on her own
growth, especially on her responses to postmodern critiques of individual life
that challenge these sympathies. Remembering herself as “Miss Subjectivity of
1978,” she now asks that autobiography not stop with the personal narrative but
guide us also to generalizations about selves in society. She reminds us that if we
think of ourselves as teachers, the process of sharing the private in public is
never purely either public or private. It is only that our ways of thinking about
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one another change as we change our genres of writing, as we include reference
to our own growth, our “aging,” our consciousness of the passing of loved ones.
She urges that we remember that our self-awareness, as teachers and as citizens,
is ﬁnally oriented around contributions to society, to collective life.
Karen Paley follows this line of thought in her discussion of the need to
remember the collective value of “expressive” writing. She notes how we have
come into a mood in which “expressive” is equated with self-indulgence and
narcissistic “emoting.” In fact, she, like Grumet, has viewed expressive and personal writing as an element in a social project that aimed for full equality in
society for all groups, all memberships. As individualism has become redirected
into narrow, power-oriented values through the inﬂuence of corporate culture,
those writing teachers who have insisted that people continue to tell their stories have felt the pressure of condescension. Writing teachers, always the lowest
on the academic totem, are now feeling the effects of this new pretext for diminishing their work. Paley takes up the task of revoking this new criticism with
evidence from classrooms and counter-arguments to critics. She shows what
many have assumed: the announcement of experience has both a social and a
personal weight, and their combination, not their separation, is the responsibility of those of us teaching writing and other subjects presented in writing.
Diane Freedman’s essay, also answering Grumet’s challenge to use all the
forms of autobiography, surveys the pedagogical contexts in which writing
“that matters” can be taught, where the writing refers equally to the literature
and to the comments and analyses given by students. She shows how accounts
of teaching experiences are becoming more self-consciously integrated with
scholarly genres. Freedman has a broad range of reference to scholarly work
that has increasingly used self-inclusion—anthropology, sociology, education,
as well as literary criticism—but then returns to show and document the salutary effects on students’ motivation when they are able to read, write, and discuss with full reference to experiences, including painful ones, of their lives.
Like Brenda Daly, Freedman is interested in the transition of writers’ senses of
audience from individual to class to public. Freedman’s essay shows genres in
the process of change and her citations of students’ work also help to show
why they change. Today, she observes, that on the part of writers, teachers, and
students, there is a willingness to loosen received generic boundaries, because
people in all parts of society, many from communities entering postsecondary
education for the ﬁrst time, have narratives that help to end the rule of “master” narratives. She shows how school work is life work—a calling for some,
work about people’s lives for others, the movement through stages for still others. Each of these works entails a new view of language and literature, a new
sense of how to overtake it and fold it into our minds.
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Rarely in the professional literature do we ﬁnd accounts of pedagogical
experiences in graduate school. Rachel Brownstein overtakes the students’
voices in her title, “Personal Experience Paper” and then considers the fact that
pedagogical experiences are necessarily personal, another version, perhaps, of
Handelman’s subject. Writing in an informal and decidedly non-ethnographic
style, Brownstein implies a degree of her discomfort, but also dramatizes her
kinship with the students. She is responding to the traditional academic hesitations about taking personal responses to literature seriously by asking if she
is wasting students’ time seeking, listening to, and then integrating their
responses and other allusions to their personal lives into her more traditional
judgments of literature’s meaning and value. She cites undergraduate as well as
graduate responses. Yet the different kinds of students entering her classes are
non-traditional, so that her account of their experiences of one another brings
a fresh accent to the genre of classroom accounts. Her discussion puts the
question of personal response to literature in a somewhat different light: if we
are aiming to encourage a wide reading latitude by postsecondary and graduate students, how do we use the experience and expertise of the scholar who
has devoted decades to the study of the same works? When listening to this
account with the “third ear,” one hears perhaps the thought of how protective
traditional scholarship had been of the subjective and the private.
A decisive shift from Brownstein’s voice is that of Joycelyn K. Moody, who
moves forcefully into risky territories about which many teachers have
expressed hesitations. In recounting a teaching situation in which she lived in
close proximity to her students, she observes in revealing detail the feelings,
moods, interpersonal psychology of trying to challenge students while relating
to them in fully personal ways, including dancing with them. This engrossing
account raises an issue that has been sensitive for centuries—from Abelard and
Heloise through Jane Gallop (whose experience is mentioned by Ohmann and
Holdstein)—the temptation toward erotic feelings between teachers and students. Moody’s essay does not, of course, provide answers and solutions in the
usual sense. Rather, she provides a personal narrative that permits us to conceptualize, and in part to judge for ourselves, the effects of what we usually
think of as dangers. We may feel the teaching situation in which she worked,
and perhaps because it takes place abroad, we may perceive a distance that
encourages us to compare it to our own teaching.
T H E S O C I A L C H A R A C T E R O F P E R S O N A L N A R R AT I V E

One of the reasons for the exclusion of the ﬁrst person in scholarly writing
is the ideal that because scholarship is for everyone, narcissism is unwelcome.
Yet, in scholarly writing, narcissism has taken indirect forms (such as the
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excessive citation of one’s own work), and in professional life it is already rampant among academics. For too many, the measure of success is the length of
one’s vita; for many graduate students and not-yet-tenured scholars, there are
many efforts undertaken “because it will look good on my vita.” The process by
which faculty members are judged and evaluated already says that you either
succeed as an individual, or you risk failure. The censorship of the ﬁrst person
in scholarly writing is accompanied by a standard that discourages the identiﬁcation of second and third persons as scholarly collaborators, thus encouraging narcissism indirectly.
In “Collaboration and Concepts of Authorship”3 Lisa Ede and Andrea
Lunsford, two scholars who have collaborated with one another for a long
time, observe that in spite of attempts to ﬁnd alternatives to the “adversarial
academy” in recent decades, “the deep structure of the academy remains relatively untouched.” (358) This statement refers, in part, to how the primacy of
individual authorship as an ideal has continued to discourage the recognition
of the value of collaborative work as a practice deserving of professional credit
at least as much as individual authorship. The axiom of individual authorship,
as backed by centuries of copyright law, is justiﬁed by the presumed “objectivity” of the individual author. The inclusion of subjective stances in the work of
individual authors would, under this axiom, discredit the authority of the
author. However, as Ede and Lunsford (as well as many other scholars collaborating with one another on an equitable basis) have repeatedly demonstrated,
collaborative efforts provide more space for personal writing to enter the text:
the two voices’ subjectivities, as well as their intersubjectivities, help to remove
the sense of narcissism that could accrue to the self-references and self-disclosures of single authors.
At the same time many styles of offering personal narratives about scholarly
lives perform the same scholarly function of enhancing public understanding
that other, less personally articulated writings have performed in the past. As
Virginia Woolf writes in A Room of One’s Own, the turn to biography and
autobiography as a source of new information provided her the means to overcome ideological biases found in traditional (male oriented) scholarship.
The account of collaboration given by Kate Ronald and Hephzibah Roskelly
points us in the directions outlined by Ede and Lunsford. Their account suggests how individuals’ sense of membership in the academy and in society is
cultivated through collaboration. In our (Holdstein’s and Bleich’s) collaboration, we chat a great deal about everything but our work. Sometimes, our concern for one another as total ﬁgures upstaged our responsibility to proceed with
this volume in a timely manner. Nevertheless, here it is, done perhaps not as
soon as we would have liked, but with the sense that it is our common project,
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with our extra attachment to it. This last observation is one of our gestures of
connection with Kate Ronald and Hephzibah Roskelly, who have collaborated
with each other as friends and colleagues for two decades. They met in graduate
school, found a common language, obviously both personal and professional
mixed in with one another, and then found that this language led to projects
that need their collaborative attentions. Just how personal a story is this? Well,
of course it is personal, but it is like the relations of many faculty members who,
unlike Ronald and Roskelly or Ede and Lunsford, have not recognized the value
and advantage of discussing their collaborations as part of their scholarly practice. Hundreds of us faculty members collaborate with one another in different
ways. Sometimes it is just a matter of “many hands making light work.” Other
times it is common for a project to demand the perspective of two or more people. We may not be used to hearing the story, account, or explanation of the collaboration attached to the given work, but those genres insert our human
experiences into our writings. Such genres seem to emerge only on dramatic
occasions, such as the account of how the double helix may have been discovered. Ronald and Roskelly’s essay shows how that acknowledging our dependency on our friends and colleagues emphasizes the social basis of personhood,
while helping to move us away from the adversarial academy.
Victor Villanueva’s essay, a combination of genres reminiscent of his own,
Diane Freedman’s, and Patricia Williams’s books teaches us how mixed and
multiple genres urge us to notice the mixed and multiple constituencies in our
society. He reminds us of the contemporary meaning of “pathos.” Our culture,
he notes, is very familiar with logos and ethos, but as most contributors to this
volume acknowledge, pathos is a problem for academic writers. Pathos, like
the ﬁrst person, has been relegated to autobiography. When it appears in scholarly writing, it is perceived as sentiment. With a dramatic combination of genres, including so-called “ﬁctional” ones, Villanueva, like Freedman and
Williams, is teaching how to create genres that include, but do not focus exclusively on, our emotional stakes in our histories and in our language uses. His
purposeful inclusion of colloquialisms, poetry, partial memory narratives
make his own present tense live in new ways. How many of us professors are
willing to describe our own habits of mind in this way that demonstrates how
fully a part of others we already are, even as individual authors?
Katya Gibel Azoulay, an anthropologist who has already written self and
society into the academic record, tells another personal story that documents
the Western refusal to acknowledge in public the ubiquity of ancestral mixtures. Of the many issues treated in her essay, perhaps the matter of scientiﬁc
racism is the obstacle most decisively opposed by her forceful account of “what
actually happened.” She observes that racism backed by science—“is stronger
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than the disclaimers that race is a social construction.” Science and local
mythologies have combined to perpetuate false habits of perception; her experience, recorded in her recent book, counters the centuries-old axiom of
assuming the primordiality of “the self in isolation.” Her voice and her story
revoke the ideal of the primacy of the isolated individual by telling her own
experience as a family history. Because of this emphasis, “I accentuate the complicated histories of people, the emergence of diasporic communities, and the
signiﬁcance of interrogating political signiﬁers.” This in turn leads to the effort
to create “courses, syllabi selections, and research projects . . . shaped and
crafted from the advantage of multiple perspectives.”
Like Azoulay’s accent on family, the essays by Morris Young and by Chris
Castiglia take us back to the childhood experiences that contributed to their
scholarly identities. Young’s re-creation of the experiences in the ofﬁce of the
“speech therapist” dramatizes how collectively held attitudes and practices
tried to guide the individual child into inappropriate categories. He goes
through a series of incidents, showing how the uncertain responses of
strangers gradually foster in him the sense of uncertainty: his appearance
always gave a ﬁrst impression of being “foreign,” even though he was born in
the United States—Hawaii.
Those of us who have not experienced this unsettling but conventional
response may not understand its effects. One presents as native-born in every
way. But appearance is used to turn the otherwise certain identity into an
anomaly. Young demonstrates the cumulative effect of experiencing these
responses over childhood and youth. By the time he arrives at the front of the
room as a university faculty member, he anticipates them. He realizes the inertia of his position, how slowly it would change. Yet he also realizes that the
moment of this writing is also a moment of change. “The use of story (and not
simply to resist or invert dominant culture) creates the possibility of expressing a fuller experience.” In this way, Young gives us the sense that “assimilation”
is for everyone. The narratives of childhood recovery help us readers to create a
more inclusive society, rather than just to resist a hegemony or to enhance an
individual. Young’s pedagogy and scholarship grow from this narrative.
Christopher Castiglia’s is the story of an individual deriving collective values from home to overcome the isolation in academic life. Like Young, he is on
a borderline: his appearance, however, works to conceal salient features of
individuality rather than revoke salient features of membership. Again, a productive response to having been placed in this situation is to tell the story.
Castiglia is the suburban youth who is really gay. His essay counteracts “the
academic desire to segregate the personal.” Placing this issue in the arena of
sexual identity emphasizes its national, even global, dimensions. Segregating
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the personal in our own society quietly performs the collective bigotry of
keeping people “in the closet.” When Castiglia tells the story, his participation
in national culture emerges, his kinship with familiar symbols and practices
are rendered as lived experiences. The examination of his own life suggests that
the success of his citizenship in family and society “has in many ways made me
a poor academic—too hungry for community, too quick with tactless speech.”
But by telling the story, Castiglia moves the academy closer to society. The
reader immersed in his appealing, articulate renditions of youth in Northern
New Jersey, feels the connections Castiglia has had to feel only through pain.
Yet he too is teaching us through the voice heard in this volume.
Richard Ohmann’s narrative takes us to a time when “student centered”
teaching was not widely known and argued about. His trepidations as a young
teacher, while common enough among today’s young teachers, make us smile
as we know him as one of the leaders of our profession, one of those whose
lifetime achievement has helped render the academy a place where more and
more of us can ﬁnd fulﬁllment. Ohmann’s descriptions of his youthful experience makes us conscious of our own historicity as well as our social privileges.
Interestingly enough, the personal voice we ﬁnd in this essay has been there,
it now seems, all along! How similar it is to the voice of English in America, as
well as to those of Ohmann’s many other contributions. Yet his essay also
shows that although we may admire a personal voice, it is not the same as to
use that voice, or any other, to write oneself into the subject matter, and this is
what his essay achieves on this occasion. His experiences at Harvard, at
Wesleyan as Vice Provost, as editor of College English: these now are part of
“English in America” the subject matter, the profession, the pedagogy, the academic community.
As a citizen of his university community, indeed, as one of its pedagogical,
intellectual, professional, and administrative leaders, he may have to take positions that do not represent his political convictions. What is he to do? He
places this issue in the context of his story, his long search for what is right for
both himself and society. Is this a “personal” story. Some will say, “easily,” but it
is not so clear, unless we have already cordoned off the “personal” into some
narrative form that has many “I’s” in it. Here the writer’s question remains
unanswered; his memberships, while clear, dictate no clear rules for how to
meet the contingencies of social circumstances. Yet, including the individual
perspective dramatizes just how incomplete this perspective is if taken alone to
be fundamental.
It is interesting to us as editors how stubborn this combination of personal,
impersonal, and collective uses of language is. We believe that these essays
show conclusively that one cannot separate “the personal” anything (well,
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maybe the toothbrush), from what belongs to or is associated with the “our,”
the some of us, and the all of us. In a sense this collection is a voice opposing
strong boundaries while recognizing a wide variety of limited uses of boundaries. This collection has found and also advocates for the reduction of censorship, for the construction of different ways of communication, and for the
informed interest in what others feel it essential to report.
We are aiming for new values for ourselves and our profession. We want to
remove the implied coerciveness of the term “profession,” a word that says in
one way or another, “you can’t say this, you can’t say that.” At the same time we
seek in the combination of the personal and the professional ways to reduce
idle combativeness that dates back to the age of classical Greek rhetoric and to
12th century university pedagogy through which students’ Latin debates were
tests of their readiness to become licensed teachers. Of course we hear voices
preparing to say that opposing adversariality is adversarial. But we have an
answer, which, we claim, is forceful but not adversarial: “A foolish consistency
is the hobgoblin of little minds.” We ourselves think that this is neither inconsistency, nor paradox, nor hypocrisy. We can dispute and oppose; we can combine, create, and transcend mistaken views; we can include ourselves among as
many others as appropriate. And we can honor revisions of our selves, our
memberships, and our societies, without declaring their demise.

NOTES

1.

2.

3.

This same issue, as it applies in physical and social sciences as well as in the
humanities, is taken up in the volume forthcoming from Duke University
Press edited by Olivia Frey and Diane Freedman, Personal Thoughts. A still
compelling volume making a similar point about science is Discovering
Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and
Philosophy of Science, eds. Sandra Harding and Merill B. Hintikka. Boston:
Reidel, 1983.
Its problematic status can be traced back much further to the separation of
the written from the oral uses of language that is, actually, thousands of
years old, though not altogether universal in Western culture.
PMLA, March 2001, 354-369.
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Ideals and Cautions
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S C H O L A R LY M E M O I R
An Un-“Professional” Practice
Margaret Willard-Traub

The ﬁgure of the solitary thinker comprises a most powerful and enduring
representation of scholarly life. This is the ﬁgure of the autonomous scholarteacher, whose intellectual sovereignty and productivity, both in and out of the
classroom, seemingly rests as much if not more upon untold hours of secluded
reading and writing as it does upon building relationships with others—even
those others who eventually may comprise important audiences for the
scholar’s writing and teaching.
Those of us whose experiences inside the institution readily challenge the
usefulness of unqualiﬁed autonomy as an ideal, simultaneously recognize its
appeal. Despite (or, ironically, perhaps sometimes because of) inﬂuences such
as the political and bureaucratic constraints on scholarship and teaching that
scholars like Michael Bérubé, Cary Nelson, and Richard E. Miller have
explored; feminist theories and practices examining the role of the ‘personal’
in professional work; widely accepted educational approaches stressing collaboration and dialogue in learning and teaching; and seemingly daily calls in the
media for scholar-teachers to communicate rationales for their work with the
public more often and in ways deemed more “accountable,” the ideal of the
autonomous scholar-teacher, much of whose most important labor occurs
outside of collaborative (or competitive) relationships, continues to circulate
as a symbol of professional success.
This ideal of autonomy endures perhaps because the vision of relative (if not
absolute) autonomy provides academics with what Richard E. Miller would call
a “felt sense of distinction” (26); perhaps it endures as well because it comprises,
at least for some, part of a legacy and a link to a common, professional past. In
any case, at the very least such an ideal operates within the institution like other
“subterranean text(s)” (e.g., the text which Linda Brodkey argues leads composition to “abet middle-class illusions of meritocracy” [234]) that “insinuate
rather than argue (their) claims” (215). That such an ideal ﬁgures strongly in
others’ and our own perceptions of the profession is evidenced, for example, by
the frequency with which “autonomy” is cited by tenured faculty members as
one reason for high satisfaction in their jobs (Schneider par. 8).
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This text of scholarly autonomy also is powerfully sustained by traditional
forms of academic writing that privilege a stance of ‘objectivity,’ and the development of argument that ostensibly stands outside the shaping inﬂuences of
social or rhetorical conditions (Gee 63). Such writing follows what both David
Olson and James Gee have called an “autonomous model of literacy”—a set of
conventions traditionally privileging a writer’s explication of logical connections between ideas, while neglecting (or at least de-emphasizing) an examination of the relationship between a writer’s subject position and those ideas, or
his or her relationships to various audiences.
In recent years, however, a proliferation of scholarly memoirs and other
examples of autobiographically inﬂected scholarship across diverse disciplines
in the humanities and social sciences suggests a shifting away in the U.S. academy from scholars’ privileging exclusively, in their practices and assessments of
writing, this “autonomous” model. Such a trend perhaps also suggests a shifting away from the view that scholars are of necessity professional ‘loners,’
engaged in work that is optimally solitary. In contrast to traditional forms of
academic writing, examples of what I will call more “reﬂective,” academic
practice like scholarly memoirs, ethnographies that are ‘situated’ with regard to
the subject position of the writer/researcher, and teaching portfolios, at least in
part deﬁne themselves against traditional expectations for ‘objectivity’ that
require, for instance, a scholar to adopt a personal detachment from his or her
object of study or to maintain a certain distance from potential audiences.
Speciﬁcally, I would suggest that such reﬂective, academic texts emphasize
the ways in which relationships between writers and their diverse audiences
(both those who are scholars and those who are not) are established. Not surprisingly, these texts align themselves with postmodern epistemologies that
afﬁrm the multiplicity and contingency of the writing ‘self ’—acknowledging
the ‘everydayness’ of people’s lives (as that is deﬁned by realities of emotion
and psychology as well as by material exigencies), and the personal realities of
writers and readers in relationship. In this essay I would suggest not that the
practice of writing “reﬂectively” threatens to supplant (or should supplant)
more traditional approaches to scholarly writing, however. Rather, I would
offer that its most thoughtful examples illustrate how such practice is situated
more broadly within an array of causes and effects involved in the current “crisis of representation” endemic to the academy and western culture; and that
such practice has the potential for being responsive to history and to the diversity of experience within the current moment in ways more difﬁcult for traditional forms. (George Marcus and Michael Fisher, focusing on the origins and
implications of cultural “transition(s),” also argue that broad, historical forces
have helped to contribute to a shift in the purposes of academic writing in
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anthropology speciﬁcally, prompting this writing to move away from “explaining changes within broad encompassing frameworks of theory,” and toward
“exploring innovative ways of describing at a microscopic level the process of
change itself ” (Marcus 15). As in the case of many of the scholarly memoirs I
examine in this essay, this “microscopic” level is often at the level of individual
lives and the speciﬁc communities and contexts which shape and are shaped by
those lives.)
In her collection of autobiographical essays entitled Crossing Ocean
Parkway: Readings by an Italian American Daughter, Duke scholar Marianna
De Marco Torgovnick, for example, theorizes the ‘everyday’ sources for her
authority and knowledge as a scholar, examining what her family history and
her childhood growing up in the Bensonhurst section of Brooklyn has meant
for her intellectual work. For Torgovnick, Bensonhurst is not only the home of
her childhood. It is a place she recognizes as both “choking and nutritive” (11),
a place that is also the New York of newspaper headlines, where in the summer
of 1989 Yusuf Hawkins is set upon and killed by a group of angry whites. Like
Howard Beach before it and Crown Heights after it, this public Bensonhurst
will come to signify for much of the rest of the country the intersection of
urban violence and racial hatred—a place with a distinct yet terrible ‘voice,’
othered by its own ability to other a young African American man and the two
friends walking with him through the neighborhood that night. Torgovnick
herself describes the ways in which her own gender is the basis of an othering
within Bensonhurst’s Italian American community, and how her hometown
becomes for her an object of scholarly—as well as personal—inquiry:
What has Bensonhurst to do with what I teach today and write? Why did I need to
write about this killing in Bensonhurst, but not in the manner of a news account or
a statistical sociological analysis? Within days of hearing the news, I began to plan
this essay, to tell the world what I knew, though I stopped midway, worried that my
parents or their neighbors would hear about it. . . . Now, much to my surprise,
Bensonhurst—the antipodes of the intellectual life I sought, the least interesting of
places—had become a respectable intellectual topic. People would be willing to
hear about Bensonhurst—and all by the dubious virtue of a racial killing in the
streets. (9-10)

Even though Torgovnick’s Bensonhurst presents itself as a “respectable intellectual topic” because of Hawkins’s killing, she resists writing about it as such—
at least not in the manner in which she has been trained professionally. Instead,
she gives us a hybrid text: she brieﬂy provides us with, in the words of my colleague Anne Reeves, a “phantom” treatment of the event as she might have written it, and then goes on to give her audience what she apparently thinks they
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need to hear, or perhaps at least what she feels she needs to say: “Now, as I write
about ‘the neighborhood,’ I recognize that although I’ve come far in physical
and material distance, the emotional distance is harder to gauge. Bensonhurst
has everything to do with who I am and even with what I write” (11).
In this way, Torgovnick’s text accomplishes some of what Michael Bérubé
identiﬁes as cultural studies’ work of “talking back”—talking back to dominant paradigms, “raid(ing) and unsettl(ing) the compartmentalized disciplines
of traditional academic study” (138), by replacing a more traditionally framed
academic treatment of the events in Bensonhurst with an explanation of the
“emotional distance” she has traveled, and the connections between that distance and her intellectual work. This hybrid text not only talks back to
assumptions about what constitutes appropriate academic writing, however; it
also talks back to assumptions about who constitutes an appropriate—or perhaps inevitable—audience for that writing. For while Torgovnick expresses the
fear that her parents and neighbors will react badly to her essay, her anxiety
suggests she is inscribing in that essay multiple audiences—composed not only
of her academic peers, but of her family and community, as well.
Torgovnick’s text, as one example of what I would identify as the most
engaging and productive autobiographical writing being produced by scholars
today, is also characterized by an inscription and explicit analysis of multiple
‘voices’ within the text. Such a multiply-voiced text often comprises what
Torgovnick herself has called “crossover writing” (PMLA, 282), for its ability to
establish relationships with diverse, disciplinary audiences within the institution. “Crossover writing” may be a useful term, as well, for thinking through
the ability of reﬂective texts like memoirs also to reach extra-academic audiences. Providing scholars with a means for communicating with audiences
beyond the academy’s walls, as well as with a means for communicating with
audiences inhabiting other academic disciplines and various positions of
power within the institution, makes it possible for them to enact an ethics of
accountability, for example, to diverse individuals and constituencies both
within and outside institutions of higher education.
In the case of scholarly memoir and other ‘reﬂective’ academic texts—that
is, texts which explicitly examine the subject position of the writer and implications of that writerly position—such communication is achieved through
the kind of “heteroglossia” (324) that M.M. Bakhtin describes. Scholarly memoirs thus might be said to comprise an alternative intellectual practice, while
also varying (as does all discourse) in the ways in which and degree to which
they nurture the “roiling mass of languages” (Holquist 69) and voices of which
they are comprised. As a group, these memoirs might be said to privilege the
establishing of relationships not only between different voices within the text,
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but also between the text and diverse audiences without, a practice that enacts
both an accountability to and a “responsive understanding” (Bakhtin 280) of
the social world.
S I T UAT I N G ‘ P E R S O N A L’ VO I C E S W I T H I N T H E I N S T I T U T I O N

Such an intellectual practice is embodied in much of the work of feminist
scholars across the disciplines. Gesa Kirsch introduces her study of the writing
experiences of women scholars in Women Writing the Academy: Audience,
Authority and Transformation in part by exploring the relation between gender
and speaking with an “academic” voice:
Women who write academic discourse have a different point of departure than
men: they ﬁrst have to establish a place of authority before they can begin to speak
and write with conﬁdence. In establishing such a place, women have to challenge old
norms and establish new ones; they have to create a space for themselves in an institution that has not always provided space for them. . . . Furthermore, feminist scholars have pointed out that women’s authority is easily undermined because they have
to speak—and write—the “language of patriarchy,” a language that places men in
superior and women in subordinate positions in its vocabularies and representations of everyday phenomena and social relationships. (20–21)

Scholars such as bell hooks, Patricia Williams, Marianna De Marco
Torgovnick, Nancy K. Miller and Ruth Behar, among others, also have demonstrated in their scholarly work, much of which draws on examples from personal
experience, how academic and professional languages function to place women,
people of color, and the poor in subordinate positions both outside and within
the academy, albeit in different ways and with different consequences.
Though still too frequently excluded, the voices of these ‘others’ represented
in such scholarly work nevertheless have contributed signiﬁcantly to a “heightening of debates and stakes involved in writing that is perceived as theoretical”
(Lutz 261)—that is, the very writing that is given the highest currency in the
institution. At the same time, Catherine Lutz writes that “one effect of the
struggle (of women, and men and women of color in the academy) for institutional space and respect may have been an inﬂation of theory’s value even as
questions are raised about the dualisms and individualism on which its existence is based” (261). Such an inﬂation suggests that the heteroglossia of voices
emanating from those whose discourses are different from the traditional,
“masculinized” (Lutz 249), theoretical discourse of the academy may be as
hard as ever for us as scholars to hear.
The kind of “responsive understanding” of the social world which such hearing encourages, however—an understanding that acknowledges the legitimacy
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and ‘logic’ of multiple voices striving for equity and deﬁning excellence in multiple ways—is what drives much research in both feminist composition and
feminist literary studies. Both ﬁelds take as one of their points of departure the
(im)possibility of a mix of voices—especially the voices of women, people of
color, and working-class people—being both heard and valued within the institution. In her essay “Me and My Shadow,” Jane Tompkins articulates this
(im)possibility as she identiﬁes herself as, in fact, double-voiced. Tompkins suggests that, by possessing (at least) two ‘voices,’ the voice of a “critic”-self, and
that of a “person who wants to write about her feelings,” women academics
have a more difﬁcult time achieving speech at all, at least within a professional
context.
While Tompkins argues that such diverse voices sound within contexts
which are necessarily exclusive of each other because of the hierarchies which
inhere in academic discourse and theory, Nancy K. Miller challenges
Tompkins’s dichotomy by responding, “Do you have to turn your back on theory in order to speak with a non-academic voice?” (5) The very language of
even Miller’s question, however, suggests the power of dichotomies as she posits
two voices, one which is academic and “theoretical,” and the other which is not.
Feminist scholars in composition, like Terry Myers Zawacki and Elizabeth
Flynn, take yet a different tack on the question of what ‘voice’ is appropriate to
academic writing, as they struggle to ﬁnd ways to present to students “alternatives to traditional academic discourse,” and to help students write “personalacademic” (Zawacki 33) essays—essays that might feature “authentic” voices
able to integrate “intuition with authoritative knowledge” (Flynn 429). Lynn Z.
Bloom, like Zawacki and Flynn, suggests that ﬁnding one authentic, personal
voice (845) is crucial if a writer is to accomplish academic work (that is, work
involving much debate and innovation) while at the same time claiming political power. Bloom, Zawacki and Flynn echo the notion that there exists an
authentic voice which a writer might discover, a notion that Lester Faigley
argues commonly operates in scholarly debates within composition vis à vis
the view of the individual as “the subject of high modernism: a coherent consciousness capable of knowing oneself and the world” (16). In such a view, a
writer’s one “authentic” voice might be said to function as a “window” on the
self and the world, at the same time it serves as a necessary condition for individual agency.
In any case, this attention paid to the issue of ‘voice’ in feminist scholarship
may be said to represent an anxiety about the (im)possibility of inscribing the
personal—which is linked closely to political agency in feminist circles outside
the academy—as also part of the intellectual work of scholars and students.
Negatively, this anxiety perhaps at times manifests itself in an unreasonable
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quest for a writer’s one, “authentic” voice—that voice which will serve her in
accomplishing both the scholarly work of the academy and the political work
she might be called on to do outside the academy. Positively, this anxiety has
helped drive the proliferation of new forms of academic writing, including
that of scholarly memoir.
It is not that the academic trend toward valuing reﬂective writing offers
hope of achieving an ‘all-purpose’ discourse, ﬁt for purposes both academic
and extra-academic; rather, it will be my contention in the rest of this essay
that such reﬂexivity is not beside the point of good academic work, but instead
is central to rigorous scholarly practice.
Such a reﬂexive turn is also part of a wider valuing by society of personal
stories, as well as part of a complex dialogue among the voices and life stories
which surround us every day. From the ﬂoors of national political conventions, to the sets of popular T.V. talk shows, to the halls of the academy, publicly delivered and published reﬂections about personal lives—some examples
of cultural analysis, lavishly textured and insightful; others arguably instances
of a more prosaic or self-serving rhetoric—function to persuade, cajole, give
testimony to, instruct and entertain a complex array of audiences. Moving
along on the social currents created by these stories are voices, highly variegated and kinetic, simultaneously responding to and reshaping each other.
And these voices increasingly have made their way into the academy, mixing
with traditional voices of disciplinary authority as the canons of many ﬁelds
have been challenged and disrupted, for example, by the growth of cultural
studies, feminist studies and postmodern epistemologies that insist that the
‘everyday’ and the local are not only valid objects of inquiry, but also valid
sources for authority and knowledge.
A N A LT E R N AT I V E I N T E L L E C T UA L P R A C T I C E : W R I T I N G T O
I N T I M AT E AU D I E N C E S

Like Torgovnick, anthropologist Ruth Behar draws on the local and the
‘everyday’ in order to address multiple audiences. Like much feminist writing,
Behar’s essay “Writing in My Father’s Name” purposely draws attention to its
form. Appearing as a series of diary entries, the essay in part chronicles the
reaction of a nonacademic audience—her family—to the earlier publication of
Translated Woman: Crossing the Border with Esperanza’s Story, an ethnography
which Behar combines with a self-reﬂexive “shadow biography.” A large part of
Behar’s project in both instances is to illustrate that the forms of academic
writing we are most used to seeing, and the forms of rationality this writing
represents, are historically constructed, neither universal nor inevitable. And
her essay illustrates how this writing has traditionally been constructed: for
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example, by considering the myriad ways in which patriarchy has affected her
own personal life and professional work, she puts into practice Pierre
Bourdieu’s notion of “epistemic reﬂexivity,” and reveals the “social and intellectual unconscious” of patriarchy “embedded in (the) analytic tools and operations” (Bourdieu 36) of anthropology itself.
Behar treats her relationship with her father, in particular, as an object of
scholarly inquiry, an object which she illustrates can lend powerful insights
into some of the ideologies that inﬂuence how women write, and are written
by, culture in the academy. As she chronicles the fracturing of her family and
suggests how it is related to discourses like patriarchy and immigration, Behar
also acknowledges the multiplicity of her own writing self. Identifying herself
as storyteller, anthropologist and daughter, she is writing not only about her
parents and how her relationship with them has affected her professional life;
in a way, her parents appear as one of the audiences for her writing:
It dawns on me that I include my parents too much in my professional life. But how
could I not? I’m still my father’s daughter. I carry his name. And I allow my parents
to have a claim on my work. I not only send them reviews of my book . . . I can’t stop
writing about them. Immigrants succeed through their children; they sacriﬁce, they
invest, so their children will succeed. And the immigrant daughter, who worries
about surpassing her parents, keeps trying to include them in her work, to throw a
raft their way, so they can sail together on the choppy seas of the academy. (72)

In the context of her self-reﬂexive writing projects, Behar’s relationship with
her parents thus serves as an illustration of how—both inside and outside the
academy—the pressures of patriarchy compel women scholars to “write in
(their) fathers’ names” (79). Beyond this, however, the example of Behar’s writing might also suggest the gains and the risks involved when a scholar writes
both about and to intellectual fathers within the institution, at the same time
she is writing both about and to other kinds of fathers (or mothers) beyond its
walls—and writing in ways that acknowledge the “claim” these extra-academic
audiences have on her work as a scholar.
Behar’s use in her writing of the example of her relationship with her parents—an example that helps her to illustrate the impact which cultural ideologies have on her scholarly work—seems, interestingly, to lead her at least in part
to the assumption (or perhaps leads her to reveal the assumption) that her parents might share with her and her professional peers the same interests with
regard to such an analysis. In fact, an apparent assumption that her parents
would want to “sail (with her) on the choppy seas of the academy” collides headon in her essay with the frustration both of her parents seem to feel because of
the ways they see themselves being represented in her “shadow biography”:
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Mira, I’m going to tell you something, Rutie,” my mother announces. “La mierda no
se revuelve, porque apesta.” Don’t stir up the shit, because it will stink. “You know,
Rutie, I’m not a typist. Ya es la segunda vez que los dices.” It’s true, I’ve twice described
my mother in my writing as a typist rather than by her title, Diploma Aide. I try to
apologize, but my mother is not done with me yet. “And why did you have to tell
everybody your father was ashamed that his father was a peddler in Cuba? That wasn’t nice.” I wish I could get my mother to understand the poetic logic of my storytelling. “Mami, don’t you see? My book is about the life story of a peddler in Mexico.
And my own grandfather was a peddler in Cuba, but Papi was always so ashamed of
his origins that he couldn’t even talk about it. Don’t you think that’s interesting?”
But I can’t convince her. Writing about the shame seems only to compound the
shame of the shame. (66-67)

In describing this clash of perspectives, Behar takes great pains to insure that
her writing ‘self ’ makes itself accountable to the risks involved in writing to
extra-academic as well as to academic audiences. She goes on to say that as a consequence of this conﬂict of perspectives, she has adopted a strategy of “silence,
exile, and cunning” with regard to her writing, so she might hide from her father
and mother the fact she continues to inscribe “the story of (their) dissolution as
a family ever more irrevocably into the academy” (82). Behar’s desire to hide her
words from a particular, intimate audience is echoed, though not entirely paralleled, in Richard Rodriguez’s Hunger of Memory. After a confrontation with his
own mother about a published account of their family’s life, Rodriguez admits
he “probably . . . will never try to explain (his) motives (for writing publicly
about his personal life) to (his) mother and father” (176). Opting instead to
write to “public readers (he) expect(s) never to meet” (177), Rodriguez deﬁnes
this audience of “strangers” in ways that evoke an “essayist prose style” model of
literacy, where the reader “is not an ordinary human being, but an idealization, a
rational mind formed by the rational body of knowledge of which the essay is a
part” (Gee, 63). Rodriguez thus conceives of his audience vis à vis an uncomplicated, though perhaps not uncommon, notion of the “public reader”:
I write today for a reader who Ïexists in my mind only phantasmagorically. Someone
with a face erased; someone of no particular race or sex or age or weather. A gray
presence. Unknown, unfamiliar. All that I know about him is that he has had a long
education and that his society, like mine, is often public (un gringo). (182)

Rodriguez’s text describes the “public” reader as virtually uncomplicated in
subject position, and exceedingly unfamiliar—a ‘faceless’ reader who could not
possibly be more different from his own parents. At the same time, he depicts
himself, as the author of his text, as also unfamiliar and, in one sense, as ‘voiceless’ within the context of his own family:
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I think my mother sensed that afternoon that the person whose essay she saw in a
national magazine was a person unfamiliar to her, some Other. The public person—
the writer, Richard Rodriguez—would remain distant and untouchable. She never
would hear his public voice across a dining room table. And that afternoon she
seemed to accept the idea, granted me the right, the freedom so crucial to adulthood,
to become a person very different in public from the person I am at home. (189-190)

While Behar, therefore, comes to the conclusion that because of the conﬂicts
it creates, she must exclude (however much she desires to do otherwise) this
most intimate of audiences—her family—from her writing, Rodriguez excludes
his family as one of his audiences because such an exclusion is “crucial to adulthood,” and to the process of becoming a “public” person.
Behar’s reasons for the (ostensible) exclusion of this intimate audience is perhaps more akin to Nancy K. Miller’s reasons for excluding her father as one of the
readers of her own autobiographical essay, “My Father’s Penis.” Miller’s exclusion, like Behar’s, is prompted by a concern about the effect her writing (“born of
the troubled intimacies of the autobiographical penis and the theoretical phallus” [Personal, 146]) might have on the intimate audience that is her father:
Had my father still been able to read, I would never have written about “the penis.”
By going public with the details of domestic arrangements on Riverside Drive, I was
ﬂying in the face of the parental injunction not to “tell” that had haunted my adolescence and continued well into my adult years; the panic my parents felt that they
would be exposed by us; the shame over family secrets. But he was down in his reading to the occasional newspaper headline and, I think, at his end, despite a ﬁnely
honed personal vanity, beyond caring. He had become no longer himself, and I
needed to mourn his disappearance. (146-147)

Miller’s exclusion of her father as one of her readers is facilitated by her
father’s physical decline, the same decline that accounts in part for her “need”
to write the essay. And like Behar, this exclusion of one, particular intimate
audience is her response to the sense that her writing is “ﬂying in the face of
the parental injunction not to ‘tell’ . . . family secrets.”
It may be possible, however, to see ways in which, as a scholar, Behar (if not
Miller) both succeeds and fails as she attempts to “hide” her words from the
extra-academic audience comprised of her parents. (The French scholar Alice
Kaplan and Rodriguez, too, may be said to both exclude and include their families as one of their audiences, an interesting move in the context of memoirs
that recount their own exclusions, as children and as adults, by members of
their families.) Through her use of dialogue like that above, I would argue
Behar’s text does indeed inscribe her parents as an audience, and in so doing
begins to confront one of the scholarly biases that Bourdieu argues blurs the
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“sociological gaze,” as she begins to examine how her relationships to her family and to her family history have framed her own intellectual work. Such an
examination might, in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s terms, include both a consideration of the “enabling” and “disabling” biases that such a family history brings
to her work as an anthropologist.
But Behar’s example, like Kaplan’s example in her memoir French Lessons,
also perhaps illustrates that scholarly autobiography, or autobiographically
inﬂected cultural criticism—like all scholarly writing—is not without its limitations. Like other texts, self-reﬂexive texts can result in reductive representations of others’ subject positions. Owing in particular to what Bourdieu might
identify as the “intellectualist bias” threatening to blur the “sociological gaze”
of scholars, self-reﬂexive texts—no more than ‘traditional’ texts, although perhaps in more highly charged ways—can risk “collapsing practical logic into
theoretical logic” (39-40), with the result being a reductive (albeit theoretically
‘logical’) representation of the actions and attitudes of o/Others, including
intimate others. Behar’s desire to include her parents on her journey across
rough academic waters, for example, as well as her attempt to get her mother
to see the “poetic logic” of her writing, may signify an over-identiﬁcation with
these others that in some ways denies the differences in their subject positions.
The autobiographical texts I examine here, in other words, vary widely in the
degree to which and ways in which they explicitly examine the competitive and
collaborative relationships among different subject positions or ‘voices’ within
the text, as well as the degree to which they explicitly examine relationships
between such voices and the audiences they inscribe.
Kaplan’s memoir French Lessons, for example, in articulating an often
antagonistic relationship between her own experience with learning French
and her students’ experiences learning the language, might be said to discourage an examination of the relationship between different ‘student’ voices in the
text. Kaplan’s representation of her teaching practice, for example, seems often
to involve imposing desire on her students: “I, Madame, have to make their
mouths work. I walk up to a student and I take her mouth in my hand; I
arrange it in the shape of a perfect O” (134). With her student’s mouth in
Kaplan’s hand, both the student Kaplan once was (a student who learned
French by “shaping” her mouth herself, to suit her own purposes in the context
of relationships with the friends and lovers described by her memoir), and the
younger student sitting before her in the classroom, are at risk of falling mute.
Because diverse student voices fail to sound, at junctures such as this in the text
there seems to be little room for the kind of double-voiced (much less multivoiced) discourse that Bakhtin describes, discourse that might be productive of
new or alternative knowledge about teaching and learning, for example.
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In other words, by not making explicit the ways in which her own learning
(through sensual experience) and her students’ learning (in the classroom)
might intersect as well as diverge, Kaplan’s text at times masks the presence of a
mix of voices capable of acknowledging the contingency and multiplicity of
self, and of the self ’s relationship with the world. I would suggest that in such
moments in Kaplan’s text as the one I cite above, these voices and the attendant
relationships among (and within) them are hidden from view by a “form of
analysis” that is more “conventional” (Holquist 69) than it may at ﬁrst seem; an
analysis that in a sense ‘forgets’ the material and emotional details surrounding
Kaplan’s own learning, neglecting the ways in which these contingent details
might apply as well (though not necessarily in the same ways) to her students’
learning.
While Kaplan’s text may thus preclude fuller acknowledgment of the commonalties between her own ‘student’ subjectivity (or voice) and the subjectivities of her students, Jane Gallop’s autobiographical text, Feminist Accused of
Sexual Harassment, in a sense functions in the reverse. Chronicling her own
experience of being a student in college in the early 1970s, and of gaining
access simultaneously to feminism, “to real learning and to active sexuality”
(5), Gallop goes on to chronicle her experience in the 1990s of being accused
by two female graduate students of sexual harassment, and proposes in her
book to “produce an understanding of sexual harassment based . . . upon the
limit case of a feminist so accused” (7):
I was construed a sexual harasser because I sexualize the atmosphere in which I
work. When sexual harassment is deﬁned as the introduction of sex into professional relations, it becomes quite possible to be both a feminist and a sexual
harasser. (11)

Gallop contends that being a “feminist sexual harasser” is a “contradiction
in terms” (7), though, because gender is the key factor in a (feminist) deﬁnition of sexual harassment (24). Beyond this, however, Gallop’s text comprises a
challenge generally to condemnations of sexualized relationships between
teachers and students, through its examination of her own past, personal experiences with feminism, pedagogy and sex—experiences which she says were
“empowering” (43) for her, and which she seems to offer in illustration of their
potential beneﬁt for others.
Gallop’s use of her own experience, however, may lead her, like Kaplan, to
an analysis more conventional than at ﬁrst it might appear. By neglecting how
the details of her own students’ psychologies and histories might differ from
her own, for example, the potential for a mix of diverse ‘student’ voices to
emerge in the text is diminished, if not erased entirely. Instead, it is Gallop’s
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own ‘student’ voice that sounds alone, even as it is other students’ desires
which ostensibly are being articulated:
Nowadays, women’s studies is a lot older and more established; it doesn’t feel so
much like a bold experiment. While it still is said in women’s studies circles that
feminist teachers and students ought to have a nonhierarchical relation, ought to
work together as sister seekers of knowledge, in fact the relation between feminist
teachers and students is not what it was when women’s studies was young.
Yet my students still want a feminist education that feels like women’s studies did
to me in 1971. And so do I, deeply. I want it for them and I want it still, again, for
myself. (19-20)

In particular, remembering speciﬁc ways in which discovering feminism
was for her also about discovering (and feeling) “brave new possibilities”
(18)—which included teacher-student sex—Gallop posits her own ‘student’
subjectivity as “‘choke’ or origin point” (Lutz 255) for conceptualizing the subjectivities of her students twenty years later.
In other words, Gallop’s insistence that it is not necessary for her text to
acknowledge in speciﬁc ways how her own subject position (past and present)
differs from the subject positions of her students, I think bespeaks what
Bourdieu has identiﬁed as the scholarly bias “more profound and more distorting than those rooted in the social origins or location of the analyst in the
academic ﬁeld”—that is, the “intellectualist bias which entices (the scholar) to
construe the world as spectacle, as a set of signiﬁcations to be interpreted rather
than as concrete problems to be solved practically” (39). As part of a February
1998 electronic exchange on the Pre/Text discussion list, Gallop explains in this
way her text’s lack of attention to her accusers’ subjectivities:
Because I was not writing about the case in and for itself but only for the light it
could shed upon larger issues, there were many things about the case I did not discuss in the book. I chose only to discuss those things, those details that when interpreted could yield wider understandings, understandings that could produce new
knowledge . . . in the theoretical debates I wanted to enter. Which is why I don’t talk
about the students. To me the fact that they accused me of things I didn’t do is not
very theoretically interesting. . . . It is not unusual for students to ﬁnd negative evaluations intolerable and to get angry and want to hurt the teacher back. But it didn’t
seem something that would produce much knowledge. I only could have counteraccused them, written a book about what bad students they were and blind, angry
people. I thought that would be tacky, beneath me, so I chose not to discuss that.

In one of her last posts to the list before signing off, Gallop adds an “important, because both obvious and neglected, point about teaching,” which may shed
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some light on why she felt that her options in writing (about the subjectivities of
her students) were so limited. As she expresses them, again during the Pre/Text
discussion, her reasons seem to have to do with her sense that perhaps relationships between students and teachers are, after all, not the “consensual amorous
relation(s)” (57) between two “empowered” (though perhaps differently empowered) individuals posited by her text, but are instead relations between individuals with considerably different amounts and kinds of power and agency:
All the emphasis on the teacher’s power in contemporary pseudo-political discourse on
pedagogy neglects perhaps the most essential thing. And something we might not want
to neglect in our politics. LABOR. Teachers labor for students. Students do not labor
for teachers. Students beneﬁt from our labor; we do not beneﬁt from students’ labor.

I would read the scene of work which Gallop sketches out above as one in
which the teacher is the subject of high modernism: a coherent consciousness
capable of producing knowledge, and of engaging in labor in ways which are
not contingent on the collaborative labor of students. In such a scene, one
which seems to be replicated in Gallop’s text at several junctures, at most a single voice sounds—the voice of Gallop as the teacher.
Behar’s desire to include her parents on her voyage through rough, academic waters, too, may be peculiarly academic, and bespeaking the “intellectualist” bias that Bourdieu points to as the central challenge for the scholar aiming
to develop a rigorous self-reﬂexivity. (Pointing to a perhaps parallel, although
not identical, challenge confronted by white, middle-class teachers of adult
basic education students, Lester Faigley cites Linda Brodkey’s ﬁndings that “in
spite of their energy, dedication, and commitment to universal education,
[these teachers] could not admit that their lives were very different from those
of their [students] because there was no space in their discourses for the subjectivities that their working-class [students] presented” [35].) All of these
examples suggest the difﬁculties scholars face in order to acknowledge differences in subjectivity between themselves and intimate O/others, including
family members and students, an acknowledgment nonetheless crucial for
scholarship in which such others ﬁgure prominently.
Writing reﬂectively thus presents scholars with a signiﬁcant dilemma. For,
according to Bourdieu, an “epistemic reﬂexivity” involves subjecting the social,
academic and “intellectualist” positions of the scholarly observer to the same
critical analysis as that to which the (constructed) object is subjected, in order
to “theorize the limits of anthropological knowledge” (42) associated with the
analyst’s “membership and position in the intellectual ﬁeld” (39). Making a
distinction between epistemic and textual reﬂexivity, however, Bourdieu critiques the use of the ﬁrst person in sociological analysis, and the “postmodern”
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notion that the writing of a text is itself implicated in the construction of reality. Rather, Bourdieu argues that “it is not the individual unconscious of the
researcher but the epistemological unconscious of his discipline that must be
unearthed” (41) if the reﬂexive return is to enable the intellectual to escape the
“delusion” (which Bourdieu says is dear to both intellectuals and Westerners
generally) of being free and undetermined, while at the same time not encouraging him to fall into “the game of intimist confession” (44):
Intellectuals are particularly inventive when it comes to masking their speciﬁc interests. For instance, after ‘68, there was a kind of topos in the French intellectual milieu
which consisted in asking: “But from where are you speaking? From what place am I
speaking?” This false, narcissistic confession, vaguely inspired by psychoanalysis,
served as a screen in the Freudian sense of the word and blocked a genuine elucidation, that is the discovery of the social location of the locutor: in this case, the position
in the university hierarchy. . . . I deliberately constructed (the) notion (of the ﬁeld) to
destroy intellectual narcissism and that particularly vicious legerdemain (escamotage)
of objectivation which consists of making objectivations either singular, and here psychoanalysis comes in handy, or so broad that the individual under consideration
becomes the token of a category so large that his or her responsibility vanishes
entirely. To proclaim “I am a bourgeois intellectual, I am a slimy rat!” as Sartre liked to
do, is devoid of implications. But to say “I am an assistant professor at Grenoble and I
am speaking to a Parisian professor” is to force oneself to ask whether it is not the relation between these two positions that is speaking through my mouth. (193-194).

According to Bourdieu, objects of inquiry do not call for distanced observation and theorizing, because such observation and theorizing is impossible:
the intellectual has interests which affect how she constructs such objects. At
the same time, Bourdieu equates the framing of those interests too individually with “narcissism,” and too broadly with an evasion of responsibility, an
equation often used by other critics of reﬂective (scholarly) writing such as
Margery Wolf and Daphne Patai.
However, where I think Bourdieu’s critique proves inadequate with regard to
examples of contemporary, reﬂective writing like those I have examined here, is
in the fact that it does not fully take into account scholarly texts that explicitly
address audiences beyond the walls of the university. It is increasingly common
to hear academics acknowledge that, for reasons often having to do with political
survival, they need to speak to audiences beyond the institution. I would situate
many contemporary scholarly memoirs like Kaplan’s and autobiographically
inﬂected essays like Behar’s along with other reﬂective, multi-voiced texts such as
Patti Lather and Chris Smithie’s Troubling Angels, within this larger context;
as such, these reﬂective, academic texts necessarily inscribe extra-academic

42

Personal Effects

audiences. That these audiences are frequently familial perhaps should not be
surprising: the family may very well represent the extra-academic audience
which an intellectual knows best, thus not only comprising a focus of both personal interest, but representing as well the concerns of constituencies outside the
academy’s walls which the scholar may need or want to address.
Attending to such (an) extra-academic audience(s), however, necessitates a
more complicated, though not necessarily more narcissistic, reﬂexivity—
focusing on and beyond the writer’s social position in the intellectual ﬁeld, and
geared toward an explicit formulation of an ethics for the writing.
Unlike Behar, in her memoir Kaplan includes only ﬂeeting images of her
own father, together with a few more, mostly sketchy, representations of other
family members. While periodically making observations that connect her
school experience with her experience at home (“I had come from a house
where the patterns had broken down and the death that had broken them was
not understood. Now I loved the loudspeaker and the study hall and the marble ﬂoor because they made me feel hard and controlled and patterned” [53])
these brief reﬂections most frequently elicit only a terse comment from her. Of
her sister’s objections to her project (“‘You’re turning the family into a research
project. . . . It’s underhanded. And it’s cold’”), she says simply: “But I didn’t feel
cold, I was burning” (202). Such an unelaborated response, including neither a
description of her sister nor a description of her sister’s speciﬁc reasons for her
objections (in her “Acknowledgments,” Kaplan says only that her sister’s “story
of (their) family is different” [221]) is another example of how Kaplan’s memoir eschews explicit theorizing.
Interestingly it is Kaplan’s students, whose appearance is the most prominent element of the book’s ﬁnal chapter, with whom she represents herself
ﬁnally as communicating best and as having the fullest ‘familial’ kinship. It is
in the classroom, then, that Kaplan says ultimately she feels the least like she is
“in exile from (herself)”; and it is in describing at least a few of these classroom
scenes that the text includes an explicit and detailed interpretation:
Then something will happen, in the classroom, and I’ll see this French language
as essential in its imperfection: the fact that we don’t have as many words is forcing us
to say more. The simplicity of our communication moves us, we’re outside of cliché,
free of easy eloquence, some deeper ideas and feelings make it through the mistakes
and shine all the more through them.
In French class I feel close, open, willing to risk a language that isn’t the language
of everday life. A sacred language. (210)

If French then is always “not-quite-(her)-own-language,” a language with
which Kaplan in some ways “gags” (210) herself, she explains it is also a language
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that allows her to express the “deeper ideas and feelings” that she isn’t able to
express in English, an expression that perhaps goes against the grain of her desire
to forget the past. And it is during at least some moments in class, while she is
sharing this “imperfect” language with her students, that such expression occurs.
Kaplan describes just this kind of moment in a passage in the memoir’s last
chapter, where she describes having assigned her class a novel to read that she felt
she didn’t really understand: “it seemed too simple and I didn’t know how I was
going to teach it” (211). In the novel, a crime has occurred in the narrator’s
childhood; during class, one of Kaplan’s students explicates the passage in which
the narrator recounts watching adults as they arrive one night at his house. The
narrator says he is surprised that after the crime he was not interrogated by the
police because “‘children watch. They listen, too’” (212). But it is Kaplan’s student who, for her, expresses the “deeper ideas and feelings” embedded in the
imperfection of this language: “‘What he really means to say is that they write.
Children grow up and they write about what they saw and heard’” (213).
In one of the most emotionally inﬂected passages of her book, Kaplan theorizes about this moment in class, seemingly taken aback by the intersections
between her own complicated subjectivity (as not only a scholar and teacher,
but also a child who watched her father die) and the ‘reading’ of text and experience which her student brings to the class:
I cried, not sorrowful tears but tears of happiness from discovering something I
hadn’t known about before. Why was I so moved by what she said? . . . She had
explained to me (the author’s) sense of a past that can’t be erased but which is
always incomplete. . . .
Maybe it was simpler, what moved me. I was thinking about being a child myself
and seeing and hearing but not being able to say yet, not having the words for what I
saw. Or having them, but no one asked. No one asks the child what is going on, and
the child sees, and listens, and engraves those memories and those people one after
another in a private language. It’s only later—maybe it’s too late—that the pain of
those memories is brought forward to the present time of writing. (213-214)

Kaplan here both connects the events of her own childhood to this other set
of events, events in the classroom, while she also abstracts more generally
about the effect on children of the loss of a parent.
Within the memoir and the classroom, therefore, part of Kaplan’s intellectual
work in (an “imperfect”) French becomes theorizing—albeit sporadically—
about the effects of her own father’s death; as, conversely, does her work in
French become part of her emotional experience of his death. In studying and
speaking French with her students Kaplan “discover(s) something (she) hadn’t
know about before”—i.e., that her memoir is in part a record of childhood losses
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which had been hidden away by her use of French. As readers we know more,
ﬁnally, of her sense of the personal and professional consequences of having
watched and listened while her father died, of having his death engraved in her
own private, secret language.
A N U N - ‘ P R O F E S S I O N A L’ P R A C T I C E : T E L L I N G S T O R I E S O F L O S S

Kaplan’s memoir therefore explores the imperfections of her experience as a
student, scholar, and teacher of French, by portraying—often in exquisite
detail—scenes of personal and professional loss. Depicting such scenes may be
one of the most controversial aspects of scholarly memoir, for telling stories of
loss is an especially rare practice within the academy. Even in the face of a
number of contravening tendencies functioning in academic culture, however,
the recent ﬁeld of scholarly memoirs provides us with many different examples
of theorizing the intellectual relevance of such stories. Building on the work of
Carolyn Heilbrun, I would like to suggest new ways of reading these memoirs
and stories of loss, both of which suffer from a relative lack of “critical or biographical commonplaces” that for other kinds of texts have been “elaborated
over generations of critical activity” (18-19).
First of the tendencies which make difﬁcult within the academy telling (and
hearing) stories of loss, is our impulse as (Western) scholars to dichotomize
concerns of a professional, or intellectual, nature, from concerns we might
characterize as more personal. Again, this tendency is one which feminist scholars both in Composition and across the disciplines have struggled with for
some time now, and from various starting points. Such a tendency is embedded
both in the concrete practices and in the discourses of our profession, relying as
those practices and discourses do, for example, on thinking through binaries—
such as the binary of the ‘personal’ and the ‘professional.’ David Bartholomae’s
“Inventing the University,” for example, might be said to invoke such dichotomous thinking (and I acknowledge here the contradiction in my stance, entailing as it does what Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede would call disciplinary
critique in “traditional agonistic fashion” [169], at the same time that critique is
aimed at binary thinking). Bartholomae’s essay invokes multiple dichotomies—
between student writers and professional writers, between writing in a ‘personal’ voice and writing in an ‘academic’ voice—as it argues that “to speak with
authority (student writers) have to speak not only in another’s voice but
through another’s code; and they not only have to do this, they have to speak in
the voice and through the codes of those of us with power and wisdom”(156)
(emphasis mine). The title of Peter Elbow’s “Being a Writer vs. Being an
Academic: A Conﬂict in Goals” might be said to invoke a similar kind of thinking, although even as he presents this opposition and the “speciﬁc conﬂicts” it
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raises in the teaching and designing of a ﬁrst year writing course, his own text
explicitly prods him: “everyone says, ‘Don’t give in to binary thinking’” (73).
The second (though perhaps not ﬁnal) tendency within the academy which
makes difﬁcult an exploration of the professional and intellectual signiﬁcance
of telling stories of loss is the presumption that loss is unspeakable, a presumption which is perhaps stronger within the institution’s walls than it is beyond
them. The strength of this tendency may be rooted at least in part in an institutional ideology which posits scholarship as a progressive series of ‘gains’ in
knowledge, an ideology which serves to erase or to diminish an acknowledgment of the losses which are an inevitable part of academic (or any) life. Such
an ideology of gain affects our ability to conceive of an individual career—and
of the development of professional authority within the trajectory of that
career—as marked both by meaningful gains and by ‘meaningless’ losses.
Richard E. Miller’s analysis of Pierre Bourdieu’s Distinction: A Social Critique of
the Judgment of Taste, has Bourdieu pointing to “the impossibility of radically
reforming any highly developed educational system, since that system will, of
necessity, be predominantly inhabited by individuals who have proﬁted from
that system, who are invested in that system, and whose felt sense of distinction has been established and certiﬁed by that system” (26). Yet many of the
reﬂective texts that I examine in this essay—particularly memoirs written by
women and scholars of color—describe and theorize instances of professional
and personal dissatisfaction, and experiences of exclusion or loss, often at the
hands of a system from which these scholars nonetheless have proﬁted and in
which they are deeply invested.
I would begin to read such texts as hybrid, incorporating many of the conventions of traditional forms simultaneously with oppositional discourses that
challenge various widely-held assumptions about professional life—assumptions not only from which as academics we have proﬁted, but also by which we
have been constrained. I would argue that the ideology of gain to which I have
referred is just such a constraint, increasing as it does the difﬁculty of putting
into practice a feminist epistemology that afﬁrms the myriad connections
between the personal and the professional, and contributing to a feminization
in the academy of ‘personal’ writing—including scholarly memoir—which
often is the kind of writing reserved for recounting the stories of loss that we
do tell. At the same time, such an ideology may add to the anxieties inherent in
professionalization generally, and speciﬁcally to the anxieties that are a part of
such highly charged “rites of passage” as the job search and the tenure process.
Some of the workings of this ideology of gain are unveiled in a recent article
in CCC by Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede. In a brilliant re-vision of another
essay which they had co-authored together a decade before (“Audience
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Addressed/Audience Invoked: The Role of Audience in Composition Theory
and Pedagogy”), Lunsford and Ede examine what they call the focus on “success
in communicating with and persuading others” (173) in academic literacy
broadly, and in the rhetorical tradition more speciﬁcally. These authors’ “selfcritique”(168) ﬁnds evidence of this impulse toward “success” in their own earlier essay, but avoids the easy tendency toward either/or dichotomizing,
“resist(ing) the lure of totalizing, oppositionalizing readings” (169). Instead, the
authors reﬂect on the consequences for their writing of their own “personal
identiﬁcation with schooling,” (173) and suggest how their own particular subjectivities were shaped by western individualism and an emphasis on “success”:
Academic good girls, we studied, even excelled, and in so doing we came to associate
both schooling and the writing we did in school with a positive sense of self, a
means of validation and “success,” and of hailing appreciated audiences. So powerful was this identiﬁcation, in fact, that we recast those painful memories of struggle
that we could not repress, reinterpreting experiences that might have led to resistance and critique as evidence of individual problems that we could remedy if only
we would work harder, do (and be) better. Such an approach is congruent, of
course, with the individualism inherent throughout our culture, educational institutions, and scholarly disciplines, an individualism that traditionally writes the kind
of struggles we experienced as students as inevitable, even necessary and salutary,
aspects of the western narrative of individual success that (our previous essay)
implicitly endorses. (171-172)

Lunsford and Ede suggest that the narrative of individual success which they
point to as implicitly operating within their own (previously published) essay,
“inevitably, albeit silently, casts misunderstanding, miscommunication, disagreement, resistance, and dissent as failure and, as such, as that which is to avoided or
‘cured’” (173-174). In much the same way that the narrative of “success” which
these authors point to serves to exclude alternate narratives, so too would I suggest an ideology of gain embedded in academic culture serves to exclude from
our consideration a wide range of professional and personal stories.
Many scholars, especially feminist scholars, have acknowledged the need to
reﬂect on and theorize the ways in which personal history and experience
shape the ‘subject’ and the form of professional work, and especially of scholarly writing. One sign of the seriousness—and perhaps again the anxiety—
with which scholars have approached this self-reﬂective project has been the
proliferation of terms to describe such critical work: literary theorists Nancy K.
Miller and Susan Suleiman have written (about) the uses of “personal criticism” and “mediated autobiography” respectively; anthropologist Behar’s “vulnerable writing” has a reﬂexive quality in common with Linda Brodkey’s—and
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Mary Louise Pratt’s—“autoethnography.” Feminist, social theorist Nancy
Fraser describes the essays included in her text, Unruly Practices: Power,
Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory as “exercises in situated
theorizing” (7). Although these terms and writing tasks are various and differently inﬂected, I would suggest they all signify an alternative intellectual practice which attempts to make sense of the personally situated nature of
scholarly work, and to theorize what Gesa Kirsch and Joy Ritchie have termed,
after Adrienne Rich, a “politics of location” (7) for that work. Mariolina
Salvatori, in a review in CCC, describes recent “teacher texts” by Miller, Jane
Tompkins and Jane Gallop as constituting a “theoretical phenomenon.”
Describing these texts as “introspective accounts of how teachers bring their
personal and academic lives together as they think about and theorize teaching,” Salvatori argues that the “varied nomenclature (of what she calls ‘practices of the personal’) may be taken to indicate the richness of the genre as a
‘category in process’ . . . (but) might also be taken as a sign of a certain anxiety
about its functions and possibilities” (567).
This anxiety arises in part from the fact that these texts are accountable to a
different kind of story than is often told in academia. The ‘professional’ stories
we most often tell ourselves and each other are stories of accretion, stories
which elaborate and focus on a progressive accumulation of achievements and
gains: gains in knowledge achieved through scholarship, gains in professional
status achieved through hard work, gains in prestige. The prevalence and quality of these success stories, and the timbre of the voices which they inscribe,
stand in stark contrast to the stories and voices of professional and personal
loss contained within scholarly memoirs and other “reﬂective” academic texts.
In such texts these stories often center on a professional loss, like the loss of
a job. The Cliff Walk by Don Snyder details his experience of being ﬁred in his
third year of a job by a department in the midst of down-sizing. Torgovnick, in
her collection of autobiographical essays, Crossing Ocean Parkway, describes
the circumstances early in her career surrounding her loss of a child, and her
subsequent experience of being denied tenure. While Torgovnick sees the two
experiences and their consequences as drastically different, she is puzzled
nonetheless at how often her colleagues seem to conﬂate the two. Theorizing
that this may have something to do with how the “tenure process is surrounded by talk of ‘judgments,’ ‘destinies,’ and ‘fates,’” Torgovnick remembers
how she, too, had experienced that process as a “sustained attack on (her)
identity and self-esteem” (67).
The legal scholar Patricia Williams also examines loss within an institutional context, using an analytic lens trained on how “inept” pedagogies can
kill—both bodies and minds—in her memoir The Alchemy of Race and Rights
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(which she subtitles “Diary of a Law Professor). Williams’s text comprises an
analysis of how traditional legal discourse constructs racial and gender subjectivity as “irrelevant” (100), rendering the concerns of people of color and
women, as well as these people themselves, invisible in the larger society. Like
Mary Rose O’Reilley’s memoir The Peaceable Classroom, Williams’s text speaks,
for example, of the losses incurred by law students when speciﬁc forms of
assessment and speciﬁc pedagogies pretend to rely on neutral or unbiased languages, or presuppose that either students or teachers (or both) possess
uncomplicated subjectivities that do not transcend the walls of the institution.
Since Williams’s examination and critique of law school discourse hinges as
much on her familiarity with her students’ experiences—as well as on a reﬂection about her own experience and family history—as it does on her familiarity with the texts or discourses they encounter, her “diary” is a testimony to her
own personal difference. While it might be a contradiction in terms within the
context of a supposedly “neutral” discourse to be a “black woman law professor” with a great-great-grandmother who was herself legal property, within the
context of her text’s discourse her own complex subjectivity is an indispensable resource for critiquing the biases in the law, and the subsequent ‘losses’
which these biases entail.
In the context of published memoirs, professional stories of loss therefore
are often also familial stories, involving intimate ‘others’ who either were never
able, or who no longer are able, to be actual audiences for the text: Williams’s
discerning of the “shape” of her great-great-grandmother, and of the “hand”
(19) of the man who owned her (Williams’s own great-great-grandfather);
Kaplan’s evocation of her dead father, “his image, silent and distant with headphones over his ears, a founding image for (her) own work” (197); British sociologist Carolyn Steedman’s evocation of her mother, suffering from an envy
that in some ways succeeds in killing her; psychologist Kay Redﬁeld Jamison’s
description of her father’s “black and chaotic moods” (35); and Behar’s description of her frequently estranged father. Nancy K. Miller, in the concluding chapter of her book, Getting Personal, theorizes her relationship to “the
autobiographical penis and the theoretical phallus” (146) in the context of her
father ‘s illness and death; and Torgovnick, in the Epilogue of her text, examines
her relationship with her father in the context of his ﬁnal illness and death.
It is striking how often what my colleague Linda Bachman would call the
“reﬂective gaze” around which these scholarly memoirs are constructed
belongs, in fact, to an ‘other’ who is in some way absented or lost—either by
illness, death or estrangement. And it is striking as well how often in these
memoirs, many written by women who now are established in their careers,
that this is an intimate ‘other,’ a parent, often a father—that parent perhaps
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most often looked to as a model of professionalism. In an unpublished manuscript Bachman, drawing on the ideas of Peggy Phelan, writes that
the desire to represent the self in autobiography or performance more broadly
emerges from a sense of loss engendered by the inability to see oneself. The reﬂective
gaze of an “other” is therefore the necessary vehicle for autobiographical representation: “one needs always the eye of the other to recognize (and name) oneself . . . the
external gaze is a compensatory way of returning a failed inward gaze” (Phelan 15).

So perhaps these texts suggest that while autobiographical, or reﬂective,
practices function to (re)conceive the purposes of academic writing—establishing relationships between writers and multiple and complex audiences, supporting the aims of interdisciplinary and disciplinary scholarship, often
concerning themselves with issues of social justice and ‘public’ accountability—
at least in part they are also ‘personal’ attempts to see what can’t be seen, to
recover what can’t be recovered, perhaps even to grieve what has been irrevocably lost.
My own interest in the practice of reﬂective writing is rooted as well in a
desire to acknowledge the part loss has played in my professional life, and how
that loss—which has included a distancing from family and friends, and exclusion from the working-class culture of my childhood—has shaped my teaching and scholarship. Turning reﬂectiveness in upon itself in this way has helped
me to see more clearly, for example, how the experiences of students and colleagues as well as those of family and friends, simultaneously converge with
and differ from my own—encouraging me to acknowledge all of these different groups as potential audiences for my work. I believe not only has this made
me a better scholar and teacher; it has helped me to feel less isolated in my
work, and more a part of diverse relationships which make great demands yet
offer great intellectual and affective rewards.
I also have learned the value of writing and teaching against an ideal of
scholarly autonomy. Richard E. Miller, having summarized Bourdieu’s sense of
the impossibility of reforming educational systems since such systems are primarily populated by those who are invested in maintaining the status quo,
concludes that “it would appear that no academic can escape the allure of this
game, not even those overtly interested in fully democratizing current educational practice, since such activists implicitly believe that education is the preeminent site for organizing relationships between individuals” (26). The
examples of reﬂective practice I examine brieﬂy in this essay demonstrate, on
the contrary, not only that many academics value relationships as integral to
their scholarship and teaching, but also that they believe such relationships are
located in various sites not only inside but also outside of higher education.
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Unlike more traditional academic prose, these texts summon a language of
loss—along with other languages—in order to frame relationships which thus
are both personal and professional. In so doing they begin to illustrate how loss
is both speakable and unspeakable, within the institution but also beyond its
walls; how the complexity of loss can be revealed in the context of a discourse
which is multiply-voiced; and how telling stories of loss perhaps opens up new
possibilities for speaking to multiple and varied audiences. As examples of
scholarly memoir such as those I have examined here speak to multiple and
complex audiences—composed of students, of colleagues, and of constituencies outside the academy—they also speak, as Patti Lather might say, with “ears
to hear” (“Clarity,” 538) the stories of loss these O/others have to tell.
Not alone, but as one practice among many, such speech compels us to
acknowledge the connections between the individual and the collective; to
examine our assumptions about what kinds of writing do and do not carry
discursive authority, and why; to create, perhaps, what Fraser would call
“bridge discourses and hybrid publics” (12); and so perhaps, too, to inscribe
and collaborate with audiences both inside and outside the academy. Like the
audience for this essay, such multiple and complex audiences have much to
teach us—including teaching us about how and why to acknowledge the
inevitability of loss as well as of gain.
Lather, with her co-author Chris Smithies, has just such a complex array of
audiences in mind in Troubling Angels: Women Living with HIV/AIDS. The
audiences for Lather’s and Smithies’s text include professional peers as well as
women living outside the institution, many of whom are also negotiating—
and grieving—the profound loss(es) which accompany illness and death.
Lather writes that after the completion of their text, she and her colleague
“continue to . . . construct risky practices of textual innovation in order to . . .
be of use in a time when the old stories will not do” (“Clarity,” 541). We might
look to Lather and Smithies, then, as well as to writers such as Kaplan, Behar,
Torgovnick, Miller, Williams, and Lunsford and Ede, and to many other scholars writing reﬂectively across the disciplines, for alternative models of intellectual practice that can begin to fulﬁll such a need for innovation.

2

IN THE NAME OF THE SUBJECT
Some Recent Versions of the Personal
Jeffrey Gray

On hearing that so-and-so was leading a double life, I said with
surprise, ‘Only two?’
Iris Murdoch

In the past quarter of a century in America, personal accounts have multiplied
like Mandelbrot fractals, spreading into spaces formerly inhospitable to them.
David Simpson, examining the new primacy of autobiography in The
Academic Postmodern and the Rule of Literature, notes that personal stories
now “pour off the presses, in literary criticism, ethnography, sociology, cultural
studies, and philosophy” (23). Two of these areas in particular, cultural studies
and literary criticism, might seem unlikely hosts to such incursions. The twentieth century’s two chief modes of reading, after all, have had little truck with
the personal: the New Criticism studiously ignored subjectivity, while poststructuralism has argued that subjectivity is discursively constructed.
Particularly in this latter context, not yet consigned to the museum of critical
prehistory, the reappearance of the personal may seem anomalous. Wasn’t the
author supposed to be dead?
More likely, the author never died at all, but, as Simpson writes, was just put
on hold “as an attempted corrective to an entrenched tradition of liberal expressivity” (14). Whatever the case, the Return of the Subject is unmistakable, and
several reasons or contexts suggest themselves. First, personal accounts in criticism can be seen as the academic facet of a larger culture of disclosure, whether
at the presidential, congressional, or popular level; in television, for example,
“true” stories, especially but not only of crime or transgression (“Cops,” “The
Best of Autopsy,” “Survivor,” “The Real World,” and many others), have been
displacing ﬁctions for some time. Second, few serious readers believe any longer
in a view from nowhere; the critique of objectivity that began in the sciences
early in the twentieth century, achieved, toward the end of it, additional headway from feminism and ethnic studies. In now-familiar postmodern terms, the
master narratives of progress and enlightenment have vanished in discredit,
opening a large space for the proliferation of smaller narratives (Lyotard).
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Third, a de-authored or authorless view of texts undermines the historical
impact of writings from socially marginalized groups, writings for which
authorship matters crucially. In this connection, a U.S.-centered multiculturalism, which has tended to downplay difference within groups, has helped to
reinscribe a mimetic theory of representation, a theory within which one can
speak and represent. In criticism, the Return of the Subject owes much to this
latter set of currents and the institutional pressures it has generated.
In this essay, I will point not so much to the presence of full-blown autobiographical accounts in books such as Wild Orchids and Trotsky, a collection of
essays/stories by literary critics and theorists, nor to numerous writers who
have helped to break disciplinary ice by telling stories—Clifford Geertz, say, or
Richard Rorty, Stephen Greenblatt, Judith Frank, and others. Rather, I would
like to focus on the announcement of “subject position,” a synechdochic activity in which the self as a distinguishable entity is displaced by the activity of
identity-making, producing not stories but categories of value, what I’ll call
personal “effects.” Before I try to make this and other distinctions, let me offer
some background to the discussion.
Many in the ﬁelds of multicultural criticism and culture studies argue that,
if anything, academic writing is not personal enough. In 1996, an issue of the
PMLA featured a Guest Column of four views and a Forum of twenty-six letters on the place of the personal in scholarship. One contributor, Jane Gallop,
argued that the cause for worry is not “scholarship that seems narrowly personal but rather scholarship where the personal does not recognize itself as
such and thus passes for the universal” (Letter 1150). For her, as for most of the
contributors, autobiographical excess, if it is a problem, is less dangerous than
silence as to subject position and the dubious “objectivity” that silence might
imply. Gallop does note that “[b]oth excesses contribute to our failure to recognize the extent to which knowledge is entangled in life,” but, for her own
part, she intends to integrate the subjective so thoroughly that no personal
strand can be separated out: “I’m headed for a writing where it would be literally impossible to separate gossip from scholarship” (1150).
In his guest column of that issue, “Against Subjectivity,” Michael Bérubé
agrees. Using a title that parodies detractors of the trend toward the personal,
he offers an argument not against subjectivity but only against subjectivity that
is insufﬁciently aware of itself. Like Gallop, Bérubé objects to omission of an
account of one’s subject position. The “worst form of subjectivism” comes in
the form of scholars’ “projecting their own interpretive idiosyncrasies onto
their research while blithely believing that they’ve ﬁnally grasped the object as
in itself it really is” (1066).
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Indeed that impersonalism worried most of the participants, few of whom
found any problem with explicitly personal components of criticism.1 Bérubé,
like Gallop, does acknowledge a potential problem, the danger “for readers,
who may view the personal turn as license for reductive conﬂation of the
scholar with the scholarship” (1066) but does not seem to believe that such a
conﬂation, “reductive” or not, is implicitly invited by many if not most scholars.2 Of course, there are speciﬁc experiences which strongly condition or even
determine scholarship. The question is, which ones?
In other words, it is not a matter of excluding the personal from writing, an
impossibility even for those who most insist on that exclusion, but of the ends
to which the “personal” is put—that is, of the claims to be made in the name of
the Subject. While I will abandon quotation marks following this sentence, my
suspicion of the word “personal” is not based solely on the postmodern insight
that our subjectivities are continually under construction, even after our bodies are dead and gone. It is rather that the personal as deployed in much current academic writing is not personal—that is, not individual, not subjective in
so far as subjects are distinct from other subjects, not interchangeable. The
personal, instead, is often used strategically and synechdochically. Cathy
Davidson writes, in the same issue of PMLA, that the Subject is “both individualized and, if it works, generalizable” (1070). She seems to mean by this that
in the local we ﬁnd the universal, but a different meaning may be taken from
the phrase and from many recent ﬁrst-person accounts in scholarly writing. “If
it works,” what one achieves is a personal effect that links the “I” to a collective
which becomes rhetorically empowered to the degree that it appears decentered. It is not a matter of announcing any subject position but rather certain
subject positions and not others. Statements of the personal, then, are not
arbitrary announcements of situatedness. They are made for particular reasons and often under particular duress.
The examples that follow have presented themselves in the normal course
of reading in the ﬁelds of cultural studies and contemporary literary criticism.
In order to suggest a continuity and even the beginnings of a typology, I have
thought it better to cite several than to isolate a text or two. This need not
mean cursory treatment, since statements of position in scholarly texts often
take the form of a single paragraph or even a sentence. While the result is
inevitably partial and incomplete, I hope to suggest some of the varieties of
subject position as set out in contemporary academic writing. I will argue,
among other things, that the personal as individual, far from being empowered
in contemporary discourse, is often associated with guilt and disengagement
and is not encouraged but penalized.
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P E C U L I A R S I T UAT I O N S

In her introduction to Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in
Contemporary America, Tricia Rose writes that her “peculiarly situated identities” are “immensely productive” in helping her read American hip-hop culture. Rose writes that “[s]peaking from my positions as a pro-black, biracial,
ex-working-class, New York-based feminist, left cultural critic adds even
greater complexity to the way I negotiate and analyze the social world” (xiii). I
begin with Rose’s statement because it offers a phrase—“peculiarly situated”—
useful in looking at several other identity statements, often, like this one, set
out in prefaces, and because the categories she invokes are indicative of the
kind of subject position announcements I most want to examine here—
remembering that the issue is academic writing and not the culture in general,
for which a separate argument would need to be made. We might ask ﬁrst how
peculiarly situated these positions are. Some academic intellectuals, “New
York-based” or not, may not be ex-working-class, but how many are going to
speak from a non-“pro-black” viewpoint? How many are not on the Left? How
many, who are willing to say so, are not feminist? “Biracial” could qualify, narrowly in New York City, as “peculiarly situated,” but to the extent that “even
greater complexity” is discernible in the book, why would one attribute it to,
say, biracialism, rather than to other factors in Rose’s education or sensibility?
I will not be examining preface-book relationships systematically, but let
me mention this one so as to try to situate my own criticism. Black Noise is an
extremely thorough and often insightful book. While it does not describe the
formal speciﬁcity of rap in the sense of tempos, keys, modes, or rhythms, other
than in impressionistic terms, it does scrutinize the technology of production
(particularly types of equipment and studio techniques) very knowledgably—
one of its chief contributions. So, in saying that there is no particular reason
why one would credit Rose’s insights or observations to her feminism, leftism,
or pro-blackness, I hope to distinguish the critique I’m setting out from critiques of the academy based, as Stanley Fish writes, “on equal measures of
ignorance and malice,” especially journalistic critiques of the academy’s ventures into popular culture—critiques which might characterize a book on hiphop culture as by deﬁnition frivolous. In other words, though I could wish for
a world in which I would not need to say this, I look at literature departments’
forays into popular culture and music—forays I myself often make—as necessary and salutary. The problem is, rather, that presenting the self as a list of categories has a coarsening effect. The catalogue does not place the self at the
center of critical insight; instead, it creates the self as an other, as a set of memberships, parameters of the critical response.
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One of the best-known contemporary critics of race and culture—known
as much now from television appearances as from her several books—is bell
hooks. In her writing, Professor hooks frequently offers first-person accounts
in which she, as “an institutionally marginalized other” (Teaching 86), is misunderstood or mistreated, or her work rejected by a journal for being too
“experimental.” She is slighted at a dinner party, detained at an airport by
police, or unfairly accused of something (Black Looks 174, Yearning 23-24,
29–30, among others). In her introduction to Outlaw Culture, she writes,
“These essays and dialogues represent my ongoing growth as artist, cultural
critic, feminist theorist, writer, seeker on the path” (6). Each essay, she adds,
“combines the many voices I speak—academic talk, standard English, vernacular patois, the language of the street” (7). Again, we need to ask what cultural
capital is being offered here. Surely all writers’ work represents some account
of their growth as critics, theorists, seekers. All educated persons speak at
least the three idioms of the standard, the professional, and the vernacular.
Many scholars obviously speak much more divergent languages than these.
(Hooks does not speak a non-English language.) Hooks’ claims are quite different from Rose’s, but hers is, again, the case of a not unfamiliar subject
position presented as aberrant, peculiar, and in excess of other, “ordinary”
subjectivities—those who aren’t seekers on the path, whose work is accepted
by magazine editors, who aren’t detained at the airport, who speak (presumably) only academese.
In the PMLA “personal” issue, Carol Boyce Davies, writes that while not all
scholarly endeavors are related to personal experience, hers are. The peculiarity of her situation lies in the fact that “generations of strugglers” cleared the
way for her to study and become a professor. Thus, “locating [her]self in history as an active subject is a necessity” (1154). This is not an exceptional narrative—not for African-Americans, where it should be obvious, but not for
others either. Thousands of academics are/ have been the ﬁrst in their families
to go to college. Generations of ancestors struggled to produce us all. This reality does not deny Davies’ history; it conﬁrms it, but it weakens the argument
for specialness.
I will offer only one more “peculiarly situated” example. Caren Kaplan
begins her book Questions of Travel: Postmodern Discourses of Displacement
with the sentences:
For most of my life, travel has been a certainty rather than a question. I grew up in
the state of Maine where the license plates read “Vacationland” and the tourists
came and went in seasonal waves. And I have been a tourist myself often enough,
looking for some relief from the rooted realities of dailiness. (ix)
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Kaplan goes on to explain that she once had relatives in Argentina and still
has some in Israel, South Africa, and the United States. She does not claim
explicitly that these afﬁliations authenticate or enhance the book which follows, but pace Bérubé, some sort of connection between scholar and scholarship, whether or not invited, is practically inevitable. The problem is that
having relatives in other states or countries, or growing up in Maine, are not
credentials to support critiques of Euro-American imperialist travel writers in
Africa, India, or the Mediterranean.
Kaplan’s light remarks about license plates may constitute a trivial example,
but that triviality suggests how keenly academics in general—some far more
than others, as I explain below—feel a disciplinary pressure to declare a position. Just as deracinated white college freshmen in composition courses that
work with the topos of difference have trouble writing that ﬁrst essay about the
“tribe,” so many white academics seem to strain to ﬁnd a credible subjectivity
to declare.3
It should not escape notice that I have begun with examples from women
scholars, three of them African-American (Rose is bi-racial but “pro-black”),
who, one might argue, have had to make a career out of specialness in some
regard. There are institutional constraints placed on non-white literature
scholars, often dictating what careers they can or cannot successfully pursue,
and penalties for failing to announce ethnicity, of which scholars and writers
of color are well aware. If it is true that more non-white than white scholars are
introducing the personal, it is also true that autobiographical elements are
more often introduced by women scholars than by men, a situation I discuss
below. But declarations of peculiarly situated positions are obviously not conﬁned to women or to writers of color.
The options for white academics, however, are limited, as suggested by the
last of the preceding examples. And they fall into alarmingly gender-coded categories, the women often apologizing for their class, their privilege, their
embourgeoisment, and their theory; the men stubbornly refusing to admit
those same conditions by pointing up their own non-elitist backgrounds.
Barbara Johnson, Elizabeth Abel, Nancy K. Miller, and Jane Gallop, among
white female critics writing about black texts, go to such lengths to acknowledge situatedness that they virtually disqualify themselves as critics. Barbara
Johnson’s article on Zora Neale Hurston, “Thresholds of Difference,” begins,
One of the presuppositions with which I began was that Hurston’s work was situated “outside” the mainstream literary canon and that I, by implication, was an
institutional “insider.” (318)
Moreover,
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[I]t was not clear to me what I, a white deconstructor, was doing talking about
Zora Neale Hurston, a black novelist and anthropologist, or to whom I was talking. . . .
and
It was as though I were asking Zora Neale Hurston for answers to questions I did
not even know I was unable to formulate. I had a lot to learn, then, from Hurston’s
way of dealing with multiple agendas. . . . (317)

Johnson goes on to consider possibilities of the interchangeability of outsider and insider, of which Hurston as a participant-observer anthropologist
was also aware. Nevertheless, one questions the humility. Johnson’s efforts to
avoid arrogance result in a patronizing tone that is surely unintended. Would
she say of Woolf or Faulkner that she “had a lot to learn” from that writer?
Jane Gallop expresses even more hopelessness about her shortcomings as a
white woman critic:
I realize that the set of feelings that I used to have about French men I now have
about African-American women. Those are the people I feel inadequate to and try
to please in my writing. (qtd. in Abel 477)

Elizabeth Abel quotes Gallop approvingly at the beginning of Abel’s “Black
Writing, White Reading: Race and the Politics of Feminist Interpretation,”
where she asks the question,
If white feminist readings of black women’s texts disclose white critical fantasies,
what (if any) value do these readings have—and for whom? (477)

In a second epigraph, Abel quotes Nancy K. Miller:
I began to wonder whether there was any position from which a white middle-class
feminist could say anything on the subject [of race] without sounding exactly like a
white middle-class feminist. . . . the rhetorical predictability of it all. The political
correctness. . . . In which case it might be better not to say anything. (“Criticizing
Feminist Criticism,” qtd. in Abel 477)

At least one African-American critic has found such approaches problematic. Michael Awkward, in a chapter of Negotiating Difference, on white critics
and black texts, discusses the Barbara Johnson article, ﬁnding it a “more
thoughtful and illuminating investigation of the signs ‘white’ and ‘black’ than
those of her self-referential male counterparts [Fromm, Wesling, and Sollors,
discussed earlier in the essay]” (86). However, further along the spectrum of
critical self-examination, he ﬁnds a more disturbing instance—that of SueEllen Case, who, addressing black women’s theater, regrets that any analysis she
might attempt is doomed by its inherent, racially determined limitations:
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Because this description of the position and project of women of colour has been
written by a white author, the discourse is necessarily distanced from the actual
experiences which shape this position. . . . The distance of the white author from the
ethnic community creates a critical absence of …contacts [with theater companies
of women of color] and research opportunities. This distance has inﬂuenced all the
information in this chapter. . . . (qtd. in Awkward 88)

Awkward points out that, while preferable to the universalizing moves of
earlier, less self-conscious critics, this self-disqualifying approach precludes
any engagement at all with the subject matter. It is a “self-protective avoidance
of the appearance of white female hegemonic imposition of its own image
upon the literature of women of color.” Awkward also contends that Case’s
argument for white limitations is overstated, since “there exist enough critical,
historical, and sociological studies of people of color composed by white
scholars to undermine Case’s claim about the impossibility of white access to
non-white” materials (88).
Critical self-interrogation reaches extremes in an article on feminist appropriation of Native American stories, where the author, Victoria Boynton, introduces herself as “Barbie-Tonto”:
How! I greet you as a ripped-off TV Tonto: a white critic with her “Indian” reading.
In a word, I am the white character beneath that white word signalling Indian-ness:
How. In addition, I am Barbie, white doll woman of America, lifting my little pink
plastic hand, performing my Indian gesture as I make the word How between my little pink plastic lips, cross-talking, pretending it’s mine. (53-54)

Boynton does not explain why “Indian,” is in quotes while white (an unconstructed category?) is not, but that is the least cause for concern. Boynton
begins her next paragraph nauseated, she says, with self-hatred: “Race, class,
cultural privilege, and personal history gag me as I come to Leslie Silko’s writing, a reaction which, in turn, prompts this declaration of thetos, this proclamation of my positionality as academic reader. I don’t want to colonize through
reading. I don’t want to steal, appropriate, lay claim to what is not mine” (54).
Guilt this thick overwhelms anything left over or distinguishable as topos;
certainly, we learn next to nothing about Silko’s work. And, although Boynton
uses the phrase “personal history,” we learn nothing about that history nor
about any subject position other than the undifferentiated, collective position
of guilty white colonialist intellectual, familiar from university classrooms. It
would be a relief to ﬁnd that Boynton’s essay was a parody of academic “subject”-anguish, but it does not appear to be.
Nicole Ward Jouve’s White Woman Speaks with Forked Tongue demonstrates
that the trope itself is worth exploring. Jouve explores it through a nuanced,
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idiosyncratic, speciﬁc account of growing up in France and Canada. Her beginning might be de rigeur—“I belong to the race that has taken a few centuries
only to destroy or threaten what it had taken god or nature millions of years to
make” (vii)—but she neither claims specialness nor founders in abjection.
Indeed, an acknowledgement of embeddedness and of complicity does not
exclude critique and may be made without declarations either of inadequacy
or of a peculiarly advantageous perspective. Mary Louise Pratt, in her introduction to Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, writes,
These projects are both anchored, as I am, in the metropolis; to concede them
autonomy or completeness would reafﬁrm metropolitan authority in its own
terms—the very thing travel writers are often charged to do. In writing this book I
have tried to avoid simply reproducing the dynamics of possession and innocence
whose workings I analyze in texts. The term ‘transculturation’ in the title sums up
my efforts in this direction. (5-6)4

This is a well-grounded caution, but Pratt also explains that hers is “a book
by an Anglo-Canadian expatriate for whom the openings of the 1960s and
1970s coalesced in an attempt to sustain teaching, maternity, writing, parenting, institution-building, and domestic partnership in the United States” (xii).
As with Kaplan’s Maine license plates and the example of Iain Chambers cited
below, the charisma often attached to “expatriate”—that of artistic or political
exile, danger, and exoticism—somehow falls ﬂat when we are speaking of
Canada and the U.S., two nations lacking the kinds of relations that call up
these rich associations.
Once self-consciousness is introduced, it seems to require a meta-selfconsciousness within which it can be understood. Prefatory remarks about
subject position, in other words, need context and interpretation. Catherine
Keller’s preface to From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism and Self, provides
an example of the writer who sees the necessity to acknowledge and interpret
her own statement of situatedness, even while doing so raises fresh and perhaps unanswerable questions. She writes,
My being a white North American woman, loosely middle class and eclectically
Protestant in background, does not render my vision any more or less truthful than
another. But such concrete conditions suggest what I speak from, and so whom I
am most likely to address. By naming such conditions I hope to post a few gargoyles at the threshold, warning not to mistake the ensuing generalizations for any
all-inclusive truth. (ix)

This is honest and reasonable, and yet isn’t the reader capable of making
this kind of corrective herself? It would require a naïve reader to assume that a
text, especially a contemporary academic text, pretends to offer “all-inclusive

60

Personal Effects

truths,” even without the author’s posting gargoyles. But the self-consciousness
about self-consciousness is the point here:
Currently, among white academic feminists, anxious as we are to confess our privilege as well as to ﬁght our oppression, the invocation of our sociological attributes
sometimes sounds like a password to political correctness. . . . Still, it seems worth
acknowledging, for instance, that my whiteness is evident in this book, though (or
because) I do not thematize race. (ix)

Here is the acknowledgement of the epistemic problem of setting out subject position in the general terms of “white academic feminist.” Given the
problem, however, one questions the value of making the statement to begin
with: If “whiteness” is really evident in the book—and the author claims it is,
curiously either because she doesn’t take up the issue of race or in spite of the
fact that she doesn’t—then, what purpose is served by saying that what follows
is written “as a” white woman? To say that whiteness is evident in her book
demands some development of what is meant by whiteness, since, while
Americans do talk about “black culture,” no one apart from the Aryan
Brotherhood seems to believe in the existence of a “white culture.”
Put in general terms, then, even in the case of a writer who realizes that such
positions as “white academic feminist” are not self-interpreting, setting out this
statement does seem little more than “a password to political correctness,” a
means of warding off charges of naiveté. The speciﬁc terms—Jouve remarks that
her entanglement with Greek mythology has something to do with “four formative childhood years in Athens, in plain sunny view of the Acropolis” (ix)—
are more useful.
I have said that, under the pressure to declare a viably marginal subject position, white academics have responded along surprisingly stereotypical gender
lines. The self-excoriations of Johnson, Abel, Miller, Gallop, and Boynton, for
example, are harder to ﬁnd among male critics.5 The latter, instead, often either
ignore such pressure or react with bravado, constructing their own “marginalized” subjectivities. Harold Bloom invokes his working-class background—
“Myself the son of a garment worker….” (23)—in stating his position vis-a-vis
the infamous “School of Resentment,” his progeny from decades past at Yale.
Frank Lentricchia paints himself, in “My Kinsman T.S.Eliot,” as a savvy ragazzo
growing up in an immigrant two-family house in Utica. (“We don’t know Verdi
or Dante…we never heard of them” [66].) In responding to racist/ sexist/ elitist
charges against the poetry of Dana Gioia, the “expansivist” poet Frederick
Turner notes on Gioia’s behalf: “Gioia, a second-generation Mexican-ItalianAmerican with a Native American grandfather, makes an unlikely ‘elitist’”
(Turner 813). Turner himself, also evidently under attack as racist and elitist,
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refers to his Chinese wife and to the question his mixed-race son asks him:
“How can you be a racist?”
But in rising to the defense, Turner fails to see, as his accusers fail to see, that
there is no demonstrable correspondence between private relations and public
utterances. That a man marries a woman (or has a mother who is a woman)
does not argue either his sexism or anti-sexism. The defense, in other words, is
as mistaken as the prosecution: it too trades on a conﬂation of subject position
and ethnic identity. Once accused, there is no defense. Innocence, like ethnicity, cannot be proven by an appeal to experience.
Turner’s and Gioia’s examples suggest a category that overlaps with, or is perhaps a branch of, the “peculiarly situated” identity. Much has been written about
mestizaje or métissage, but bi- or multi-racialism is only one variety of the “inbetween” identity, a position from which one can offer insight into more than
one discursive community. A modest but representative example of in-betweenness is Iain Chambers’ book Border Dialogues: Journeys in Postmodernity, which
extends Benedict Anderson’s analyses of nationalism (in Imagined Communities),
taking a wide sweep in its treatment of postmodern elements of New Mexican
deserts, England, and Western European cities. The introduction, titled “The
Double Solution,” explains the “double” view afforded the author by his having
lived in Italy:
Italy has provided me with an important critical counterpoint to a British experience. It has allowed me to look back on where I came from with different eyes and
ears….Caught between mimicry, alterity, and ultimately silence, I write from two
shores and between two cultures. (12-13)

Even if one subscribes to the idea of an identity constituted and complicated by travel, the claim here seems disproportionate. Many writers have lived
abroad for extended periods; whether they should invoke the alterity and
authority of “in-between” is another question, especially since both cultures in
this case are European, both saturated with the values of capitalism, individualism, and industrialism under investigation in Border Dialogues.
A better known and more persuasive example is Edward Said, who writes in
Culture and Imperialism,
Although I feel at home in them [the American, British, and French nations], I have
remained, as a native of the Arab and Muslim world, someone who also belongs to
the other side. This has enabled me in a sense to live on both sides, and to try to
mediate between them. (xxiii)

A few pages later, Said adds that
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this book is an exile’s book. For objective reasons that I had no control over, I grew
up as an Arab with a Western education. Ever since I can remember, I have felt that I
belonged to both worlds, without being completely of either one or the other. . . . Yet
when I say “exile” I do not mean something sad or deprived. On the contrary
belonging, as it were, to both sides of the imperial divide enables you to understand
them more easily . . . these circumstances certainly made it possible for me to feel as
if I belonged to more than one history and more than one group. As to whether
such a state can be regarded as really a salutary alternative to the normal sense of
belonging to only one culture and feeling a sense of loyalty to only one nation, the
reader must now decide. (xxvi-xxvii)

The place of Said’s work in contemporary cultural and literary studies is so
central and familiar that the subject claim scarcely needs to be made. But
since Said invites the reader to decide what to think about such a position, we
may notice two things. First, that in-betweenness is a positive, beneficial,
empowering attribute, enhancing understanding of the worlds between
which one ﬁnds oneself. Second, and more interesting, that Said continues to
see this in-betweenness as aberrant, contrasting it with “the normal sense of
belonging to only one culture.” But in reality the position Said presents as
aberrant is quite normal, particularly so in the discursive community to
which Said and his readers belong. An excellent assessment of this position
may be found in the Éloge de la Créolité by Patrick Chamoiseau, Rafael
Confiant, and Jean Bernabé, where the authors point out that the future of
the world is Creole, that the child of a German and a Haitian, born and living
in Beijing is “caught in the torrential ambiguity of a mosaic identity. . . . He or
she will be in the situation of a Creole. That is what we [writers of Caribbean
literature] have prefigured. . . . Expressing Creoleness will be expressing the
very beings of the world” (112-113; authors’ emphases). Inaccessible ethnographic interiors may still exist, but mestizaje is—and perhaps always has
been—the norm of coasts, where we experience our endless interchanges with
the rest of the world. But if cultural/linguistic/ideological mestizaje is or has
become the norm, then who can invoke the authority of in-betweenness? If
Difference still needs to be marked against a “neutral” background—whether
the latter is seen as whiteness, masculinity, or in this case “belonging to only
one culture”—then what happens when everyone becomes Different? We will
have to return to this question.
Just as home is no longer a ground against which travel is a discrepant ﬁgure, so cultural in-betweenness no longer stands out against a background of
homogeneity or rootedness. When Said, in another context, says to Salman
Rushdie, “I am—as we all are—a sort of hybrid,” he seems to suggest this universality. But, by “all,” does he mean “all us postcolonials,” or does he mean
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“everyone”—as in We Are All Postcolonials Now? The latter is the sense in
which I read it, a sense for which one ﬁnds much support in Said.6
An important touchstone of in-betweenness in the past decade has been
Gloria Anzaldua’s Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, a book that found
its way onto innumerable syllabi, in contemporary literary studies as much as in
cultural studies, gender studies, and literary theory. Anzaldua’s principal trope—
or rather a motif which generates a profusion of tropes—is in-betweenness:
“Living on borders and in margins, keeping intact one’s shifting and multiple
identity and integrity…” is exhilarating, she states in her preface (i). She speaks
of “conﬂuent streams,” of “life in the shadows,” of “juncture” and “cross-pollination” (ii). “Nosotros los Chicanos straddle the borderlands,” she says later in the
book. But one has the sense in Anzaldua of writing as an attempt to work something out, to make problematic distinctions between unsatisfying categories like
Mexican, Chicano, American, much as the Caribbean writers of the Éloge make
them between the terms Caribbean, American, and Creole. Borderlands is full of
contradiction—particularly about Mexican-ness as “racial,” as “a state of soul,”
and as “linguistic,” falling into one or another version where it suits—but is more
credible for that: nothing in her work constitutes a racial or ethnic given, or not
for more than a paragraph at a time.
THE TO GGLE SWITCH

My last examples, which show the problems of an emphasis on the collective
or representative over the individual or speciﬁc, begin to demonstrate a particular maneuver, a movement back and forth between the collective and the individual, according to circumstances. We might call it the toggle switch of
multiculturalism, the device of turning on and off the sign of ethnicity. A paradigmatic example can be found in a pair of lines from a poem by Pat Parker,
titled “For the White Person Who Wants to Know How to be My Friend”:
The ﬁrst thing you do is to forget that i’m Black.
Second, you must never forget that i’m Black. (12)

In these lines, the capitalization of Black seems to suggest the continuity of
blackness, the small case i the contingency of the individual Self. The paradoxical instruction to forget and not to forget offers the possibility of advocating
sameness when that functions for moral ground, difference when that functions. To argue universalism is, to many in the academy today, to brand oneself
as a reactionary humanist, yet to disclaim the continuity of a particular ethnicity or race is a move toward assertion of individual agency on the part of the
“Other,” which one may applaud, since it does make us all the “same” as
regards our rights as individuals. But to work the other side (“never forget”), as
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Parker candidly—and perhaps ironically—admits to doing, is to assert difference when and only when it serves you.
As a more extended example of this doubleness, Traise Yamamoto’s essay
“Different Silences” in a volume titled The Intimate Critique: Autobiographical
Literary Criticism is illuminating. Here I would like to offer a context, since this
is a question that has been explored more famously in African-American modernist texts. It is the question of being or not being visible, in situations where
neither to notice nor not to notice “identity” is acceptable from the point of
view of the seen. Richard Wright, in Paris, described a sense of freedom he had
not felt in the United States: on the one hand, it was pleasurable indifference
on the part of the Parisians (“He did not bother them! They did not give a
damn about him!”); on the other, it was a simultaneous and equally pleasurable visibility (people’s stares were “friendly, open, curious” [Webb 247]). But,
asking himself which he would choose, if forced to choose, between being
ignored or being the object of attention, Wright came down on the side of the
visible: “No more ﬁendish punishment could be devised . . . than that one
should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all
members thereof . . . [If they] acted as if we were non-existent things, a kind of
rage and impotent despair would ere long well up in us, from which the cruelest bodily tortures would be a relief . . .” (Webb 249).7
But what appears a puzzle in Richard Wright (and incidentally in James
Baldwin’s “Stranger on the Seine”) becomes a strategy in Yamamoto’s essay,
where, as in Pat Parker’s poem, neither noticing nor failing to notice is
acceptable.
Yamamoto’s motif is the sentence with which she begins: “You ask me to
speak.” The “you,” one judges from the incidents, is a non-Asian-American
world in which the writer is made to feel uncomfortable. Apparently unconscious of this collectivizing, she inveighs against the “you” which her math
teacher deploys to collectivize her (“But you’re usually so good at this kind of
thing”). Indeed, there are a series of rhythmic accusations against “you,” such
as “You suggest that housecleaning is a good way to make extra summer
money, then say I’m a snob when I tell you that my grandmothers did not
clean other women’s toilets. . . .” (128). At several points in the essay Yamamoto
provides binary choices, neither of which is acceptable to her. There are, for
example, “liberal arts folks who ignore or overemphasize ‘the Japanese stuff ’ in
my poetry” (130). She quotes Trinh Minh Ha, who describes the ordeal of the
Third World woman intellectual, compelled to expose her work to critics who
“either ignore, dispense with, or overemphasize her racial and sexual attributes” (Yamamoto133). Yamamoto also writes, “when I tell people I write
poetry, they often go on to tell me how much they like haiku, as if it were
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inconceivable that I might write in Homeric dactyls or Dantean terza rima”
(130). Thus, to express admiration for Asian forms or themes would be to collectivize the Asian-American writer, and yet to ignore those elements or to
expect her to write terza rima, would constitute a failure to recognize ethnicity
and would also be unacceptable—more unacceptable, since her next paragraph
begins, “And yet, those particulars [of “Asian-American” experience] are what I
respond to when I read Asian American writers.”
Her essay ends with the remark that “mine is a heritage that knows the
beauty of silence.” Such a remark is not necessarily mis-representative, but a
writer so self-consciously speaking out of an explicitly stated subject position
needs to acknowledge the irony of asserting a cultural continuity that surely
would offend—we know because she has told us so—if others asserted it.
Yamamoto’s article, nevertheless, provides insight into double-binds for
those construed as ethnics in the academy. Obviously, ethnicity is often manipulated from the institutional side. David Palumbo-Liu in an article about representing an ethnic constituency within a literature department, looks at ways
in which “individuals marked by racial difference [have] been asked . . . to forget the personal as it resides in them as racialized beings experiencing race and
at other times not only to recognize the personal as racial but to foreground it
particularly in their scholarly duties” (1075). He says that minority scholars are
“expected either to dismiss race as a factor despite the reality of the way their
race is recognized or to study their race (as ancient culture or contemporary
issue) . . .” (1075). Thus, “Is the request that I teach Maxine Hong Kingston a
sign of the dreaded ethnic ghettoization or a sign of respect?”8
But the double-bind can, in Parker and Yamamoto and others, become a
sort of disingenuous judo, a power move too little examined, even by those
who are learning to use it. In the “personal” issue of PMLA that I have noticed
in this essay, a young scholar named Sheng-Mei Ma tells how he was denied a
teaching assistantship while the non-Asian students “moved on to better
teaching positions in the department.” He argues that his being Asian doomed
him to the demeaning job of media assistant, and that, according to the
English faculty, he must have “appeared to belong to an East Asian or comparative literature program,” although, for that matter, “comparative literature
does not ﬁnd [Asian] candidates genuine enough either.”
Why exactly would any comparative literature department ﬁnd an Asian
student less than “genuine”? And why, at a late-century American university,
most of which assiduously court graduate students of non-European ethnicity,
would such a student be systematically oppressed? The argument gets complicated when Ma confesses that he “toyed with the idea of becoming an Asian
American minority” precisely in order to get a job, suggesting that he was
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aware of the advantages but also that he thought better of it and did not present himself as a minority. But this is not what happened. Originally, he
reports, he refused to identify himself as an Asian and spelled his name “Sean
Ma,” which he thought was an Irish-sounding name. But his professor “set
[him] straight,” shouting at him in the hallway, “‘Sheng-mei, you misspelled
your name!’” “When I whispered my motive,” he says, the professor chided,
“‘You shouldn’t do that.’” Ma regrets that he never had a chance to thank the
professor for teaching him “one of the most valuable lessons I learned in graduate school—my name” (1157-58).
But the lesson he learned was not his name, the importance of which he
already seems to have known, but the reality of the market. Ma did get a job and
quite a good one. Did he try to get it with a counterfeit Irish name because, as
he suggests at one point, the profession prefers Irish to Chinese? In other words,
was his whispered motive to enhance his chances in a racist academy, hoping to
pass as European, or was it, in a spirit of self-sacriﬁce, to level the playing ﬁeld,
not to press an ethnic advantage? Though the latter choice is contrary to his
interpretation of his demeaning experience as a media assistant, he did not, as it
turns out, just “toy with the idea”; he announced—and why not?—his ethnic
name. Through all this account, Ma seems unaware of his ﬂipping back and
forth between two diametrically opposite versions of ethnicity in the academy,
one where it is a boon to be exploited, the other where it is a handicap best concealed. The ﬁrst of these would appear to be struggling up from its repression,
against the complaint, the ignominy of a student who did not get his t.a.-ship.
THE WRITING LESSON

The spelling of Ma’s name, not as Sean but as Sheng-Mei, represents a critical
moment in identity construction, its writing. In a U.S. institutional milieu, when
given the appropriate opportunity in writing, do you or do you not announce
ethnicity? Given market realities, I think, of those who can, few do not. Though
language is the one thing that can prevent our being reduced to bodies, language
is also used to reintroduce the body. Identity cards, passports, birth certiﬁcates,
and genealogies are among the most authenticating texts we possess. As an
example of one of the two most recent horrors of ethnic cleansing,
[W]hen it came down to the matter of deciding who was a Tutsi, the killers relied ﬁrst
on identity cards, which were introduced by Belgians during this century, and secondly upon knowledge of a person’s ancestry. It was after these two lines of inquiry
proved insufﬁcient that physical characteristics were used as an indicator. (Fenton)

Benedict Anderson has also used the identity-card example (“Exodus”), as
has Gayatri Spivak, whose aged mother, carrying an American passport, breezes
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through French customs, while Spivak, “Highly Commodiﬁed” professor and
special guest of the French government, suffers ofﬁcial scrutiny. It is not a matter of color, says Spivak, but of passport (“Postmarked” 90). In the case not of
national but of academic and literary borders, the failure to write identity can
be a mistake. What began—in feminism and minority studies—as a needed
acknowledgement of subject position, problematized or not, has become an
institutional directive. There are concrete penalties for failure to announce difference. One of the most compelling poets in the United States today is Jay
Wright, who was widely heralded through the 1970s and 80s, particularly in
African-American journals. A special issue of Callaloo was devoted to his work;
he won numerous awards, as well as the admiration of critics such as Harold
Bloom, John Hollander, and J.D. McClatchy. But the Yale seal may have been as
damning for him as Borges’ prize from Pinochet. Most of Wright’s books are
now out of print, and his work is not included in any of the Norton anthologies, including the Norton Anthology of African American Literature, even while
poets inﬂuenced by him are included. Is there not a relation between this living
burial and the fact that Jay Wright seldom allows himself to be photographed or
videotaped, and that he writes as much about Southwest Indian roots as about
black America? Is Wright naïve to think that his work should stand on its own?
Anyone can quibble about an anthology, but the exclusions in this case tell a
story. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., the chief editor, along with Nellie McKay, of the
Norton African-American anthology, has long struggled to deﬁne black literature
in a non-essentialist way. And yet essentialism seems to ﬁnd its way back into the
deﬁnition. In 1992, in Loose Canons, Gates wrote of the need not to deﬁne a black
tradition in terms of “a pseudoscience of racial biology, or a mystically shared
essence called blackness,” but rather “by the repetition and revision of shared
themes, topoi, and tropes, a process that binds the signal texts of the black tradition into a canon” (39). At the same time, however, he wrote that we must identify this tradition by moving “inductively, from the texts to the theory” (39).
Michael Bérubé has noted how the inductive method suggested by Gates begs the
question of how one identiﬁes a “black text” (“Beneath” 223). Black literature,
according to the inductive method, would not include, for example, non-black
writers whose works may exhibit the same topoi and tropes to which Gates refers.
Instead, one would ﬁrst read texts by phenotypically black authors and then
decide what the principle topoi and tropes are. If this is to be the method—and
why not?—one would presumably arrive, as the Norton anthology does not, at an
idea of the black tradition that would include writers as celebrated as Jay Wright
or, in a very different sense, Frank Yerby. Yerby was an enormously successful
African-American novelist and at one time probably the wealthiest expatriate
American author (Coles 1999, 149). Though his novels depict racial problems
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among black and white expatriates, similar to those explored by James Baldwin,
Richard Wright, and Nella Larsen, he disavowed “racially conscious” literature
early in his career. At the very least, these writers’ absence from Norton should be
contrasted with the presence of Queen Latifah or Gil-Scott Heron. But at this
point a new series of questions fans out, beyond the scope of this essay: Queen
Latifah but not Duke Ellington and Billy Strayhorn? Not Stevie Wonder?9
Non-white writers who have failed to identify themselves with collectivities
have often suffered infamy as conservatives, apostates, or Europhiles. Richard
Rodriguez is seen on the Chicano left as an arch-conservative and is anthologized in freshman English readers with William Buckley, Linda Chavez, et al,
because he has declared his abhorrence of the “typical” life, because, as he says,
“When I rehearse my life, I describe one life only, my own. Richard Rodriguez,
not even his brother, not his sisters” (12).10 Derek Walcott’s case is similar in
that he has insisted, in a highly nuanced way, on individual agency, has deeply
problematized (though never denied) his role as a speaker of or for the
Caribbean, and has thus been seen, especially by Caribbean insider critics, as a
renegade who has found his niche in the North—this after four decades
devoted to creating a theater tradition in Trinidad and, in more recent years,
after dedicating his Nobel proceeds to found an arts colony in St. Lucia.
Do white writers of ﬁction and poetry suffer anything comparable? There
are ethnic or national cases in which white writers are asked for ﬁdelity to the
group—Seamus Heaney, who used to be criticized for too little addressing the
Troubles in Ireland; or Philip Roth, unﬂattering portrayer/betrayer of the
Jews—but generally they are not asked. Writers of color, on the other hand, are
held accountable to the group and suffer accusations of inauthenticity when
they write texts which their critics or the public deem non-representative.
R E T R O G R A D E PA I N

“Everyone’s tired of my turmoil,” said Robert Lowell in a poem of the
1960s, as his turmoil waxed and his fame waned. Lowell was speaking personally, but he may also have been marking a change in literary tastes and
expectations. No one wanted any longer to hear about individual problems—marriages, divorces, affective disorders, psychic anguish, material or
emotional loss. His students—Anne Sexton, Sylvia Plath, W.D. Snodgrass,
and others—extended the “confessional” mode beyond Lowell, a mode that
still enjoys currency in popular poetry and music, but is anyone in academic
literary studies still interested in hearing a personal account free of collective
dimensions?
It is not as though collectivities mean nothing. It is that they mean too
much. Blackness takes on meanings in the world which the individual did not
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intend and over which s/he has no control. Maleness, similarly, is too large a
category, too overdetermined, to have speciﬁc meaning: it’s as if to say “being
alive” means something. Its repletion of meaning frustrates interpretation. No
one can deny that, in America at least, blackness has had and continues to have
negative meanings attached to it, but even those meanings were never exclusive. Like all signs, black has tended to a diffusion of meaning. My concern is
not only that some of the writers quoted here ignore the speciﬁcity and materiality of the personal in order to announce membership in collectives, but that
they also ignore the welter of conﬂicting and overlapping collectivities among
and through which one actually lives. Nathaniel Mackey’s narrator, in that
poet’s open-ended poem of identity Song of the Andoumboulou, rejects numerous ﬁrst-person plurals as too suspect, too full of failed promise: “No we of
romance we contrived coupling / no nation’s we / collectivity’s wish. . . .” but,
instead: “We / made of how many / who could say?”
How many? The regional we, the we of neighborhoods, the professional
we, all the we’s of unions and teams and affiliations and affinities (music,
sports, religion, politics, even academics!). The affective “we” of empathetic
subjectivity—the we’s of all the loves possible, in and out of family. These are
collectives we move through daily, some saturating our lives more than others. Many can be stronger and more local than race, class, or gender. Thomas
Wolfe’s remark that a French waiter and an American waiter have more in
common than a French banker and a French waiter is observable in one’s own
life, in one’s own profession. It is certainly true of musicians and of poets.
Watch a Japanese and a Spanish musician interact; then watch a Spanish
musician and a Spanish attorney.
To miss these other collectivities and bonds is also to miss the crucial
insight that identity is a limitless process of becoming, always in dialogue with
otherness, a dialogue much enhanced when investment in a single identity is
withdrawn. The painter David Hockney has pointed out that to choose a single
perspective is to be dead. To be alive, we must keep displacing perspective. If
perspective is ﬁxed, time is stopped, and space is petriﬁed. “To have a ﬁxed
point, you have no movement; you are not there, really” (qtd. in Costello 15).
One must be willing to engage a wider community of individuals, a wider net
of continuities.
The claim for diversity at the heart of multiculturalism continues to be
undermined precisely by the insistence on cultural holisms and ethnic continuities, the insistence on borders rather than border crossings, on authenticity
rather than on hybridity and agency.11 Are the border crossers somehow not
“multicultural”? The great Chicano novelist Daniel James, the great British
novelist Kazue Ishiguro, or the great British novelist Konrad Korzeniowski; the
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great French poet Edgar Poe or the great French poet Frank O’Hara; the great
American novelist Vladimir Nabokov, the great classical poet Derek Walcott,
the great Aztec poet Jay Wright, and so on—culture-traitors all? The Race
Traitors magazine would do well to consider examples other than “whites”
longing to be “black.” Crossings require sacriﬁce of the heimlich’s complacency; they foster a sharper awareness of the genuinely porous boundaries, if
boundaries at all, between cultures.
Finally, speaking “as a” white, black, Chicana, Jew, and so on raises more problems than it can possibly address. If bourgeois individualism has now had the
examination it needed, speaking “as a” has not.12 If the individual subject was
problematic and suspect, the collective is no less so. And if we are to speak “as”
something, it must be more than a recital of historical/positional categories.
Though discrete human communities certainly treasure continuities, we
should consider just how locally constructed our (U.S.) ideas of the collective
are. J. M. Coetzee has suggested that Americans may have something to learn
from the South African critique of ethnicity. He observes that the idea of “natural” groups seems to be accepted in an unexamined way in the United States,
whereas, among the Left in South Africa, there is a strongly skeptical attitude
toward the naturalness of groups (“tribes,” “peoples,” or “races”), and a correspondingly strong deconstructive treatment of the histories and literatures of
such groups. This is a natural reaction to having lived for forty years under a
regime whose social, educational, and cultural policies were based on the postulate of separate (God-given) groups with separate destinies (Begam 428).
If reinscribing essentialism, as Coetzee suggests, plays into the hands of those
who essentialize in order to repress, does not anti-essentialism—one might ask—
play into the hands of critics who deconstruct in order to disenfranchise? The
question, then, must be how to extend the critique of the Subject without falling
into the camp of those who would use it to silence others. Anti-essentialism is
suspect among some Left academics, for example, because they see it as a critique
exploited by the Right. But one person’s anti-essentialism does not spring from
the same sources or serve the same purposes as another’s. What is needed is an
anti-essentialism that subsumes these arguments, one that can account for the
uses and excesses of “authenticity” narratives as well as of versions of representation that would reduce all traits and continuities to features of a text.
G E N D E R A N D T R A N S PA R E N C Y

I’ve noted the preponderance of women’s names in this essay, about two
females to one male. If this should seem askew, consider that the ratio is more
than ten to one in The Intimate Critique: Autobiographical Literary Criticism.
Of the twenty-two authors represented, two are male. The editors, apparently

In the Name of the Subject

71

ﬁnding as I did much more autobiographical criticism by women than by
men, offer in their introduction a theory of “male” and “female” modes of discourse—the one formal and hierarchical, the other “open-ended, generative,
and process-oriented” (2).13
In observing that some women will write in a male mode and some men in
a female, the editors are careful to acknowledge the essentializing potential of
such oppositions (Ice People v. Sun People?). Does the opposition return us to
the disturbing topos examined by numerous feminist critics—the idea of narrative as female, indeed of woman as native, as unreﬂective “experience,” transparent and knowable, opposed to man as knower, as cognitive, inscrutable? Do
men theorize, while women write poems and novels?
It is surprising how readily an academic writer can, perhaps unwittingly,
submit to a view of Nature as female and Culture as male. Gayatri Spivak has
discussed how in the history of theory since the Enlightenment, the chief problem has been that of autobiography, the problem of how “subjective structures
can, in fact, give objective truth” (“Questions” 66). In one of the PMLA letters
on the Personal, Agnes Moorhead Jackson, identifying herself as an “other” in
the “white male heterosexual” academy, one “who know[s] from the inside,”
presents this idea of Spivak’s as if it were the raison d’etre of the personal in criticism, writing that “our lives are the ‘subjective structures’ that ‘can . . .give
objective truth’” (1159).
Jackson does not notice that Spivak is warning us against precisely this reiﬁcation of native (and female) “experience” as an object of study by male “scientists.” Spivak reminds us how the discourse of the “Native Informant” became
“objective evidence” in the founding of ethnography, comparative religion,
and linguistics. Spivak ends that interview saying
The person who knows has all the problems of selfhood. The person who is known,
somehow seems not to have a problematic self. These days . . . [o]nly the dominant
self can be problematic; the self of the Other is authentic without a problem, naturally available to all kinds of complications. This is very frightening. (66)

How such an explicit warning can be ignored is a mystery. This gendered
division of labor (women write novels, men do theory) is not new. In modern
culture, as David Simpson has pointed out, sensibility and expression have
usually been associated with or allocated to women. Literariness, after all, was
thought to consist of fables, poems, and myths, suitable for women and children. Stories must be told by embodied subjects living in history, not by the
male founders of global and “neutral” theories, whose own historicity must be
downplayed for those theories to be credible. It is with this division in mind
that Nancy Armstrong argues that the very notion of modern subjectivity

72

Personal Effects

came into being as feminized: “the modern individual was ﬁrst and foremost a
woman” (Desire and Domestic Fiction, qtd. in Simpson 95).
To conﬂate for a moment the issues of gender and ethnicity, consider that,
among postcolonial critics, Gayatri Spivak and Sara Suleri frequently
announce their problematic subject positions, while Abdul JanMohammed
and Homi Bhabha do not. Among white critics in cultural studies, do Andrew
Ross or Cary Nelson or Werner Sollors or Frederic Jameson tell autobiographical stories? If not, are they playing the neutrality game so much under antihumanist ﬁre, or have they simply found nothing in the way of birth or
upbringing that they can use to authenticate their writing? Signiﬁcantly,
Michael Bérubé, in writing about the centrality of the personal, also leaves out
any personal account. He does use a conventional ﬁrst person, a pleasant,
familiar “I.” Indeed, Bérubé’s recognizable style gives us a person, without our
being told his race or gender or his familial or professional struggles. Whatever
his reasons, he has chosen to leave those details out.14
I think, in short, if someone wanted to do the work of quantifying, s/he
would ﬁnd that male scholars do not insert or assert the autobiographical nearly
as often as female scholars do, and that white males, always with exceptions, continue to be the least autobiographical in critical writing. The penalty they incur
for not announcing a position is negligible or at least milder—accusations of
feigned neutrality, universalism, spurious “objectivity”—than that incurred by
writers of color, whose failure to mark identity can entail consequences such as I
have described above.
THE FUTURE OF THE PERSONAL

Personal experience does not exist in an uninterpretable sphere. To say so is
not to deny suffering; instead, it is to assert the one thing that cultural and literary critics are supposed to know: that representations matter, particularly
those we make to ourselves. Some people recover completely and even immediately from violence or deprivation; others, who never experienced such traumas, are troubled all their lives. To postmodernize Epictetus: it is a question of
how—or even if—we read the text of our experience. Leaning over the river of
your life, you may see incoherent eddies; or you may see a face. You may decide
that face is your own, or you may not.
While many readers now realize that serious thought is not separate from
an embodied subject in history, the critique of that subject is certainly incomplete and more necessary than ever. These two realities account for the troubled shift one often notices in contemporary writing between essentialist and
anti-essentialist modes, a restless movement between linguistic, anti-transparent positions and the foundation-hungry insistence on subjectivity.
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Perhaps one of the reasons this contradiction cannot be worked out is
that the discussion takes place within a democratic paradigm. Ethnicity is a
contrastive positionality, lived in the meeting of cultures, and often
expressed as a figure-ground relationship. In more than a linguistic sense,
black has been marked in a white world, female in a male world, short in a
tall world (We ask, “How tall are you?”). To take less inflammatory examples,
motion is marked in a world where most things appear to be at rest, or irony
in a world where “sincerity” is assumed. These latter examples, while less
obviously hierarchical than the oppositions of black and white, female and
male, illustrate the same problem: if all utterance is ironic, as some critics
will say, then there is no irony. If we are all mestizo, then the ground has
become as neutral as it was when no one accounted for subject position,
when “objectivity” was assumed.
Whatever forms the critique of the subject takes, the personal will survive,
in the face of (or the wake of) poststructuralist arguments that subjectivity is
discursively constituted. It will do so not by means of explicit positional statements, made under duress to expiate the guilt of achieved individuality, but
more likely in the way that the personal has always survived—through what
Hans Vaihinger once called the philosophy of “as if.” We live as if we were not at
birth sentenced to death; we speak as if language referred to a world outside
itself; and we act as if we were the loci of coherent subjectivities anterior to our
actions and speech. But theorists, at least, should not forget that these suppositions are constructed; they should not too easily revert either to the authority
of categories or to the authority of experience, whether to convert ontology
into epistemology or to move goods in a competitive market.
Some of the most prominent postcolonial critics—Gayatri Spivak, Edward
Said, Homi Bhabha, Satya Mohanty, Sara Suleri—have come out in recent
years as proponents of something that sounds a lot like liberal humanism
(“authentic humanism” in Said, “subaltern secularism” in Bhabha, “post-positivist objectivity” in Mohanty). But a return to humanism need not mean the
imposition of the values of one group upon others.15 Rather, it entails (these
critics and others remind us) a settling for the incomplete. Hope of a universal
humanism will be compromised by those groups that deny the intrinsic worth
of others. An “authentic” or “subaltern” or “new” humanism must be conscious of these perils. Similarly, anti-essentialism need not be discredited
because some critics or political ﬁgures have exploited it, particularly considering its problematic if not malign alternatives.
The paradox is that what people share is what they cannot share: consciousness, pain, unrecuperable feeling. This unknowability is shared by and among
individuals. If consciousness, the place of the subject, cannot be represented in
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words, yet, in “isolate ﬂecks,” as William Carlos Williams said, “something/ is
given off.” It is given off not so much in statements about the self, and least of all
in the checking of boxes on a form, as it is in actions, and especially, in this context, the action of writing.

NOTES

I am grateful to Steven Gould Axelrod, Susie Lan Cassel, David Bleich, Julia
Fiedorczuk, Melissa Fabros, Felipe Smith, and particularly Dermot Quinn for
their suggestions on earlier versions of this article.
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

The twenty-six letters were grouped under two rubrics, more or less “pro”
and “con”: “The Inevitability of the Personal” (sixteen letters) and “Problems
With the Personal” (ten letters). Of the latter, only two, David Simpson’s and
Terry Caesar’s, can be said to question the trend of autobiography in criticism of the last decade or so.
See also note 13 below, regarding “The Male and Female Modes of Rhetoric,”
quoted in The Intimate Critique.
While I do not want to place quotation marks around every use of “black”
and “white,” or to say “those construed as white according to local conventions,” I use these terms unhappily and under erasure, subsuming and disguising as they do an enormous range of nationalities and identities.
“Transculturation,” a term coined by Cuban sociologist Fernando Ortíz, means
that the peripheral culture selects what it wants from the metropolitan or colonizing culture, not that it merely “acculturates,” in the earlier model of cultural
transference, absorbing and changing itself helplessly. “Transculturation,” is
invoked by Pratt not just as an object of study but as a procedure whereby she,
as author, may avoid falling under the spell of hegemonic travel texts and thus
reproducing or reinscribing their imperial modes.
Though less frequent, acknowledgments of limitations by male critics do of
course appear. An example is this prefatory statement by George Lipsitz,
from Dangerous Crossroads: “As a North American limited by the parochialism and prejudices of my life and my culture, I know that my efforts to interpret and analyze political and cultural practices from contexts far different
from my own are likely to fall short in ways that I cannot anticipate” (17).
In the introduction to Culture and Imperialism, for example, Said writes that
“all cultures are involved in one another; none is single and pure, all are
hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic”
(xxv). In “Representing the Colonized,” he writes of the need to see Others
“not as ontologically given but as historically constituted” and in this way “to
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erode the exclusivist biases we so often ascribe to cultures, our own not
least.”
I have discussed Richard Wright’s Paris experience in “Essentialism and the
Mulatto Traveler: Europe as Embodiment in Nella Larsen’s Quicksand.”
This is not the place to take up the question of whether phenotypic markings authorize a person to teach a given subject area, but for many university
search committees, they clearly do. See Nellie McKay on the problems created by committees’ insistence on ethnicity in African-American studies.
Editors Gates and McKay do acknowledge the omission of Jay Wright in this
note in their preface:
With the exceptions of the poetry of Jay Wright, Zora Neale Hurston’s
Their Eyes Were Watching God, and the short ﬁction of Gayl Jones, which could
not be included here for reasons of copyright, our anthology contains the texts
that, in the judgment of the editors, deﬁne the canon of African-American literature at the present time. (xxxvii)

10.
11.
12.

Jay Wright’s work, however, was not excluded for reasons of copyright.
After writing my remarks about his absence from the Norton anthology, I
learned from a letter from Jay Wright, that Gates and McKay had suggested
publishing some early poems (two from Wright’s ﬁrst book and a very small
one from his sixth), but they wanted none of Wright’s more serious work,
from the later books upon which his reputation rests. This, at least in Jay
Wright’s view, still constitutes exclusion, since the conditions for inclusion
were unacceptable. The work excluded is work not perceived as “black”
according to the “shared themes, topoi, and tropes” which the editors, quite
non-inductively, consider indispensable; it is also work done in forms not
conventionally associated with the African-American tradition. These exclusions, obviously, are an editor’s prerogative, but so is it a reader’s to question
them.
The other correction I need to add here is that, while Wright’s principal
volumes remain out of print, his collected poems will appear in late 2000.
See Henry Staten’s excellent reappraisal of Rodriguez in the 1998 PMLA
Ethnicity issue.
For a full development of this point, see Susan Stewart, “The State of Cultural
Theory and the Future of Literary Form,” in the 1993 MLA Profession.
I take this in part from Nancy K. Miller: “But if ‘identity politics’ has challenged
bourgeois self-representation—with all its unself-conscious exclusions—
speaking ‘as a’ has emerged as an equally problematic representativity” (qtd. in
Gubar 386). See also Gayatri Spivak: “The moment I have to think of the ways
in which I will speak as an Indian, or as a feminist, the ways in which I will
speak as a woman, what I am doing is trying to distance myself from some kind
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of inchoate speaking as such. There are many subject positions which one must
inhabit; one is not just one thing.” (“Questions” 60)
While setting out this opposition as helpful if not deﬁnitive, they distance
themselves from it by noting that they are drawing on an article by Thomas
J. Farrell titled “The Male and Female Modes of Rhetoric.” Nevertheless, they
do not question it. Quoting Farrell, they say that the female mode “seems at
times to obfuscate the boundary between the self of the author and the subject of the discourse, as well as between the self and the audience, whereas
the male mode tends to accentuate such boundaries” (2).
In another essay and context, however, Bérubé does speak autobiographically, offering a lively account of his coming of age in “Discipline and
Theory,” his contribution to Wild Orchids and Trotsky.
Among others who note this, see Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity, in
which he argues that universalism should not be rejected because of the ethnocentric uses to which it has sometimes been put. Nations have demonstrated (recently, in the case of the French in Rwanda) that actions can be
taken on behalf of humanity. Moreover, universalism does not in fact motivate colonial projects, though it has been used to justify them. Finally,
Todorov argues that what is universal is “not one quality or another, but the
capacity to acquire any of them.”

PA R T T WO
Self-Inclusion in Literary Scholarship

3

RADICAL INTROSPECTION IN
SCHOLARSHIP AND TEACHING
BRENDA DALY

My best teaching takes place when I am most attentive to students, when I am
fully engaged in listening to and learning from them, when I am talking with
them, not at them. Unfortunately, I am not always capable of such deep listening. Students sense this immediately. They may not accuse me directly, as my
son has on occasion—“Mom, you’re not paying attention!”—but their
demeanor changes. It’s a subtle thing, but palpable. Over the years, I have come
to understand, primarily through the introspective practice of personal scholarship, that I am most attentive to students after ﬁrst attending to my own needs.
As I studied to become an English professor, one of my greatest needs was to
integrate my past and present selves, my private and professional selves, my
teacher and scholar-selves. I knew, before post-structuralists told me, that the
notion of a uniﬁed self is an illusion; at the same time, I often experienced this
fragmentation as debilitating rather than liberating. When I began graduate
school in the late 1970s, I used a private journal to achieve some degree of
coherence even as my private life was fragmented by my professional ambitions.
In time, however, my study of feminist theory prompted me to question the
necessity of maintaining the boundaries between my journal and my academic
essays. If I were to put into practice the feminist credo, the personal is the political, I would have to acknowledge that two topics central to my scholarship, sexual violation and motherhood, were also autobiographical. In order to change
the world—along with other feminists—I would have to write transgressively,
challenging public hierarchies and practices with stories of their often painful
consequences in the realm of so-called “personal experience.” At the urging of
feminist professors, I began to write such essays in the early 1980s. By early
1990, women students who had read my autobiographical scholarship began
asking me to teach them how to use the personal in their academic essays.
Initially, I was surprised by their interest in personal criticism; however, I soon
recognized that they too felt the need to understand the mother-daughter relationship or, in some instances, recover from the painful effects of sexual violation. As a result, they sought out opportunities to read, reﬂect on, and write
about these complex and sometimes traumatic experiences.
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What these women students found—in studies of novels by Edith Wharton,
Joyce Carol Oates, Jamaica Kincaid, Jane Smiley, Dorothy Allison, and Toni
Morrison—is that autobiographical reading and writing is a complex creative
process, at once emotional and analytical. Personal scholarship has also helped
these students to heal from personal pain while, at the same time, changing their
ways of understanding themselves and the world. I call this teaching/learning
process “radical introspection.” As James Hill deﬁnes it, radical introspection
challenges “individualist constructions of pedagogy” and has as its goal “insight
toward social action” (18). As Hill says, the concept is rooted in the liberal feminist notion, “the personal is the political,” and in “the Italian Marxist Antonio
Gramsci’s concept of the organic intellectual, and the African American tradition of prophetic Christianity” (Hill 5). Although some academics view the use
of the personal in scholarship as a narcissistic, unreﬂective practice—Dale Bauer
claims, for example, that “writing about the personal aims to recapture the
immediacy of context and to suggest an authoritative experiential stance but
which, no surprise here, seems only to reify the personal” (57)—the practice of
radical introspection does not “reify the personal;” rather, it often enables reﬂective practitioners to move beyond what Maurice Natanson calls “egologic”
(quoted in Bleich’s The Double Perspective 46).
I want to emphasize, however, that radical introspection requires emotional
as well as intellectual honesty; without acknowledgment of emotions that many
of us would rather disavow—envy, guilt, resentment, shame—the practice cannot succeed. Unfortunately, as Jane Tompkins points out in A Life in School, the
academy does not encourage introspection. Higher education has failed, she
says, to “focus on the inner lives of students or help them acquire the self-understanding that is the basis for a satisfying life. Nor, by and large, does it provide the
safe and nurturing environment that people need in order to grow” (xii).
Furthermore, as Tompkins argues in “Me and My Shadow,” many intellectuals,
having been taught that emotions should have no part in the process of acquiring knowledge, fear and disparage emotions. “The strength of the taboo,”
Tompkins says,“can be gauged by the academician’s inevitable recourse to namecalling when emotion, spirituality, and imagination are brought into the curricular conversation: ‘touchy-feely,’ ‘soft,’ ‘unrigorous,’ ‘mystical,’ ‘therapeutic,’ and
‘Mickey Mouse’ are the all-time favorites, with ‘psychobabble’ and ‘bullshit’ not
far behind” (Life in School 214). Indeed, according to David Bleich, “There is an
unacknowledged fantasy in the program of cognitive science that intellectual
work must be separate from its feelings and passions, must be autonomous relative to its human and social contexts” (“Academic Ideology,” 573). Because many
academics hold such views, I continue to feel vulnerable when using the personal
in my scholarship and teaching; nevertheless, the practice of self-inclusion has
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helped my students and me to resist and even transform debilitating ways of
understanding the world.
In this essay I will give several examples of the process of radical introspection, a process from which the teacher learns as much as the students. The ﬁrst
example comes from my own autobiographical writing. After my mother’s
death in August 1997, I decided that, rather than attempting to contain my
grief, I would continue a project begun before her death: analyzing the effects
of my mother’s limited education on her life and mine. In an effort to reunderstand my mother’s so-called “personal” experience of schooling within a
broader social, political, and historical context, I read Madeleine R. Grumet’s
Bitter Milk, Carmen Luke’s Pedagogies of Everyday Life, and Wendy Luttrell’s
Schoolsmart and Motherwise: Working-Class and Women’s Identity and
Schooling, each of which gave me a new perspective on my mother’s education.
Here is a brief excerpt from my essay, entitled “Weeping for the Mother”:
Like the stories of working-class women in Wendy Luttrell’s Schoolsmart and
Motherwise, my story is one of “persistent sadness and regret, what Nancy
Chodorow calls ‘weeping for the mother’” (97). I weep for my mother, a major ﬁgure in the story of my schooling, primarily because her life was severely limited by
her lack of a formal education—speciﬁcally, a feminist education. I do not, however,
mean to suggest that my mother was completely unschooled; despite the fact she did
not complete high school, she did learn lessons outside the classroom—at home, at
church, from television and magazines.
Because I wanted a better understanding of her education, I once asked her what
she had read as a child. She answered, “I read little women when I was a teenager. I
imagined myself as Jo. I’m going to read it again. Never was anything read to me [at
home] as a child. I remember most vividly my Sunday School Pamphlets. I took them
most seriously, and Mrs. Schultz, my teacher, made everything come alive for me”
(letter, September 24, 1994). Following this brief narrative about her own reading,
my mother quickly shifted focus, giving this account of her father as a reader: “I
remember being impressed with my Daddy sitting uncomfortably on a kitchen chair,
tilted back under a single light bulb—reading far into the nite.” Remarkably, when
asked about her own reading, she puts the spotlight on her father, a man who, even at
the age of 72, she called “Daddy.” She’s still daddy’s little girl,” one of my brothers
recently observed, with bitter accuracy. Like the working-class women in Luttrell’s
study, my mother tends to describe men—her father or husband—as school-smart,
while discounting her own intelligence. My mother did not believe that the story of
her schooling had value, probably because, unlike the subjects in Luttrell’s study, she
had never had the opportunity to share her story in a classroom setting.

The sharing of such stories would be encouraged in some feminist classrooms while, ordinarily, it would not be allowed. Unfortunately, feminist
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efforts to allow women to integrate their experiences and their schooling, their
emotions and intellects, continue to be misconstrued and devalued by university and college administrators. For example, in Jill Ker Conway’s recent memoir True North, this former college president explains that she was opposed to
the founding of Women’s Studies programs because, for one thing, they are
based on “specious ideologies about ‘feminist’ or excessively nurturant teaching styles as a justiﬁcation for less real research.” She continues, “Overly nurturant teaching, from which all overt criticism has been removed seemed to me
to run the same danger for the young as permissive child rearing, because both
obfuscate the nature of power and thus limit the possibility of rebellion” (218).
Why does Ker Conway assume that feminists would be “overly nurturant,”
and why does she assume that feminists would “obfuscate the nature of power”?
Perhaps some feminist professors do make this mistake; however, since my feminist professors have been both rigorous and nurturing, while also recognizing
the need to analyze power relations, it is possible that Ker Conway’s view of
feminist teaching is based on an unexamined, sentimental view of mothering.
The best mothers are not overly-nurturant; instead, as Jessica Benjamin argues
in The Bonds of Love, they maintain the tension between the demands of self
and other rather than simply sacriﬁcing their own needs, boundaries, or expectations. As redeﬁned by Benjamin, the dialogic nature of maternal thinking has
important pedagogical implications; nevertheless, we are just beginning to
understand why many women experience “an epistemological revolution”
(Belenky et al 34) when they become mothers. One’s world view alters dramatically when it becomes necessary to care for another person—and, at its best,
teaching is caring for other people. Nevertheless, many higher education
administrators remain suspicious of the goals of supposedly “overly nurturant”
feminist pedagogy.1 Why? One answer can be found in the historical exclusion
of maternal thinking from higher education, an exclusion that resulted from
the “feminization” of primary and secondary education.
According to Madeleine Grumet, the feminization of teaching during the
nineteenth century enabled more women to enter the profession; however,
women teachers were discouraged from assuming administrative positions;
instead, they were expected to control the children while they, in turn, submitted to (male) administrative control. But most important, schools were organized to encourage the child’s identiﬁcation with the father through a gradual
differentiation from maternal nurturance. As a result, higher education came
to be deﬁned by the absence of maternal values and practices. As Luttrell
points out, “A sexual division of labor is built into the American educational
system as its working assumption” (91-91). My mother’s acceptance of this
sexual division of labor is evident in her assumption that men, such as her
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father, are school-smart while she, having been a mother all her adult life, is
not. Despite the intellectual challenges of nurturing children, my mother holds
the view that her “instinctive” maternal practice must remain outside the
bounds of formal schooling. So pervasive is this view of mothering—that it is
an instinctive rather than a rational practice—that feminist philosopher Sara
Ruddick began her book Maternal Thinking by asserting that, yes, mothering
does require thought. Maternal thinking continues to be excluded from higher
education as evident from the continuing exclusion of emotions from most
university and college classrooms. As a result, women often experience schooling as a painful process of leaving their mothers behind.
My understanding of this painful loss of the maternal in the academy—and
of my own need for radical introspection—was deepened by a former graduate student, DeRionne Pollard, who now teaches writing and literature at a
community college in Illinois. In a conference paper Pollard presented at my
invitation, she equates the loss of her mother with the loss of her personal
voice in academic writing. In the following letter to Pollard, included here with
her permission, I respond to her effort to integrate her personal and academic
voices which, as she explains, remain segregated in two different papers, one
academic, the other personal.
Dear DeRionne,
I am deeply moved by both your papers, the academic essay, “I Hear You, You
Hear Me,” and the personal paper, “Mother-Hunger: A Struggle to Find My Voice,”
which will, I hope, eventually become part of the academic paper. On hearing you
say, at the conference here in the fall of 1997, that you had “come to hate writing,” I
felt such grief and guilt: as your primary writing mentor, I had taught you to hate
academic writing. You also said, “Yes, I know the academic language, but I really
don’t like it. It is so hard for me to translate my voice to paper. Something always
gets lost in the translation” (“I Hear” 3).

In fact, when DeRionne expressed frustration with academic writing, I had
offered her the opportunity to write a more creative introduction to her thesis,
but I did not allow any departure from academic conventions in the remaining
three chapters because, I explained, she might wish to submit these chapters as
writing samples in her applications to graduate schools. Despite such misgivings, I strive to listen attentively and respond respectfully as DeRionne continues to explain her feelings about academic writing. I reply:
Your conference paper on the use of personal narratives in the academy has caused
me to reﬂect on and change my pedagogy. In that paper, you state, “This fear of
writing has paralyzed me partially because I feel incompetent” (“I Hear” 3). At ﬁrst,
DeRionne, I resisted your harsh self-assessment; I wanted to point out that you are a
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highly competent student who understands theoretical concepts and effectively
incorporated them into your writing. In fact, I nominated your thesis for a department award because I felt you had become an excellent writer. How, then, did you
came to feel “incompetent”? At the same time, I believe you felt incompetent, primarily because I have had similar feelings. Like you, I have sometimes felt that my
own voice was “lost in translation” in an academic essay, and like you, I have often
questioned my authority as a writer and teacher. Also, like you, I have wondered
whether, after taking my courses, students are “better writers” (“I Hear” 2). As a
result, I have begun to ask, as you have, “How do I foster a connection between my
students’ personal and academic voices?” (“I Hear” 3).

As this dialogue illustrates, the practice of radical introspection does not
simply “reify the personal,” but rather forces me to move beyond egologic: my
perception of DeRionne’s experience as a student does not match her perception. Initially, I want to defend myself, silencing DeRionne’s experience of
incompetence by insisting that she accept my view of her as highly competent
with theory. After all, my intentions are good: if she accepts my view, she will
feel better, won’t she? But, reminding myself that the practice of radical introspection must be emotionally as well as intellectually honest, I acknowledge
that I too have sometimes felt a sense of loss and self-doubt. Through
DeRionne’s honest analysis of her own pedagogy, as a community college
teacher, I begin to reﬂect on my own teaching. My letter to her continues:
Now, as a teacher at a community college, you express fear that your students will
lose their joy in writing, just as you did. Speaking of a bright student, you write, “I
was so fearful of Cheyenne losing this joy for writing while she was in my class” (“I
Hear” 6). But Cheyenne didn’t lose her joy for writing; in her ﬁnal letter to you she
wrote: “Our relationship helped me not only because it reassured me that this is
what I’m meant to do, it made me feel like there were people out there that care as
much about writing as I do. It made me think about my writing with a renewed
sense of enthusiasm as well as in a realistic sense. That I shouldn’t put so much pressure on myself to be a huge success as a writer, but just to write. And probably the
most important thing is to recognize my own voice and to know that I am in everything that I write” (“I Hear” 9). You succeeded, DeRionne: you gave Cheyenne a safe
place, in an exchange of personal letters with you, to voice her concerns about your
pedagogy, and—most important—her feelings about her relationship with you.

DeRionne has succeeded with her student Cheyenne, whereas I have failed
with DeRionne. Nevertheless, because there is trust between us—DeRionne
accepted my invitation to present this conference paper, and she is willing to
speak the truth to me—I can learn from my past failures; that is, if I can listen
and respond without becoming defensive:
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At ﬁrst, you explain, you adopted a pedagogy of distance because “If I wasn’t too
connected to them personally, if I didn’t know enough about them to understand
why and how they write, I would be able to maintain my distance which would
allow for objective evaluation” (“I Hear” 7). At ﬁrst you felt that, because you tended
“to get too involved” with students, this distancing strategy would enable you to be
“fair.” I too have felt the necessity of distancing myself from students in order to
evaluate their work fairly. But when you say, “If I didn’t know them, I wouldn’t have
to hear them” (“I Hear” 7), I must acknowledge what is lost with the adoption of
this pedagogy of distance. Through your exchange of letters with Cheyenne, you
came to understand that this distance was consistent with “valuing the academic
writing and the academic voice” but at the same time you were “moving away from
personal writing” (“I Hear” 7). Why, you began to wonder, were you doing this? To
answer this question, you cite the theory of muted groups:
The theory of muted groups was developed to describe situations in which
groups of people are in asymmetrical power relationships) e.g., blacks and whites;
colonizers and the colonized). The theory proposes that language and the norms for
its uses are controlled by the dominant group. Members of the muted group are disadvantaged in articulating their experience, since the language they use is derived
largely from the perceptions of the dominant group. . . . In order to be heard, muted
group members must learn the dominant idiom and attempt to articulate within it,
even though this attempt will inevitably lead to some loss of learning. The experiences “lost in translation” to the dominant idiom remain unvoiced, and perhaps
unthought. (Crawford and Chafﬁn 21).

Recalling that DeRionne had read this essay on muted group theory in my
seminar,“The American Canon Debate,” I felt some relief: at least she had learned
something of value from me. But my relief was short-lived because I quickly recognized that by teaching only theory, I had forced her to mute her personal voice.
I am unwilling to give up the theoretical; after all, DeRionne is using theory—the
theory of muted groups—to explain why the muting of her personal voice in academic writing has caused her to feel “lost in translation.” At the same time, our
dialogue has prompted me to reﬂect on my pedagogy. As my letter continues, I
ask DeRionne how we might overcome our mother-hunger in the academy:
I wonder, DeRionne: if we devise a more self-inclusive pedagogy, will it be possible to overcome the mother-hunger we both feel? Do you think that by using the
personal in our scholarly writing we might provide our students and ourselves with
the emotional nurture for which we hunger? In “Mother-Hunger” you write, “My
mother-hunger has immobilized my voice and has rendered me silent. It is like I
have cut out my own tongue because I don’t want to speak of the pain I feel” (n.p.).
This insight, that the pain of mother-hunger had silenced your personal voice, is of
great value. You have articulated a powerful argument for the use of the personal—the
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emotional, the embodied, the poetic—in academic writing. By censoring this voice,
the voice of the mother, academic discourses cut us off, as you point out, from our sustenance, from our linguistic and physical foundations. This, then, is yet another way
that the mother—in all her guises—is censored in higher education. Like you, I have
found that “mother-hunger is powerful and mysterious;” for example, after becoming
a full professor in 1997 I was almost disabled by my disavowal of aspects of my identity associated with the maternal: my body, my emotions, my personal life. As you say,
“Mother-hunger creeps up on you. You don’t feel her coming, although deep down
you know you will have to face her someday” (n. p.). As you say, eventually she “sneaks
up on you like a shadow” (n. p.).

After sharing some of my own experiences with this “shadow,”2 I conclude
my letter to DeRionne by describing what her writing has taught me:
The repression of the personal voice in favor of the theoretical, as I learned from
your beautiful essay, “Mother-Hunger,” is yet another way in which the academy
devalues the maternal. However, I believe that the solution to this problem is not to
disavow academic writing, but to integrate our personal and theoretical voices in
our scholarship. We must also, as you have taught me, introduce this mixed mode of
writing to our students. My failure to introduce you to personal criticism has taught
me a valuable lesson: that students have a powerful need, not simply a desire, to
integrate the personal voice into academic writing. But I wonder if I have fully
understood your experience of being muted in the academy: because you are black
and I am white, because you are a lesbian and I am a heterosexual, your experience
is also different from mine. In order to continue this exploration of our differences,
I am emulating the epistolary pedagogy you employed with your student,
Cheyenne. Just as you felt that Cheyenne became your teacher, you have become my
teacher. With your help, I hope that my future students will not “come to hate writing” (2), as you have.
With love,

Although I failed to introduce personal criticism to Ms. Pollard, I had begun to
teach this transgressive mode of writing to other graduate students, but only
upon request and only in tutorials. In the writing of these women students I saw a
recurrence of two major topics, both traumatic—the loss of the mother and the
experience of sexual violation. These women’s self-inclusive academic essays illustrate Shoshana Felman’s arguments that “every woman’s life contains, explicitly or
in implicit ways, the story of a trauma” (16);” they also illustrate Felman’s point
that the lack of an autobiography is, in fact, the condition of all women. She says,
In spite of the contemporary literary fashion of feminine confessions and of the recent
critical fashion of ‘feminist confessions,’ I will suggest that none of us, as women, has
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as yet, precisely, an autobiography. Trained to see ourselves as objects and positioned
as the Other, estranged to ourselves, we have a story that by deﬁnition cannot be selfpresent to us, a story that, in other words, is not a story, but must become a story. (14)

Initially, I resisted the notion that all women are trauma victims because it
does not take into account the fact that some women—holocaust or rape victims,
for example—suffer much more severely than others. How, I wonder, is it possible
to argue, as Felman does, that women, as women, do not have autobiographies?
The answer, as feminists have been arguing for some time, is that male-dominated
institutions continue to train women to see themselves as “Other.” If this training
is not completely successful, if a woman’s psyche does not come to mirror the militaristic structure of the university, she experiences a sense of estrangement.
Fortunately, the militaristic ideology of universities is now being exposed
and criticized. David Bleich argues, for example, that the current grading system enforces a hidden ideology—an ideology based on militarism—that
requires the exclusion of feelings. Through hierarchical evaluation of both
teachers and students, according to Bleich, the academy maintains its “unacknowledged fantasy . . . that intellectual work must be separate from its feelings
and passions, must be autonomous relative to its human and social context”
(“Academic Ideology” 573). The academy’s repression of feelings, along with its
emphasis on individualism, creates a competitive atmosphere that makes it difﬁcult for faculty and students to develop a sense of trust. Without trust and a
sense of community, individuals feel embattled and isolated. Perhaps, through
an exchange of our stories, faculty and students might put aside competitiveness, as DeRionne and I do. Unfortunately, such exchanges are often prevented
by the conventions of academic writing. How, in such an intellectual warrior
culture, are women students to become “storied selves”? Felman answers that
women can do so only indirectly: “by conjugating literature, theory, and autobiography together through the act of reading and by reading, thus, into the texts
of culture, at once our sexual difference and our autobiography as missing”
(14). If Felman is right, the use of the personal in scholarship is not, at least for
women, a self-indulgent practice but, rather, a necessity. In addition, as Felman
emphasizes, this act of “conjugating” requires collective action—“together
through the act of reading and by reading, thus, into the texts of culture”—of
the kind in which my women students and I have engaged.
Unfortunately, traditional grading practices frequently undermine the establishment of trust between students and teachers, and without such trust it is difﬁcult—through this conjugating of literature, theory and autobiography—to
transform the texts of culture. Despite this obstacle, my students and I have
sometimes managed to create islands of trust, although less often in formal
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classroom settings, within a competitive university. When a student tells me her
story, and I tell her mine—always in the privacy of my ofﬁce—we are able to
begin the work of conjugating, the work of radical introspection. Students often
describe this conjugating of literature, theory, and autobiography as a means of
“integrating” formerly disparate “voices” or selves. Such claims of self-integration may suggest, at the very least, a lack of awareness of post-structuralists
challenges to the notion of a unitary subject; however, these students are not
necessarily self-deluded. It is possible, for example, that poststructuralist
notions of the self—or “subject”—simply do not apply to women. Political
philosopher James Glass makes this argument in Shattered Selves, a study of
women who suffer from multiple personality disorder, all victims of paternal
sexual abuse. Glass concludes that it is irresponsible of post-structuralists to
base their claims of fragmented identity on textual examples only; however,
despite his commitment to the concept of a core self, he found Julia Kristeva’s
theory of a “subject in process” compatible with the humane treatment of
women suffering from multiple personality disorder. For me, and for my
women students, writing personal criticism is a ﬂuid process of integrating, not
only texts, but also selves (or voices)—personal, social, political.
It was this need to integrate a range of texts and selves that prompted graduate student Sue Woods, after reading my personal essay in The Intimate
Critique, to request an independent study in autobiographical reading and writing. Because Woods was a mature and intelligent student capable of understanding the risks of such writing, I agreed to mentor her. In the preface to her
autobiographical thesis, Woods explains that she had never before “integrated”
voices formerly used either in creative writing or literature courses—“the academic/authoritative and the personal/experiential” (29). Even though she found
the writing process difﬁcult—there was tension, she discovered, between narrative and analytical modes—she persisted through numerous revisions. Drawing
on feminist and Bakhtinian theories of language, she analyzed her experiences
of mothering and of sexual violation through their depiction in Edith
Wharton’s The Mother’s Recompense. The results were remarkable: after presenting a portion of her thesis at a regional MLA conference, Woods submitted
her essay to the editors of Creating Safe Space: Violence and Women’s Writing,
who chose to publish it, along with an essay of mine. Through informal conversations with Woods, women graduate students learned of this new form of academic writing, and they too requested independent studies. Since I was not yet
convinced that this transgressive form of writing was safe for students, I continued my practice of teaching personal criticism only at student request.
My next request came from graduate student Angela Larson who, like Woods,
wished to explore issues of sexual abuse and motherhood. In the preface to her
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thesis, Larson explains that she decided to write a personal-criticism after struggling with “intense emotional connections” to Joyce Carol Oates’s female protagonist in Marya, A Life. She says, “I will never feel complete or whole until I can
integrate my abused, private self with my public one” (81). To achieve this integration, or conjugation, Larson analyzed Oates’s novel, along with her own experience, through the lenses of feminist and reader-response theories. She writes:
“Reading Marya’s story has opened my eyes to unknown parts of myself, while
using Jean Kennard’s bi-polar reading theory has allowed that self-discovery to
have focus” (74). Larson regards the writing of her thesis as the ﬁrst step, the ﬁnding of a “safe space” in which to tell her story, in a process of recovering from the
trauma of sexual violation. Writing about the experience of abuse by a former
boyfriend, Larson asserts, was the ﬁrst step in saving her own life. Such a claim
may seem exaggerated; however, according to psychologist Judith Lewis Herman,
author of Trauma and Recovery, the act of writing or telling one’s story may heal
those who have been traumatized by warfare, torture or rape, but only if certain
conditions are met: the trauma victim must tell her story, complete with accompanying affect, and in the presence of an attentive and afﬁrming audience. I tried
to serve as that attentive and afﬁrming audience for Larson while, at the same
time, expecting her to revise in order to achieve the highest quality writing.
As more and more graduate students asked to study personal criticism with
me, I gradually acknowledged that, despite the risks, this form of writing was beneﬁcial, not only for women, but also for men.3 As a result, I began to offer graduate students the option of writing autobiographical academic essays. Creative
writer Kim Munger was one of the ﬁrst to choose this option. Having heard me
read an excerpt from Authoring a Life,4 Munger knew that I would welcome an
autobiographical-critical approach in my graduate methods course, English 521,
“Teaching Literature and the Literature Curriculum.” In an abstract for her ﬁnal
paper in that course, Munger deﬁnes radical introspection in this way:
This paper examines . . . the use of the technique of radical introspection to
approach teaching Toni Morrison’s novel, Beloved. It begins with an examination of
what it means . . . to cross the boundaries of academic discourse in the disciplines
and to take a more personal, introspective approach to reading literature and writing about it. It calls into question the traditional modes of academic writing . . . and
suggests the use of radical introspection, a combination of autobiography and
reader-response criticism, as a way to de-center the privileged, distanced academic
voice and to illustrate how literary texts may take on personal signiﬁcance for the
students who read them.

Munger began her paper by illustrating her own autobiographical reading of
Beloved: As “the descendent of border-state slaveholders in Chariton County,
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Missouri,” she announces, she will examine the similarities between the family
stories she had been told and Morrison’s represenation of the Garner family.
Munger suggests that, before assigning the novel, teachers might also engage
students in examining their own pasts: “Who are they descended from? Where
did their ancestors come from, and when?” (25). She also recommends that
teachers ask students to give examples of incidents of discrimination and
ostracism in their own family histories, a process that for many becomes an
interrogation of their own racial identities, including whiteness.
Following Munger’s example, I have also begun offering undergraduates the
opportunity to include personal experiences in critical essays. This process began
when an undergraduate named Laura Armstrong Randolph came to my ofﬁce to
inform me that she, like two of the sisters in Smiley’s novel A Thousand Acres,
was also an incest survivor. Because of this personal background, she explained,
she found it upsetting to discuss Smiley’s novel. After revealing that I too was a
survivor of father-daughter incest, I asked Laura if she would be willing to a
tutorial to study incest narratives. Our goal would be to determine which narratives, in her view, were most honest. Since up to one quarter of the women students in any given classroom are survivors of some form of sexual violation, I
explained, I wanted to learn how to be more effective at choosing and teaching
such narratives. She agreed to a tutorial in which we would study contemporary
novels about father-daughter incest written by both male and female authors.
We also agreed that our purpose was not to engage in personal therapy but to
participate in a larger feminist project: the work of cultural change.
The results, as I explain in Authoring a Life, were even more educational
than I had anticipated. Since Randolph was also enrolled in my seminar, “The
American Canon Debate,” she began to speculate about the relationship
between the canon and father-daughter incest. From Christine Froula she
learned that, from a feminist perspective, the situation of literary daughters
mirrors the relationship of daughters in the incestuous family. This insight
prompted Randolph to write a paper arguing that
the traditional English curriculum has a dramatic effect upon which incest narratives will be considered acceptable. It is highly unlikely, for example, that a narrative
of such force as Allison’s Bastard Out of Carolina, which depicts a working-class victim of paternal incest, will ever be included within the English curriculum. . . .
However, the taboo of speaking about incest in the college classroom still exists;
therefore, even though the incest narrative may be part of the plot, it is rarely the
primary focus of classroom discussion. For example, The Bluest Eye is frequently
taught; however, attending to other aspects of the narrative, such as its critique of
racism, allows the instructor to dismiss, ignore, or make short shrift of the scene in
which Cholly sexually violates his daughter, Pecola. (161-162)
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In short, although some feminists teach father-daughter incest narratives,
we are not always fully aware of how our own race and class identities inﬂuence our choices and our pedagogies. A white middle-class teacher might, for
example, avoid a working class narrative such as Bastard Out of Carolina in
favor of the middle-class narrative, A Thousand Acres, in which the act of sexual violation is not fully depicted. On the other hand, a middle-class white
teacher might choose to teach The Bluest Eye so that, by focusing only on
racism, it would be possible to avoid even discussing incest. Incest survivors
are likely to experience such a pedagogy of avoidance as yet another betrayal by
an authority ﬁgure.
Despite these and other pedagogical problems—including what now seem
to be my own excessive fears about self-disclosure in the classroom—autobiographical reading, writing and teaching have been beneﬁcial to my students
and to me. The process of writing autobiographical scholarship has enabled
me to externalize and analyze personal traumas, thereby overcoming most of
their debilitating effects. In addition, to my surprise and pleasure, my autobiographical academic book, Authoring a Life, has attracted readers not only from
outside my discipline—such as scholars in creative writing, education and
family counselling—but also from outside the academy, such as survivors of
childhood sexual abuse and the professionals who work with them in psychotherapy or in chemical dependency programs. This wider readership has given
me a sense of community, a kinship that intensiﬁes when survivors respond to
Authoring a Life by telling me their own stories of trauma and recovery.
Through these exchanges of stories, I have come to think of personal criticism
as a new form of consciousness raising, a way of putting into practice the old
but still important slogan: the personal is the political. Far from reifying the
personal, this sharing of reﬂections about our personal experiences, allows us
to participate in the ultimate goal of radical introspection: insight toward
social action.

NOTES

1.
2.

For more on this topic, see Maher and Tetrault.
I began to feel the effects of this shadow during the summer of 1997. I was
burned-out, joyless, and in constant physical pain from too many hours at
my desk. This pain ﬁnally forced me to face my shadow-self: in the process
of writing an essay called “Our Body Is Our School,” I came to understand
that, in my personal quest for academic excellence I had, like the university
itself, come to overvalue the intellect at the expense of my body and spirit.
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3.

4.
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Fortunately, through radical introspection, I have come to understand the
damaging effects of our current construction of schooling. This essay is
forthcoming from Heinemann/Boynton in a collection called Facing the
Shadow in Education, edited by Regina Foehr.
In 1998, a number of male students signed up for my graduate seminar,
“The Use of the Personal in Scholarship,” (a title borrowed from the PMLA
forum on this topic in 1996). All responded positively to this transgressive
mixed-genre form of writing.
On February 18, 1996, I read a portion of a personal essay “My Friend, Joyce
Carol Oates,” in the word up! series sponsored by Iowa State University’s creative writing program. This essay, ﬁrst published in The Intimate Critique,
became a chapter in Authoring a Life.
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L O S S , M E M O R Y, A N D T H E WO R K
OF LEARNING
Lessons from the Teaching Life of Anne Sexton
Paula M.Salvio
Depression is boring, I think,
and I would do better to make
some soup and light up the cave.
Anne Sexton
There seemed to be no standard for dealing with this gifted, ghosted
woman.
Maxine Kumin
What is the secret that “oozes from the box?” Deleuze and Guattari
suggest “the secret must sneak, insert, or introduce itself into the
arena of public forms; it must pressure them and prod known
subjects into action.”
Thousand Plateaus

PROLO GUE

Anne Sexton was an inspiring, conscientious teacher, a fact that often goes
noticed. In addition to her teaching appointment at Boston University, Sexton
taught poetry at Mclean Psychiatric Hospital, Colgate University, Oberlin
College and Wayland High School in Wayland, Massachusetts. Her collaboration with Herbert Kohl and the Teachers and Writers Collaborative in the
1960s made substantive contributions to revitalizing English education, in part
by initiating teaching partnerships among writers, artists and teachers. Sexton
is rarely thought of as a dedicated teacher, nor is she immediately associated
with the signiﬁcant contributions she made to Teachers and Writers. Rather,
she is most often remembered for her struggles with alcohol and addiction to
pills, a mental illness that deﬁed cure, or as a “confessional poet,” a category
that annoyed and offended her.
When asked about her status as a confessional poet, Sexton explained that
she preferred to describe herself as a “storyteller. “ Her skill at handling plots
and character is evident in the subjects she addressed in her poetry—madness,
spirituality, addiction, adultery, death, and the myths encrypted in what she

94

Personal Effects

refers to as the gothic New England family romance. Among the most striking
trademarks of Sexton’s poetry is a cast of personae who expose and question
the mass produced images of middle-class women in post World War II
America. Typically, Sexton’s poetic forays terminate in uncanny images where
female bodies are fragmented—a violent breaking heart, a splintered hip, a valley of bones. Sexton replaces images of the content, suburban housewife with
“full helpings,” as Alicia Ostriker notes, “of her breasts, her uterus, her abortion, her ‘tiny jail’ of a vagina, her love life, her mother’s and daughters’ breasts,
everyone’s operations, the act of eating . . . even the trauma of her childhood
enemas” (11, 1982). Each of these images possess a peculiar power that direct
her readers away from sentimental notions of home as a place of plenitude.
Throughout Sexton’s poetry, bodies move toward the edges of life, death, old
age, the ends of marriages, childhoods, sanity and love. Kitchens become sites
of family constraints and family bonds, spaces where, despite most peoples’
preference to avert such issues, the poet inquires into psychic lability and the
fallibility of the family.
Yet, despite the substantial collection of lecture notes, correspondences with
students and journals that Anne Sexton left behind, the remains of her teaching life have rarely been addressed. In this chapter, I situate Sexton’s life as a
teacher in the center of what feminist philosophers address as some of the key
questions and problems in feminist pedagogy: the problem of navigating the
appropriate distance between teachers and students, the relationship between
emotional life and knowledge, and the difﬁcult questions surrounding identiﬁcation and separation in the classroom. This chapter does not offer a biographical portrait of Sexton, rather it literally performs a method of writing
auto/biographically in which Sexton functions as an interlocutor or shadowgraph, indirectly illuminating gender, sexual and cultural sediments that inﬂuence our conscious and unconscious interests, our scholarship and our
teaching. I draw on Sexton’s pedagogical documents to test the limits of how
much our students need to know about us, what the role of transference and
counter-transference plays in our teaching, and what it means for our students
to write auto/biographically, beyond the usual story-telling or narration of
experience.1
Among the key documents that I focus on are the lecture notes Sexton wrote
as the Crawshaw Chair in Literature while teaching at Colgate University in
1972. These notes, housed in the Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center at
the University of Texas, Austin, suggest that Sexton developed innovative
approaches to teaching writing that were performative in structure and drew on
one of the privileged concepts in psychoanalysis, that it is the love object that
teaches.2 While Sexton’s lecture notes may at ﬁrst appear as a series of narcissistic
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acts in which she consistently violates the proper distance between herself and
her students, her pedagogy in fact suggests possible ways for educators to compose spaces for learning and teaching that address the half-spoken losses that
society and culture fail to address. Sexton did not ask her students simply to listen to her “confessions,” nor did she ask them to directly site their losses or “selfdisclose” in the seminar room. Rather, she uses a performative pedagogy to
indirectly route her students through ﬁgures of others so they could more fully
apprehend themselves in relation to history and literature. A close reading of
Sexton’s teaching documents demonstrate that we do not simply come to know
ourselves directly, by writing our life, rather we must take indirect routes
through the other, through history, literature, and theory, to represent our lives.
Through these indirect writing and reading practices we can more fully rethink
and modify personal and social expectations. Such indirect routes bring the
auto/biographical I to form in ways that can more fully contain the histories and
the biographies of those before us, drawing our lives, to paraphrase Virginia
Woolf, from the lives of the unknown who were our forebears. The purpose of
this approach to auto/biography is not to pass on tradition, but to break its hold
over us, and to intervene, as Anne Sexton so boldly did as both poet and teacher,
in the transmission of canonic culture.
The losses and ambivalence that Sexton carried into her teaching life manifest themselves in her performative approach to teaching writing and these
performances allegorize losses that are deemed ungrievable within our culture.
As a young mother, Sexton not only lost her children to the anguish of mental
illness, but she writes of abortion and the loss of physical health to cancer, drug
and alcohol addiction. Sexton often claimed that her poetry did not replicate
her life, but staged it—that it was a public performace of the most prevalent
cultural expectations of femininity in post World War II America. The losses
that accrue in Sexton’s poetry, losses that were not only ungrievable at the
time, but often remained unnamable, constituted a part of the prescribed cultural roles for women and children. These losses ﬁgure into Sexton’s melancholic teaching. In this chapter, I conceptualize melancholia as a lyric lament
through which a person protests our culture’s narrow prohibitions on who can
rightfully grieve and which losses are worthy of recognition.
The lyric turn Sexton makes toward themes of loss is painful insofar as she
implicitely attests to the social and psychic threat of contemporary diseases
such as AIDS and cancer. Her pedagogy also brings to consciousness what
Melissa Zeiger describes as a cultural melancholia that resonates through the
end of a century that has repeatedly witnessed unimaginable loss of life, from
World War I through the Holocaust and Hiroshima to Cambodia and Bosnia.
(see Zeiger’s Beyond Consolation). The attempt to represent, in writing or
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otherwise, memories that we inherit via these encrypted losses can be traumatic, therefore raising questions about the propriety of different kinds of cultural remembrance. Central to this debate has been the question of whether
the public exposure of pain and loss is either morally necessary or politically
effective. For curriculum studies, a series of questions emerge: In our interactions with the past, what does curriculum remember, repress, or encrypt? How
does one enter into an exchange with the past that can negotiate trauma, and
at the same time locate the historical speciﬁcity of our students?
Drawing on the work of Judith Butler, I argue that melancholia can be a
rich resource for teaching and scholarship; it holds nascent political texts
which students and teachers can draw upon to re-establish the lines that
demarcate psychic and social life, and in turn re-negotiate the personal, social
and political prohibitions on grieving. By giving dramatic language to ambivalence and loss, Sexton demonstrates how pedagogy can be used to ritualize
melancholy, creating an occasion for teaching and learning that can open texts
to meanings otherwise foreclosed upon.
T H E A R C H I VA L S I T E

Long before her death, Anne Sexton meticulously prepared her manuscripts
and letters for the archives so that her work could be reborn into historical
memory. She often hoped aloud that her poetry would endure to offer comfort
and insight to those who, like her, suffered with the unrelenting pain that
dominates people who are afﬂicted with mental illness and addictions. The
archive of Anne Sexton, like the body of Sexton herself, exceeds the limits of a
conventional teaching life; it generates a particular form of melancholy that is
associated with a life falling apart, a terminal, unrelenting, inexplicable mental
illness that resulted in Sexton ending her life by carbon monoxide poisoning
on Friday, October 4, 1974, at the age of 46. After returning home from lunch
with her close friend, Maxine Kumin, she climbed into the driver’s seat of the
old red Cougar she bought in 1967, the year she started teaching, and turned
on the ignition (Middlebrook, 1991, 397).
It is July of 1994. I am working in the archives at the Harry Ransom
Research Humanities Center at the University of Texas, shufﬂing through
some folders that contain correspondences Sexton exchanged with her students. I’m hungry, restless and feeling stiff from sitting all day, so I decide to
take a walk. Before I leave, I randomly pull a letter from the ﬁle in front of me,
skimming through it, planning to return to it later in the day. I note that the
letter was written by Chris Leverich, an English major at Colgate University
during the spring of 1972, and that the letter is in fact a substitute for the ﬁnal
assignment—an imagined interview with Anne Sexton. In his letter, Leverich
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details a trail of memories, lost expectations, and emotions that he has kept to
himself throughout the term. “In a way, I’ve fallen in love with you,” he writes:
Of course, it’s a fantasy. I know that. Yet, there is something, a force, a charm that is
ever powerful and ever attractive to me. So many times I’ve wanted to be alone with
you, to talk to you, to break the formalities of student and teacher. . . . I guess that’s a
fair summation of my ﬁrst feelings toward you: an initial sexual attraction gradually
honed into a mixture of respect and admiration. As the semester went on and I got
more and more into your poetry whole new horizons opened up before me. I knew
I was reading your life and what it was to you. (HRRHC)

Leverich goes on to capture, with tremendous exactitude, the sense of loss
he felt for never having really gotten to know Anne Sexton, noting that the end
of the term would mark the last time he would hear her voice.
I sort of resigned myself to never knowing you, even after that little spark ﬂared up
in me when you called my name—“Chris”. But it seemed like only a reﬂex action
after Bruce said it. Still, I wanted it to roll around over your tongue. I wanted you to
say it again in your head and remember it. I couldn’t stand that you wouldn’t even
remember my name someday. Like you said in class about John Holmes: “If you
leave someone without having them love you, then you lose them.” I knew we would
leave that way and I would lose. (HRRHC)

The explicitly sexual content of this letter can be read as an Oedipal narrative—a son’s longing for his mother—and contains images of a desire to be
devoured (even if in name only). Leverich goes on to fantasize about driving to
Radcliffe to meet Sexton’s daughter, Linda, where they would talk about philosophy. “But I didn’t go. I didn’t go because I knew I wouldn’t see what I
wanted. I wouldn’t see a miniature you . . . I knew I never wanted Lolita, but
Jocasta” (HRRHC). Leverich’s desire to know Sexton is, as he notes, a fantasy
that I could not help but worry about. On the one hand, I worried about her.
To what extent were the images in Leverich’s letter symptoms of his desire to
swallow his teacher up, a violent fantasy through which to threaten his
teacher’s identity and claim her for his very own? On the other hand, I worried
about Leverich. To what extent did Sexton’s memories of sexual distress and
loss ﬁgure into her pedagogy at this time, mixing in with this student’s past, a
past wrought with pain and loss that he may very well have been working hard
to forget? I began to think about how the encrypted memories we hold of violence, lost ideals, and betrayals are acted out through pedagogy, memories that
appear absent but take up an uncanny presence in our classrooms.
Teaching and learning inevitably invoke ghosts from the past, family dramas,
and failed romances. Nested in each word Leverich writes, in each scriptural
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relic, is a personal past that was awakened as he sat in class working with
Sexton’s poetry, among her poems “The Truth the Dead Know,” “Her Kind,”
“Somewhere in Africa,” “The Fortress,” “Said The Poet to the Analyst.” As a student in this class, Leverich took part in classroom assignments that were performative in structure. “Give me a persona,” Sexton asked her students. “Could you
write with your mother’s voice about her marriage, about her son . . . a woman
in church, what is she thinking?” (HRRHC). Leverich writes of the sudden
death of his own father when he was eight years old, and his admitted proclivity
to “look for a mother and father . . . perhaps that’s what I see in you; a woman
who is both dominant and passive, at once bold and timid, and even impatient
yet understanding.”
As I read this letter, I felt as if Leverich had isolated the ache of loss because it
was so deeply tied to difﬁcult realities, emotions, and ideas. Such acts of isolation not only numb pain, but they hold it in reserve, blocking it from circulating in our imagination, emotions, initiatives and contacts with other people.
The conﬁnement of an unbearable reality to an inaccessible region of the psyche is what Maria Torok refers to as “incorporation” or “preservative repression.” Drawing on clinical observations made by Freud and Karl Abraham in
1922 of the increased sexual activity of people who experienced a death in the
family, Torok proposes a new category of psychology—the illness of mourning.
She argues that the pain associated with loss is not directly tied to having lost a
loved one, but rather this pain is associated with the secret that the loss occasions, a secret that she refers to as the “psychic tomb.” Torok understood the
ﬂow of sexual desire in the face of death as the ﬁnal, climactic outpouring of
love for the departed. Complications ensue, however, when the bereaved is a
parent, grandparent, sibling or other “nonsexual associate,” because in such
cases, sexual feelings and outbursts are personally and socially unacceptable to
the mourner; the involuntary effusion of feeling constitutes an event that the
mourner cannot make sense of with respect to her or his somber feelings of loss
and bereavement. In these instances the affect experienced in the face of death
must be kept under wraps, thereby transforming this ﬁnal outpouring of love
into an intrapsychic secret. The mourner sets up a secret enclave, what Torok
refers to as a crypt, for the departed love-object, precisely because the survivor
is being deluded by society and culture into behaving as if no trauma or loss
had occurred.3 Or, to put this another way, the departed returns to haunt the
living because they have not been granted a proper burial. In Torok’s view, the
shameful, undisclosed suffering of the dead returns to their descendents and
unsuspected, the dead continue to lead a devastating psychic half-life in them.
Torok’s work emphasizes the ways in which the inherited fears, anxieties and
hindered self-fashionings that were unresolved by our decendents are carried
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into succeeding generations and take occupancy in our lives as memories that
are neither fully evident nor fully concealed. This emphasis calls attention to the
history of psychic structures, and how psychic traumas and secrets can be
inherited rather than strictly tied to individual experience. The concept of the
phantom offers us another route into Leverich’s letter, a route that brings us
beyond reading this document as a letter written by an individual student, to
postulating that encrypted in this love letter, this failed assignment, are inherited, secret, psychic substances of his ancestor’s lives and that these substances
can take up an uncanny presence in the classroom. Leverich’s love letter might
be more fully understood as an indirect, circuitous outpouring of love, not literally for Sexton, as he told me years later in an interview, but for a beloved aunt
who he had lost to drug and alcohol abuse, a woman whose presence he felt in
the poetry and teachings of Anne Sexton. The memory traces in Leverich’s writing provoke an unsettling disruption in this class, a disruption that was provoked not simply by Sexton’s presence, but by the presence of others who are
neither fully remembered nor forgotten, neither fully recognized nor ignored
(166 in Torok).
“Memory is a sense of the other,” writes Michel De Certeau; memories “call
out to the other who is absent; they are produced only in a place that does not
belong to it,”
hence [memory] develops along with relationships. . . . It responds more than it
records . . . memory leaves its mark like a kind of overlay on a body that has always
already been altered without knowing it. This originary and secret writing
“emerges” little by little, in the very spots where memory is touched. Memory is
played by circumstances, just as a piano is played by a musician and music emerges
from it when its keys are touched by the hands. Memory responds more than it
records, up to the moment when, losing its mobile fragility and becoming incapable
of new alterations, it can only repeat its initial responses (De Certeau, 1984, 86-88).

De Certeau portrays memory as an “anti-museum,” that ﬂoats and refuses to
be ﬁxed in time or space. Pedagogy directs its attention toward remembering
and forgetting at every turn; the question that remains is whom do we choose
to remember in our classrooms and whom do we fail to address? How do we
respond to the memories that are too terrible to disclose? I want to use De
Certeau’s notion of memory as an ‘anti museum’ to emphasize the project of remembering implicit in the work of Abraham and Torok. Their concept of the
psychic crypt suggests a project of remembering the dead and restoring to
memory forgotten and erased persons that harbor secrets and fears that continue to live a half-life in succeeding generations. On one level, the individual
example of Leverich depicts how a seminar space might become a site of private
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mourning. Leverich’s memories of loss appear to circulate and ﬂow through his
readings of Sexton’s poetry, thereby infusing the pedagogical event with the
speciﬁcity of his own emotions, history, and desires. We might read Leverich’s
letter as an attempt to articulate strains of feeling that he associated with intergenerational secrets that were unmoored by the poetry of Sexton. The pedagogical project lies in creating occasions, through writing, talking and other acts of
symbolization, for Leverich to reﬁne an attachment to the half-spoken losses
haunting his personal past and to coordinate these losses with the larger social
ﬁeld. This work is particularly difﬁcult, however, when the losses a person suffers with are not recognized as legitimate and thus not granted public space for
articulation.
The melancholic temperment that Torok sought to understand is marked by
a loss of address that gives way to an unbounded state in which a person
appears to abandon her position as a subject, for she has no addressable other,
that is to say, there is no one to listen to her plaints, no one who recognizes her
grievances as worthy of attention. In many ways, melancholy bears out the ‘crisis of representation’ that Simon Watney and Paula Treichler have ascribed to
the AIDS crisis. Both Watney and Treichler speak of the human devastation
incurred by the AIDS epidemic, as well as the rage at injustice that it demands.
In her study of AIDS and breast cancer elegies, Zeiger points out that the work
of Watney and Treichler emphasizes the profound difﬁculty of “producing an
adequate discursive response to something as ideologically dense and resiliently
irrational as AIDS discourse has been. Because hatred of people with illnesses,
and of gay men and women, is naturalized at so many levels, discursive reﬁguration has had to take place in moral, emotional, sexual, metaphysical, aesthetic,
and political terms” (Zeiger 21). If a crisis cannot be named or represented,
then how can it be taught? If the only modes of representation available to us as
teachers function either to sensationalize and thus diminish human suffering
on the one hand, or to disassociate people from daily experience and therefore
from the human on the other, then we slip into a pedagogical narrative that disassociates itself from the life of feeling and the needs, desires and vulnerabilities
of the body. Melancholia inevitably poses questions about the difﬁculties of
representation and the sense of despair that can be associated with establishing
modes of address when what people long to write about can place them in jeopardy, compromise their safety, or position them as a contaminant among their
classmates. Nested in these questions are other questions about memory,
remembrance and separation—not simply the ﬁnal separation between the
dead and the living, but also a wide range of disconnections between persons
who are “well” and “sick”, emotionally stable and unstable, intellectually worthy
and unworthy, excessive and productive. What degrees of distance do we keep
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between the living and the dead? How do we remember those we have loved
and lost?
Many of the poems Sexton wrote and taught in her classes contain themes
of loss and mourning and attest to the psychic and social threat of cancer, early
sexual distress, addictions and madness. Maxine Kumin remembers Anne
Sexton in her early years as a poet, working strictly with traditional forms,
“believing,” writes Kumin, in the value of their rigor as a forcing agent, believing that “the hardest truths would come right if they were hammered to ﬁt “ a
stanzaic pattern, a rhyme scheme, a prevailing meter (“Reﬂections” in Anne
Sexton, The Artist and her Critics, 1978, p. 104). Sexton often spoke of writing
poetry as a form of psychoanalysis that could create coherence out of the disjunctive, fragmented experiences of psychic lability that came to take possession of her. For a time, the dramatic situations Sexton rendered in her poetry
functioned as an effective methodology for inquiring into memory and grief.
In “Briar Rose”, a poem from her 1971 collection, Transformations, she renders
a searing representation of sexual violence:
Each night I am nailed into place
and I forget who I am.
Daddy?
That’s another kind of prison.
It’s not the prince at all,
but my father
drunkenly bent over my bed,
circling the abyss like a shark,
my father thick upon me
like some jellyﬁsh.

Here, Sexton uses vivid images to convey how sexual assault functions to
eradicate identity, “I forget who I am,” resulting in a form of amnesia that
effectively takes a victim’s life, “nailing her in place”, imprisoning her, stripping
her of will and agency. Throughout the time Sexton wrote poetry—from 1957
when, at the suggestion of her psychiatrist, she enrolled in a poetry workshop
taught by John Holmes at the Boston Center for Adult Education, to the time
of her death in 1974—Sexton used writing to “make a new reality and become
whole . . . When writing,” Sexton explained, “it is like lying on the analyst’s
couch, reenacting a private terror, and the creative mind is the analyst who
gives pattern and meaning to what the persona sees as only incoherent experience” (quoted in Middlebrook, 1991, 64). While teaching at Colgate University
during the spring of 1972, Sexton described the tight lyric form as a cage in
which a writer could put wild animals in, a means through which to “make a

102

Personal Effects

logic out of suffering . . . One must make a logic out of suffering or one is
mad.” She asserted, “All writing of poems is sanity, because one makes a reality,
a sane world, out of insane happenings” (HRRHC).
Yet the memories of loss that Leverich inscribes in his letter and Sexton in
her poetry did not simply surface because they willed them to, just as I cannot
simply summon up my own memories and set them in the syntax of an essay.
Women, marginalized people, and those who have endured trauma cannot
write from memory, argues Shoshana Felman, for our auto/biographies are
comprised of precisely what our memories cannot contain, or hold together as
a whole, although our writing inadvertently inscribes it. While the historical
conditions that constituted trauma for a white middle-class woman such as
Sexton are not equatable with the historical conditions of people who have
endured generations of colonization, in both cases the structure of trauma
works to obliterate an addressable other. Felman ﬁnds that memories can only
surface and circulate vis à vis a process through which we access our stories
indirectly—by conjugating literature, theory, and autobiography through
reading, writing, and, I will add, history and performance, and in turn reading
into the texts of culture our difference(s) as missing, absent, lost.4 This
approach to writing, reading, and teaching auto/biography requires that we are
united with the lives of others, not by a synthetic understanding, but whereby
one person’s concerns are meaningful to another and these concerns return to
us an unexpected revelation, desire, or insight in our own life.5 The letter written by Leverich was just one artifact that returned an unexpected insight. As I
re-read his letter, I remembered a scene earlier that term, long before I had left
to make the trip to Austin, Texas, a scene that reminded me that Sexton was
indeed perceived by many as a teacher perpetually in error.
THE RETURN OF AN INSIGHT

After I had received the news that I was awarded funding from the
University of New Hampshire to travel to the archives, one of my colleagues
came up to me in the hallway. He made it quite clear that he thought the university was wasting its money on this project. “My wife wondered,” he told me
with a laugh, “why you would want to study someone who was not only crazy,
but who slept with her students? And what has this project got to do with
teaching and teacher education anyway?”
At that moment, I became acutely conscious of how precarious Sexton’s status as a teacher would be. It is one thing to write about mental illness and loss as
a poet, but to teach in the throws of profound melancholia, anxiety, and alcoholism is quite another. It became evident that the remains of Sexton’s teaching
life were quite troubling, for the images that surfaced when I proposed that her
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teaching life be remembered, that we might even be instructed by her pedagogy,
were those of a woman in ruins, untrustworthy, and strange. The ghost of
Sexton, as teacher, exists at the border between convention, rationality, and
madness. As I approached Sexton’s life as a teacher, I felt myself writing and
teaching from a vulnerable position. I began to loosen my grip on the sense of
command and authority I brought to the archive. In retrospect, I remember this
encounter in the hallway because, as much as I wanted to deny it, my colleague’s
questions were questions I had harbored all along. The letter written by Chris
Leverich was but one relic that provoked my own anxieties to surface, anxieties
that I had managed, up until now, to ignore.
I have since learned that much of what remains of Sexton’s teaching life
represents excessive sexual violence, anxieties, fears, and desires to remember
and be remembered, all of which will not remain repressed. To consider bringing these excesses into the realm of education is to threaten the meticulous
work that is being done by mainstream culture: (1) to solidify normative
notions of what it means to be a good teacher and a good student, (2) to possess emotional stability, and (3) to determine which bodies and bodies of
knowledge are most worthy. Sexton is the symptom that signals the (failed)
repression of the infectious, melancholic teacher; she is the non-normative
teacher who is believed by many to lack academic taste and who, as my colleague demonstrates, can function as a foil for educators to declare themselves
“dissimilar” to her excessive, tormented pedagogy. After all, educators worth
their salt are prudent and straightforward.
A N AU T O B I O G R A P H I C A L F R A G M E N T

Anne Sexton appears as an uncanny interlocutor through whom I have
begun to approach unresolvable questions about memory, knowledge, and the
body, questions that were fused into my teaching life from the very start. I
began to teach in 1981, the year my father began to suffer with esophageal cancer, a disease that is aggressive and for which there was very little curative treatment. Esophageal cancer does not strike out randomly, rather it is selective,
primarily afﬂicting people who are addicted to alcohol. One morning, early in
December, after my father had just returned home from a month-long stay in
the hospital, I sat at the kitchen table with him, not knowing what to say, yet
knowing I had to say something, for he had arrived, we were told, at the limit
of his life. And what was left for him to do he had to do alone. “Does it terrify
you to know you will die soon?” I asked him quietly. “Alone into the alone,” he
quoted from C. S. Lewis. He said it felt like that. And, how improbable that it
should be otherwise. Long before my father had died, he felt cut off from us,
and it was not simply the certainty of his death that made this so. Nor was it
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the fact that as a doctor, he knew all too well what the months ahead would
hold, his biggest fear being that he would suffocate to death.
My father suffered with severe melancholia that took hold of him at unexpected times, thrusting him into painful silence, isolation, and despair. He
drank, I think, to ease an unrelenting anguish that he never spoke of but that
intruded on him throughout his life. I could tell you that like many men growing up during the depression and World War II, my father learned to believe
that drinking was a part of being a man. I could tell you that like many men of
his generation, drinking was tied to rituals that bound people in rites of celebration, mourning, friendship, romance, and religion. But such a narrative
departure into cultural history would only serve as a defense against the pain,
loss, and sense of betrayal that came to feel so familiar to me as a child. For me,
liquor was never endowed with romantic or sacred properties. Rather, in my
mind, it was nothing less than a lethal substance my father used to commit a
slow suicide.
How could a devoted doctor knowingly and most deliberately disease himself? How can a person who excessively diseases himself so skillfully offer others a cure? I was left with unresolvable questions that I could not put to rest,
and for which I could ﬁnd no meaningful allegorical equivalents or redemptive
possibilities. The losses that I accrued through my father’s life and death—a
sense of abandonment, betrayal, a severed attachment—are among the
encrypted details that seep through my pedagogy and my scholarship.
My father’s life and death taught me to be skeptical of knowledge. Not only
are skeptics determined to avoid confusion, but they are also fond of delay and
doubt. They harbor suspicions about forming attachments to concepts, persons, and beliefs. Perhaps this is why the null hypothesis always intrigued
me—it offers a method through which to claim an attachment and then delay
commitment through methods of deliberate disavowal. The art and science of
a democratic education offered me processes through which I could put my
skeptical temperment to use. The scientiﬁc method of John Dewey subordinates transmitting the past to creating a future that is distinct from the past
(see Dewey, 1984). This method of inquiry is described by Horace M. Kallen as
one that ‘makes precept a function of practice, exalts variation over repetition,
encourages the free co-operation of differences to displace the regimented
reproduction of identicals, prefers the doubt, the enquiry, the experiment of
competitive cooperation of the sciences to the obedient and unquestioning
rehearsals of dogmatic faith’ (360 in Hook)—all problems that we struggled
with in our Catholic household. “One can never know,” my father’s father
would say as he read the newspaper in the evening, sitting on the terrace,
drinking a glass of wine.
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But the truth is that the feelings of skepticism that ﬂooded our home were
more akin to a kind of wholesale mood of exaggerated distrust and an unexpressed yearning not to repeat the past than they were to the disciplined forms
of scientiﬁc inquiry that my father found so compelling. I could write a narrative history of my family’s skepticism for you. I could write about the ambivalence my paternal grandfather felt about educating his children—skeptical as
he was of the educational value of academic knowledge, both wanting and not
wanting his children to secure academic degrees, feeling torn, possessing,
despite his lack of formal education, an enormous appetite for the lyricism of
Dante, Leopardi, Puccini. I could go on to link my family’s proclivities to
doubt our lovers and to scrutinize our politics, religious faith and one another
to philosophical traditions that scrutinize the sanctities of faith and hope.
And I could render scenes of teaching where skepticism seeped into my
classroom, touching my curriculum entirely. But such a move, once again,
would only serve as a defense against a more profound lesson my father
handed down to me, for the practice of skepticism was not the most memorable lesson I inherited. From my father, I learned that knowledge and the
body are often at war and, despite our apparent mastery of knowledge, our
bodies too often remain vulnerable. In seeking knowledge, we are really seeking insight into what to do with our bodies, for teaching and scholarship are
inevitably about decisions of the ﬂesh.
In looking back, I learned to recognize that in the throws of illness, loss, or
during a crisis in meaning, there are prohibitions placed on the expression of
weakness, fear, and pain. But perhaps more importantly, I have come to understand that the shameful, undisclosed suffering of the dead, suffering that could
not be expressed, returns to their descendents and unsuspected, this suffering
continues to lead a painful half-life in them. Thus, the undisclosed suffering of
my father, made manifest in his acute melancholia, lives on, haunting me in
unsuspected ways, slipping into my pedagogy uninvited, compromising my
capacity to reﬁne my attachments to memory and history. From this point of
view, a dividing line no longer falls between my father’s life and death. His life
and death can ﬂow together, repeating and reinforcing each other vis à vis my
teaching life.
In the narrative account I offer, I turn to teaching as a consolation for my
loss, and this turn exacts a serious price. Not only do I position myself as a vulnerable daughter who inherits a scholarly and pedagogic project from her
father, but by using pedagogy as a consolation for loss I displace my sense of
abandonment, betrayal, and outrage rather than working through it.6 My loss
registers in strikingly apparent ways. For example, in the books that I choose to
read with my students in courses I teach in curriculum studies, literacy, and
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English education. Among them, Missing May by Cynthia Rylant, Krik? Krak!
by Edwidge Danticat, My Brother by Jamaica Kincaid, Fugitive Pieces by Anne
Michaels. Each of these stories portrays profound loss, from the death of a
beloved aunt and a brother, to the horriﬁc loss of life endured by the people of
Haiti, to the brutalities of World War II. These books function like urns, holding loss, keeping it in place. As my students and I read Krik? Krak! events that
we have failed to learn about claim a presence in the room, a presence that
demands that we speak beyond our means. Yet, to what extent do we use this
book to console ourselves after learning of the U.S. involvement in Haiti and
the horror of living under the brutal threats of the Tonton Macoutes? Do the
routes that we take through Danticat’s book only function to offer my students
a narrative adjustment to loss, a consoling sign that enables each of us to adjust
to the injustices that Danticat writes about? Do these consoling signs in turn
distract us from properly re-membering the dead? The historical ﬁgures in
these stories are not easily quieted by the ofﬁcial discourses of momuments
and memorials. In her analysis of Shot in the Heart, the account by Mikal
Gilmore of his family history and the execution of his brother, Gary Gilmore,
Leigh Gilmore emphasizes that “trauma causes history to erupt from its manageable conﬁnes. In this context, the dead are no longer persons who lived in
the past, but angry, bitter, and mournful ghosts. The dead in this construction
refuse to do the work of history, which is to stay buried, in effect, to ‘be’ the
past, and to maintain the rationality of time as past-present-future. . . . The
dead return because they were not properly buried” (5). To address trauma in
the classroom raises several questions posed by Gilmore, including how the
dead will permit and be permitted by the living to live on. Such questions
invariably pose rhetorical challenges that are directly tied to melancholia, for
melancholia is brought about by a ‘failed mourning,’ a failure that torments the
melancholic by stealing speech because the losses that she has endured are not
deemed grievable by our culture, and therefore they cannot be spoken aloud.
In The Psychic Life of Power, Judith Butler elaborates on the ways in which
melancholia works as a lyric lament to protest our culture’s narrow prohibitions on who can rightfully grieve, and which losses are worthy of attention.
Following Butler, I want to argue that melancholy can be a rich resource for
teaching and scholarship, for it holds nascent political texts which students
and teachers can draw on to redraw the lines that demarcate their own psychic
and social life, and, in turn, renegotiate the personal, social, and political prohibitions on grieving. The pedagogy of Anne Sexton offers us insight into how
poetry and writing can be used to renegotiate these prohibitions, particularly
the lecture notes she wrote while teaching at Colgate University during the
spring term of 1972. These lecture notes provide a more complex way of
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putting melancholia to productive use in the classroom, offering us insight
into the ways in which we might use poetry, performance, writing, and reading
for learning about the transitions necessary to life, grieving being one among
many of the vital transitions we can work through.7
T H E M E L A N C H O L I C P E DAG O G Y O F A N N E S E XTO N

Throughout Sexton’s pedagogic documents are moments in which she
directs her students’ attention to social issues pertaining to the suffering, violated entity Elaine Scarry has termed “the body in pain.”8 The bodies in
Sexton’s poetry are most often women’s bodies—one freshly scarred from a
hysterectomy, a dying woman who is incontinent, a young girl giving up her
baby, a daughter refusing to grieve—who speak to the reader through dramatic speech. While much of the subject matter for Sexton’s poetry came
directly from her own life and times, she also transcended these biographical
details, shaping them into art forms that spoke to a vast audience about the
silent anguish felt in many post World War II households, testifying, in other
words, to the discontent felt in the bourgeois American family.
When writing poetry with her students, Sexton asked them to use the force
of dramatic consciousness to engage in composition processes that demanded
what Sexton described as a “total immersion of you into the subject.”
(HRRHC). In her poems, as she tells her students, we have the poet as actor:
Wearing different faces; the young girl running from her lover . . . the unknown girl
giving her baby up so intensely, so close to the bone . . . we have the seamstress bitter
and gnarled over her sewing machine, spitting bile onto the zippers and we have the
young lovers, the young girl speciﬁcally with her adulterous moment trying to
marry for a moment at least some happiness (HRRHC).

The acts of total immersion that Sexton engaged her students in often
began with the invitation to “write a short poem, a character sketch using a
persona . . . become that person, put on that mask.” The methods of dramatic
introspection and incorporation that Sexton used to write poetry and to teach
writing are strikingly akin to those used by actors as they work to build their
characters. Nowhere are these methodologies more evident than in the notes
she wrote for a course she taught as the Crawshaw Chair in Literature at
Colgate University. The Crawshaw Chair required a long, weekly commute
from Sexton’s home in Weston, Massachusetts, to Hamilton, New York. Sexton
was required to teach two days of classes back-to-back, a writing workshop for
about ten students in the evening, as well as a lecture course on poetry in the
afternoon. During the time Sexton commuted from Weston to Colgate, she
often complained of feeling anxious to the point of nausea. Much of Sexton’s
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teaching was accompanied by stage fright and uncertainty, and there were
many bad days and fears of failure.
Leverich describes Sexton as a shy, sensitive person who, on certain days,
would sit at her desk in class, chain-smoking cigarettes, croaking out words
between drinks of water. She seemed to him a desperately lonely creature. At
the same time, there was a force, a charm, that was ever-powerful about her.
She was both bold and timid, dominant and passive, even impatient, yet
understanding (HRRHC).
In a conversation I had with the chair of the Department of English at
Colgate, Bruce Berlind, he recalled the difﬁcult weekly routine of picking
Sexton up at the airport in Syracuse, driving back to Hamilton, New York (frequently singing songs from the 40s), and, the next day, driving back to the airport where she boarded a small plane for Boston. They co-taught the poetry
workshop, and Sexton taught the lecture course alone. The lecture course,
entitled “Anne on Anne,” co-designed with Berlind, was composed of a series
of eleven lectures for a small group of English majors. Berlind describes this
course as a “course in herself.”
Its structure was simply linear, beginning with Bedlam and coming up-to-date. The
lecture component of the classes was minimal. Mostly the classes were discussion sessions based on the students’ readings of her books, copies of Anne’s drafts of many
poems, and copies of various interviews and reviews of her work. The “ﬁrst-person
presence” was, of course, at the center—although Anne often claimed that the I in
poems dealing with her affairs was a ﬁction (Personal correspondence, 1996).

The aim of this course was to engage students imaginatively with the writing life of Anne Sexton by studying and then performing the interpretive
methods she used to write poetry. Gathered together in Lawrence Hall, room
320, students would sometimes inhabit the poetic form of a Sexton poem and
then extend it, at times changing the content, but miming the metrics. Sexton
openly invited her students to study along with her what she referred to as the
tricks, ﬂaws, and false starts that a poem undergoes before it reaches its ﬁnal,
published form. Throughout her lecture notes are meditations on poetry,
mini-lectures, and classroom assignments that suggest that Sexton was not satisﬁed with having her students talk about poetry. Rather, she demanded that
her students inhabit poetic forms and take on personae. In Lecture I of the
Crawshaw series Sexton read the following statement by one of her critics:
“Anne Sexton’s poems, for example, create largely the world of her persona, the
I of the poems, which undergoes a continuing development and is clearly
related intimately and painfully to the poet’s autobiography.” She, in turn,
responded to this statement by stating that
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I would like for a moment to disagree. It is true that I am an autobiographical poet
most of the time, or at least so I lead my readers to believe. However, many times I
use the personal when I am applying a mask to my face, somewhat like a young man
applying the face of an aging clown. Picture me at my dressing table for a moment
putting on the years. All those nights, all those cups of coffee . . . all those shots of
bourbon at 2 a.m . . . all this applied like a rubber mask that the robber wears
(HRHRC).

Like Sexton’s composing processes, theories of melancholy evoke acts of
incorporation, skin, and the personal and cultural objects we endow with
meaning. In ways akin to a method actor, the melancholic incorporates the
beloved; she takes them in as idealized, demonized, in some cases, exoticized,
others. In his 1917 essay, “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud argues that when
a person has lost someone he/she loved, the ego incorporates aspects of the
lost other into its very structures, thereby “sustaining” the life of the bereaved
through acts of imitation. “By taking ﬂight in the ego,” writes Freud, “love
escapes annihilation.” Yet this escape from annihilation comes at great cost, for
the incorporative strategies used by the melancholic function to disavow the
loss and to deepen the grief.
These incorporative strategies are an effective means through which to
remake the ego into the person who has been lost. It is in this sense that the
melancholic bears a resemblance to a method actor, for her body becomes a
double body, skilled at reproducing the gestures and being of some other person, a lost love, a charismatic leader, the ethos of a nation (see Phelan, 1993,
172). The language that Constantin Stanislavski used with his actors during
rehearsals is replete with the language of incorporation and is useful for
understanding the strategies used by the melancholic. In Building A Character,
Stanislavski documents a young actor’s discussion of the process he used to
create the character of a man who possessed distinctly different characteristics
than himself. He writes:
[A]s soon as I was in this other man’s skin, my attitude towards you (Stanislavski)
underwent a radical change. . . . I enjoyed looking you full in the face in a brazen way
and at the same time felt I had the right to do it without fear. Yet do you believe I
could have done this in my own person? Never under any circumstances! In that
other person’s skin I went as far as I liked, and if I dared do that face to face with you
I should have no compunction in treating the audience across the footlights in the
same way. (p. 27–8).

The capacity to cross the boundaries of skin into the character of another,
and to do so with intention, caution, consistency, and to keep within the
boundaries of the character, the play, or the “given circumstances” is work the
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actor, unlike the melancholic, is adept at. The melancholic does not exert
agency over her desire to transpose the ego of the bereaved into her own. And
while both the actor and the melancholic may be skilled at transposition and
incorporation, the actor retains these incorporative strategies as techniques,
while for the melancholic these strategies serve to chisel away at the ego, resulting in a profound sense of ego loss.
Jacques Hassoun characterizes the melancholic as the eternally ravished
one, the passive victim, who is depleted of drives and thus incapable of investing anything in the social world, sinking deeper and deeper into a desperate,
endless recitation of complaints that are directed at unnamable, ungrievable
losses. About social and institutional life, writes Hassoun:
Confronted with the enigma that the Other’s violence poses, the subject—here brought
to subjection—ﬁnds himself somehow confronted with an absence of otherness.
Where all the components of the social bond should be—audible, comprehensible—
suddenly what looms up instead is a surprise that can only alienate the subject
(Hassoun, 7, 1997).

I ﬁnd Hassoun’s portrait of the melancholic troubling, however, for he casts
melancholia as a passive state wherein a person is utterly stripped of agency
and will. Returning to Freud, I found a somewhat different portrait, for the
plaints and endless lyric laments of the melancholic proceed, according to
Freud, from an attitude of revolt, a mental constellation by which a certain
process has become transformed into melancholic contrition (1989, 169–70). I
want to proceed from the position of revolt and lyric lament that characterizes
much of Sexton’s poetry to the place of her pedagogical performances. As I do
so, I want us to keep in mind that while the melancholic is overpowered, she
refuses to be tamed (see Fanon 1965).
A P PA R E N T C O N F E S S I O N S

On the one hand, Sexton appeared to engage in self-conscious confessions
in the seminar room, displaying her own raw and visible wounds to the academy. Confessions work to enlist the sororial and fraternal sympathies of the
listener so as to exonerate the sinner and, in turn, to efface the differences
between them. The confessional narrative casts Sexton as the victim, and
through the medium of narrative, she passes her guilt on to her students and
readers. After all, we may very well summon up some sympathy for Sexton,
secretly ﬁnding that we are more like her than we dared imagine, and, out of
our own unexamined anxieties, we might very well exonerate her.
Sexton openly admits to “doing reference work in sin,” and to using her place
at the podium to seek “an appeal before a trial of angels” (HRRHC). In one of her
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lectures at Colgate, she brings her students back to the scenes that inspired her
poem “Flee on Your Donkey.” Sexton begins this lecture by telling her students
that they will learn things that “no one else in the world knows” from looking at
her worksheets. Back at the scenes that inspired this poem—a poem that would
take Sexton from June 1962 to June 1966 to complete—students learn of Sexton’s
desire to ﬂee not only life but madness. She confesses that this is “a poem that
everyone told me not to publish. It was too self-indulgent, it was material I had
already gone over. And yet, I hadn’t told the full story of my madness. I hadn’t
talked about ﬂeeing it as well as ﬂeeing life” (HRRHC). Her lyric laments persistently invoke the bodies of women who are conﬁned, maimed, dying, contemplating suicide, melancholic, medicated, or penetrated without consent.
Yet, while Sexton appeared at every turn to confess her life repeatedly and
unabashedly to her students, positioning herself as an apparent victim, 9 her
lyric laments and apparent confessions come from a mental constellation of
revolt that is characteristic of melancholia. This melancholic revolt is manifested both in the trope of the mask that appears throughout the Crawshaw
Lectures and in her parodic sensibilities. Sexton insisted on the ﬁctive character of the I in her poems and explained to her students that, in the case of her
poetry, “I am often being personal but I am not being personal about myself.”
Sexton’s parodic sensibility functions to undermine the normative order of
“performing confession” in the academy. Parody need not be comic. Derived
from the Greek parodia, parody is a countersong, a neighboring song (see
Crapanzano, 1990, 144).
Like melancholia, parody is structured in ambivalence, for it too has the paradoxical capacity both to incorporate and challenge that which it criticizes. There
is a paradox inherent in the incorporative tactics of Sexton’s composing
processes: she simultaneously incorporates loss or lack in her body and disincorporates the authority of the master by wearing her wounds, to paraphrase Franz
Fanon, on the surface of her skin like an open sore—an eyesore to the colonizer.
The losses and ambivalence that Sexton carried into her teaching life manifest themselves, I believe, in a speciﬁcally performative approach to teaching
writing. Put more directly, the performativity marking Sexton’s teaching documents is drenched in melancholia, and these performances allegorize losses
that are deemed ungrievable in academic institutions where grief is preempted
by the absence of cultural conventions for avowing loss. I do not intend to suggest that all performative pedagogies are manifestations of trauma, but I do
want to argue that there is social value in framing performative pedagogy as a
structure of address that is directed toward loss. This value is articulated in the
following passage by Butler: “Insofar as the grief remains unspeakable,” writes
Butler, the rage over the loss can redouble by virtue of remaining unavowed.
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And if that rage is publicly proscribed, the melancholic effects of such a proscription
can achieve suicidal proportions. The emergence of collective institutions for grieving are thus crucial for survival, for reassembling community, for rearticulating kinship, for reweaving sustaining relations. . . . What cannot be avowed as a constitutive
identiﬁcation for any given subject position runs the risk not only of becoming
externalized in a degraded form, but repeatedly repudiated and subject to a policy of
disavowal (Butler,1997, 148-149).

By giving dramatic language to ambivalence and loss, Sexton demonstrates
how pedagogy can be used to avow a broader range of subject positions in the
classroom. Her use of performance accommodates the double-ghosted bodies
that are housed in the melancholic. Performative modes of address have the
capacity to bring about dialogue with the phantoms we hold, precisely because
in performance, the body is metonymic, of self, of characters, of voice, and of
personae. As I said earlier, what marks the melancholic student is a loss of
address, an unspeakability that is not a symptom of thoughtlessness, or
“retrieval problems,” but rather a symptom of what cannot be spoken in
school. In my case, I failed to locate a narrative structure through which I
could speak of and grieve my father’s self-abuse and my sense of abandonment. Consequently, I used teaching as a means through which to compose a
narrative that could contain my loss. This move, however, only served to harbor the not fully confronted phantoms or secrets from my earlier family history. The ﬁgure of Anne Sexton is but one example of an historical ﬁgure to
whom I turned in order to establish an addressable other through which I
could work through the losses that were encrypted in my pedagogy. In this
sense, we might think of Anne Sexton as a mask through which I could
approach the secrets of my past about the claims addictions made on my family and how these secrets exert their inﬂuence on my pedagogy. What remained
half-spoken in my life prevented me from using language in conventional or
normative ways. Thus, the mask constitutes another kind of expressive contract, it organizes an/other operation of language.
Students who get lost in their own circuitous speech can often establish an
object of address through the spatial registers characterizing the mask and the
image or through the fragmented, associative narratives of juxtaposition.
Because performance is contingent upon physically establishing an addressable other, an audience, and crafting a character and a point of view (subjectivity), it offers a viable means through which to introduce the Other into
pedagogy. In this sense, pedagogy can ritualize melancholy by creating an
occasion for writing that is open to ambivalence and can, moreover, allow the
writer to link melancholia to a larger historical ﬁeld, which would open texts to
meanings otherwise foreclosed.
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The approach to remembering I call for requires that we create exchanges
between the ghosts and the living, thereby transforming losses that await articulation into meaning. This work is delicate; it calls for a logic that Peggy
Phelan describes as moving us beyond the Euclidean plane, for ghosts defy the
laws of “proof,” and hence they are likely to be subjected to dismissal and
doubt (1993). The melancholic cannot reproduce or prove the presence of the
Object she longs for, but if, through writing and other forms of representations available through the expressive registers of theatre, dance, the visual
arts, and music, the melancholic can remember by generating personal meanings, details, and associations, then she can restage and restate the effort to
remember her loss. In this way, she can learn how loss can acquire meaning,
and potentially generate recovery, not of the departed, but of herself, as the
person who remembers.10
If I began this chapter in the archives in Austin, I want to end with a phone
call to Aspen that was prompted by the letter I found in the archives. In
February 1998, I interviewed Chris Leverich. Leverich remembers Sexton as
fragile and sickly, suspicious, her eyes glazed over with tranquilizers. “I felt that
she was working hard to get through the class. She was so terriﬁed to be there,
and you could see the terror in her body. At the same time, she was profoundly
insightful, perhaps the ﬁnest professor I’ve ever had.” When I asked Leverich
what price he exacted as a student in her class, he told me that “Anne Sexton’s
teaching triggered for me a deep channel of emotion and areas of thought
which were oftentimes frightening, so much so that I would push them aside.
I’ve looked at these emotions for brief moments of time, but they trigger feelings beyond grief and sadness. Sexton wrote and spoke to us about her deepest
emotional and social involvements, and she taught me to address mine.”
Leverich’s memories suggest that Sexton’s pedagogy of masks offered her students opportunities to approach, in some instances to wear, the masks of an
Other. Such an approach to teaching and learning can create possibilities for
teachers and students to re-draw the lines demarcating their own psychic and
social life, and, by doing so, to renegotiate the personal, social, and political
prohibitions on grieving.
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Narrative Conference in Evanston, Illinois, 1998, and at the American
Educational Research Association Conference in San Diego,1998. I would also
like to express my gratitude to Rachel Trubowitz, Mary Rhiel, Elizabeth Lane,
John Erni, Lad Tobin, Madeleine Grumet, Toby Gordon, Peter Taubman,
David Bleich and Diane Freedman for reading earlier drafts of this work. I also
want to thank Jenny Marshall for the patience and sensitive insights she offered
during the ﬁnal preparation of this manuscript. Finally, I am indebted to Bruce
Berlind for offering me his memories, his time, and his rich, personal collection of Sexton’s teaching materials.
1.

2.

3.

This essay portrays an example of what Leigh Gilmore refers to as the “autobiographical demand,” a form of critical life writing in which the demands
of autobiography, the call to tell my story, and the demands of biography, the
call to tell your story, coincide. Gilmore argues that the auto/biographical
demand presents a narrative dilemma because it both divides and doubles
the writer. At the moment that I begin to tell the story of Sexton’s teaching
life, aspects of my life surface and demand articulation. These demands provoke a sense of instability in my writing and pose emotional and rhetorical
constraints that auto/biography manages by mingling a range of forms:
biography, memoir, autobiography, poetry, the essay and theoretical writing.
Throughout this chapter, I draw on Gilmore’s concept to explore the ways in
which the auto/biographical demand places in relief the double bind faced
by a writer who inherits the unavoidable tasks to speak for the dead and to
properly address a traumatized past that is unspeakable because it remains
shrouded in shame. The dead, Gilmore goes on to remind us, make demands
on the living, they surface in our dreams, our current relationships, through
writing, teaching, and scholarship. But in order to understand these
demands, the writer must distinguish between her story and theirs and in so
doing, must navigate through the delicate tensions that are inherent in the
narrative structure of auto/biography—the tension between telling stories
and sustaining family loyalities, articulating family secrets and properly
mourning a traumatized past (see Gilmore).
Throughout this chapter, I draw on teaching documents that are housed in
the Anne Sexton archive at the Harry Ransom Research Humanities Center
at the University of Texas, Austin. When referring to these materials, I use
the abbreviation HRRHC.
Abraham and Torok develop the concept of “cryptonymy” to reconﬁgure the
Freudian notion of the unconscious as a psychic crypt, a kind of tomb or
vault harboring the not fully confronted “phantoms” or secrets from the
analysand’s eariler family history. For more on the concept of the fantome
and cryptic incorporation, see Peggy Kamuf, “Abraham’s Wake,” Diacritics 9,
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no. I (1979): 32–43 and Nicholas Rand’s translator’s introduction to The
Wolf Man’s Magic Word, “Toward a Cryptonymy of Literature.” Also, for
further commentary on Abraham and Torok, see Esther Rashkin, Family
Secrets and the Psychoanalysis of Narrative. Princeton University Press.
Princeton, New Jersey, 1992. Also, for a discussion about the implications
melancholia has on student writing and the difﬁculties students face in
locating an object of address when writing about loss see Hallet (1999).
Madeleine Grumet discusses the epistemic and pedagogical implications of
composing educational autobiography by conjugating theory with literature, history, and other people’s stories in “Scholae Personae: Masks for
Meaning.”
For an extensive discussion on the concept of a “return of a difference,” see
Elizabeth Ellsworth (1997), Teaching Positions.
To ‘work something through’ is to re-possess or reclaim emotions that we
have become estranged from; this work makes present that which was otherwise encrypted or buried in the past so that it can in fact be felt as emanating
from one’s own person, one’s own body. Thus, ‘working through’ memories
entails the gradual knowing of the disaffected material that comes from our
own being. In his essay, “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through,”
Freud describes this process as one which must “allow the patient time to
become more conversant with this resistence with which he has now become
acquainted, to work through it, to overcome it, by continuing, in deﬁance of
it, the analytic work according to the fundamental rule of analysis” (volume
twelve, Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund
Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey, p155).
Throughout this essay, I characterize Anne Sexton as a melancholic
writer/teacher. Although Sexton’s mental illness was never deﬁned during
her lifetime, psychologist Kay Redﬁeld Jamison maintains that if she were
living today, the case for manic-depressive illness would be very strong. Not
only does Sexton have a strong family history of mental illness and suicide,
but her symptoms—pronounced swings and labiality in mood, expansiveness, impulsivity, altered sleep and energy patterns, anger, seasonal variations in mood—are all highly characteristic of manic-depressive illness. So,
too, are her alcoholism and the worsening, rapidly cycling quality of the
course of her illness. Sexton’s “hysterical” symptoms may very well have been
a manifestation of the emotional extremes and labiality that go along with
manic-depressive illness. Women who have affective illness not uncommonly are diagnosed as “borderlines” or “hysterics.”
With this said, I want to emphasize that throughout this chapter I use the
term melancholic to evoke more than a congenital disease caused by a biological endowment gone awry, or a “brain problem.” I do not wish to deny the
biological dimension of melancholia, rather I wish to argue that melancholia
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contains the possibilities to articulate more fully the boundaries between psychic and social life, and, like every human emotion, it offers us the opportunity to gain insight into self and Other. Sadness, writes Michael Vincent
Miller, informs us that the loss was important; “anger alerts us that the person
in our path is an obstacle. Depression can be the most chastening state imaginable: it throws us back on our deepest sorrows and feelings of helplessness.
What it may tell us about our limitations, our fears of abandonment, failure,
death, ought not to be narrowed too quickly to a matter of neurotransmitters
ﬂowing between synapses” (see Miller in Hassoun, viii–ix).
See Elaine Scarry (1985). Scarry not only explores the political implications
inherent in the inexpressibility of physical pain, but she explores the role of
the imagination in coming to terms with the limits of language, arguing
that ‘the human being who creates on behalf of the pain in her own body
may remake herself to be one who creates on behalf of the pain originating
in another’s body; so, too, the human beings who create out of pain
(whether their own or others’) may remake themselves in a way that distributes the facts and responsibilities of sentience out into the external
world’(pp. 324–5). Scarry’s theory of making offers important insights into
the potential implications of Sexton’s poetry, suggesting that her imaginative work as a poet, teacher and playwright distributed unspeakable facts
and responsibilities of sentience into an external world in an effort, not
only to articulate loss, but to move away from pain, towards the boundaries
of self-transformation.
Diane Wood Middlebrook is cautious about concluding that Ralph Harvey,
Anne Sexton’s father, made sexual advances toward her. However, Sexton’s
memories of this abuse do surface in her psychiatric tapes and in her work.
Middlebrook writes, “Was Sexton’s report a memory or a fantasy? This question achieved great importance in her therapy, and in her art, but it cannot
be answered with certainty. The evidence for its actuality lies chieﬂy in the
vividness and frequency of her descriptions during trance states. Moreover,
Sexton’s symptoms and her behavior—in particular, the dissociative states
that were so prominent a feature in her case, her tendency to sexualize signiﬁcant relationships, and the ﬂuidity of the boundaries she experienced
between herself and other people—ﬁt the clinical picture of a woman who
has undergone sexual trauma. From a clinical point of view, her doubts
about this memory were not evidence that it did not happen” (57).
Middlebrook goes on to note that Sexton’s accounts did vary and that her
memories of abuse surfaced in therapy when she was reading and writing
about incest, especially during active work on a play that had, as its central
conﬂict, an incestuous episode. “As Sexton frequently commented,” notes
Middlebrook, “once she had put a memory into words, the words were what
she remembered. Thus she could give dramatic reality to a feeling by letting
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it generate a scene and putting that scene into words for Dr. Orne while in a
trance” (57). Dawn Skorczewski however, notes the danger inherent in questioning the evidence of such abuse, arguing that to suggest that Sexton
merely dramatized her memories through her art is to align ourselves with
patriarchy. For a substantive and moving discussion about the educative
value of teaching incest narratives, see Authoring A Life, by Brenda Daly.
In Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, Peggy Phelan elaborates a form of
remembering that does not seek to reproduce the lost object but rather
rehearses and repeats “the disappearance of the subject who longs always to
be remembered” (147). The crucial point underlying Phelan’s argument is
that to simply describe what or whom we have lost does not reproduce the
object, rather these descriptions remind us how loss acquires meaning and
can indeed generate recovery, not of the lost object, per se, but for the person
who remembers. The economy of performance spurs memory on, encouraging memory to become present, yet these memories cannot be contained
or controlled.

PA R T T H R E E
Teaching and Scholarship Face to Face
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“ K N O W L E D G E H A S A FA C E ”
The Jewish, the Personal, and the Pedagogical
SUSAN HANDELMAN

The ultimate conﬂict in the classroom is who we are when we
encounter and are swallowed up by the artiﬁcial world of academia,
our ﬂeshly selves slumbering in hard chairs, and how does this strange
ritual come to mean anything to us. Our private lives occur in
terrifying places where we grapple alone with the impossibility of certitude or peace. Teaching these conﬂicts means addressing that,
opening the windows of academia and letting life seep in like air.
Abby Bardi, graduate student
The movement of Eros and the movement of the mind cannot take
place separately, converging only at the end. In the person, the
student, they interact and interpenetrate. They must be treated so in
interactions with a person. They must be moved together.
Joseph Schwab
Our Rabbis taught: If one sees a great multitude of people, one says,
“Blessed [are you God] who is wise to secrets.” Just as all their
opinions are different from each other’s, so too their faces are all
different from each other’s.
Talmud Brakhot
F I N D I N G A VO I C E

I am not quite sure know how to begin this essay. A book whose subject is
“the place of the personal in the academy” is bound to raise so many rhetorical
expectations. I imagine my readers eagerly anticipating liberation from dry
impersonal, academic prose, and wondering what secrets might be revealed. So
I ask myself: Which rhetorical form should I use in this piece? Must it be a
monologic narrative? Could I write it as a dialogue or letter? But which “I” do I
present here? What will be my persona ?
I am comforted to learn that the word “personal,” is derived from “persona,”
which in turn designates the “mask” used by actors in ancient Greek drama,
the dramatis personae who spoke through it: per + sonare, “to sound through.”
Let me continue to take refuge in etymology and philology as I try to ﬁnd my
voice, my way of here “sounding through the mask.” The word “voice” itself
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comes from vocare and is connected to “vocation,”derived from the Latin vocatio: a “bidding, an invitation, a call, a summons.” So vocation is a profession as
a “calling.” Here I begin to recognize connections between the personal and the
academy . . . if one views the academy as I do, as truly a “vocation,” a “calling.”
Needless to say, this sense of profession as a calling to “service,”as having a
moral and even religious component, has been obscured by the more contemporary meaning of “professionalization.” Today, the term connotes the
achievement of technical skill, specialized theoretical knowledge, and admission to an elite community of self-governing practitioners.1
Being “professional” is also commonly taken to mean being able to remove
one’s own “personal” prejudices and emotions from the task at hand. Yet a
“professor” is also deﬁned as one who “professes”: from pro-fateri, to “declare
loudly,”publicly; one who “makes open declaration of his statements or opinions, one who makes public his belief.” “Con-fess” and pro-fess share this same
Latin root; so one also “professes one’s faith, love, or devotion.” I am intrigued
by the way this etymological chain of connections moves so swiftly into the
theological—to the extent that even the word “Parson,” (the representative
head of a parish church) appears under the entry for “personal” along with the
“Three Persons of the Trinity”; “Divine being, hypostasis.”2
I have to stop. The dictionary supplying these deﬁnitions has now taken me
into the heart of Christian theology, supplied me quotes from Chaucer,
Milton, Dryden, Shakespeare, and the New Testament. But one of the central
concerns of my academic (and personal) life has been ﬁnding and hearing the
“Jewish voice.”And being caught between voices: the voices of my secular, elite
Ivy League education, and the voices of Jewish tradition: the clamorous, argumentative voices of the Talmud, the creative, ironic story-telling of the
Midrash, the rapturous voices of Jewish liturgy, the deliberative voices of
Jewish philosophy, the lyrical, yearning melodies of Hassidism.
Contemporary literary theory has enabled me to read these classical Jewish
texts in new ways, and in my previous academic work, I tried to reveal some of
the underlying Jewish strands in that theory itself. Yet I have written by
“sounding through certain masks” and not others. Early in my academic
career, I felt compelled to write in a certain way, as I myself became professionalized, entered the ongoing conversation in the ﬁeld, mastered its lingo and
codes. In mid-career now, I have acquired a sense of how quickly the theories,
topics, and interests of what we in literary studies often refer to as “The
Profession” change. Those exciting, radical books about “Structuralism in
Literature” from my graduate school days are now abandoned in a remote corner of my bookshelves. I sometimes wonder how soon it will be until those
new volumes which took their place on the main shelves—on body studies,
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queer theory, post-colonial and cultural studies—will become their dusty,
neglected neighbors.
It’s not surprising to me, then, that the recent move towards “personal criticism” was spearheaded by mid-career, highly successful and well-known literary critics who had previously been engaged in the highly theoretical discourse
of the 1980s. Like Cultural Studies, the turn towards “the personal” both continued and reacted against those modes of criticism. But I suspect that the shift
in these critics’ perspective also has to do with the changing course of inner life
as one matures in years. I know that “inner life” is not exactly an au courant
theoretical term; and I don’t remember any academic preparation for dealing
with the kinds of unexpected turns one ﬁnds oneself making in one’s self-deﬁnition as a scholar, colleague, or teacher as one progresses in a career. Like several other of my contemporaries, though, I ﬁnd our previous ways of writing,
teaching, and talking about literature to be unsatisfactory and constraining.
And so I have refocussed my earlier highly abstract theoretical work in deconstruction and hermeneutics, to a concern with the ethics of criticism, and an
intense interest in pedagogy. . . . an interest that was always implicit in my work,
but not able to ﬁnd open expression.3 I have returned to that older meaning of
“profession” as “calling,”and it is much more the question of what are we “called”
to do in the University with our students that preoccupies me now I seek also to
hear my students’ voices in a different way. For I keep ﬁnding that they—in their
resistance and awkwardness and naiveté and freshness and unprofessionialized
sense of things—are often more provocative, unpredictable, and challenging
than many of the latest new theories or interpretations.
READING AS CALLING TO EACH OTHER

I also take with me from Jewish tradition a deeply-rooted sense of teaching
and learning as “holy” and “redemptive” endeavors, and of being bound to a
three-thousand year old community of memory, study, and practice which has
endured the vicissitudes and traumas of history. I write this essay in the city of
Jerusalem, on a special Fellowship for educators from around the world. And I
partake here of the “quiet revolution” occuring in women’s access to the most
rigorous and advanced forms of traditional Jewish learning.
In Hebrew, the word for “calling”—kriyah—is also the word for “reading.”
In this sense, reading is not just a matter of “textual “or “cultural” analysis. It
is a voicing, calling to the other, a being called to account, a summons to be
present. From my previous academic work on the great modern Jewish
philosophers Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) and Emmanuel Levinas (19061994) and their relation to literary theory, I have seen how Western culture,
too, has to be “called into account” by Judaism. Rosenzweig and Levinas both
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came out of the monumental German-Jewish tradition of philosophy, and
abandoned the project of constructing grand theories, meta-narratives of
knowledge long before the familiar contemporary postmodern critics we all
customarily cite did so.
Rosenzweig also left a brilliant career in the German University to found an
Institute for Adult Jewish Education in Frankfort, but all too quickly died from
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’s disease). He continued to write,
translate and teach as his physical capabilities diminished solely to the ability
to blink his eye. Levinas emerged as one of the most inﬂuential philosophers in
post-War France after surviving in a prisoner-of-war camp, and losing many
relatives in the Holocaust. His work helped inspire Sartre to engage in phenomenology and Derrida to critique ontology. Above all, Levinas called philosophy to account and placed ethics prior to metaphysics. He also had dual
pedagogical career, engaged both as a French University professor and a
teacher training young French Jews at the preparatory school of the Alliance
Israelite Orientale. He too, wrestled with the problem of being, as he put it, a
Jew “speaking Greek,” the language of the academy and of philosophy.
I also wrestle with this problem and I, too, sympathize with Rosenzweig’s
departure from the suffocating German academy of his time to become another
kind of “Teacher”; yet I am not ready to abandon my career in the University.
But I do hope university learning can be changed, and believe that Jewish models of study and commentary have much to say to educational reform.
Ultimately, what I learn from Jewish tradition is that “texts” are not only, nor
primarily “books”—or “cultural practices” or “discourses” or “ideologies”—but
ultimately “Teachings” (this is the root meaning of the Hebrew word Torah,
used to refer to all the biblical and rabbinic literature). For me now, hermeneutics or cultural studies or political critiques or pedagogies of the oppressed are
not, in the end, enough to encompass the meaning of “teaching” ; on the contrary, there is a sense in which “teaching” instead encompasses them. Or as
Rosenzweig writes:
Literature is written only for the sake of those who are in the process of development,
and of that in each of us which is still developing. Hebrew, knowing no word for
“reading” that does not mean “learning” as well, has given this, the secret of all literature away. For it is a secret, though a quite open one, to these times of ours—obsessed
and suffocated as they are by education—that books exist only to transmit that which
has been achieved to those who are still developing” (“On Jewish Learning” 216)

I have spoken here of “teaching” and of “voices,”but so far carefully avoiding
the word “God.” Needless to say, the relation of the modern University to religion is vexed. As I leaf through the pages of the most recent PMLA, and its
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book ads, I wonder: Should I instead talk about these “Jewish voices” in terms
of “hybridity “and “alterity” and “marginalization” and “diasporic ethnicity” or
the “symbolic construction of the Jewish body” or “cultural and discursive
practices?” Perhaps were I at another stage, I would ﬁnd this language and its
rousing calls for liberatory practices more useful, but now I seek to let the
sounds of a Jewish voice be heard differently—differently even from standard
“Academic Jewish Studies,” which itself has always had a complex relation to
the University.
Moshe Idel, the preeminent living expert on Jewish mysticism has recently
argued that the conception of Jewish learning as “experiential, transformative
and intended to go beyond the strictly mental level” was marginalized in much
foundational academic Jewish scholarship.4 This was due in part to the culture
of the nineteenth century German University in which modern academic
Jewish studies was born. Idel argues that Torah study, however, was never seen
solely as matter of content, or the amassing of knowledge; it was not even ultimately about “knowing,” but the changing of one’s way of life. Even the “Book”
itself, in much of Jewish thought was seen as only one step on a long trajectory
of performative religiosity; learning, in other words, was instrumental and
“knowledge,”(though of course important) was not its ultimate purpose.
Traditional Jewish modes of learning, moreover, attempted to bring people
together into what Idel calls a “sonorous community”—a “sound community.”
In traditional Jewish study and reading, the text is activated by being sounded
out orally, loudly vocalized, sung, exteriorized. This practice rested in part on
the view that since language mediates the experience of God, words become
forms of power. Shouting out the sacred text also created an external reality
that encompassed all those together in study . . . just as God creates in the Bible
by “calling”—kriyah—not by ﬁat. (This understanding of study was especially
prominent in Hassidism and Kabbalah.) “Learning,” concludes Idel, is “entering an ambience as much as it is an acquiring of knowledge” and we need to be
cautious in overemphasizing the purely mental aspect when we describe the
historical phenomenon and practice.
The traditional Beit Midrash, “House of Study” was, and still is today, a
place of clamorous noise, quite unlike the hushed university library. One of the
traditional modes of study which is still quite alive in yeshivot (advanced
Jewish religious schools), and which I have personally most loved, is to learn
orally with a ﬁxed study partner—hevruta—with whom one intones the text
aloud, line by line, and engages in vigorous questioning and argument about
its linguistic nuances and meaning. A passage in the Talmud Kiddushin 30b
describes that relationship:”R. Chiya bar Abba said, even a parent and a child,
or a teacher and his student who are studying Torah together . . . at ﬁrst
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become enemies of one another—but they do not move from there until they
become devoted friends of one another.” That is, the passionate debate at ﬁrst
makes the study-partners opponents; each disputes the other’s interpretations
as they seek to fathom the meaning of the text, each bringing his or her own
background, associations, experiences, questions. Nevertheless, they are
engaged in a collaborative enterprise, in a face to face intimate dialogue. Out of
this intense reciprocal interchange, hierarchical relations dissolve, and they
become in the end intimate friends.
In their analysis of the sociology of the Beit Midrash, where a large community of study partners sit and learn in the same room, Moshe Halbertal and
Tovah Halbertal note that the volume and gesticulations of all these pairs
together create a physical choreography of bodily movement, voice and noise,
a kind of “acting out of a page of Talmud.” The students, that is, are enacting
the voices of the same rabbinic sages whose own debates with each other constitute the pages of the Talmud the students are studying. At the same time, the
students are also interpreting this “script ; it becomes a text and drama at one
time. This approach to the text is non-chronological; all the previous commentators printed on the pages of the Talmud, dating back a a thousand years
and spanning the entire Jewish diaspora, are taken up along with the current
students in a kind of a contemporaneous conversation, a discourse above time
and place (Halbertal).
The technique of learning in small groups or pairs has been rediscovered in
the past few years by educational theorists, who now call it “co-operative learning.” Its advocates support their work with epistemological claims that all
knowledge is in fact, social, dialogic, communal. They offer abundant evidence
of the pragmatic effectiveness of co-operative learning and its success in creating classroom community, a truth I can afﬁrm from my own use of these techniques in my classes.
What further, I wonder, might models of “sacred learning” have to say to the
“secular” University, and how could they be used in non-dogmatic ways?
Especially when we in literary studies tend to talk about everything in our “discourse” of ethnicity, multi-culturalism, alterity, and critical pedagogy except
God and religion. A recent story in my Smith College alumna magazine about
“religion on campus” quoted a student who said: “It is harder to come out as a
spiritual person than as a lesbian here at Smith (Fisher, 12). In an ironic way,
“spiritual persons” have become “marginalized” “silenced” voices in many
classrooms. Yet the “postmodern” world is indeed a post-secular one as well,
and the old dichotomies between “critical thinking” and “religious belief,” or
“science” and “religion” are just as outmoded as those between “subjectivity”
and “objectivity.”5 In sum, I agree with Mary Rose O’Reilly who writes: “The
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question for me is, how do we teach people who are profoundly, and even
stubbornly, spiritual brings? I think we assume that spiritual beings is the last
thing they are (because it is on of the last things they will let us know” (138).
It is time for a personal anecdote. A brilliant honors student in a recent
senior seminar of mine told me she was having great trouble choosing a topic
for her honors thesis. She wanted to write, she said, with an ironic half-smile,
on “The Meaning of Life.” Her advisor, however, discouraged her and said,
“Why does it always have to be about you?” She said to me wistfully “Maybe
there’s something wrong with me, but I always want to see how it relates to my
life. I was assigned to write a paper for my American Literature class on
‘Financial Exchanges in Huckleberry Finn’ But I’m just not interested in that.”
In other words, our students, too, are desperately trying to ﬁnd their “personal
place in the academy.” This student does not see the world as entirely “produced and constructed by material, historical factors, in a network of political
and economic exchanges” . . . and neither do I.
How, then, can students like this feel more at home in the University? Can
and should we also attempt to help our students in their spiritual struggles,
which they often keep so hidden from us and from the classroom but which
are so much a part of how they try make sense of the world? As a very bright
undergraduate once poignantly and somewhat bitterly said to me: “You professors here in the University pull out the rug from under us—and we never
even had a ﬂoor.” So true: we contemporary academics, especially in literary
studies, often describe our pedagogical and intellectual goals in terms of “critique, subversion, interrogation”—or what Lionel Trilling felicitously called
“the unmasking principle” that has inﬂuenced intellectuals since the French
Revolution. Marx and Freud, Trilling wrote, “taught the intellectual classes that
nothing was as it seemed, that the great work of intellect was to strike through
the mask” (Dickstein, 1998). That wonderful phrase comes, of course, from
one of Captain Ahab’s grand anguished speeches in Moby Dick. It also reechoes the etymology of “persona”: can we ever strike through, or only sound
through? What are the pedagogical consequences of these attempts? And how
can our students’ resistance to our work also teach us? As the Talmud says,
“Much have I learned from my teachers, even more from my colleagues, but
from my students, most of all” (Ta’anit 7a).
K N O W L E D G E H A S A FA C E

“As the Talmud says.” With that phrase, I revert to one of my most comfortable Jewish voices; citing a classical rabbinic text and commenting in the margins
. . . with the adverb “as” signaling a commitment to the text before the moment
of analytical questioning, debate, and interpretation. There is a way in which I
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would probably be most “personal” here if I assumed that rhetorical role of rabbinic-style commentator on a Jewish text. For I must say I am not entirely satisﬁed with my “voice” in the sections I have just written. My resort to English
philology and etymology was a way of historicizing the words dealing with the
“personal” and the “professional,” in order to open them to the traces of other
meanings inscribed in them. Of course, I also wanted to ﬁnd a shared language
with my readers, and try to move a theological discussion to common ground.
I would be equally uncomfortable, though, with a purely “confessional
voice,” or an autobiographical narrative. The individual “confessional” voice is
not such a major part of classical Jewish discourse, in part because Judaism is
not a “confessional” faith dependent on an individual’s afﬁrmation of certain
dogmas, or a conversion experience, but instead a covenental membership in a
People with a collective history, fate, and destiny. Even on Yom Kippur, the Day
of Atonement, the holiest day of the year, the numerous “confessions” of sins
in the liturgy are said in the collective: “We have transgressed, we have
betrayed, we have robbed, we have slandered,”and so forth. My sense of myself
as a Jew, and my voice as a Jew is indeed at its most “personal” when it is most
bound up in that collective and transhistorical “sound community” of studypartners and interpreters who shout and sing out and wrestle with the sacred
text together, who argue and laugh together, celebrate each other’s sorrows and
joys together through the liturgical cycle of the Jewish year, which itself recapitulates and re-enacts the dramas of Jewish history. As the biblical scholar
Michael Fishbane once remarked, the most “authentic” Jewish literary genre is,
perhaps, the anthology—a simultaneous compilation of diverse texts, voices,
sources. That is the way the Bible, the Talmud, Midrash, halakhic codes are
constructed—as massive anthologies . . . the collective voices of scores of generations superimposed on each other, jostling each other on the page, calling
to each other.
Even amongst the Jewish mystics, there is a paucity of personal, confessional
experiential accounts, especially compared to the Christian tradition. I have no
space here to analyze further why that is so, or attempt a “history of the self,” or
the notion of “peoplehood,” or the rhetoric of commentary in Jewish thought.
If I think, however, about resources in Jewish thought and literature to examine
the “personal” and its relation to contemporary teaching and scholarship, I go
back again to Rosenzweig and Levinas, who model for me a way to exist as a Jew
in the modern Western University, and to some key passages in the Bible upon
which they have commented, foundational texts familar to all.
The well known early chapters of the Book of Genesis describe the creation
of the ﬁrst “person,”Adam. In the Hebrew Bible, “Adam” does not initially signify
a proper name; it is a pun on the word adamah, “earth, ground,”and so signiﬁes
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“the earth creature.” Nor does this word in itself signify a gendered creature. In
one of the classical midrashic (rabbinic exegetical) readings of the creation of
Adam, this “earth creature” is described as a kind of androgyne with “two faces”
(du-parzuﬁm) which are positioned away from each other, one in front and one
in back (Ber. Rab. 17:6; Berakhot 61a). God’s splitting of this double-faced creature into two, and turning the faces so they could see each other, is also the origin of “male and female.” This reading is based on interpreting the Hebrew word
tzela in Gen.2:22–23, usually translated as “rib,” in another possible sense: “side.”
On another level, one could say this midrash also teaches that human identity is
from the beginning “bifurcated”: “identity,” “personhood” come only when one
faces the other.6 Indeed, the word for “face” in Hebrew, panim is a plural noun
which takes a plural verb. Its verbal root, panah, means “to turn towards.” The
living face is never still and singular; it is always a moving, changing set of gestures, expressing/concealing turns of feeling and thought. The Hebrew word for
“innerness,”pnimiyut, is also derived from panim. The face is physically the distinctive mark of our individuality, the most “personal” aspect of ourselves Yet,
paradoxically, we cannot see our own face directly.
The face also acts as an interface between self and world. What it means to
“face the other,”and what it would mean for “knowledge itself to have a face” are
central issues for both Rosenzweig and Levinas. And, I would add, for any
teacher, for any pedagogical scene. I have ﬁnally found here, I think, a Hebrew
counterpart to the English word “personal.” I want to use this notion of the
“face” to guide the rest of my thinking in this essay about the meaning of the
“personal” in the academy. In that way, I hope to sound my “personal” Jewish
voice, and perform a Jewish mode of study while trying to clarify our larger collective professional and pedagogical goals in the University. In much of my past
research, I engaged in meta-theoretical analyses of rabbinic hermeneutics; here
I also want to enter “inside” that exegetic process itself. Yet like Rosenzweig and
Levinas, I aim to move dialectically between “inside” and “outside,” to illumine
what in Jewish tradition speaks to all of us, Jews and non-Jews, professors and
students, persons of faith and atheists.
After completing his philosophical magnum opus The Star of Redemption,
Rosenweig wrote and taught very differently. In a letter to his ﬁancé in 1920,
just before he became ill, he said: “You see, I can no longer write a “Book”;
everything now turns into a letter, since I need to see the ‘other” (in Glatzer,
Rosenzweig, 90). That indeed was the inevitable rhetorical and pedagogical
consequence of the philosophy he formulated in the Star, the last few pages of
which end with a vision of truth itself as a “countenance,”a face (Star, 418–24).
For what else do we mean by the “personal” than to “give a face” and voice
to something? For knowledge to be “personal,”in this sense, would not mean
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for it to biased, confessional, ideological, but on the contrary to have a “face”—
that is, to be turned towards another, vulnerable and susceptible to the face of
the other, in all her or his particularity . . . an address to the other. This position
would imply a similar foundational pedagogical stance.
Another way Levinas, and Rosenzweig articulate that stance phenomenologically, and the meaning of the “personal,”is through the expression “Here
am I” (hineni in Hebrew; me voici in French), which is also the response of the
biblical heroes in climactic moments of their being summoned: Abraham to
the sacriﬁce of Isaac (Gen 22:1); Moses to the burning bush (Ex 3:4); Isaiah to
his prophetic call (6:8).
Instead of evasion and blame, “Here am I” should have been Adam’s
response to God’s question “Where are you?” in the Garden after the ﬁrst sin
(Gen. 3:9). Rosenzweig interprets God’s question here as God’s own quest for
the “you”; this address is a kind of indeﬁnite deictic which opens the possibility
for an other to be constituted who can freely confront God as an “I.” Comments
Rosenzweig: “The I discovers itself at the moment when it asserts the existence
of a Thou by inquiring into its Where” (Star 175.) But the answer hineni, the
opening of the concealed isolated, locked self, comes for the ﬁrst time in the
biblical narrative only later in Gen 22:1 when God calls out to Abraham before
the sacriﬁce of Isaac, in the vocative, in direct address, not with an indeﬁnite
“you” but with his proper name, “Abraham!” That is, in all Abraham’s non-conceptual particularity and individuality, and in love for his singularity: “Now he
answers, all unlocked, all spread apart-all ready all soul ‘Here am I.’ Here is the I,
the individual human I . . . wholly receptive” (Star 176).7 Deborah Kerdeman
(1998), using Gadamerian hermeneutics, argues that indeed education should
not focus on “self-understanding” through the question “Who are you?” That
assumes the self could be reﬂected upon apart from the situated relationships in
which self-understanding is constituted. In the existential hermeneutics of
Gadamer, “self-understanding is rather constitutive of our being, an indication
of how we are situated in relation to people and events . . . an expression of
practical engagement that illumines and shapes our moral orientation. The key
question for Gadamer thus is not “Who”? But “Where? Where are we? We’re
always someplace. Are we present? Or are we hiding?”
For Levinas, inﬂuenced by Rosenzweig, “Here am I” is a phenomenology of
the self answering the violence of philosophical ontology. Over and over again
in his philosophical work, the word I comes to mean “here am I” answering for
everything and everyone—a self constructed not out of “ontological presence”
but ethical responsibility, as a “reason beyond the cogito.” This “I” is not a
manifestation of “innerness” but an extra-version a breaking out of the narcissistic, enclosed self to be exposed and vulnerable to the other, to the extent that
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one becomes completely responsible for the other. Or as Levinas puts it: the
“here am I” is a kind of bearing witness, the self at the service of others “without having anything to identify myself with but the sound of my own voice or
the ﬁgure of my gesture—the saying itself ” (Otherwise Than Being 149). The
“calling” of the face of the other is met by the sound of my voice, saying “here
am I for you.”
Behind his emphasis on this term is Levinas’ own bitter experience as a Jew
in France during World War II, and the transformation of his former teacher
Heidegger into a Nazi sympathizer. So it is also precisely the phenomenological impersonality of “Being” in Heidegger, that spurs Levinas to link neutrality
to indifference, and ultimately to violence and murder. This position underlay
Levinas’ critique of all anonymous and impersonal structures of thought
including Structuralism, and its descendants. Neither was the answer the existentialist emphasis on the cry of the subjective self, for he viewed the ego in its
natural state as self-enclosed, self-interested and violent. This is a complex
philosophical discussion which I have explored in depth in Fragments of
Redemption. Here, though, I’m more interested in how it all relates to pedagogy in the contemporary University.
T E A C H E R A N D S T U D E N T : A R E L AT I O N O F T WO F A C E S

As waters [reﬂect] face to face, so is the heart of one person to another.
Proverbs 27:19

One way a text is “made personal” is by being embodied in the living voice,
face, and being of the teacher in dialogue with the student, and the students
with each other. This mediation is a key pedagogical aspect of the hermeneutics of the tradition of rabbinic interpretation in Judaism—also called the
“Oral Torah.” The Oral Torah is the record of the collective voices of the teachers and their students through the generations as they debate and perform the
meanings of the teachings, and search out what rabbinic tradition calls the
“seventy faces of the Torah.” It began to be written down in the early centuries
of the Common Era, and includes the Talmuds, midrashic literature, legal
codes and analyses—all that is not explicitly written in the Bible. Oral Torah is
also invented and continued every time we in turn read, teach, argue over, and
interpret these texts, ﬁnd a new face in them. So I have often thought it would
be more appropriate to calls Jews the “people of the Mouth” rather than the
“People of the Book.” Even the Hebrew language is written without vowels; in
the very act of reading it, one must vocalize the words, even if only mentally
supplying the vowels that make the words have a sense .
I spent a great deal of intellectual energy in my ﬁrst book, The Slayers of
Moses, trying to understand the creative freedom of rabbinic interpretation,
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and its wondrous exegetical extravagances. I linked that hermeneutic to the
creativity of contemporary secularized Jewish interpreters from Freud to
Derrida. But I missed this key pedagogical link: “Oral Torah” attains that creative and interpretive freedom because it is a lived teaching and not only a
book or a system of signs. It is mediated and embodied by the relations of
teachers and students who literally breathe voice into and give a face to the
written text in the context of a community of memory, obligation, and practice. In this light, one can understand some of the many poignant Talmudic
stories and Jewish laws that compare a person to a sefer Torah, a Torah scroll.
Says the Talmud, for example:” A person who is present at the death of someone, is obligated to tear his clothes [a sign of mourning] To what is this similar? To a Torah scroll that has been burned.” (Shabbat 105b).8
I want to move into another kind of “Jewish voice” now, and turn from
Rosenzweig and Levinas the university philosophers, to Rabbi Nachman of
Breslov, a remarkable nineteenth century hassidic Rebbe. In addressing the
ruptures modernity had brought to the Jews, he wrote not only commentaries, but also parables, stories, and songs and was one of the sources for
modern Hebrew literature. The relation between a hassidic Rebbe and his
disciples was particularly intense, and led R. Nachman to intriguing reflections on the nature of the teacher-student relation. R. Nachman especially
stressed the importance of seeing the face of one’s teacher rather than only
reading the teacher’s writings, or hearing from another person what the
teacher has said:
Know: one who has the eyes to see, can see and recognize in the face of the student who his teacher was, even if the student only saw him once, for “Who is like the
wise man and who knows the interpretation of a thing? A person’s wisdom makes
his face shine, and the boldness of his face is changed [Eccl. 8:1].” And therefore
when the student receives the wisdom of his teacher, he receives his face [kabbalat
panim, a pun on the phrase “welcome”]. And for this it is necessary to look in he
face of his teacher at the time when he is receiving his wisdom, as it is written [Isaiah
30:20]: “And your eyes shall see your teacher” [referring to the messianic era and
vision of God]; for wisdom is in the face, as explained above, and therefore, when
one looks in the face of the student, one can know who his teacher is. (Likkutei
Moharan 230)

In the next quote, this “teaching” relation is inscribed as well between friend
and friend.
One has to make limpid and clear one’s face, so that each person can see his own
face in his face as in a mirror, until, without rebuke or preaching, his friend will
immediately repent over his deeds, just from looking into his face. For in looking

“ Kn o w l e d g e H a s a F a c e ”

133

into the other’s face, he will see himself as in a mirror, how is own face is sunk in
darkness.” (Likkutei Moharan, “Teﬁllah L’ Habbakuk.” 19)

What possible translation of these passages is there for the University? What
further could we understand as the relation between knowledge and the face?
Perhaps that the “face” here signiﬁes something about the relation between student and teacher over and above the content transmitted, the way in which any
true wisdom is ultimately inscribed in a human relation and is not simply a
“text.” The way the teaching ultimately comes from the teacher on a level
deeper than pure intellect, and beyond its verbal representations. The way in
which the teacher embodies the knowledge in an act of giving forth to the
other out of desire, and connection. That the moments of illumination a student has are when she or he discovers his or her “own face” through the face of
the teacher, which means that the face is not a simple mirror which passively
reﬂects a similitude but refracts back actively. And this requires not imitation
of the teacher, but the work of the student, who senses the need for inner
change. Likewise, to “receive the face” (kabbalat panim) is not a passive act.
“Reception” and “reﬂection” here are modes of self- transformation. This
“mutual seeing” is the opposite of the one-sided, eagle-eyed view of the
Hegelian philosopher who observes all from above, or the sinister all-seeing
gaze of the Foucauldian Panopticon, or a rapacious, objectifying sexual gaze.
Nor, could the “virtual, electronic face” of a teacher in the video version of
“Distance Learning” fully express it. There is something in the living face that
eludes this capture. (Redeﬁning knoweldge as a relation to an other rather than
a reﬂection of some independent, essential substance is, of course, a paradigmatically postmodern epistemological position.)
One could try to translate these passages in psychoanalytic terms. Arthur
Frank, in an essay on “Lecturing and Transference: The Undercover Work of
Pedagogy” also asks what induces people to attend lectures in person, when
reading a written text is so much more efﬁcient. He insightfully analyzes the
latent desires of audience and lecturer—and by extension student and
teacher—in this living pedagogical situation. The ritual and celebratory nature
of the occasion, of course, draws the attendees. The auditors further believe
they can somehow glean more by contact with the personal presence of the
speaker. The actual text of the lecture, he then suggests, is in reality only a pretext—just as the manifest content of a dream, in the Freudian paradigm, is the
screen that allows latent meaning to be transmitted. In the same way, the pedagogy of the lecture is highly personal, but the lecturer for the most part conceals that element and purports to be coolly only transmitting knowledge and
information. Like the dream, then, “the lecture works precisely by concealing
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the personal essence; stated another way, the personal element is effective only
if it is concealed” (30).
The same holds true, Frank argues, for the student-teacher relation which
he also conﬁgures in terms of the Freudian notion of “transference” in psychoanalysis. “Transference,” simply deﬁned, is the unconscious projection of desire
and fantasy by the analysand onto the analyst; “counter-transference” is the
unconscious projection of the analyst onto the analysand. The student (like
the analysand, or audience at a lecture) projects the teacher as the one who
possess the Truth, or in Lacanian terminology, the Subject-presumed-toknow: “I do not mean the truth of the subject matter of the course, but rather
the supposed truth of the lecturer herself and the truth of the students themselves” (31). Inevitably, then, the teacher/lecturer/analyst is also the “one who
never says what they want him to say”:
I propose that the desire of the students is for the speech of the animator’s self—not
the spoken text the animator presents (that is only the price of admission), but the
speech of what animates the text. For structuralists (if there are any left) the subject
may be dead, but for students, the key to ideas is in the biography of the thinker.
This principle of truth deriving from life experiences pervades students’ relations
not just to those they study but to their teachers. (30-31)

Since this autobiographical speech is concealed and never fully given, the
desire of the student is stimulated by this lack: “What this desire is for, insofar
as desires are ever for anything, is for the subject-presumed-to-know to reveal
herself in some exercise of authority.” The key to successful psychotherapy,
however, is the conscious understanding, working out, and resolution of the
transference. Frank argues that the role of the educator parallels that of the
good analyst, who understands that the issue is ultimately not her or his own
self-revelation but rather querying the analysand: “What do you want from
me” and “What should you expect from yourself ”: “The essence of what I call
moral education is this capacity for self-reﬂection: to become moral beings we
must see our actions as they are seen by others.” (32–33). Citing Irving
Goffman, he adds that this kind of moral education can’t be “taught”; it can
only be modeled during teaching: modeled not as a method of scholarship or
knowledge, but rather as “a mode of how to handle oneself in the matter of
one’s own claims to position” (34).
Compare R. Nachman again: “One has to make limpid and clear one’s face, so
that each person can see his own face in his face as in a mirror, until, without
rebuke or preaching, his friend will immediately repent over his deeds, just from
looking into his face. For in looking into the other’s face, he will see himself as in
a mirror, how is own face is sunk in darkness.” On the one hand, this, too, could
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be a kind of “transference relation”: without speech, one’s silent face, made
limpid and clear,”“without rebuke or preaching” enables one’s friend or student
to sense her own lack, and stimulates her desire to transform herself.The analogy
goes only so far, however, for R. Nachman implicitly also reminds us that to
make one’s face limpid and clear involves one’s own moral-spiritual work .The
classic injunction to the psychoanalyst to make her face a “blank screen” is not
the same as shining visage emanating from a lived wisdom that has left its luminous trace on the body. I, too, still believe in a truth deriving from life experiences, (and from texts) written on the face. And I also identify with that student
of mine who still was half-hoping, to ﬁnd “The Meaning of Life” in what she was
reading. What was she really asking of me? What was my responsibility for her?
Martin Buber, in his eloquent essay “The Education of Character” describes a
moment in a teacher’s facing a group of typically unruly and resistant students:
But then his eyes meet a face which strikes him. It is not a beautiful face nor particularly intelligent; but it is a real face, or rather, the chaos preceding the cosmos of a
real face. On it he reads a question which is something different form the general
curiosity: “Who are you? Do you know something that concerns me? Do you bring
me something? What do you bring?” (112)

Do not our students come to us “in search of their face,”and do we not need
to bring them something more than the negative moment of undoing our
authority? Do we not promise them something by our very act of standing
before them? What do we owe them?
For Buber “Education worthy of the name is essentially education of character” (104) which does not mean giving instruction in ethics. He argues that
only the whole being of the teacher can affect the whole being of the students,
and often this happens when the teacher has the least thought of affecting the
students. Yet Buber urges the teacher to will to take her part in the stamping of
the student’s character, along with all the uncontrollable multifarious inﬂuences that are inevitably affect students lives. For Buber, “great character” is a
person who in “every living situation” acts out of a “deep readiness to respond
with his whole life, and in such a way that the sum of his actions and attitudes
expresses at the same time the unity of his being and its willingness to accept
responsibility” (114). Buber envisions a “rebirth of personal unity, unity of
being, unity of life, unity of action” to move “beyond all the dividedness of
individualism and collectivism” and which is the way also towards genuine
community (116). In an era where absolute values have been destroyed, he
says, an educator can begin by fostering the student’s painful sense of lack of
this unity, nurturing it into a desire, and showing students some glimpse of
that unity, as far off as it might be,
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In our fractured postmodern era, especially in literary studies, we rarely
hear words such as this; we tend to stress instead rupture, divided selves, fragmentation, the dark binds of power and ideology, the difﬁculty of “agency.” We
begin with lack but often do not move far beyond it, “pulling out the rug when
they never even had a ﬂoor.” We cannot return to a naive innocence, but
Buber’s vision is a kind of needed pedagogical counterbalance which also, I
think, describes the deeper yearning of students, the moment when their faces
are open to ours.
What, I wonder further, is pedagogical desire? Who gives and who takes?
What do we yearn for in wanting to teach and wanting to learn? How do we
keep this yearning, this dialectic of giving and receiving from becoming
manipulative and degraded? In an intriguing essay entitled “Eros and
Education” Joseph Schwab also traces the vicissitudes of Eros and argues that
education cannot separate the intellect from feeling and action. “Eros, the
energy of wanting, is as much the energy source in the pursuit of truth as it is
in the motion toward pleasure, friendship, and fame, or power.” For Schwab,
the teacher’s task is to locate those objects to which “youthful Eros” readily
attaches, and then direct it to more enduring objects. Eros, he points out, is
ﬁrst located and activated by “a certain face-to-face relation between teacher
and student,” an interpersonal relation involving a reciprocity of evocation and
response (109-110). Schwab means this quite physically and concretely, and
supplies a vivid and subtle picture of classroom dynamics:
If in the ﬁrst moments of the ﬁrst meeting of a new class, the teacher’s gaze wanders
ﬁrst to one, then to another and another of the anonymous faces before him, those
faces which are not readable yet as to promise and performance, and if, in this wandering inspection, two or three students answer his regard in a way which signals to
them their curious awareness of him as a person, a start has been made. The person
who is thus aware of me is a person of whom I become aware. The wandering movement of my eyes is stopped. They return to him or her. From an anonymous sea of
faces, from the mere collective, individuation has begun; the “class” is beginning to
be “persons.” The teacher thus answers the awareness he feels in the student; he
examines more closely the person who has signaled interest in him. In reciprocity,
this new inspection is no longer felt by the student as mere curious awareness, but as
awareness of himself as a person. More, the student feels his own movement from
item to individuality, from anonymity to personality. And he is grateful (110–111).

Eros at bottom for Schwab is a “desire for selfhood: To experience another’s
recognition of one’s self is to receive reassurance of that self ’s existence.” That
initiates further growth and gratitude, which the teacher also in turn experiences, knowing that she is needed and useful. And in the end, the teacher
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“wants to convey not merely what he knows, but how he knows and how he
values it. He wants to communicate some of the ﬁre he feels, some of the Eros
he possesses, for a valued object” (124).
GIVER AND RECEIVER: CONTRACTING THE SELF

Or, I would add, as the Talmud puts it, “More than the calf wants to suck,
the cow wants to give” (Pesachim 112a). That relation of suckling infant to
nursing mother is also a not-so-simple dynamic of desire. Who indeed “initiates” and “controls” the relation, the mother or the infant? Many texts and stories in Jewish tradition use the feminine imagery of nursing to describe not
only the teacher-student relation, but the relation between text and interpreter.
Among the most extraordinary is the following Talmudic statement: “Why
were the words of Torah compared to a nipple? Just as with a nipple, whenever
an infant fondles it, he ﬁnds milk, so it is with the words of Torah— whenever
a person ponders them he ﬁnds relish in them” (Eruvin 54b).
There is also way in which the desire of the infant to nurse activates the
milk of the mother, and the way the desire of the student to learn activates the
desire of the teacher to teach. To use kabbalistic terminology, the “receiver”
[mekabel] activates the “bestower”[mashpia]. The tension between withholding and giving, holding on and letting go is also itself key to the pedagogical
act. In Jewish mystical tradition, the relation of “bestower” and “receiver” is
itself an ever shifting dialectic of desire and fulﬁllment, meeting and separation that is seen as structuring the entire creation—from the most interior
ﬂuxes of the divine godhead, to the relation of the divine and the human,
human and human, male and female, and so forth. Kabbalistic texts describe
the initial act of creation not as an overﬂowing self-expression of the divine,
for that would have left no place for the other, and for a separate ﬁnite world.
Instead, there was a primal “self-contraction,” by God, a tzimtzum, a “concealing or withdrawal” of the divine light in order to leave an “empty space.” In
that space, however, remains a “trace” [reshimu] of the divine. And in that hollow, the world subsequently begins to develop (as in a womb) as further divine
contractions and emanations are projected into the void. In a sense one could
also say that “self-contraction” is really the secret of human relations, and of
ethics: I let go and make space for the other person.
Many chassidic and kabbalistic thinkers also understand this cosmological
withdrawal as a paradigm of pedagogy, and vice versa. The analogy is made to
the teacher who also has to make a number of contractions and concealments,
in order for her or his thoughts to be apprehended by the receiver. For if the
teacher would try transfer her or his ideas directly on the level s/he conceives
them, that student would be overwhelmed. As R. Yosef Yitzhak Schneerson
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(1880–1950) puts it, in order for the student to absorb the inﬂuence of the
teacher, the teacher must ﬁrst entirely “remove the light of his own intellect, and
conceive an intellectual light that is on the receiver’s level.” The concealment,
however, is ultimately for the purpose of revelation, just as the tzimtzum is
made for the purpose of a new independent creation.(Schneerson, 21).
This dialectic of revelation and concealment would be another way of analyzing “sounding through a mask,” or the role of masking in being “personal”
in teaching. The “concealment” of tzimtzum, however, is a “masking” not for
the purpose of manipulation, or a postmodern play of surface mirrors, but an
ascetic-ethical-spiritual gesture in which one limits oneself, in which one
moves out of one’s own position into the position of the other. I indeed use
this model to instruct me in my own teaching, conceiving of my role less as
expansive self-expression but as leaving a “trace” (reshimu) of myself in the
space I create for my students, a trace that hints, points, invites, but does not
compel. (Thus also my reluctance to write a highly “confessional,” autobiographical narrative here as well.) Students should also have the freedom to
withhold their personal beliefs. But the larger lives we all live should be felt at
the edges, indicated, traced.9 R. Nachman further understood in his own brilliant way that this act of emptying out is also deeply productive for the teacher.
For in the act of teaching, of comprehending and giving of knowledge, the
teacher, so to speak, “empties” herself of her knowledge,” and so creates an
open space within herself that enables entirely new knowledge to enter her
mind. The bestower becomes the receiver.
Ultimately, this concept of tzimztum and necessary contraction reminds me
of what my many years of teaching experience have also led me to conclude:
that one can never really teach anything “directly.” The teaching that is truly
received and absorbed by the student is done via indirection. And the arousal
of the desire to know itself also comes so often through indirection, through a
lack which prompts desire, through a glimpse of a trace which tracks a glimmering light. Indirection, as R. Nachman understood so well, was also the
secret power of stories. Stories, he said, help people who have “fallen asleep,”
who are sunk in an existential darkness and lack of awareness to awaken and,
as he puts it, “ﬁnd their face,” without the light overwhelming and blinding
them. Stories “garb” and “enclothe” the light so it can be received, enable the
sleeper to awaken gently, like blind person healing and slowly coming to see
illumination (Likkutei Moharan “Patakh. R. Simon” 60)10
Maria Harris, in Teaching and the Religious Imagination, has also described
teaching-via indirection using Kierkegaard’s idea of “indirect communication.” In indirect communication, the communicator’s intent is nevertheless to
“confront the hearer in a way that enables the hearer to discover that a rigorous
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demand is set before her or him,” an “existence possibility” that forces the
reader to choose her relation to the communication (positive or negative). In
so doing, the hearer chooses her own subjectivity. This is not a choice for or
against the “subject matter” as a system of clues, but the relation toward that
possibility or subject matter. The hearer does this through a “double reﬂection:
through apprehension of the form presented, and through approbation of the
form in relation to the self ” (66). Ultimately, then the student/hearer is
aroused “not only to do something (or be something or dream something, or
await something, or allow something to happen) but to recognize that one is
morally, ethically religiously called to do something” (69).
L E T T E R S : S E E I N G T H E FA C E O F T H E S T U D E N T

I cannot conclude this essay without at least offering a glimpse of some of
the faces in my classroom, and of modes of teaching I have tried to develop to
“see the face of the other.” In the end, for me it all comes down to what occurs
in the classroom, when teacher and students meet “face to face.” Jane
Tompkins says it well when she writes that despite all our professed academic
goals of critical thinking, or social change, or transmission of cultural heritage,
or professional training,
I have come to think that teaching and learning are not preparation for anything but
are the thing itself. . . .The classroom is a microcosm of the world; it is the chance we
have to practice whatever ideals we cherish. The kind of classroom one creates is the
acid test of what it is one really stands for. And I wonder, in the case of college professors, if performing their competence in front of other people is all that amounts
to in the end. (“Pedagogy,” 659)

For all the proclamations of contemporary cultural and postmodern theory
abut the social and dialogical nature of knowledge, and how knowledge is created through the conversations we engage in with communities of interpreters,
and for all our idealistic talk about the University as a “community”—all too
often, the academy is lonely, fragmented, and anxiety-ridden place for both
faculty and students. A philosophy professor friend once bemoaned to me that
he could not ﬁnd a community in which he felt at home: his only real “community” are the people for whom he writes his academic essays, and who come
to the conferences he runs. But that is an audience, not a community. Despite
our attempts to create classroom and University “community,” we often are
really only “audiences” for each other’ s monologues.
Like Rosenzweig I ﬁnd it harder and hard to write “books,” and more and
more use an epistolary mode in my teaching and writing in order to see the
face of the other. It was one of the students in a graduate seminar I offered on
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the topic “Literary Theory and the Teaching of Literature” who spurred this
change in my teaching She pointed out to me that the “ memos” I had asked all
the students in that seminar to write to each other about the micro-teaching
exercises that each did for the class, had become wonderfully interactive letters.
She persuaded me from then on to stop having students write “journals” in my
classes, and convert to a form of “communally published letters.” I am eternally
grateful for this advice to Mary Alice Delia, whose dissertation, Killer English:
Postmodern Theory and the High School Classroom (1991) includes an excellent
chapter on letter writing.
This practice radically changed my teaching and the dynamics of my classroom; students write with a rare creativity, eloquence, and passion, and form
closer relationships amongst themselves. The rhetorical form of the letter frees
the writer to choose her or his persona and is, of course, a way of simultaneously “sounding through a mask,” and “facing the other,” a way of revealing and
concealing at the same time, without coercion. The writer can be as intimate or
as distant, as analytical or as emotional, as direct or indirect as she or he
chooses. I ask each person to read his or her letter aloud, and I, too, write along
with everyone. In the end, this letter writing makes every one a participant,
gives everyone a voice and a face, even those who are shy or afraid to speak.11

That frustrated student who had wanted to write her Honors Thesis on the
“Meaning of Life” wrote the following end-of-the-semester summary letter to
our “Bible as Literature Class”:
Dear Class:
We’ve chatted long and hard about the Old Testament and
discovered more ways than I thought possible to look at it. We talked
of good and evil and love and humanity, and almost all of creation.
We’ve looked at families and gender and cycles of forgiveness. And
perhaps some of us are in agreement with Jan’s statement about the
Bible, that “it is not supposed to make sense.” But that’s exactly why it
does make sense. We can look at it from any angle and see a
semblance of ourselves in its reﬂection of the world. We ﬁnd
connection (and in a small way, comfort) by that recognition. And
that’s the marvel. That’s why so many millions of people have turned
to it, and continue to turn to it,
While I started out the semester asking, “What is the meaning of
life?” and I’m not necessarily any closer to the answer, I’ve learned
more ways to search for it . . . it comes down to us to judge ourselves.
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We may all be “tools” in a master plan. Or there may truly be free will.
We may all be doomed to isolation and failure—no character in the
entire Bible exists without suffering, and an occasional mistake. Even
the “upright and blameless” Job must bear his share. Whatever the
truth of reality is (which we have no way to ultimately determine) it is
only ourselves that we can hold accountable . . . We lose things when
we lose track of ourselves. The Bible is one way of ﬁnding ourselves.
Our connections with the characters, our instincts to ﬁll in the spaces
by relating what we would feel or think, that is what provides meaning,
what uniﬁes us all as humans.
We often cannot make sense of the data of our lives, because like
Jacob who doesn’t know how to reconcile himself with what he’s
done because “he’s done something that is greater than his awareness
of himself. He has moved into his destiny” (Hugh O’Donnell), we cannot always see past our present knowledge to the changes that are
occurring in our being. We can only take Pam’s interpretation of Eve to
heart and realize that not just the serpent, but God and ourselves are
“necessary to the realization of our purpose: to live.”

“We can look at it from any angle and see a semblance of ourselves in its
reﬂection of the world”: her words uncannily echo the key trope I have been
working with here all along. In this class, not only the text, but each of us was a
kind of refracting mirror which allowed her to see a “semblance” of her face—
and to connect with the faces of others.
T H E PA S S I N G O F T E A C H E R S A N D S T U D E N T S

These letters often forged deep connection between myself and many of
these students. In the cycle of teaching and learning, though, the student and
teacher often reverse roles, and ultimately have to part from each other. Mary
Alice Delia, the graduate student who inspired me to use letters in the classroom, and who became my dear friend, was an award winning High School
teacher whose battle with leukemia forced her to retire early, until the end
came in November, 1997.
Ironically, the day before Mary Alice passed away, I was talking about her
creativity as a teacher to a colleague in Jerusalem while we were examining
texts from Jewish tradition about various forms of leave-taking, and about
teachers and students. We were again looking at that greatest teacher in the
Bible, Moses, and the way he responds to God’s telling him that the time has
come for him to leave the world, and reiterate he will not be able to go into the
Promised Land. At the very end of the Book of Deuteronomy, Moses has to
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accept this decree and make arrangements to pass his teachings and authority
on to his student and successor, Joshua. There are many intriguing midrashim
which creatively expand on this narrative. In many of them, Moses protests,
argues, and refuses to accept God’s pronouncement that the end has come. In
one of the most extraordinary, Moses again asks God for the chance not to die
and God tells him:
“This is how I have decided, and this is the way of the world: each generation has
its interpreters, its economic guides, its political leaders. Until now, you had your share
of service before me: now, your time is over and it is your disciple Joshua’s turn.”
Moses answered, “Lord of the world, if I am dying because of Joshua, I shall go
and be his student.”
God replied, “If that is what you wish to do, go and do so.”
Moses goes to become Joshua’s student, conceals himself at door of Joshua’s tent
and listens to him teach, but suddenly the methodological and pedagogical rules of
wisdom are taken from Moses and he no longer understands. The children of Israel
plead with him to teach them the last words of the Bible, but he says, “I do not know
what to tell you,” stumbles and falls. And he then says to God, “Until now I asked for
my life, but now my soul is given to you.” (Midrash Tanchuma, end of V’Etchanen).

In this midrash, in order to hold on, Moses is willing to abandon his role as
teacher and become his student’s student. But that perhaps is the way of any
great teacher. Both the way a teacher begins to learn how to be a teacher, and
the way a teacher ends her career as a teacher.
So, ﬁnally, I often wonder what indeed does remain of all the classes we have
prepared, committee meetings attended, writing we have read and published, and
students we have taught. I will remember Mary Alice as much as, if not more
than, the books and lectures I have written and heard. For in the end, what are
they all about but to facilitate each other’s illuminations, to recognize and conﬁrm
each other’s faces? So I end this essay with these reﬂections not to depress or sadden, but to help us remember the preciousness of our lives together in the
University, and the shortness of the time. The writer Grace Paley once said: “To
me teaching is a gift because it puts you in loving contact with young people.” As I
think back on my life in academia, perhaps that what will be what most endures.

NOTES

I would like to express my gratitude to the Mandel School for Advanced
Professional Educators in Jerusalem where I was a Jerusalem Fellow from
1997–1999 for the time and support needed to write this essay. I am equally
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grateful to the many friends and colleagues in Jerusalem, who stimulated my
thinking about this topic, helped me formulate ideas and track down sources,
and who represent to me what Jewish learning, superb pedagogy, and humanistic education are all about: Rav Daniel Epstein, Melila Eshed- Hellner, Walter
Hertzberg, Menachem Kallus, Rav Marc Kojovsky, Daniel Marom, Simi Peters,
Jeffrey Saks, Ora Wiskind-Elper, Sassona Yovel, Noam Zion, Aviva Gottlieb
Zornberg.
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See Lee S. Shulman, “Theory, Practice, and the Education of Professionals.”
The Elementary School Journal (98:5):511–526. That turn of the century
“ideology” of professionalism, writes Shulman, valued the technical “objective” and “scientiﬁc” but also had an equally strong moral and “service”
aspect which we need to recover.
The dictionary I refer to here is the online http://www.dict.org which is the
DICT Development Group: Online Dictionary Query, a database of several
dictionaries. I also used the online Middle English Dictionary
http://www.hti.umich.edu.
My earlier books were: The Slayers of Moses: The Emergence of Rabbinic
Interpretation in Modern Literary Theory, and Fragments of Redemption:
Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Scholem, Benjamin, and Levinas.
Recent work on pedagogy includes: “The Torah of Criticism and the
Criticism of Torah: Recuperating the Pedagogical Moment,” in Steven
Kepnes, ed. Interpreting Judaism in a Postmodern Age (New York: New York
UP, 1996): 221–242; “Dear Class,” Essays in Quality Learning:Teachers’
Reﬂections on Classroom Practice in Steven Selden, ed. (University of
Maryland, IBM Total Quality Learning Project, 1998):17–32;”’ We Cleverly
Avoided Talking About God’: Personal and Pedagogical Reﬂections on
Academia and Spirituality,” in Courtyard: Jewish Theology Seminary 1:1
(1999); “Emunah: The Craft of Faith,” Crosscurrents: Religion and Intellectual
Life 42:3 (1992): 293–313.
Moshe Idel, “Models of Learning in Jewish Mysticism,” unpublished lecture
to the Summer School of the Institute for Advanced Study, Hebrew
University, Jerusalem, June 26, 1998.
For more on the relation of the modern secular University and religious
issues, see works such as Parker Palmer, To Know as We are Known: Education
as a Spiritual Journey (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1993); Jane
Tompkins, A Life in School: What the Teacher Learned, (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1996); Mark Schwen, Exiles from Eden: Religion and the
Academic Vocation in America (NY: Oxford Univ P, 1993).
This precise formulation comes from my friend and colleage Simi Peters.
God again asks a similar question to Cain: “Where is Abel, you brother” (Gen
4:9) In response, comes the famous rhetorical question: “I know not. Am I
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my brother’s keeper? There is an implicit textual connection with the
“where” question addressed to Adam, and the two non-answers—between
the inability to face one’s own actions and the inability to face the other . . .
resulting in murder. Following the narrative logic of the Bible in the early
chapters of Genesis, perhaps we could say that the original “personal identity” question is not, “Who are you” but “Where are you?” . . . where are you
situated in relation to others, present or hiding?
See the excellent analysis of Martin S. Jaffee, “A Rabbinic Ontology of the
Written and Spoken Word: On Discipleship, Transformative Knowledge, and
the Living Texts of Oral Torah,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion
(65.3): 526-549. Jaffee insightfully analyzes the dialectic of Oral and Written
Torah in terms of the “face-to-face encounters” of the rabbinic teacher-student relation, and the sense of teacher as “living text” to be decoded and
recomposed by the student for his or her life.
I thank R. Zvi Blanchard for helping me formulate the relation in this way.
I am grateful to Ora Wiskind-Elper for her kind personal assistance in helping clarifying R. Nachman’s work for me, and aid in tracking down sources.
See also her book on R. Nachman, Tradition and Fantasy, p. 220 and her
entire Ch 2, “Telling Tales, or the Physic and Metaphysics of Fiction.”
See also Wayne Booth’s well-known essay “The Rhetorical Stance.” Booth
points out that most college students have no sense of a real audience when
they write, nor can they ﬁnd the proper tone of voice—for after all, the
reader is the instructor with the red pencil and grade book, and that is not a
“real” audience. So students write in the pedantic, disembodied voices that
suppress any personal relation to the reader, or between the writer and the
subject, and lose any sense of what the writing is for. In Writing Teacher’s
Source Book, ed G. Tate and E. Corbett. (New York: Oxford UP, 1981).
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“ W H O WA S T H AT M A S K E D AU T H O R ? ”
The Faces of Academic Editing
Louise Z. Smith

To what extent and in what ways is academic editing personal? It might look
objective. Since 1980, PMLA has had a policy of author-anonymous and referee-anonymous (or “blind”) review of manuscripts. Submissions must
exclude internal tip-offs as to their authors’ identities, so that referees can focus
on what’s said rather than on who (or whose protegé) said it. Referees’ identities, too, are withheld from authors: no rewards, no reprisals. The object is fairness. Recently, though, PMLA’s editorial board considered doing away with
anonymity. With signed submissions, so goes the argument, established
authors will not have to bother with the long, drawn-out process of review and
revision some see as “brutal,” but will get into print as quickly as if their articles
had been commissioned (Shea). As for unknown authors, good luck. PMLA
has maintained anonymous review. But even with it, you can’t entirely eliminate the personal in academic editing.
The four participants in PMLA’s “Guest Column: Four Views on the Place of
the Personal in Scholarship” (1996) concurred that “the personal” inevitably
shapes literary scholarship. Of course, literary editors have famously imparted
their personal imprints: Gordon Lish substantively “changed some of [Raymond
Carver’s] stories so much that they were more his than Carver’s” (Max 34). The
New Yorker’s Harold Ross and William Shawn employed dramatically differing
though equally inﬂuential editorial personae. Although Shawn’s persona seemed
“an inspired sort of doing nothing, of just letting a piece run” (Mehta 71), his
tastes governed which pieces ran. (In contrast to Shawn, unduly assertive copy
editors have damaged literary manuscripts [Higgins, Becker]). Editors of life
writing, too, acknowledge personal factors; if editing is hard when they have “to
drag the mere truth out of some notable who is swollen with self-importance,” it
is “even harder when the editor [knows] the author” (Davison 92). Over the past
twenty years, even the relatively objective ﬁeld of textual studies (which compares textual variants so as to arrive at a “standard edition”)—has “reapportion[ed] textual authority . . . from a monovocal . . . toward a [democratized]
polyvocal” entity in which many personal agendas must be negotiated (Pettit
252; Tanselle). I know of no one so far, however, who speaks of a profoundly personal enterprise that also shapes scholarly discourse: journal editing.
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Having edited College English between 1992 and 1999, I now have a fuller
understanding of “academic discourse.” What ﬁnally gets into print by no
means represents it. Only editors know the broad spectrum of submissions,
and if we sent every submission to referees, they’d be justiﬁably furious with us
for wasting their time. Each published article bears the personal imprints—in
both substance and style—of author, referees, and editors engaged in often
highly personal processes of negotiation. An article is a polyvocal text, though
its author ﬁnally bears responsibility and authority. Moreover, behind each
unpublished manuscript stands a person who very often, in one way or
another, is isolated. That person needs an editor’s serious reading perhaps even
more than a regularly published author does. Corresponding with both published and unpublished authors was a major part of my work as editor. An editor does not necessarily just sift submissions and publish some of them,
thumbs up, thumbs down.
If they ever think about it, readers may ﬁnd my editorship impersonal.
(Quiz: Name the current editors of PMLA, CE, and one journal in your special
ﬁeld. Gotcha? Donald Gray’s term as CE editor ended in 1985, James
Raymond’s in 1992, but in 1999 I still get forwarded letters addressed to each.
Journal editing is a bastion of anonymity.) Until now, I have chosen to remain
pretty much behind the scenes except for a few 4Cs and NCTE panels. Don’t
expect a searing exposé here, either: in what follows, disguised details protect
conﬁdentiality. Behind the scenes, though, the personal inevitably enters in
many ways. It shapes the development of published articles, shapes editorial
policies, and—for better or worse—shapes the professional lives of both
obscure and established authors, as well as of editors themselves.
THE PERSONAL IN MANUSCRIPT DEVELOPMENT

My editorial term fortunately coincided with the decline of theory-speak
and the ascendency of a more personal, down-to-earth voice. Richard Larson,
who edited College Composition and Communication from 1980 until 1986,
valuably advised, “Don’t try to make everybody sound alike.” To make room for
individual voices meant, ironically perhaps, allowing some authors to continue
using post-structuralist terminology, though I asked them to tame it by explaining a concept in fairly ordinary language and then giving the special term in
parentheses. Every profession from English Studies to Dairy Science has its own
lingo, after all. A letter-to-the-editor complaining about the term “phronesis”
got no editorial sympathy (or space in CE), since the article’s explanation had
been clear. How come some English professors balk at learning new words?
What kinds of personal criticism to publish in CE was, for me, an intriguing
question. Personal criticism is usually all about the pronoun “I”—how I read
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this, how I came to understand that, how I changed my mind about the other.
Personal criticism has been identiﬁed as “the witnessing ‘I’ of subjective experience,” and it has often been associated with feminist writing produced for
particular occasions (Miller 14). A good example is Adrienne Rich’s famous
speech, “When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-Vision,” which she gave at the
MLA conference in 1971. Rich saw herself as “asking women’s questions,
bringing literary history and criticism back to life in both senses” (33). And she
saw herself as searching for “ways . . . in which the energy of creation and the
energy of relation can be united” (43). Personal criticism took courage. In The
Last Gift of Time (1997), Carolyn Heilbrun looks back twenty years to when
she wrote Reinventing Womanhood (1979). The book
represented, in its introduction, what was for me a remarkable act of bravery; it still
seems brave to me upon reﬂection. In this current age of memoirs, detailed recollections, and the publication of one’s most personal ordeals and imaginings, my need of
the courage required to speak personally and of my family in the late 1970s must seem
quixotic, if not deluded. (193, my italics)

In the tabloid-besotted 1990s, it was easy to forget what courage personal
criticism demanded of Rich and Heilbrun, and their historical moment in
early feminism is in any case long gone. Now we can readily acknowledge that
Rich’s questions are not exclusively “women’s questions,” and that the challenge of uniting the energies of creation and relation is not only women’s
work. In 1942, Alfred Kazin praised Edmund Wilson because
At a time when . . . the very exercise of criticism seemed peculiarly futile and isolated, Wilson continued to write . . . [as, in Saint-Beauve’s words] a “naturalist of
souls,” a critic in whom judiciousness and sympathy became illumination. . . . In
[the 1930s,] an age of [Marxist] fanaticisms and [New Critical] special skills, he
stood out as the quiet arbiter, the private reader of patience and wisdom whose very
skill gave him a public importance. (447-448, my italics)

Perhaps it is no accident that Wilson’s dedication of Axel’s Castle takes the
form of a personal letter addressed to Christian Gauss, a letter that says “I have
wanted to dedicate [this book] to you in acknowledgment of the kindness and
instruction which, beginning at college, have continued ever since. . . .” What
kind of “you” might Wilson and Kazin, Rich and Heilbrun have in mind in
envisioning their readers? In working with manuscripts, it seemed to me that
the implied listener in personal criticism is a “you” rather than a “they” and
that we need to distinguish the “you” of strong personal criticism from the
“you” of merely cathartic personal criticism.
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The implied listener in personal criticism deﬁnitely is a “you” rather than a
“they,” because personal criticism ﬁrmly embraces the essay form, as distinct
from the article form. In an article, a relatively disembodied writer addresses a
remote audience—“they” who must be convinced. New Literary History editor
Ralph Cohen illustrates the point by quoting Paul de Man’s account of fruitlessly
seeking unity among a collection of his own articles (which he calls “essays”):
The fragmentary aspect of the whole is made more obvious still by the hypotactic
manner that prevails in each of the essays taken in isolation, by the continued
attempt, however ironized, to present a closed and linear argument. The apparent
coherence within each essay is not matched by a corresponding coherence between
them. Laid out diachronically in a roughly chronological sequence, they do not
evolve in a manner that easily allows for dialectical progression or, ultimately, for
historical totalization. Rather, it seems that they always start again from scratch and
that their conclusions fail to add up to anything. (qtd. in Cohen 1)

Such a disjunction is the antithesis of personal criticism—and of the essay.
The article writer presents an airtight case: the facts and the very best way to
interpret them, a way that overcomes all potential counter-arguments and
emerges as unanswerable: “So there!” In each new article, de Man seems to me
to be saying, the disembodied argument begins “from scratch” because it
must stifle the embodied person—that potentially trouble-making person
who knows ﬁrsthand where the ﬂaws and counter-evidence are buried so as to
make the argument “closed and linear.” If the real embodied person were
allowed to speak his mind more fully, there would be some continuity from
one argument to the next. On the other hand, in an essay—as in a personal
letter that makes its recipient “feel addressed” (Koppelman 76) and invited to
answer—a speaker more candidly acknowledges troublesome factors,
addresses a nearby “you” listener, explores some of the facts and offers an
interesting—though not airtight—interpretation of them to which “you”
responds with gestures of intimacy—a nod, a glare, a raised eyebrow, and so
on. Ironically, even while the participants in PMLA’s Guest Column afﬁrmed
“the personal” in scholarship, none addressed the others as a listening “you”;
each was writing an article, not an essay.
As I have recently suggested, an essay makes “you” feel addressed by
employing the deictic relationship between “I” and “you” that Montaigne
coined in discovering
that he is neither the source nor the location of deixis. He cannot construct stable
distinctions between object and subject. . . . He can produce only a record of . . .
shifts, uncertainties, and displacement. (Kittay and Godzich 206-07)

“ W h o Wa s T h a t M a s k e d A u t h o r ? ”

149

The “you” he addresses in ordinary language (not Latin) is thus not a stable
and remote entity (like the King or the Cardinal), but a nearby listener whose
moment-to-moment reactions affect how “I” speaks and what “I” speaks
about—the “shifts, uncertainties, and displacements” that a real person experiences but that a de Manian arguer suppresses in the interests of airtightness.
Three centuries after Montaigne, Bakhtin elaborated this deictic when he
spoke of the “surplus,” meaning the shared but differing perspectives that
result when “you and I” are together, each looking over the other’s shoulder
and seeing something the other cannot (Morson 53). At such proximity, each
of us is “answerable” to the other, not because of systems (such as “class”) but
because of our concrete acts with other real individuals in ordinary life
(Morson 114-15). The “surplus” embodies the ethical relationships that Kittay
and Godzich explain linguistically as “spatiotemporal coordinates of the act of
utterance” (19). One could say that Bakhtin’s notions of “answerability” and
the “surplus” are ways of naming this intellectual intimacy (Smith “Prosaic”).
Today’s “personal criticism” produces mixed results, some strong, others
merely cathartic. Essays of strong personal criticism vigorously address a
friendly and respectful reader (Germans would say, a Sie), whereas cathartic
essays address an intimate (a Du) (Smith “Make”). Cathartic criticism
addressed to a Du can be illustrated by a 1993 essay called “Breaking Silence:
The Woman Warrior,” in which the critic confesses,
[A]fter I was divorced, sometime before the saving decision of Roe vs. Wade, I measured my security by my ability to afford an abortion. Even as a graduate teaching
assistant, I kept enough money in my savings account to allow me to travel outside
the United States should I need one.” (Garner 122)

Sentences like those do nothing to illuminate The Woman Warrior. Instead,
they distract us by testifying to the author’s personal association with NoName Woman, an association about which nobody cares except the author’s
intimates—the relatives and friends who share a personal relationship with
her. Diane Freedman, editor of the volume that included Garner’s essay, told
me that when her students read it, they remarked that Garner had not written
personally enough. Enough for what? To me, their reaction illustrates how easily the line between personal criticism and personal exposé—what Heilbrun
above calls “the publication of one’s most personal ordeals and imaginings”—
may be blurred. In another example—from a critical essay on narratives of
Western families by Tillie Olsen, Meridel LeSeur, and others—the author
muses, “I can remember the pain I felt when I ﬁrst wrote that ﬁnal sentence
two years ago” (Graulich 186). Again, the spotlight is redirected from criticism
of the works themselves to an exposé of the author’s experience of writing
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about them, implying that her pain of authorship is somehow comparable to
the suffering portrayed in the narratives: a mawkish analogy.
CE submissions that aimed at catharsis were not published. One such submission claimed that its author “felt violated” when her dissertation director
stole her citation. The rape metaphor neglected how people who had experienced literal rape might feel in reading it. Another submission recounted how
a writing group helped its members to recover from a natural disaster. When it
was rejected, the author retorted that only an insensitive editor could fail to
sympathize with their pain—as if sympathy were the main criterion for publication. These examples illustrate a self-indulgent personal criticism that seeks
authorial catharsis more assiduously than it does illumination of texts and
issues. In short, the deixis involved in such cathartic criticism places “you”—
Du—too close to the author, so close that the listener is caught up in the
speaker’s Montaignean “shifts, uncertainties, and displacement.” At such close
range, there’s no room for the listener to look over the speaker’s shoulder and
see the Bakhtinian surplus. Instead of Bakhtinian “answerability,” the selfindulgent speaker elicits Rogerian echoing: “You felt violated?” This foreshortening results in the listening Du seeing almost the same things the speaker sees,
risking a kind of rhetorical solipsism. Self-indulgent personal criticism
addresses readers as if they were the author’s intimates and thus falsiﬁes intimacy. The “you” it addresses is a phoney: am I supposed to say, “I’m sorry”?
How sorry am I, really, or is that just a sweet nothing, after which I go about
my business? Susanne Langer’s description of some expressivism as “a frozen
tantrum” (26) comes to mind.
In editing CE, I avoided the cathartic Du and turned to the strong “you”—
Sie—of the best personal criticism: about but also authentically, “answerably”
to a person, one who owes the speaker nothing morally or emotionally—only
friendly intellectual attention. Mina Shaughnessy provided a model for Sie
when she recalled sitting at her desk at CUNY in 1977, “reading and re-reading
the alien papers, wondering what had gone wrong and trying to understand”
(Errors vii). Without claiming to feel my eyestrain or asking me to feel hers, she
made me feel addressed and able to look over her shoulder so as to develop
and challenge her work (cf. Lu, Hunter). Ten years later in 1987 Jane
Tompkins’s manifesto of personal literary criticism, “Me and My Shadow,”
appeared in New Literary History (how jealously I wish CE had had the opportunity to publish it!). Some paragraphs portray the scene of writing (Jane sits
stocking-footed at her desk) and address her colleague as “you” or “Ellen”; others portray Tompkins’s work impersonally and speak of the same colleague as
“she” or “Messer-Davidow.” To undermine “the public-private hierarchy” in
academic discourse, Tompkins quotes Hawthorne’s advice: authors should
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imagine that “a friend, a kind and apprehensive, though not the closest friend,
is listening to our talk” (170), and that is the kind of reader she addresses: Sie,
not Du. Feeling addressed, I thought, “Maybe after—if?—I get tenure I’ll dare
to write like that.” Shaughnessy’s preface and Tompkins’s essay are models of
strong personal criticism.
Similarly, Patricia J. Williams in 1991 wrote an account of how she transformed an experience recorded in her personal journal—her rage at a white
clerk’s prolonged refusal to unlock a door and admit her into a women’s clothing shop—into a law review article. Near her essay’s conclusion, Williams
achieves the union Rich imagined between creation and relation, the private
and the public. She moves from a private reﬂection—on the power she felt as
the sole audience for her father’s poems—to a public reﬂection on race and
gender:
My power was in living the lie that I was all audiences [of my father’s poems]. My
power was in the temptation to dissemble, either out of love or disaffection. This is
blacks’ and women’s power, I used to think, this power to lie while existing in the
realm of someone else’s fantasy. (707)

Williams’s intimate family members are by no means the only “you” to
whom her personal reﬂections are addressed. Both Tompkins’s and Williams’s
stories of writing achieve intellectual intimacy between the storytelling speaker
and Sie. This is what cathartic criticism, limited by Du, merely claims. Yet,
there is an element of celebrity journalism in these pieces of personal criticism:
if Tompkins were not well-known as editor of Reader Response Theory (and as
Mrs. Stanley Fish), or if Williams could not subtitle her book The Diary of a
Law Professor, could they risk self-revelation with quite the same conﬁdence
that readers would ﬁnd their private lives interesting?
Self-revelation without self-indulgence characterizes CE essays I published
by Carol Deletiner, Richard Miller, Paul Kameen, Kurt Spellmeyer, Ruth Spack,
and Nancy Welch to name just a few. Here are some examples. Dan Morgan’s
student confesses to murder, and from grappling with how he should respond
personally and professionally, Morgan concludes that students’ “extreme” situations “reﬂect what has been occurring in our society at large” (324). Dana Elder
transforms a “prose poem addressed to my parents” into a public meditation
on social class in the academy (Elder 570). Pauline Uchmanowicz calculates
her double-time career as a part-time instructor in terms of “dog years” and
ﬁnds pedagogical riches in correspondence between students in private and
public colleges (Uchmanowicz). Jerry Herron recalls writing of Walter Pater’s
“arrival at Oxford [as] typical of a more general arrival, which the university
made possible . . . ,” and then remarks, “This passage has a lot more to do with
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the wishful transformation of somebody like me . . . than it does with Walter
Pater. . . .” Herron’s experience of “turning against where [he] had already
been” is not only personal, but also a “turning against history” that may characterize “ambitious Americans” as a class, people with “an urge to belong and
not to belong” (930-934). Just as he says after reading a poem, “it was so good
to be written to” (937), CE’s readers might feel he was writing to us as his Sie.
Linda Brodkey wishes “everyone were taught to write on the bias” because language without a bias “is only words as cloth is only threads,” and because writers cannot avoid bias simply “by recast[ing] their ﬁrst person claims into the
third person” (546): the personal is inescapable. Revision entails many personal elements, and not one single CE submission was published without
revision—almost always substantive. To deﬁne the border between editing and
co-authorship is a special challenge, learned mostly by trial and error. It often
began with my trying to understand why two referees had rendered conﬂicting
advice, to help an author decide which of their suggestions to heed or ignore,
and to consider what suggestions I could usefully offer. How could I help an
author to address both specialists and generalists, to acknowledge opposition
without sacriﬁcing her own stance, to integrate further research without losing
focus on his original question? How could I help an author to organize more
clearly and less repetitiously, to introduce and conclude more engagingly, to
boil down stylistically—without ending up sounding like me? Would an
author receiving my ﬁve-page single-spaced revision letter full of questions
and suggestions—along with half the manuscript’s sentences restructured and
condensed—just pack up and take the work elsewhere? That happened once.
Authors did not accept every suggestion, nor did I expect they would. For me,
the great pleasure of editing was to talk over what an author’s idea was and
how best to get it across. To see me through occasional bad days—hazy, hot,
and humid days when editing felt like doing somebody else’s laundry while my
own piled up—I kept a “kudos” ﬁle full of letters saying “Thanks for helping
me ﬁgure out what I had to say.” In 1997 I wrote such a letter to Mosaic editor
Evelyn Hinz in gratitude for her extensive work on a manuscript I had submitted—the best support my writing has ever had. Every published CE article
entailed many personally negotiated questions, but you might ﬁnd examples of
them tedious. Besides, they are conﬁdential.
THE PERSONAL IN EDITORIAL POLICY

An editor’s personal preferences can shape a journal in matters ranging
from insigniﬁcant to crucial. An editor can design a journal’s look and feel, can
revamp its features, and can control the much more serious matter of anonymous or signed review. I changed the ﬁrst two as little as possible. I maintained
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anonymous review—ﬁercely! Even so, no matter how carefully guarded the
identities of authors and reviewers are, eventually an editor cannot help but
ﬁnd out. Fierceness notwithstanding, the personal then enters into manuscript
selection.
An editor might use a journal’s design as a way to express her personality,
kind of like wallpaper. Oh boy, I fantasized, now College English can have cat
cartoons and a centerfold “Theorist of the Month.” But I never thought the
journal belonged to me personally. Asked in 1991 to redesign the cover, I
replied “What’s wrong with the blue stripes?” NCTE answered, “We always
redesign for new editors.” After my “But why spend the money?” repeatedly
failed to persuade, I ﬁnally suggested, “OK, how about the letter E in various
fonts ﬂying through a window, suggesting the varieties of English Studies to
which the journal is open?” Still blue and white.
Nor did I feel it was up to me to change the features (which earlier editors
had kept consistent). Yes, CE would continue to include lyric poetry, which
enabled the journal to be literary in brief, offered pleasure to readers and,
frankly, provided ﬂexibility in spacing copy. No, I would not add an editor’s
column, since I wished neither to opine eight times a year nor to explain how
each issue cohered; CE would speak for itself. Yes, CE would continue to ban
footnotes, even though I personally prefer them (Thompson). That decision,
though, was a mistake: footnotes can provide readers with access to the origins
and trajectories of a discussion, a valuable function for a journal whose over
15,000 member subscribers span a great many specialities. I compounded the
mistake by believing that fairness demanded consistency throughout my editorial term. In not changing the journal’s design and the features, I did not of
course avoid “the personal.” Some of my characteristics—thrift, respect for
precedent, preference for staying in the background (oh well, and fondness for
blue and white)—invisibly shaped these early decisions and the discourse
resulting from them.
The most important editorial policy was to maintain anonymous review.
This policy hadn’t been broken exactly, but it had been a little bit bent by
guest-edited issues. Even if a “call for papers” precedes these, guest editors may
end up quietly commissioning contributions. Then fairness diminishes.
Avoiding guest-edited issues, I nevertheless retained the clearly labeled
“Editor’s Choice” and introduced the occasional “symposium” among experts
whom I obviously had invited. By and large, however, I resisted Stanley Fish’s
view that author-anonymity is neither feasible nor desirable. For Fish all editing is personal: famous authors’ manuscripts are ipso facto signiﬁcant, as are
their protegés’ to a lesser extent, whereas unknowns’ manuscripts require the
advice and consent of the most famous referees willing to evaluate them (1985,
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1988). However, I believed that Fish’s view confused ideological with personal
identity, over-valued the latter as constitutive of scholarship, assumed that reputation is self-maintaining, and—all or nothing—found anonymity undesirable unless it could assure a perfectly objective process (Smith “Anonymous”).
In order to maximize impersonality, our practice at CE resembled the
PMLA practice to which Fish objected. I commissioned book review essays by
experts whose own scholarship had earned them the right to evaluate that of
others. Otherwise, our staff logged in each manuscript anonymously, making
sure to conceal any internal reference to the author’s identity (including institutional afﬁliation). Anonymous log-in applied even to manuscripts whose
authors I had invited to submit revised and expanded talks given at MLA,
CCCC, and other conferences; issuing about 75 invitations annually, I had no
trouble forgetting who had given which talk. I read every manuscript and conferred with the associate editor(s) on whether to seek referees’ advice. We then
made up a list of possible referees. Only after that did we learn its author’s
identity, a necessary step in order to avoid selecting the author or the author’s
colleague as a referee. To the staff ’s amazement, my list of potential referees for
a manuscript as-yet-anonymous to me often included its author’s name. In
fact, that is how I learned that a scholar’s reputation is not self-maintaining.
We readers were sometimes taken aback to discover that a piece we thought
unworthy of even of being refereed, much less accepted—or that seemed likely
to need very extensive revision—was in fact the work of a well-known scholar.
One of my least favorite tasks was to write rejection letters to these scholars,
especially when they were also my friends. On the other hand, we sometimes
found that a manuscript publishable with little revision was the work of an asyet-unknown graduate student.
Impersonality with regard to manuscript selection was the goal—but not the
means—of author- anonymous and referee-anonymous review. The personal
enters the review process because potential conﬂicts of interest among an
author and referees must be minimized. This is harder than it looks. In the
small world of scholarship, it is possible to know who teaches in an author’s
department and appears regularly with the author on conference programs. But
it is impossible to know who may have read a manuscript already for another
journal, who may have heard the piece at a conference, what other social relationships may link author and referee, and who may accurately guess the
author’s identity. Of course an editor seeks unbiased referees—what would be
the point of sending a manuscript to a referee whose approval or disapproval
one could anticipate? But an editor remains at the mercy of individuals’ professional integrity, which I assure you is unevenly distributed. At the high end is
Heather Dubrow, whom I invited to referee a manuscript because she had
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established her expertise in its subject by guest editing a special issue of PMLA.
When she received this manuscript, however, she recognized it as a submission
for that special issue, one which she had admired but ﬁnally could not include. I
said that that didn’t matter. She wrote a detailed, positive report with valuable
advice, and the piece appeared in CE. At the low end is a referee whose name I
will not mention. An author asked her friend at another university to read a
manuscript in draft; by coincidence, CE later asked the same friend to referee
the piece, and without disqualifying herself, she trashed the manuscript (bringing up issues she had never mentioned to the author). No one would ever have
discovered the conﬂict of interest except for a terrible clerical accident (the only
such we know of) in which the referee’s name was left unconcealed when CE
transmitted the referee’s report to the author. That was the end of their friendship, and of my respect for the referee. It took two acts of fate to make the personal visible—glaringly—in this ostensibly impersonal process.
Other personal factors can color an anonymous review process. Referees are
selected because they have published scholarship in the ﬁeld to which an
author seeks to contribute—and because they can be counted on to deliver a
detailed, constructive review on time, a personal quality that an editor discovers only through experience. Some very famous and busy referees took time to
compose detailed and constructive reports for which the authors and I are
deeply grateful; whether these referees ever contacted the authors once their
manuscripts were published I have no idea. If not, the connection remains
invisible.
Another personal element is that a referee may sabotage or promote an
author’s challenging or applauding the arguments that that referee has established. However, an editor can usually avoid that referee only if he or she
appears in the author’s works cited list. Unlisted but similarly situated referees
cannot be avoided because no CE editor can possibly know all the networks of
alliance and enmity in every scholarly speciality. The editor of a specialized
journal or a newsletter might have a somewhat better chance at guessing who
might recognize an author’s identity or have an ax to grind, and so on. Also,
referees may use a manuscript as a springboard for their own ideas, ignoring
what it does say and competing rather than collaborating with the author.
Still another factor that compromises even anonymous review is that today’s
reviewer may be tomorrow’s reviewee (Patten 100), a consideration that may
have prompted a doctoral student to volunteer to review his dissertation director’s latest book for CE. (Or was he just green?) Moreover, I believe one earns
the right to review others’ work by making one’s own scholarly mark ﬁrst. The
butter-up factor is one reason why referee-anonymity is just as important as
author-anonymity. In the interests of consistency and fairness, I even declined
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referees’ requests to be identiﬁed to authors so as to collaborate, reasoning that
their collaboration could grow after a manuscript was published.
Personal circumstances—especially impending tenure decisions—also can
affect objectivity. An assistant professor’s request for speedy review can be ethically accommodated. But what about the author, invited to revise a refereed
manuscript, who told her tenure committee that it had been accepted—and
then later, when the revision turned out to be weaker than the original and was
rejected, enlisted an advocate to twist my arm? An amusing instance of
attempted interference came from an irate participant in the University of
Texas’s culture wars during Linda Brodkey’s days as writing program director.
Having heard of her CE article “Writing on the Bias,” he threatened me with a
lawsuit if I published anything more about the UT situation. How easily he
might have discovered that “bias” referred to cutting cloth, a metaphor in
Brodkey’s literacy biography.
A final personal element was my reliance on readers to realize that the
views expressed in any given article were not necessarily those of “the management.” I never felt that CE belonged me; rather, it ought to represent the
interests and demographics of a very large and diversified professional organization. I tried to make sure that CE included authors representing various
kinds of academic institutions and ranks, as well as races, ethnicities, and religious and sexual orientations. Only once in seven years did an author claim
ethnic discrimination as the cause for rejection of a manuscript. I told the
author that the manuscript simply wasn’t done well enough for CE. (When
my stuff gets rejected, is it because an editor has found it too smithily bland,
too Z-fully mysterious, too tall?) Thus, while CE included my interests (such
as reception studies, forms of poetry, non- and echt-canonical authors in balance, applied linguistics, and deafness), it also included articles that were not
of particular interest to me and, frankly, some that I heartily disagreed with
(for instance, Alan France’s critique of David Bartholomae and Anthony
Petrosky’s Ways of Reading, which I consider The Great American Textbook
for composition). Politically, I hoped that some readers would find me too
conservative, others too liberal. They did. The late Thelma Atkins, a parttimer at UMass/Boston who had been a USO tap-dancer, often reassured her
students, “If I insulted you today, don’t feel bad. Soon I will have insulted
everyone.” A good motto for me, I thought.
All in all, the personal element of manuscript selection involves how such
matters as the clarity and consistency of editorial correspondence, as well as
the timeliness of decisions and of publication, affect authors’ and referees’
careers and reputations. The impersonal, it turns out, cannot entirely avoid
depending upon the personal.
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C O R R E S P O N D I N G W I T H U N P U B L I S H E D AU T H O R S

Does an editor read all the submissions, or just the better ones chosen by staff
readers? Who writes the rejection letters? To what extent are they boilerplate?
The answers to these questions have a lot to do with an editor’s personal characteristics. If you decide to read all the submissions and write the letters, you’re
going to have less time for professional reading or playing the piano or. . . .
CE publishes roughly 10% of submissions. I decided—in retrospect, perhaps with excessive idealism—that the best I could do was to read the other
90% just as seriously and to write some individual comments to the authors.
(Except for a one-semester sabbatical, when Associate Editor Gillian Gane was
in charge, I did this.) In time I learned to adjust my comments to the seriousness of the submissions. The few frivolous submissions received short notes: a
high school student’s “A” paper, an unsolicited review sent in 1991 of a single
book published 1986, a software ad thinly disguised as an article, a short story,
an after-dinner speech to a town reading group—all manuscripts whose
authors had obviously never looked inside the journal. In June, 1992, two
poems arrived with a cover letter written on three-hole lined paper, which I’ll
lightly paraphrase (so as to avoid tracking the poet down for permission):
I am a young man who has moved out of his parents’ house and has written many
great poems, of which one has been published in Dude magazine. . . . It would be
very much appreciated if you published one of the following poems in your mag.
Like any other professional writer, I expect to be paid if published. The ﬁrst poem
was written in ‘91, and the second was written last week.

Authors like this one received letters suggesting as gently as I could that they
try another publisher.
Most rejected submissions were serious but inadequately researched. Since
lazy people do not write manuscripts, I reasoned that the authors were isolated
in one way or another. Some taught in colleges geographically remote from
good libraries and inadequately supplied with electronic resources. Some lacked
colleagues working in the same ﬁeld, who could give their manuscripts preliminary readings. Some faced overwhelming workloads. Some authors conﬁned
their research to outdated sources or read too superﬁcially, thus remaining
unaware that their points had already been made. In contrast, other authors
summarized research so thoroughly that they never got around to saying what
made their own work newsworthy. Or they acknowledged having nothing to
add to a professional discussion but, nevertheless, hoping that readers would
like to know how they saw it. They were addressing Du, not Sie. Some authors
represented others’ work inaccurately, as saying what it would be convenient for
their own arguments if it had said. And some manuscripts suffered the same ills
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that English 101 papers are heir to: vagueness, windiness, repetition, and convolution affecting everything from sentences to paragraphs to overall structure—
none of it beyond my willing editorial help if the idea itself warranted
refereeing. These authors were all writing uphill and deserved encouragement.
To read their work attentively and offer some detailed comments or suggest
some further reading—and sometimes to remark on interests and experiences
we shared—were ways in which my rejection letters could modestly counter
their isolation and foster their professional growth, and—a little at a time, I
hoped—the growth of the profession. One thing no editor ought to do, however, is to name another journal that would be just right for the rejected piece;
although I gladly published a few castoffs from PMLA, Profession, and other
journals (and noticed some of CE’s rejections in print elsewhere), I never welcomed the task of disappointing the false expectations other editors raised,
however well-intentioned. Instead, authors’ own research ought to show them
which journals publish in the ﬁelds to which they seek to contribute.
Some well-established authors of rejected manuscripts really ought to have
known better. The prize for sentimentality went to a famous author who
described taking students to spend a day in jail so that they would know what it’s
like to be incarcerated: the absurdity lay, of course, in the fact that the incarcerated do not go home at the end of a day. The prize for boneheadedness went to
the faculty member who had her entire seminar submit papers; reading through
these anonymously logged-in submissions, I increasingly wondered why so
many in a single batch dealt with such similar questions—only to retrieve their
cover letters and discover that the students had been sent to CE in search of a
second set of paper comments! (“Editor goes on six-state murder spree!”) Then
there were the two senior authors who persuaded their graduate student to
withdraw an accepted manuscript from a book-in-progress and send it along
with their two manuscripts to CE as a three-part package. Since that would have
amounted to their guest-editing a special issue, I let the three know that their
manuscripts would be refereed individually. Referees recommended rejection of
the graduate student’s work, which I agreed was weak. I accepted the other two
manuscripts, but rather than leave their protegé in the lurch (“All for one! One
for all!”), the two senior authors withdrew their work. Months later they
relented, CE published their articles, and eventually CE also published an
entirely different manuscript by the graduate student. Another well-known
author’s manuscript required extensive revision, on which associate editor Pat
Wright and I labored for days; on the morning when Pat was ﬁnally about to
mail copy to the printer, he was eating breakfast and browsing through another
publication when his eye fell upon an article by the same author, including—oh,
no!—a very long passage corresponding word-for-word to part of CE’s copy. Of
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course, we had to pull the whole article and substitute another, wasting all our
work and scrambling to meet the printer’s deadline. Confronted with the double
submission and narrowly missed copyright infringement, the author answered
unapologetically, “But I want to publish it in CE. The circulation is so much
larger.” Each of these vignettes shows personal motives that remain invisible in
published academic discourse. Thank goodness such situations are unusual.
Editorial correspondence includes personal moments as sad, bizarre, and
funny as any other part of academic life. An established scholar urged me—
purely on his say-so, never mind the scholarship—to write on behalf of his
friend at another university who had been denied tenure and to get my friends
to do the same. An unknown author accused a CE author of repeating the
unknown’s ideas expressed some years before in a graduate seminar they had
taken together. A famous author charged that in rejecting his submission I was
part of a cabal. When a submission that relied upon caricature was rejected, its
author retaliated with Xeroxed copies of several already-published articles setting forth the identical caricature—but with differing examples: a kind of selfplagiarism. An author’s name appeared on each page of a submission (against
the rules on CE’s mast page), so we cut it off before reviewing it; not having
kept a copy, the author insisted that I retype it. I rejected a humor piece, thus
convincing its author that I had no sense of humor—or had lost it since CE
published another humor piece years before. And so on.
M E A N D M Y S H A D OW

What does it mean to me personally that I am CE’s ﬁrst woman editor?
When my gender is no more noteworthy than my being the ﬁrst DutchAmerican editor, or the tallest, feminism will have accomplished one of its
goals. For years women have made such signiﬁcant contributions to the
English Studies profession, that my relatively small role in the 1990s seems to
me quite ordinary—and it’s very good to be able to say that. In 1998, a freelance writer’s informal survey of editorial correspondence concluded that male
editors value competence, autonomy, and achievement, whereas female editors
value nurturance, collaboration, and understanding (Thomson). He presents
his results lightly, and I do not want to make too much of them except to say
that they not only reify outdated gender stereotypes—the (male) ethic of justice and the (female) ethic of care, as if we could have one without the other—
but also contradict my experience of having my work edited by Mosaic’s Evelyn
Hinz and CE’s Donald Gray, who both value all those qualities.
Am I just a cog in the profession’s publication machinery? Faculty hired
in the 1950s and early 1960s might finish their dissertations after they
became tenured, whereas today’s young faculty complete theirs—and often
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publish several articles—before getting their first jobs. At places where
tenure once demanded an international reputation, it now must be intergalactic. Tabloid scholarship sells increasingly well because “as a credential
for tenure or promotion at a real college or university,” such work is “transgressive”; the background of traditional scholarship gives such work its point
(Dowling 121-124). As the young publish more, so must the gray—or forego
merit raises. Ernest Boyer’s 1990 report to the Carnegie Commission
revealed that 47% of professors thought that publications were merely
counted (not read qualitatively). And 45% felt that pressures to publish
detract from teaching. Yet of twenty-five reasons to publish given by James
Axtell, Kenan Professor of Humanities at William and Mary, fifteen are personal (Axtell 5, 9-15). His last, most emphatic reason is that “publication of
scholarship . . . is a form of teaching in itself ” (16), and I believe that CE is
especially attuned to that connection. To publish in CE, with its broadly conceived orientation towards teaching, might help win tenure and promotion
in some institutions—and place one below the salt in others. In my early
years, CE became my favorite journal because its articles closely linked
knowing, understanding, and doing—though only occasionally transgressing. Ideally, every CE article helps readers teach with greater understanding
of English Studies (even if they do not teach the particular subject—or with
the particular critical concepts—at hand). It will be up to others to judge the
extent to which we achieved this ideal.
The most personal element in academic editing is the professional friendships built through correspondence and amongst the staff. How often have we
thought, “Why even ask so-and-so if s/he is willing to referee a manuscript
when s/he is in such demand as a speaker and writer?” only to receive a cheerful “Sure, send the manuscript” followed in due course by a thoughtful,
detailed, and collaborative referee’s report. How often have I mailed one of my
mega-revision letters and then regretted some lapse in diplomacy, only to hear
from the author, “Thanks, I needed that!” Our profession is rich in generous
good will, much of it given quite invisibly—all far less colorful than some of
the situations described above—and almost always proffered in a friendly,
respectful way to Sie.
In the transition from James Raymond’s editorial term to mine, he advised
me, “Hire people who can do things that you can’t.” Ofﬁce manager Anita
Anger kept us organized (in seven years, we misplaced one manuscript),
helped me ﬁnd the right tone of voice in difﬁcult correspondence, and particularly nurtured our interns in learning the ways of professional life. Associate
editor Pat Wright ﬁercely perfected every detail (insisting, for instance, that the
printer’s software could print a really good-looking Old English ash for John
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Niles’s Beowulf article [December 1993]), and he put together the symposium
on teaching literature in the composition classroom (March 1993). Associate
editor Gillian Gane ﬁercely got the graphics just right (for instance, in Andrea
Lowenstein’s article on teaching Maus [April 1998]), and she put together the
symposium on English Studies at the millennium (July 1999). The beautiful
young people who have been our interns have gone on to careers in music,
social services, public relations, publishing, academic administration, and secondary and college teaching. At the end of my seven years, I felt grateful to
have edited CE yet completely ready to let it be someone else’s turn, anticipating continuing associations with those colleagues I now not only write to but
also talk with as Sie, and especially with the staff: all harmoniously Du.

PA R T F O U R
Teaching and Scholarship Public and Private

7

AU T O B I O G R A P H Y
The Mixed Genre of Private and Public
MADELEINE R. GRUMET

As the social structures of afﬁliation become more abstract, more diverse, or
distant, we ﬁnd ourselves dashing headlong in retreat to symbols of connection that are increasingly familial—and defensive. Baseball, that great repository of nostalgia, has, for a long time stood as an icon for the intimate and
enduring relations of small town life. Bring the Dodgers back to Brooklyn! And
even I, who forswore the sport after the Dodgers left, worry that the Yankees
will move to New Jersey. If the Marlins could move from obscurity to the playoffs through the purchase of “free” agent Livan Hernandez for 4.5 million dollars, then maybe like the rest of our culture, the slowest game in the world is
speeding up.
But it is the freedom of Miriam Carreras, the mother of Livan Hernandez,
and their reunion that provided the excitement for the ‘97 World Series and its
narrative. Livan, who defected from Cuba to Mexico in 1995 “made eye contact
with his mother for the ﬁrst time in almost two years,” just before the game
started. Just two days before the game, Miriam Carreras had received an emergency visa from the United States Interests Section in Havana, promoted by
Florida’s Governor Lawton Chiles. In sunny Florida, basking in warm waters of
the post Cold War world, absent an evil Empire, Castro steps up to the plate
ﬁrst as the villain of the piece and then, with Governor Chiles, as guardians of
the mother and child reunion. It is a reunion that thrills the Latin American
immigrants in the Miami bleachers as well as retirees in their Florida condominiums pining for their children, still ensconced in Cleveland and Pittsburgh.
This year we were mesmerized by another parent child drama in the reclamation of Elian Gonzales by his father from his Miami relatives after his mother
drowned during her ﬂight from Cuba with Elian.
The call of home, sounding through sports, politics and media was projected on to the best seller list in 1997 in the novel, Cold Mountain, the saga of
a reunion of lovers, and reunions between them and the land? Ada, a city girl
from Charleston, living in rural North Carolina during the war learns to put
down her books, her music, and drawing pad, for agrarian self-sufﬁciency. Her
reunion with the earth is paralleled by Inman’s journey away from the war,
back to his home and her:
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Bleak as the scene was, though, there was a growing joy in Inman’s heart. He was
nearing home; he could feel it in the touch of thin air on skin, in his longing to see
the leap of hearth smoke from the houses of people he had know all his life. People
he would not be called upon to hate or fear. . . .It was to Cold Mountain her looked.
He had achieved a vista of what to him was homeland. He looked out at this highland and knew the names of places and things. He said them aloud: Little Beartail
Ridge, Wagon Road Gap, Ripshin, Hunger Creek, Clawhammer Knob, Rocky Face.
Not a mountain or watercourse lacked denomination. Not bird or bush anonymous.
His place. (281)

In From Where We Stand, Deborah Tall offers us a fascinating history of
nostalgia:
The word was coined in 1678 for the disease of homesickness. Its symptoms
included insomnia, anorexia, palpitations, stupor, and the persistent thinking of
home. Nostalgia was described in European medical encyclopedias up until the
nineteenth century as fatal . . . Armies were frequently beset by the malady, leading
one Russian general in 1733 to announce that “any soldier incapacitated by nostalgia would be buried alive.” (121)

Tall comments that the meaning of nostalgia has shifted from being a primarily geographical disease to a psychological one rooted in time, the loss of home
collapsed into a yearning for the past, particularly childhood. The ﬁeld of education has been beset with nostalgia as Allan Bloom and company have attacked
our contemporary diversity with idealized versions of their intellectual histories.
The politics of reunion haunt our work as well as loss of place, loss of relationships and loss of symbols for and of connection, are powerful and pervasive themes in curriculum and in the autobiographies and ethnographies that
speak of the experience of education.
What are our attempts to recuperate our losses in our work as educators, as
teachers, as researchers?
I have thought for a long time that both parenting and education inevitably
involve this project of recuperation. To live with children or with students of
all ages is to revisit the processes of one’s own formation. You hear your
mother’s voice sail right through you in moments of frustration or worry: You
got in at 4 a.m. and you’re going out again? You worry that they will not secure
the approval you sought from your father or your uncle. You stop yourself
from grabbing them off diving boards, off horses, and elections platforms. You
wince when they commit your particular brand of indiscretion. There iterations are exasperating, inevitable, and beautiful. They are the mimesis that
extends the dance of families through time. In the intimate life of families,
between each day’s waking and lying down, we walk, and talk, and eat, we
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stand and dodge and dream together and maybe we plan and promise, graceful
or clumsy, light or plodding, we dance the gestures of our parents and grandparents with our children. And even when we buy new dancing shoes, no taps
for me, we liken our new dance to theirs.
Schooling, on the other hand, offers us more distance, if we would take it. It
provides the stage for the same transferences as the kitchen and the living
room, but the players are different, and if we are fortunate, more various. They
have their own moves. The family personae are all there, costumed in the characters of the play of school, waiting to be performed, but schooling is lodged in
the liminal space between the family and the workplace, and it is the privilege
and responsibility of schools to offer teachers and students opportunities to
play with the relations rather than to repeat them obsessively and slavishly.
Because no families are ever exactly alike, not even happy ones, this gathering
of students and teachers from many families invites us to write the story of
coming to form once again, redeﬁning the goals of development and the paths
we will walk to reach them.
I do not say that schools are a tabula rasa for our imaginings of new ways to
be human together; they mimic other institutions, churches and synagogues
and mosques. Malls and factories, hospitals, museums, and internment centers. School time is still modeled on the labor needs of an agrarian past, school
space on pews facing an altar. For few of us are these schools strange. They may
be sad, but they are familiar and invite collusion with the politics of power
contained in the architecture, and their rituals. Nevertheless, strong as these
patterns of school culture may be, and as vulnerable as we may be to the mise
en scene of our early hopes and disappointments, I can not believe that they
exert a mystiﬁcation equal to that of family life.
Because curriculum gives a name and form to what goes on in schools, to
what they are supposed to be about and to the relationships and interactions
that support and result from this purpose, it gives us a way to name the past
and the present. Genres of curriculum operate in schools the way they do in
literature. The familiar form, whether it is the lesson plan or the one-act play,
provides what Frederick Crews calls a countercathected system, “a coded assurance that psychic activity will be patterned and resolved along familiar lines”
(20). Because the genres of the classroom are more deliberate, because they are
created and sustained in public by debate and negotiation, their function and
effects (even when produced by manipulations calculated to dominate and
deﬂect other constituencies) may be more visible to us than the forms and
relations that contain our lives in families.
It takes a long time for new genres of curriculum to take hold. We are still
experimenting with cooperative learning as if it were an unstable element,
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threatening to blow up in our faces with any prodding or poking. But the genres that we employ to study schooling are more dynamic. In the mere 25 years
since William Pinar and I published Toward a Poor Curriculum in 1976, urging
recourse to autobiographical investigations of educational experience, autobiographies, memoirs, recollections of all sorts have proliferated. The call of narrative is so strong and pervasive, that we even ﬁnd it projected in a New York
Times Magazine Section advertisement created for that great recollector of le
temps perdu, Ralph Lauren:
Only in America. Plaid ﬂannel shirts, soft and worn. Jeans that are broken in,
unbridled, no restraints. Clothing with the kind of honest, timeworn patina once
achieved only through years of wear. Each piece is a rugged individual. There are
clothes that tell a story, rich in atmosphere and character.
Double RL by Ralph Lauren

The Marlboro man has traded in his smoke for a madeleine.
Let me recover, brieﬂy, the genres of autobiography in my own work, for it
has moved from a phenomenological inquiry to a feminist project and now is
heading back to its origins.
When I try to remember what I was up to in 1975 I think that I was literally
trying to change the subject of educational research. Research in the early 1970s
was still dominated by quantitative studies. Analytic philosophy dominated
foundations studies. The appeal of autobiography in education was the call of
the humanities, speciﬁc, detailed, and organized to express the subjectivity of
the learner. Phenomenology provided both goal and method. If there was a
project of recollection it was the reﬂexive turn that recuperated the moment of
intentionality; it was the desire to catch oneself in the act of thought, rushing
like Sartre’s wind through consciousness toward the object of interest. I never
knew whether to call what I did research or pedagogy. When I worked with students it was pedagogy. When I wrote about the work it was research. As I
responded to student narratives with questions, the functions of research and
teaching blended. Ten years ago, I described working with a student’s narrative
this way: “She writes as an artist, rid of all preaching. I read as a scientist looking
for the meanings both common and uncommon. My reading of her text must
enter its world. I join her in a hermeneutic stroll, meeting the relatives, the
neighbors, locating the object, educational experience within her horizons, her
body, her language. She joins me on an epistemological perch, from which we
survey the territory that she has traveled” (Grumet 1990, 120).
Over the decades that I did this work, I rarely taught a course without asking students to write three autobiographical narratives that re-presented their
experiences of the phenomena we were studying. I didn’t care whether these
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experiences they recounted had ever really happened, because I was not interested in their psychology. I was not trying to ﬁnd out why they thought as they
did or what events in their lives had made them the personas they were. I was
interested in what and how they thought about the world, and I was interested
in asking them to think about this thought. In that way the inquiry became
more philosophical and phenomenological than psychological or sociological,
for it was about meanings, not causes. An interesting project for people who
want to teach other people about the world, don’t you think? But I did not ask
them to tell me what they thought of education, and the last thing I wanted to
know was their personal philosophies of education. That invitation would
have elicited the latest piece of popular psychology, or the old formulaic homilies that were substitutions for thought. My own scholarship involved investigating taken-for-granted assumptions about education by offering reading of
narratives that challenged them and, reciprocally, of bringing questions to the
narratives provoked by educational theories.
The narratives were not limited to stories of schooling. Narratives of educational experiences addressed mundane experiences like walking the dog, traumas like car accidents, adventures in mountains, on oceans, in foreign
countries. Stories were told about love and crime and birth and death. The
pedagogical motive was constructive, however, as well as descriptive, for students were always asked to bring these narratives into another conversation.
Thus, the grand narrative of the course would include philosophical texts of
Plato, Dewey, and Sartre, or literary autobiographies of Benjamin Franklin,
John Stuart Mill, James Baldwin, or Sylvia Ashton-Warner. The task was not
parallel play; it required them to blur genres, to challenge their narratives with
these other readings and to challenge the assumptions and assertions of these
other texts with their readings of their own stories. The ﬁnal paper was, in my
view, a linguistic bridge from the symbolization of experience they had called
private to the ways of knowing we call public.
It is telling that whereas the word public functions as a noun in this phrase
and in everyday speech, the word private rarely is seen as a noun outside the
context of this opposition, except when it refers to a military recruit, or as a
euphemism for genitalia. It is characteristic of our gendered society that the
private should function as an index to unnamable contents, an adjective to an
absent noun. Feminism has taken up the task of naming the private, taking an
inventory of its contexts, and of exploring the relation of this category to the
public, its putative antonym. Because schooling and education are the
processes through which persons move from the domain of family—the private, to the domain of work and knowledge—the public, the experience of
education has served to strengthen the opposition of these categories. Once
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feminists had revealed these categories as cultural constructions, rather than
natural or universal necessities, feminist educators began to address the ways
that schooling and informal education could undermine, rather than
strengthen, this opposition and provide continuity and reciprocity between
public and private experience.
The struggle to connect public and private labor mirrored the project of
consciousness raising that developed in the Sixties and the Seventies, expressed
in the women’s movement’s slogan “the personal is the political.” In professional meetings and in everyday life, women met to speak and study what had
been kept secret in their lives. The history, function, and cultural processes of
the separation of the public and the private were explored in the signiﬁcant
works of Dorothy Dinnerstein, Nancy Chodorow, Jean Bethke Elshtain, and
Mary O’Brien, between 1976 and 1981. The psychoanalytic and object relations theories, as well as the scholarship in political economy developed in this
era moved the feminist analysis of educational experience from the liberal
emphasis on rights and power to the discussion and analysis of desire.
Inﬂuenced by Lacan, this analysis lodged power in the imagination, believing
that it accrued to certain people or to people who were male or tall or mature
because of the projections of others, as they associated power, privilege, superiority, and resources to be associated with men and not with women. As analysts studied the motives for these attributions, consciousness raising invited
women to come together in their everyday lives to talk about their lives and to
see how they had been complicit in the arrangement that oppressed them. The
autobiographical voice was invited not only to speak in public of the experience considered private, but in the process of that speaking which served to
resymbolize experience, to formulate a story and a theory that would extend
the knowledge and experience of private life into the public life of communities, knowledge, and government.
In my own work the feminist projects invited me to recuperate the discourse
of reproductions for education. The arrogation of that word—reproduction—
to the neomarxist critique of the ways that schools extended the means and
methods of production, has dramatized the extent to which reproduction, a
theme in human consciousness, has been effaced in educational theory and literature. Bitter Milk: Women and Teaching (University of Massachusetts Press,
1988), my book that grew out of this discourse raised a number of questions
about the experience of reproduction, of being a child of one’s parents, or a parent to one’s children and about the relation of these experiences to the ways we
work with other people’s children. The book raised questions about the motives
that we bring from those experiences to our work in schools and universities,
projects of differentiation that have led us to repudiate what we know in favor
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of the abstractions and canonical texts we ﬁnd in school. The phenomenological project joined an analysis of identity, for what it meant to be a man or a
woman has a great deal to do with how human beings think about and experience our worlds. Our sex endows each of us at birth with a set of possibilities
related to our anatomy, our hormones, our capacity to procreate. These differences between men and women assume different meanings in different times,
different cultures, in different families. Just as the small child learns to discriminate mama from the lady next door, learns not to run into the street, and learns
to tell a dog’s bow-wow from a cat’s meow, that child is also learning that he or
she is male or female, and what being male or female means to people with
whom he or she lives. Because knowing is always situated, sexuality, class, race,
religion, ethnicity are all necessarily themes that shape our attention to a world
that is the object of intention and desire.
It was important to me then, as it is now, to bring the autobiographical
voice into the theoretical discourse of Bitter Milk. It was important to resist the
impulse to hide my femaleness, my motherliness, so that I would pass. I was
afraid that by relinquishing the distanced stance of an abstract supposedly universal speaker (otherwise read as male) I would trivialize the work, consigning
it to Good Housekeeping’s compendium of women’s confessions. I was afraid
that if I mentioned the birth of my children, the life of my family, the text
would be taken as a call for a return to compulsory heterosexuality and nuclear
families, as it was read by a number of feminists and young women who
understood the women’s movement as liberating them from having to identify
with procreation and child rearing. One journal’s referee rebuked me for
telling my middle class story here and there without including as well the stories of women of color, women of poverty. He was not, I believe, concerned
about the exclusion of the narratives of women of wealth.
Some of those who welcomed the presence of narrative in the text wished
that I had not contaminated it with educational theory. They liked the image
of my working at the dining room table, but didn’t want to plow through my
ideas of what that all had to do with Piaget or Lacan or object relations theory.
In elevators at the American Educational Research Association’s annual convention, people would read my name tag and tell me about their dining room
tables and the birth of their children, but few commented on the book’s thesis
that our education work is motivated by our desire to contradict our relations
to our children and our own parents, relations profoundly inﬂuenced by our
sex and gender. Well, it was an academic convention.
When that work was ﬁrst published, ﬁrst as essays, later as a book, the act of
mixing genres was still pretty unusual in professional scholarship. Some feminist literary critics such as Elaine Showalter and Jane Gallop provided models,
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but educational texts tended to be either anecdotal or theoretical, not both,
and rarely both working off each other. I have taken some time to talk about
the style of this text for it is the ambiguity of style or double discourse, if you
will, that, for all of its ambiguity, I miss in much of the contemporary work in
educational narrative.
Before I lodge my complaint against the current rise of autobiographical
studies in education, let me celebrate some of its achievements. The feminist
project to bring women’s voices into public discourse and to broaden that discourse to include accounts that had been silenced by the private/public split
and the privileging of male discourse has been and continues to be important.
There is now an extensive, persuasive, and poetic literature that testiﬁes to the
exclusion of women’s experience, and particularly of our domestic experience
from the texts and glossaries that constitute the disciplines of knowledge. In
literature, in sociology, in anthropology, in philosophy, psychology, history,
physics, biology, political science, women’s standpoints are those which honor
the material, concrete particularity of everyday life and honor the connection
and intimacy between those who share the actual time and space of everyday
life. The power of those who bear the babies and nurture them, who order the
provision of food, decide what is clean and dirty, who wash the sheets and care
for the aged is palpable. Repressed, this creativity has been repudiated by the
myth of immaculate conception, the myth of menstrual contamination; it has
been inverted into violence and destruction; it has been appropriated by
abstract disciplines of knowledge, bureaucratic systems and the projection and
collection of things calls property. We are still in the midst of that wave of revelation, and it is interesting to speculate about the degree to which these narratives have inﬂuenced changes in policies and law that address domestic
violence, abuse, divorce, and sexual harassment.
Over the last decade, the literature of women’s experience has been
enriched and differentiated by texts detailing the lives and experiences of
teachers and students of color. In Learning From Our Lives (Neumann and
Peterson), Gloria Ladson Billings describes the efforts of Gloria Hull, Patricia
Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith to create Black Women’s Studies, a discourse situation apart from white women’s racism and black men’s sexism, a discourse
dedicated to revealing the relatedness of race, class, and gender within and outside the academy. In the same volume, Martha Monteiro-Sieburth speaks to
her Latina experience, the importance of language communities, and the
importance of standpoint discrimination, insider/outsider perspectives on
education and research.
Autobiographical writing became one strand in the project to dignify the
professional work of teachers during the last decade. Teachers’ narratives were
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elicited in order to display the complexity, ambiguity, creativity, or teaching.
Narratives were elicited as well to convey the loneliness, frustration, and subordination of teaching. Bringing teachers together to write and to read each
other’s texts reinforced the collective creativity of the Bay Area National
Writing Project as well as the calls for creative responsibility in the work of
Maxine Green’s existential challenge, Donald Schön’s well received construction of the reﬂective practitioner. Janet Miller worked with teachers to elicit
their understanding of their work, interested in building school communities
from groups of teachers whose reﬂections would generate a common project.
Connelly and Clandinin approached autobiography as a method to encourage
teachers’ reﬂexive grasp of their teaching, the ways they understood and constructed curriculum within the context of the school.
Teachers’ narratives were elicited to provide the processes of community, literature, and knowledge that would remedy the sexism, classism, and downright
sadism that had consigned the knowledge of teachers about children, knowledge, instruction, the politics of schooling and community to girl talk, rushed
conversations in the halls, the lounge, long conversations over the phone, late at
night. Let me make it clear that I am not denigrating the function of this writing or of its community building. It has brought some of the energies of consciousness raising to the communities of teachers and contributes to the
ongoing work to recognize the dignity and challenge of this work.
But now, as I leaf through the articles, book titles, chapters of education literature I feel as if I am drowning in narrative. I, Miss Subjectivity of 1978, ﬁnd
myself scanning the memoirs, rushing past gritty scenes of urban density, languid landscapes of rural loneliness, skimming accounts of inspiring mentors,
desperate differentiations. My eyes move up and down the pages seeking that
shibboleth of poststructural criticism, the generalization. What’s the point, I
want to know. What can we make of this? What difference does it make to education? Maybe my impatience comes from this work I remember doing,
administering a school of education in Brooklyn, New York where there is, to
put it mildly, a lot to do. Maybe, as I age, ricocheting between the deaths of my
mother and older colleagues, I am losing existential courage, knowing that I
too will disappear into the moments and particulars, I seek the comfort of the
large idea, the marker, so long live this, and this gives life to thee.
I am not alone in my resistance. Poststructuralist critics of autobiography
have expressed their suspicions of all these scribbling selves, challenging the spurious unity of the narrating self and its linear psychology. Accompanying the
logic of its narrative, is, they assert, a naïve conﬂation of viewpoint and truth, as
if the risk of confession and the discomfort of disclosure were sufﬁcient to conﬁrm the veracity and authority of its judgments. This critique challenges the
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reliance on reﬂexivity that came to dominate the discourse of teacher education
and development in the 1980s, as well as educational research in the 1990s.
Lacking theoretical scaffolding as well as identiﬁcation of educational aims,
reﬂexivity, on its own, can dwindle into the paralysis of inﬁnite regression or
self-absorbed trivia. In response, feminist educators have pointed to the irony
that postmodernism arrived to erase the speaking self just at the moment when
women had seized the podium (Brodbribb). This sardonic observation is
accompanied with a serious concern that the activist and political expressions of
feminism will not survive the assault on the psychological self, which for all of its
suspect cohesion, sustains the public identity and commitments capable of, and
necessary for, social action.
Education is about social action. We teachers and teachers of teachers are
different from our brothers and sisters who pursue the disciplines of history
and sociology, of anthropology, of philosophy, and literature without the educational preﬁx. We cannot ignore the implications of what we study for the
events that are taking place in schools across this country as we read and write,
interview and teach, as we visit schools and communities, archives and malls.
Autobiographical theorizing suits an educational arena that ﬁnally, in the
words of Jerome Bruner, has recognized that “domain speciﬁcity [is] the rule
rather than the exception in logical development [and] that the achievement of
knowledge [is] always situated, dependent on materials, task, and on how the
learner understands things” (132). For Bruner, it is the narrative construal of
reality that can constitute accounts of situated learning. He argues for the isomorphism of the narrative and thought, and offers nine universals of narrative
realities. It is his assertion of these universals that interest me more than their
particular qualities. If we can recognize the structures of narrative, then we may
examine the processes of our own subjectivities and of the education that has
contributed to their shaping. Anna Neumann provides us with an instance of
this awareness as she offers us readings through thee separate narratives related
to her mother’s experience of the Holocaust. One narrative is Anna’s, recollected from family knowledge. Another encodes her mother’s answer to questions in a family interview, and the third is an account that her mother
produced in a document that was part of the process of applying for reparations. Neumann tells her reader that with each telling of the story, her understanding of her mother changes, and their relationship deepens. Neumann asks
how these stories, told and untold, have not only shaped the consciousness of
this woman but also structured the relations within her family. Judith Butler has
argued that it is the performance of the narrative that constitutes our identity,
and if we understand that performance as generated outside the fact of writing
in the lived and discursive conventions of our many communities, then these
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performances can help us to understand our own educational experiences and
those we design for others.
Nevertheless, we are still nervous about holding the conversations that
would help us to make some collective sense of these narratives, instances of
what Seyla Benhabib calls “situated criticism.” We are worried about offending
each other. If a text is an expression of identity, then what is it we criticize
when we ﬁnd it boring, or offer an interpretation that is not the author’s, or
take issue with the way that someone has constructed the narrative of her or
his own formation? And if that formation is situated explicitly as an expression
of gender or ethnicity, how can we take issue with its assertions, if we do not
share those characteristics. Our narratives have estranged us because they are
defensively declarative. They preclude engagement and conversation. Their
confessions display an intimacy that their rhetoric forbids.
Benhabib suggests that our postmodern passion for situated criticism (and
I would add our avoidance of engaging each other’s narratives) expresses our
nostalgia for home, “for the certitude of one’s own culture and society in a
world in which no tradition, no culture, and no society can exist any more
without interaction and collaboration, confrontation, and exchange. When
cultures and societies clash, where do we stand as feminists, as social critics
and political activists?” Benhabib asks (227). In Situating the Self, Benhabib
articulated the concern that I am addressing here by calling for a conversation
across narratives which she names “interactive universalism”: “the practice of
situated criticism for a global community that does not shy away from knocking down the parish walls.” She describes the sometimes necessary exile of the
social critic, outside the walls of the city, for “if cultures and traditions are
more like competing sets of narratives and incoherent tapestries of meaning,
then the social critic must herself construct out of these conﬂictual and incoherent accounts the set of criteria in the name of which she speaks. The
hermeneutic monism of meaning brings no exemption from the responsibility
of normative justiﬁcation” (228).
From what ground can the critic of an autobiographical or situated text
speak? If Benhabib places herself outside the walls of the city, McClaren places
himself inside the walls, adopting the guise of the ﬂaneur, to which he attaches
a marxist eye. He offers us a text interrupted with journal entries from Paris,
West Hollywood, Mexico, East Berlin, and Rio de Janeiro and asks whether we
can “use new ways of organizing subjectivity to create a self-reﬂexive social
agent capable of dismantling capitalist exploitation and domination” (228).
I too ask the questions that McClaren and Benhabib raise as they try to ﬁnd
a place for themselves as readers of culture. They seek a position from which
they can make judgments and comparisons, and a place from which their
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understanding can project ideas and plans for a better world. I think that the
position of critics is that of the reader and that the object of the critique is not
the other, a hypostatized version of difference congealed into another person,
but the text’s display of subjectivity making sense of the construction of subjectivity. Bruner associates this process with metacognition: the object of
thought being thought itself. Nevertheless, in our anxiety about identity and in
our political correctness, we resort to Crews’s anaesthetic criticism, “looking
for motifs, inconsistencies, but avoiding the experience of being alone with a
text, acknowledging its hold over us” (20). Crews sees every text as a negotiation between the fantasy of an infantile appetitive imagination and the compromises effected between those wishes and constraints of culture, achieved by
a negotiating ego. These strike me as the struggle of education in a democracy,
the struggle to construct a common conversation about what is possible in this
place and this time for the great diversity of people who live in this community. What Crews’s position returns to us is a glimpse of subjectivity, historical,
embodied, but still making things up.
That is what I think autobiographical texts do: they make up stories, selecting this episode, eliminating that one, exploring this moment in details, but
glossing that. They structure the accounts into ﬁctions of causality, with beginning, middles, and ends. They attempt to capture us, as readers, by attracting
our sympathy, or shocking us into admiration, or humbling us by revealing
our ignorance. They invite us to abandon ourselves to their worlds, that easy
reunion again, or they hold us at a distance, proclaiming their distance and
inaccessibility. They insinuate multiple references or meanings or stay tight to
one horizon in diction and cadence.
Bruner reminds us that when conﬂicting construals of reality are brought
into confrontation, what is at stake is more than a theory or a ﬁnding; perhaps
it is a way of being in the world. But he reminds us also that there are privileged
forms of confrontation, intimate friendship—psychoanalysis, for instance,
“where prise de conscience is the objective of the whole exercise” (Bruner, 148).
To capture consciousness, to understand it, is, in my opinion, the point of educational studies; consciousness is consciousness of the world and understanding that relation of knower and known is what our work is about. If the
discourse of identity and education will continue and ﬂourish, we will need
autobiography to continue to proliferate and differentiate itself, hospitable to
authors who will speak from the many places and positions that this wondrous
world provides. We will also need autobiography to blur genres with curriculum criticism and foundational studies so that the particularity and process of
an individual’s coming to know the world can be in continuous discourse with
the world that presents itself to our experience.
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Marilyn Brownstein offers the work of Virginia Woolf and Walter Benjamin
as exemplars for this conversation with a person in the world. Woolf ’s Three
Guineas, and in Benjamin’s A Berlin Chronicle each portray an instance of what
Brownstein calls a catastrophic encounter, a moment of vulnerability and
ambiguity that is sensuous, embodied, and profoundly implicated in the social
and ideological structures of their lifeworlds. These moments capture the contradictions that bind the speaker to the situation and generate questions about
the world within which this encounter is nested. Two instances of this
approach in our work come to mind. One is Jane Adan’s book, Children in Our
Lives, where the narrative of a child’s dilemma is exquisitely investigated as it
reveals the interpenetration of a child’s construal of reality with those of the
adults who care for him. Another is Wendy Atwell-Vasey’s Nurturing Words:
Bridging Private Readings and Public Teaching. Atwell-Vasey brings object-relations theory to teachers’ narratives of their own conﬂicted and ambivalent
reading experiences to understand why teachers who love to read would
embed books within curriculum that discourages the intense experience of
texts that these narratives convey.
Maybe the reunion of Livan Hernandez and Miriam Carreras was one such
moment of critical encounter, when they were reunited by the economic and
political interests that had separated them. How would they tell that story?
And how would you read it? In each case there is a double tension. There is
tension in the original narrative and there is tension on the part of its interpreter/critics, who meet the text with body and soul, credulity and incredulity.
For ﬁnally, the position of the critic/reader/interpreter is not a problem of
placement, inside or outside the city walls, but engagement. Rather than parallel play, we must write narratives that pose a question about our experience in
the world and invite our readers to join us in the exploration that results. It is a
generous and humble act that displays one’s own vulnerability as writer and
reader. The research of such an autobiography is indeed a reunion as the writer
recuperates a wish and the struggle to negotiate its satisfaction in the world. It
is a reunion when the reader following the arc of the writer’s question recovers
a world worth knowing.

8

T H E S O C I A L C O N S T RU C T I O N O F
“ E X P R E S S I V I S T ” P E DAG O G Y
KAREN SURMAN PALEY

In his introduction to The Art of the Personal Essay, a nearly eight hundred page
anthology from the classical to the contemporary era, Phillip Lopate writes, “The
personal essay is the reverse of that Chinese set of boxes that you keep opening,
only to ﬁnd a smaller one within. Here you start with the small . . . and suddenly
ﬁnd a slightly larger container, insinuated by the essay’s successful articulation
and the writer’s self-knowledge” (xxviii). This capacity of the personal essay to
open itself up, the way it relies on an implied induction to be realized in the
mind of the reader, makes it a versatile genre that can embrace many modes of
discourse and can communicate a social signiﬁcance that extends deeper than
the folds and crevices of one human navel.
I want to afﬁrm the value of personal narrative, of writing about the self in the
context of family or community, in a climate in which it has come under sharp
criticism by social constructionists and Marxists. The tendency to view essays
about the self as “inconsequential,” to borrow a word from Susan Miller, outside
the classroom overlooks the fact that, for example, the family system is a site both
of individual development and political consciousness. It is often the place where
individuals experience abuse and oppression. Familial mistreatment may establish a tolerance for and lack of questioning of racial, class, or gender oppression
outside the family. Those who want to frame their composition classes with a
cultural studies approach but who diminish the importance of family-based narratives are overlooking the connection to the very cultural studies they imbue
with such signiﬁcance. Students usually feel both welcome and important when
we invite them to write about life experiences (ones they feel comfortable making public). By either excluding or quickly jumping over these types of essays, I
think that some compositionists fail to see how the family might function as one
of the many capillaries through which power and powerlessness circulate. Or, as
Bonnie Sunstein and Elizabeth Chiseri-Strater put it, “To understand someone’s
culture, we often need to understand the person’s family, too. Through the individual we come to understand the culture, and through the culture we come to
understand the individual” (216). The Chinese boxes open either way.
Disrespect for people of color and for people of different religions was something I learned from my mother, long before I went to school, watched television,
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or read the newspaper. By the same token, I learned about gender roles by watching my father go to his retail business seven days a week and my mother work in
the home even after there was almost no work left to do there. Adrienne Rich tells
us,“[My father] demanded absolute loyalty, absolute submission to his will. In my
separation from him . . . I was learning in concrete ways a great deal about patriarchy, in particular, how the ‘special’ woman, the favored daughter, is controlled
and rewarded” (650). Ideology is wrapped up in the family system and, in many
cases, these systems are impacted by a variety of unhealthy behaviors including
substance abuse. Those who attempt to diminish the importance of family-based
stories or sever these stories from the political beliefs of their students miss out on
their pathos and intellectual energy and fail to help these students make important connections between their personal lives and the society at large.
Social constructionists who do make use of autobiographical writing may do
so in a way that seriously constricts its expression. Categorizing the personal
essay as “sentimental realism,” David Bartholomae called the genre “corrupt” in
1995 (71). Apparently attempting to repair it, in the ﬁfth edition of Ways of
Reading (1999), Bartholomae and co-editor Anthony Petrosky continue to
include autobiographical writing assignments.1 However, the assignments in
“Autobiographical Explorations” are not spontaneously written narratives which
might be guided by the false purposes of “display or self-promotion, or to further (rather than question) an argument . . .” (802). Unless student writers follow
the editors’ assignment guidelines, they are at risk of “produc[ing] each week
only more of the same, the same story written in the same style” (803). Instead,
in the book’s introduction Bartholomae and Petrosky direct the student “to
imagine [his] own familiar settings through the images, metaphors, and ideas of
others” (4) and this directive is later mystiﬁed as free topic choice. The clause
“you can write about anything you want” (804) is qualiﬁed by the parenthetical
statement “(but you would be wise to stay away from childhood experiences and
to stick with more adult experiences”) (emphasis mine, 804). The ruling out of
childhood experiences as topics is not explained; the student whose mind did
drift there might feel ashamed, as s/he has been judged as not “wise.” Neither do
Bartholomae and Petrosky see any need to explain the ban. Using a pedagogy
that is at once classical in its imitative purpose, and controlling in its injunction
to avoid childhood occurrences, the editors seek to shape the representation of
experience with models they feel are appropriate. “[Y]our job in this assignment is to look at your experience in [Richard] Rodriguez’s terms, which means
thinking the way he does, noticing what he would notice . . . seeing through his
point of view . . .” (805). Why can’t students frame whatever experiences they
select in the way they choose, and then write a revision framing it from
Rodriguez’s perspective?
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The purpose of this essay is to critique the misrepresentations of pedagogies that afﬁrm the teaching of personal narrative, misrepresentations that are
based largely on published writing as opposed to classroom observation. The
case against “expressivist” pedagogy derives from written discourse outside the
classroom, in texts such as Peter Elbow’s Writing without Teachers and William
Coles and James Vopat’s What Makes Writing Good. As Thomas Newkirk
writes, social constructionists’ objections “proceed in an empirical vacuum”
(89). Through excerpts from Kathleen Cassity’s unpublished ethnographic
study of Peter Elbow, who is largely regarded as one of the founders of “expressivist” pedagogy, I will complicate the assumptions of what can transpire in a
classroom identiﬁed with this pedagogy.
In the last ten years, social constructionists like Lester Faigley and marxist
James Berlin have launched a campaign against what was once seen as a progressive movement in education. Social constructionists, according to Patricia
Sullivan, “regard knowledge as a function of language, as a product of consensus achieved through communal discourse, and [the theory] locates the ‘real’
in a web of social interactions and symbolic transactions” (“Social” 950). In
Fragments of Rationality, Rhetoric and Reality, and Rhetorics, Poetics, and
Cultures, Lester Faigley and James Berlin construct an image of those they have
come to label “expressivists.” As Thomas O’Donnell puts it, these constructs
“become unrecognizable (to me at least) as anything expressivist teachers are
actually invested in” (425). For example, it is as if “expressivists” are so naïve as
to believe that the authors of personal narratives are unquestionably writing in
propria persona. Somehow we are so passionate in our beliefs that, like the
Maoris in the ﬁlm The Piano, we confuse drama with real life and jump on
stage to prevent a villainous murder.
I will examine the way Faigley and Berlin discuss “expressivism” in their
own texts. This critique will take us through major issues in composition theory today: coherence of the self, “authentic voice,” the social signiﬁcance or
insigniﬁcance of writing about the self vis-à-vis the family or community, and
whether the purpose of peer groups is to reinforce “the private vision” of the
individual writer or to construct meaning and purpose in community.
W H AT I S A N “ E X P R E S S I V I S T ” ?

While I have chosen to use the word “expressivist,” I might have easily chosen any number of other words. In a review of three teacher texts, Mariolina
Salvatori writes,
[T]he practices of the personal go by many different names, often used as if they were
interchangeable: personal criticism, autobiographical criticism, narrative criticism,
personal narrative, self-writing, life-writing, auto-graphy (Perrault), confessional
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criticism (Veeser), rhapsodic criticism (Lentricchia). Although such a varied nomenclature may be taken to indicate the richness of the genre as a “category in process”
(Perrault), or its need and right to self-deﬁnition, I suggest it might also be taken as a
sign of a certain anxiety about its functions and possibilities” (567).

I concur with Salvatori: the sheer circulation of so many synonyms or near
synonyms may be indicative of anxiety about the personal in the academy. On
the other hand, the multiple names may reﬂect the versatility of the form itself.
Let me offer a working deﬁnition of “expressivist” pedagogy. Inﬂuenced by
James Britton’s notion of expressive discourse, “expressivist” pedagogy is a theoretical bent that afﬁrms the use of personal narrative without necessarily saddling it with the kind of constraints indicated above in Ways of Reading.
Personal narrative takes the writer’s own life as its focus. It involves the use of a
narratorial “I” which seems to be the actual voice of the person who writes.
Sometimes the narrator may appear to isolate individual consciousness and
sometimes s/he may represent the self in one or more social contexts, such as
the family. The narrator may or may not explicitly link the particular situation
with those experienced by others. Additionally, the pedagogy many include
many forms of academic discourse, including a range of ﬁrst-person writing.
For example, Lad Tobin, Director of Freshman Writing at Boston College, is
identiﬁed with “expressivism.” He reports that by the winter of 1997 he had
studied about 650 syllabi for courses in which nearly 10,000 students have
been enrolled. Only 25% of the assigned writing in his program falls into the
genre of personal narrative. The rest of the assignments would be considered
cultural criticism, argument on public issues, and response to texts. Yet he
qualiﬁes his comments by reminding me of the kind of hybrid papers he sees
in the freshman writing program at Boston College where elements of personal narrative mix with exposition or argument in the same paper.
FA I G L E Y: T H E S E L F I N D I S C O U R S E

In 1992 the University of Pittsburgh Series in Composition, Literacy, and
Culture published Lester Faigley’s Fragments of Rationality: Postmodernity and
the Subject of Composition. In 1994 it received the Outstanding Book Award
from CCCC for making an outstanding contribution to composition and
communication studies. It contains such an impressive body of knowledge
about the history of composition, post-modern thought, linguistics, and computer assisted instruction that, had I been a member of the Outstanding Book
Award Committee along with Alice Gilliam, Cheryl Glenn, Betty L. Hart,
Frank Littler, and Charles I. Schuster, I might have concurred with the decision. And I might have done so despite deep reservations about the chapter
entitled “Ideologies of the Self in the Writing Classroom.”
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In this chapter, Faigley uses a postmodern orientation to deconstruct the
merits of the personal essay in the writing classroom. According to Faigley, this
genre proclaims “the existence of the rational, coherent self and the ability of
the self to have privileged insight into its own processes,” (111) both of which
are questioned by postmodern theory. “Expressivist” writing is guilty of what
Catherine Belsey calls expressive realism, a naïve assumption that language is
somehow ahistorical and apolitical, that it provides a transparent window into
the empirical world (112).
Faigley is also troubled that the ﬁeld of composition shows signs of being
biased toward personal narrative. Despite a broad range of contributing faculty to William Coles’ and James Vopat’s What Makes Writing Good (1985), a
collection of what these professors felt to be excellent responses to their assignments, the bulk of the writing samples are personal experience pieces. “Not
one essay resembles the frequently assigned ‘research paper,’” according to
Faigley (120). Moreover, when writing teachers use “authentic voice” as an
assessment criterion, they assume the reader can “distinguish the true self ”
(122). Faigley argues that because of the unconscious, we cannot know if
something is being repressed and, therefore, we cannot assess the sincerity of
the writer (127). Additionally, the apparent freedom students are given to
choose autobiographical topics in writing classrooms conceals “the fact that
these same students will be judged by teachers’ unstated assumptions about
subjectivity and that every act of writing they perform occurs within complex
relations of power” (128). In short, the contributors to What Makes Writing
Good do not explore the institutional context of personal narratives “and how
that setting is implicated in the production of ‘honest’ and ‘truthful’ writing”
(129). They naively assume that the rhetorical situation is neutral and that the
pressure of representing oneself to an authority ﬁgure has no impact on the
content of these essays.
In spite of this avalanche of arguments, it is to Faigley’s credit that he sees
some value in personal experience essays. He tells us, “The many varieties of
autobiographical writing have provided sites for resistance to dominant discourses….”(129). However, I am surprised that, given his support for cultural
studies, Faigley does not elaborate on the phrase “resistance to dominant cultures” or provide any examples of such writing. Personal narrative has been historically associated in this country with African Americans and with women
who are writing against oppression and producing what Foucault has called
subjugated knowledge. Additionally, essays about what Faigley calls “difﬁcult
family situations” can also resist dominant discourses (121). In fact, I read narratives about childhood abuse as acts of resistance against an oppressive and
unhealthy power structure within the culture of the family, one that may mimic
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capitalist relations of power and authority. In critiquing the limitations of
Freud’s discussion of his “hysterical” patient Dora who was distressed by her
father’s affair with her governess, Catherine Clèment describes his “ideological
misunderstanding” in The Newly Born Woman. “The family does not exist in
isolation, rather it supports and reﬂects the class struggle running through it”
(152). In the same text, Helene Cixous describes Dora as “the one who resists
the system . . . It is the nuclear example of women’s power to protest” (154).
Faigley’s limited reference to this type of writing is puzzling.
In my critique of Faigley’s chapter, I want to comment on his preference
for a certain type of research essay as well as his assumptions about a uniﬁed
self and “authentic voice” in “expressivist” pedagogy. In the process I will
point out gender bias in Faigley’s lack of intellectual respect for a particular
student essay.
Faigley is disappointed in the overrepresentation of personal narrative in
the selections in What Makes Writing Good. He writes,
[T]he range of contributors is not matched by a similar range of student writing. By
my count, at least thirty of the examples in the collection are personal experience
essays—twenty of them autobiographical narratives—and several of the remaining
eighteen include writing about the writer. Only four examples are in the genre of
professional writing (two letters and two reports). Four examples brieﬂy discuss
works of literature, but there is no literary analysis paper of the kind described in
rhetoric texts. Only two essays present sustained analyses of other texts . . . Not one
essay resembles the frequently assigned “research paper.” (120)

Faigley has a clear vision of what he refers to as “the frequently assigned
‘research paper.’” Since there are no essays that resemble it, but there are many
that feature or at least contain “writing about the writer,” it follows that Faigley
does not consider that the personal ﬁgures in “the frequently assigned ‘research
paper.’” Perhaps he is correct. If he is, then Jeanette Harris may be wise to promote hybrid texts that combine expository prose with the writer’s experience
in order to avoid “the anonymous sterility that frequently characterizes discourse that is exclusively based on information” (187). She is not alone.
In the eighteenth century, George Campbell taught us that the audience
requires some kind of gratiﬁcation or it will cease to pay attention. “[N]othing
tends more effectively to prevent this consequence, and keep our attention
alive and vigorous, than the pathetic, which consists chieﬂy in exhibitions of
personal misery” (113). In the nineteenth century rhetorician Alexander Bain
admired elements of poetry in historical writing. He writes, “There is always a
powerful attraction in human personality—man’s interest in man” (176). He
praises Plato for “reliev[ing] the severity of philosophical discussion with
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touches of general human interest. Plato adopted the form of the Dialogue to
introduce the action and re-action of personalities . . . The debate is interrupted by dramatic displays of personal feeling” (202).
In the last decade many scholars have advocated creative nonﬁction that
blends ﬁrst person singular narrative in with more traditional exposition. For
example, Mathew Wilson describes a required course he taught in research
writing. “The texts were interesting and ‘relevant,’ the students earnest, the class
discussions lively, and the papers uniformly dull” (242). Not only were the
papers dull, but they were imbued with the positivist notion that we can ascertain objective truth. In these papers there is a denial of ambivalence and no discussion of the act of writing itself. “Most college research writing involves
‘carting dead bones from one graveyard to another’” (247). Thus, if it is the case
that what Faigley calls the “frequently assigned ‘research paper’” is author evacuated expository prose, we are encouraging the production of very modernist
texts that assume the possibility of objective truth. I will return to this point.
Why is Faigley so intellectually unhappy with personal narratives? His
thinking rests on one of the now almost foundational “truths” of postmodern
thought: there is no such thing as a rational, coherent and uniﬁed self, the persona that is always already in personal narrative, according to its critics.
Personal essays that exhibit rational, coherent, and uniﬁed selves constitute a
naïve ignorance of both the complex human consciousness and the social context of the writer and his or her persona.
There seems to be a double standard in his analysis. In his book The
Performance of Self in Student Writing, Thomas Newkirk comments on a contradiction or what he calls “a strange schizophrenia” regarding narrative in English
departments. “On the one hand, [English Departments] are built upon the narrative—it should come as no news that students become English majors to get
academic credit for reading narrative ﬁction. Yet in writing classes there is a sense
that narratives are relatively easy to write and academically suspect” (20).
Moreover, while devaluing a rational, coherent, and uniﬁed self he sees in student texts selected as examples of good writing by many of his colleagues, Faigley
apparently values such a persona in academic writing. More speciﬁcally,
nowhere in his book, Fragments of Rationality, does the narrator, Lester Faigley,
actually present a fragmented consciousness. The argument and point of view
are consistent and clear throughout. Faigley celebrates the postmodern notion of
the self in his title yet the celebration is not actualized in his writing. Why is it
permissible to present oneself as rational and coherent in one mode of discourse
but not another? Why can Faigley present a rational, uniﬁed coherent persona in
an expository book on composition, but students who do so in personal narratives and professors who afﬁrm these essays are missing the latest boat in terms
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of theory? Eleanor Kutz, who offers ethnography as an alternative to the traditional research paper we assign our students, describes the voice in one student’s
ethnography. “This is not a distanced academic voice, and it does not pretend to
an objectivity that would always remain unrealized” (355). There is such a presumption of objectivity in Fragments of Rationality.
I wonder, too, about the representation of “expressivist” pedagogy as an open
invitation to produce testimonies of coherent selves. Times may have changed
the positive regard for a uniﬁed persona during the seven year lapse between
the publication of What Makes Writing Good and Fragments of Rationality, but
perhaps not. What I can say is that I was involved in two English departments
that social constructionists would not hesitate to call “expressivist.” I was a graduate student at the University of New Hampshire for over a year and a lecturer
at Boston College for six years. During my employment at Boston College, I
taught seven sections of the Freshman Writing Seminar and two sections of
Prose Writing. I have been to many staff meetings where we discussed sample
student papers. One problem we have attended to is the personal narrative that
reveals some rather disturbing circumstances regarding a family member but
closes with an often pat, unsubstantiated conclusion that undermines the very
testimony of the narrator. It is not atypical to read such a paper with an ending,
“But I know my father loves me” or “I love my brother in spite of it all.” The
majority of composition faculty I have known at these two “expressivist”
departments admire ambivalence and unresolved conﬂict in the character of
the narrator in personal essays.
What many of us may share with the contributors to the Coles and Vopat collection is an acknowledgment of honest voice, one that hints at integrity (Faigley
121). However, respect for a voice that has integrity does not imply belief in “the
true self,” but instead demonstrates the persuasiveness that accrues to a narrator
who achieves ethos. It is a staple of Aristotelian rhetoric to have the speaker convey ethos, i.e. to appear credible, moral, honest. When an evaluator labels a text as
“honest,”“authentic” or written with “integrity,” in my opinion it is a strong indication that the narrator has convinced the audience of her reading of a situation.
She has persuaded. In fact, I would argue that the logos of expressive discourse, of
personal narrative, is its ethos. As Aristotle puts it, “the speaker’s character may be
called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses” (emphasis mine, 1329). I
read Aristotle as saying that the audience is persuaded because of the credibility
of the writer. When Faigley dismisses the notion of “authentic voice” as a belief
that the author is writing in propria persona, he is confounding an alleged naivete
of the “expressivist” reader with the ethos of the writer.
Yet how can we determine the credibility of the author when we have
author-evacuated prose, the kind of prose that is currently the standard of
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credibility in academia? If we take into consideration Faigley’s approval of
Greg Shaefer’s essay, “Thucydides: The Historian as Creative Artist,” along with
his disappointment with personal experience essays, we can conclude that he
prefers author-evacuated prose. Faigley compares Shaefer’s well-written
expository piece with Norma Bennett’s personal narrative about her family.
Faigley asks his audience, “[W]hy is writing about potentially embarrassing
and painful aspects of one’s life considered more honest than, say, the efforts of
Joseph Williams’s student, Greg Shaefer, who tries to ﬁgure out what
Thucydides was up to in writing about the Peloponnesian War?” (121).
Shaefer has been directed to “compare and contrast the ﬁrst two speeches in
Thucydides’ History” (Coles and Vopat 305) and that is precisely what he does.
His essay is lucid and well argued, but ventures no opinions. Schaefer writes,
“The Corinthian argument failed because for an imperial power like Athens,
justice is not a very strong controlling force,” (309) but we do not know where
he stands in either the dispute brought before the Athenians or in regard to
Thucydides’ representation of speeches he never heard.
Norma Bennett, on the other hand, does take a risk. She chooses to write an
essay which exposes her family to the public eye in response to an assignment
by Erika Lindemann that does not ask for any kind of exposure. “The assignment asks you to write an essay that is primarily descriptive but that makes its
point by comparison and contrast.” When I read Faigley’s summary of
Bennett’s essay before reading the essay itself, I imagined the piece to be
maudlin and self-pitying, and I imagined that the narrator was so upfront with
her emotional pain that I would feel embarrassed reading it. I felt contemptuous toward her mother and repulsed by her father from his reconstruction.
After reading the essay itself, I no longer feel any of these things. Here is
Faigley’s summary:
Norma Bennett’s paper is a narrative of a summer vacation spent with her two
divorced parents who now go to different resorts. Her mothers [sic] wears her PTL
(“Praise the Lord”) jacket (in the days before Jim and Tammy Bakker’s fall) and
spends much of her day sleeping or sobbing. Her potbellied father also spends much
of the day sleeping-passed out drunk on the beach with a twenty-ﬁve-year-old
woman in a white string bikini while Norma babysits for the woman’s young child. I
have a great deal of sympathy for students like Norma Bennett, who must cope with
difﬁcult family situations as well as the pressures of college. . . . (121)

After reading Faigley’s representation of the Bennett essay, I have negative
feelings toward her mother who is a member of the religious right and who
sleeps and sobs most of the day. Yet my experience of this woman is different
when I read Bennett’s own account. While her mother’s religious afﬁliation
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does emerge in the text, the description does not play on any anti-fundamentalist biases of the reader. Norma’s mother rises before dawn each morning to walk
to the beach and collect shells. “My mom . . . praises God for his magniﬁcent
creation, and photographs her favorite sanctuary” (Coles and Vopat 159), activities that feel decidedly ecumenical to me. Moreover, there is no indication that,
as Faigley puts it, “she spends much of the day sleeping or sobbing.” Norma tells
us only that when her mother returns from the beach, “her eyes are watery, her
cheeks are red, and her nose is runny. I’m not sure if it’s because of the cold
wind outside or if she’s crying about my dad again or if she’s been overwhelmed
by the presence of the Lord. Maybe it’s all three.” (159). Faigley condenses
Norma’s speculation to one word, sobbing, thereby reducing the representation
of the mother from a spiritually active person who is experiencing an appropriate grief reaction, to an emotional mess. In doing so, he short-circuits the kind
of compassion we feel for her after reading Norma’s account. Nor do we have
any evidence that she spends much of the day sleeping. Norma writes, “I give
her a hug and grumble about getting up. She laughs and teases me about being
lazy. My mom won’t go out on the beach in the middle of the day. She goes back
to bed while I go lie with my friends. Late every afternoon, just before dinner,
we go out on the beach together, carrying sand buckets and shovels. Like a couple of kids, we sink down in the sand and start building a castle” (159). Because
Norma’s mother goes back to bed in the morning and does not go out on the
beach in the middle of the day, Faigley assumes she is the “lazy” one. In the
absence of any account of her activities, probably something that Norma herself
is not privy to, he concludes that she sleeps away the day.
I am troubled by Faigley’s representation of this woman. It leads me to
identify against myself as a woman. Drawing on a theory of Judith Fetterley,
Patrocinio Schweickart puts it this way: “Androcentric literature . . . does not
allow the woman to seek refuge in her difference. Instead, it draws her into a
process that she uses against herself ” (42). After reading Norma’s essay, I realize I had been drawn into collusion with Faigley, that I had adopted a contempt for Norma’s mother and other women who are working through losses,
a contempt that borders on misogyny.
Faigley reads Norma as writing about “potentially embarrassing and
painful aspects of [her] life” (159) but I do not feel her embarrassment, I do
not think she burdens the reader with her pain, and I do not think she asks for
our sympathy. She treats both of her parents with respect, something that may
be hard to do in relation to a father who does appear to “spend much of the
day sleeping-passed out drunk on the beach with a twenty-ﬁve-year-old
woman in a white string bikini” (Faigley 121). Yet Norma does not display this
kind of contempt for her father either. She concludes her essay:
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My Dad yells and says for me to look after David [his girlfriend’s son]; they’ll be
back late. Tears come to my eyes. Dad has lost his sobriety, his family, and his God. I
wonder how long it will be before his foundation is washed away, and his castle is
level with the sand.
I love my mom and my dad both. My dad has many friends and many good
times, but he is too miserable to enjoy them. My mom is a loner. She has quiet times
and peace of mind. As I look at my own life, I search for a castle—up high, away
from the shoreline—far away from the destruction of the tide. (emphasis mine,
Coles and Vopat, 160)

I feel the narrator’s pain here but I do not feel her reaching out for pity
from the audience. There is maturity and an ethos evident as she stands apart
from her parents wanting none of the “destruction of the tide” in her life. She
writes that her father has “lost his sobriety.” Faigley and other readers may be
unaware that she is using what ethnographers call “insider language” from
Alcoholics Anonymous, bringing not embarrassment to the story but a view of
her father as a man with a disease who has gone into relapse. I believe she
maintains her father’s anonymity in print by not being more speciﬁc. What
“lost his sobriety” means in this context is that he was abstinent from alcohol
for a period of time in AA, but that he lost that abstinence and the peace of
mind that can come from working the program’s suggested steps. I feel only
her sadness at this relapse.
Perhaps it is Faigley who feels embarrassed by the story. The absence of any
sort of self-reﬂexivity in this particular chapter further weakens his arguments
against autobiographical writing. Edward Said advises theorists to declare their
personal investment in critical projects. Inﬂuenced by Antonio Gramsci, he
suggests that we develop a consciousness of who we are as products of “the historical process to date.” These processes have left many marks but no inventory. “‘Therefore it is imperative at the outset to compile such an inventory’”
(qtd. in Said 25). I wish Faigley had done so.
T H E B E R L I N WA L L : I S W R I T I N G A P R I VAT E V I S I O N ?

Many of us who teach writing have been inﬂuenced by a taxonomy of the
ﬁeld of composition established by James Berlin. Berlin shapes a history of what
he calls expressionism beginning in the early part of the twentieth century but
with historical roots in romanticism and further back in Plato.2 “The ideal of
liberal culture indirectly encouraged the development of expressionistic
rhetoric through its philosophic idealism and its emphasis on the cultivation of
the self, both derived from its ties with Brahminical romanticism” (Rhetoric and
Reality 73). Berlin’s reasoning is slippery here. By declaring an “indirect” link
between “expressionistic rhetoric” and “the ideal of liberal culture” with its
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“philosophic idealism and its emphasis on the cultivation of self,” two characteristics derived from romanticism, Berlin makes these characteristics of liberal
culture appear to be attached to expressionistic rhetoric. The indeﬁnite pronoun “its” is used three times in the sentence further blurring liberal
culture/romanticism and expressionistic rhetoric.
What Berlin calls expressionism is almost always associated with notions of
encouraging the student to develop his or her own “unique self ” in writing,
writing that avoids and even disdains connection with the material world. This
disdain for the external world is nowhere documented by Berlin but is apparently to be taken on the good faith of the implied reader who is willing to
accept the connection to Plato3 Berlin reﬁnes his view over the course of four
frequently cited articles or books, sometimes referring to his earlier publications as the only evidence for arguments in later works. These are
“Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical Theories” (1982),
Rhetoric and Reality: Writing Instruction in American Colleges, 1900–1985
(1987), “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class” (1988), and Rhetorics,
Poetics, and Cultures published posthumously in 1996. Publishing his view
over a fourteen-year period, Berlin had plenty of time to see if his conclusions
were being practiced in classrooms. If he had, he might have seen a range of
pedagogies, some more overtly sociopolitical than others depending on the
comfort level and belief system of the teacher. As it is, Berlin limits himself
within the methodology of his own choosing.4
Furthermore, Berlin seems to either ignore or misunderstand the importance of group interaction in process pedagogy. As Peter Elbow puts it in the
introduction to the twenty-ﬁfth anniversary edition of his ﬁrst book, Writing
without Teachers,
A highly respected scholar and historian of composition, James Berlin, does write
brieﬂy of my epistemology, but it’s hard to believe he looked carefully at what I
wrote. For he says that I am a Platonist who believes that knowledge is totally private, whereas I make it clear that both the teacherless class and the epistemology of
the believing game can only function as group processes, and that their validity
derives only from people entering into each others’ diverse and conﬂicting experiences. I argue speciﬁcally that the meaning of any spoken or written discourse is entirely
dependent on groups and communities (see p. 156 for what I wrote). The teacherless
class and the believing game are completely undermined if one tries to function
solo. (Emphasis mine, xxvi–xxvii.)

Elbow’s notion of meaning making discourse communities does not sound
so different from what Berlin calls epistemic rhetoric. In Rhetoric and Reality
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(1987) Berlin tells us, “The epistemic position implies that knowledge is not
discovered by reason alone, that cognitive and affective processes are not separate, that intersubjectivity is a condition of all knowledge, and that the contact
of minds affects all knowledge” (165). Thus, for both Elbow and Berlin, meaning making is a social process.
In “Contemporary Composition” (1982) Berlin lays out a taxonomy that
basically remains the same for him in later publications, although he does revise
the names. Berlin expounds on the Platonic vision, how the “ultimate truth can
be discovered by the individual, but cannot be communicated” because it is
“beyond the resources of language” (771). Berlin sees the interactive group
process in expressionism as similar to dialectic but its purpose is not to construct meaning or knowledge. “The purpose is to get rid of what is untrue to the
private vision of the writer, what is, in a word, inauthentic” (772).
In Rhetoric and Reality (1987) Berlin takes a harder line on this type of
group process. “For the expressionist, solitary activity is always promising,
group activity always dangerous” (emphasis mine, 145). Berlin does make an
attempt to undercut this essentialism by allowing for “varieties of expressionistic rhetoric” (145) including a few that approach epistemic. “[I]n this view language does not simply record the private vision, but becomes involved in
shaping it” (146) But alas, this group of expressionists also runs amuck
“because it denies the place of intersubjective, social processes in shaping reality. Instead, it always describes groups as sources of distortion of the individual’s true vision, and the behavior it recommends in the political and social
realms is atomistic, the individual acting alone” (146). Among the expressionists who follow what he calls the “latitudinarian” view are Ken Macrorie,
Donald Murray, Walker Gibson, William Coles, Jr., and Peter Elbow (146).
Berlin’s conclusions are as inﬂammatory as they are unsubstantiated.
After closely studying Berlin’s text, I do not ﬁnd any support that these ﬁve
men either view group process to be dangerous or recommend acting alone.
There are only two references to the expressionists and group processes, or
what Berlin calls editorial groups, in the section. He writes, “[T]he purpose of
editorial groups is to check for the inauthentic in the writer’s response (Berlin,
“Contemporary Response)” (152). His source for this conclusion lies not in
any of the ﬁve expressionists he called our attention to, but in his own prior
article. I might add that neither does he offer the reader a page citation from
this article. The second and ﬁnal reference to editorial groups is in relation to
Elbow or, as he puts it, “Elbow’s camp,” and it concludes the section.
It is not surprising, then, that Elbow’s version of the editorial group was inﬂuenced
by the methods of group therapy and of the encounter group (121). Finally, at the
start of this discussion, I said that Elbow’s approach is not overtly political. In the last
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analysis, however, for Elbow as for other expressionists, the personal is the political—
the underlying assumption being that enabling individuals to arrive at self-understanding and self-expression will inevitably lead to a better social order. (154-5)

While Berlin does refer back to one thing he said at the beginning of the
discussion, that is, Elbow’s work not being overtly political, he does not refer
back to his initial inﬂammatory remarks, “For the expressionist . . . group
activity is always dangerous . . . The behavior it recommends in the political
and social realms is atomistic, the solitary individual acting alone” (145-6).
Berlin has not provided one shred of evidence for these initial
assumptions.The notion that the personal is political has become something of
a slogan in various theoretical circles, most noticeably some feminist ones.
Berlin does not agree with his own deﬁnition of what the slogan means, that
individual change precedes social change. Moreover, he seems rather obtuse
about the workings of “the editorial group” and the process of meaning making that goes on in it. Of course these groups make meaning and they are, in
their own right, discourse communities. Even if he is correct and some “in
Elbow’s camp” saw their purpose as solely to help the individual clarify and
strengthen her writing, that does not mean that they encouraged an atomistic
life style. I ﬁnd the opposite to be true: by sharing one’s work in a safe community where there is both encouragement and constructive, non-shaming critique, there is a breakdown of individual isolation.
Even more importantly, these groups have the potential for creating bonds
across racial and class lines. In my ethnography of Boston College, I-Writing:
the Politics and Practice of Teaching First-Person Writing, a white teacher develops a relationship with the only student of color in her course that is strong
enough to help the student workshop an anti-racist essay and become an
active member of the community. In another instance, when one of my students workshopped an essay about his aging grandmother, he and several
other students in the class became emotional. Because they were in the same
developmental stage, many of the students were facing similar losses, including
one student who had just learned the evening before that her grandmother did
not have long to live. Berlin advocates “intersubjectivity” (Rhetoric and Reality
165) in the construction of knowledge, but “it is important to remember that
intersubjectivities require subjectivities, and vice versa” (Cassity 179).
Berlin reduces the dialectic in expressionist editorial groups to one function: “to enable the writer to understand the manifestation of her identity in
language through considering the reactions of others—not, for example, to
begin to understand how meaning is shaped by discourse communities” (153).
What kind of meaning gets credit for being shaped in discourse communities
in the Berlin worldview? He never speciﬁes. When students come together to
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help each other write more forceful essays about racism on campus or about
the loss of a loved one, isn’t this making meaning within a community?
Doesn’t this kind of bonding break down the distrust, cynicism, and competitiveness that accrues in academia, a bonding that could carry over to all kinds
of collective support, whether for “overtly political” causes such as organizing
to stop the spread of racist grafﬁti or for overtly personal causes such as supporting one another through loss?
In Romancing Rhetorics, Sherrie Gradin takes on the false binary personal/
political with her neologism “social-expressivism” and provides a different rendering of the legacy of romanticism than Berlin does. She tells us that “expressivist theory evolves from a tradition [romanticism] that recognizes the
economic, social, and political conditions of existence,” but acknowledges in
response to Berlin that “the practitioners of expressivism can certainly fail to
incorporate this tradition into their pedagogy” (109). There are, as Berlin himself
tells us, “varieties of expressionistic rhetoric” (145). Perhaps some classrooms are
less overtly political than others depending on the degree to which individual
practitioners are comfortable with the potential for heated debate. Individual
differences not withstanding, these do not constitute a concerted and monolithic
theory either of avoidance of such issues or infatuation with “the private vision.”
In “Rhetoric and Ideology in the Writing Class” (1988) Berlin argues that
“the ruling elites in business, industry, and government are those most likely to
nod in assent to the ideology inscribed in expressionistic rhetoric” because it
reinforces “individualism, private initiative, the conﬁdence for risk-taking, the
right to be contentious with authority (especially the state)” (487).
Furthermore, Newkirk sees a logical fallacy underlying one of Berlin’s conclusions, namely that expressionism nurtures the capitalistic spirit in its students.
He faults Berlin for making similarity appear to be causation. Referring here to
Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures (1996), Newkirk writes,
To paraphrase Berlin, there are attitudes and values fostered in expressionist
pedagogies that resemble those that a capitalist system seeks to foster in consumers
(the self-gratifying enjoyment of “choice”) and in entrepreneurs (private initiative).
Because of this similarity, expressivist teaching causes students to enter happily and
even successfully into that system.
This argument is so loose that it could easily be used against the cultural studies
approach [of Berlin and others]. One could easily imagine how corporations could
proﬁt from the critical skills students develop when they “problemitize” seemingly
self-evident arguments and positions” (89).

Because two things appear to be alike, it does not follow that one causes the
other. Newkirk does not see how Berlin has proven that expressionism fosters
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an accommodation to capitalism. I would add that any pedagogy that results
in grading students, ranking them in their class, and providing the basis for
records that go out to future admissions ofﬁcers or employers is part of capitalist relations of power and authority. Grading and ranking trigger competition whether you are teaching the canon, grammar, personal narrative, or
some form of cultural studies in which students are encouraged to see how
representations of the empirical world in the mass media work to maintain a
class system (as Berlin suggests in two model courses in Rhetorics, Poetics, and
Cultures.) Most teaching in our system perpetuates divisions and hierarchy.
In Rhetoric, Poetics, and Cultures, a book that was published posthumously in
1996, Berlin does not explicitly debunk expressionism, but he does come to a surprising conclusion. There is only one reference to expressionism and it is indirect.
The proposed course “Codes and Critiques” is put forward as a foil to an
unnamed but behind-the-scenes pedagogy. He uses some coding himself here
that the Berlin reader should have no trouble recognizing. “Unlike classrooms
that insist that each student look within to discover a unique self, this course
argues that only through understanding the workings of culture in shaping consciousness can students ever hope to achieve any degree of singularity” (124).
Berlin advocates singularity, a word that means being one of a kind or having a
trait marking one as distinct from others. It is surprising that Berlin’s goal is for
the individual to see herself as “distinct from others” as it seems to represent the
very “private vision” this cultural critic argued against over a fourteen year period.
I N S I T U : T H E P O L I T I C A L E L B OW

Berlin and Faigley have perpetuated a characterization of a certain type of
pedagogy that has come to be known, largely through their efforts, as expressionist or “expressivist.” I have found their arguments to be frequently unsubstantiated and misleading. By way of contrast, I want to turn now to the only
ethnography, to my knowledge, of the work of Peter Elbow. Reading Kathleen
Cassity’s study is a way to get a sense of the culture of Elbow’s section of
English 100: Expository Writing, a required course for incoming students; it
brings us closer to lived experience than either critical commentary on texts or
generalizations about imagined classrooms. The study was conducted at the
University of Hawai’i in Manoa during the spring of 1996, the year Elbow was
a Visiting Professor. As an MA student, Cassity had an opportunity to take a
course with Elbow and then observed his Expository Writing class as the basis
for her MA thesis. He had been looking for someone to give him feedback on a
new grading contract he was implementing that semester.
Like myself, Cassity is troubled by the association of “process/expressivist”
approaches “with rugged individualism, with naïve and simplistic concepts of
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‘self,’ and with epistemological frameworks that shortchange social, cultural and
historical contexts” (15). She ultimately ﬁnds in Elbow’s teaching something that
looks like the radical approach of Henry Giroux, “border pedagogy.” Giroux
believes we should give students more opportunity to write about their own personal experiences with and emotional reactions to issues such as race rather than
have them only “articulate the meaning of other peoples’ theories” (Giroux 11).
The focus of Cassity’s ethnography is Elbow’s grading contract. In this contract the student could choose what grade s/he wanted based on workload.
Many students found the workload necessary to achieve an “A” to be burdensome even after he modiﬁed it twice. My interest in her study, however, is in
the evidence Cassity provides for her initial statement that the representation
of “expressivist” pedagogy as shortchanging social, political and historical registers is false.
Issues of race and ethnicity are prominent. Of the nineteen students in
Elbow’s class, Cassity reports that ﬁfteen are Asian, Paciﬁc, or mixed ethnicity
and four are Caucasian (9). Six of the ﬁfteen students raised in Hawai’i indicated
that their primary language is Hawaiian Creole English or pidgin (7). In one of
many lively group discussions observed by Cassity, the students complain about
the perception of Hawaiians by outsiders.5 “People are so stupid, they actually
think we live in grass shacks and stuff . . . You tell them you go to the University
of Hawai’i and they’re, like, surprised that people in Hawai’i even study” (65).
Their discussion reminds Cassity of her graduate seminar in colonialism.
The ﬁrst written assignment began with a freewrite on “any aspect of your
group identities” (70). Of note is the fact that the assignment does not encourage students to write about their individual, unique identities. After the
freewrite became a homework assignment, it was then to be revised into a
more public form. Students would pair up and their collaborative projects
were to include library research. Sue, a shy eighteen-year-old Chinese
American, read her paper aloud in conference. When asked to write about her
“group identities,” Sue selected the topic of racism toward Chinese people.
She discusses the slurs used against those of Chinese descent in Hawai’i and recites
one of the derogatory rhymes she heard other kids chanting when she was little,
rhymes feeding into the stereotype that the Chinese are “cheap.” Breaking away from
her text, she tells Peter as an aside, “I don’t really believe it, you know.”
“Right,” says Peter. “But it’s sort of like some of the rhymes black kids have had to
hear—some of the slur—nowadays it’s outlawed, but you’ve still heard it. It’s still in
there.” (70-1).

The discussion here is not about one private experience but the more general experience that people of color face.
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The use of Hawaiian Creole English or pidgin surfaces in the class. Cassity
does not address the theoretical influences on Elbow here, but from what I
can see of his pedagogy, he is in line with suggestions made by both Lisa
Delpit and Eileen Oliver. Delpit tells us that “each cultural group should have
the right to maintain its own language style.” However, we must tell students
that “there is a political power game that is also being played, and if they want
to be in on that game there are certain games they too must play” (292). They
must learn the dominant register both to understand and to change the
power realities (293).
Elbow apparently values both native and the dominant dialects. Cassity
demonstrates the pedagogy here through Elbow’s work with Kerry. This student was worried that her primary language is non-standard English. Here are
some excerpts of either oral or written dialogue between student and teacher
on the subject.
Kerry: I’m afraid my pidgin English will get in my way. You didn’t write anything
about pidgin English on your contract.
E: Feel free to write in pidgin.
…
E: (responding to an essay written in multiple linguistic registers) I like the pidgin section a lot. In my view, it’s important to learn to write in it. As you say, it’s
YOUR tongue, your “mother tongue”—and so it’s got the most “juice” in it—and
you can put the most of YOU in it. You need to write in standard English; but it’s my
belief that your standard English might improve if you let yourself sometimes write
in pidgin.
K: (responding in a process letter) I am very pleased that you don’t discriminate
against my language.

Cassity tells us that Kerry received an “A” in the course, even though she had
said at mid-semester, “I give up.” “The more Elbow not only accepted but
encouraged Kerry’s ‘mother-tongue,’ the more she wrote in both Standard
English and pidgin” (141). Language is clearly an aspect of group identity for
Elbow and his students.
The issues of ethnicity and gender emerge with an apparently deﬁant young
man named Gary. Cassity describes a conference.
Gary interrupts again, launching into another monologue. Peter urges him to talk to
his collaborator. “If you want to make these arguments about gender and ethnicity,
if you want to say all these don’t affect who you are, I want you nevertheless to take
account of the fact that it looks to a lot of people like they do. I want you to take into
account the opposite point of view” . . . I wonder if [Peter] feels frustrated as I do. If
so, he doesn’t reveal it in either his facial expressions or body language. (74)
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I do read frustration in some of Elbow’s written comments as he challenges
viewpoints he disagrees with. He writes to Dave and Brad: “When you talk
about the rise in wages for women compared to men, you forget to mention
one little fact: that women still get paid much less than men for the same work!”
(89). To Karen and Gary, he writes, “There’s something quite weird about your
paper. Every example of racism that you talk about is an example of thinking or
behavior by members of a targeted group, blacks or Hawaiians. Nowhere in your
paper do you ever give an example or seem to acknowledge the more pervasive
racism of groups with more power . . . as though you think only blacks and
Hawaiians are racist. Did you mean to do that?” (89). To Adam and Mark, he
notes, “You make a bunch of statements that are kind of illogical—that no one
you know is gay. (You better not be so sure.) That everyone you know who is
gay is messed up. (I thought you didn’t know anyone.) That once someone is
gay you can’t see them the same. (Well how can you trust your perception when
you know you go into this gear?)” (90).
In spite of Elbow’s disagreements, he is still able to make positive comments
on some aspects of each of these essays whose perspectives clearly trouble him.
However, Cassity informs us that to Adam and Mark (who wrote on homosexuality) “the best he can come up with is ‘I’m glad you enjoyed working
together—and that you did substantial re-arranging and changing’” (90).
From her perspective, he was struggling to ﬁnd something positive here.
Let us recall that Elbow and other white people were in the minority in this
classroom. After reading the ﬁrst draft of this summary of her work, Cassity, who
is herself of mixed ethnicity, responded, “Obviously, if you come cruising in here
with a white superiority attitude, you will soon be cruising back out, probably
with a black eye. Peter was well liked by his freshman students so I think that says
a lot about what kind of attitudes he displayed in class toward differences.”
After having had this privileged peek at a small slice of Elbow’s teaching
practice, I can only conclude that race, gender and sexual orientation are fair
game for this “expressionist’s” classroom. Not only does Elbow appear not to
ﬁnd the last word in any private vision, as Berlin has repeatedly told us, but he
seems to have no inhibition whatsoever about challenging his students’ visions
when he disagrees with them.
R E P R E S E N TAT I O N A L P S YC H O T H E R A P Y

Is it possible to change? Can we stop playing Extreme Representation?
When a composition teacher who aligns herself with Bartholomae, even
insists that everyone use Ways of Reading in her composition program, read an
early version of this essay, she asked me to make light of the ways “expressivists” have been represented. I did not then and I have not now.
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We live in a world that ﬁbrillates daily with ethnic conﬂict (and the outbreaks would be even more plentiful if many of us stopped sublimating our
xenophobia with sports team fanaticism) and I see a version of this type of
destructive Othering in the discipline of composition and rhetoric. (My guilt
does not elude me; I, too, sublimate my introjected racism with sports mania
and I have broken some kneecaps in this essay.) We have to stop and look more
precisely at what our colleagues are saying in print and how the text is dramatized in classroom practice. I am not asking naively, “Why can’t we all just get
along?” but rather I am saying, “Let us look more carefully before we write
each other off.”
Revising concepts of a lifetime is not easy. I am a Jew currently teaching in
my second Jesuit university. “Now you’ve gone too far,” (says my diseased
mother from her grave) as I conduct an ethnography of a class in Liberation
Theology taught by Father Tom, a real priest. We talk, we argue, I notice things
that strike me as anti-Semitic in the reading, he says they are not meant to be.
Why do I bring this project up? Because immersing myself in the theology of
another religion no longer produces a sustained ﬂinch. After seven and a half
years, I no longer feel the horror of centuries of pogroms and forced conversions and exterminations with each annunciation of the word “Christ.”
Can we stop our theoretical ﬂinching in composition? Can we stop kicking
our colleagues to the curb? Perhaps we can think of such a change as a lesson in
what Robert Schreiter calls “intercultural hermeneutics” in his book The New
Catholicity. In Schreiter’s discussion of the differing needs of a speaker and a
hearer, he offers the example of a missionary couple who went to North India to
evangelize. Unfortunately they owned a cat, an animal the villagers associated
with witches. “[T]he appearance of the missionaries’ pet cat caused the evangelistic message to be lodged near witchcraft in the hearers’ world, rather than near
salvation” (35). Just because some composition teachers valorize writing about
personal experiences, it does not follow that economic, ethnic, and religious differences are reduced in status in our classrooms and in our students’ texts..
I have analyzed commentaries by Faigley and Berlin that were based on
“expressivist” texts. In an effort to encourage a larger project in composition
studies, where theorists take a look at the opposition’s classrooms before
publishing critiques that then become hypostatized as actual situations, I
have borrowed from an ethnographic study of someone who has become
associated with “expressivism.” It has been my intent to disrupt the essentialized misrepresentation of those teachers who encourage both personal writing and writing that would be seen as cultural criticism. O’Donnell argues
that “expressivist bashing” (423) has flourished perhaps because of a failure
on the part of expressivist teachers to articulate the theories underlying their
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practice” (425). It is my hope that this essay will enter a gradually growing
body of work by researchers such as Kathleen Cassity, Thomas Newkirk,
Sherrie Gradin, Thomas O’Donnell, and Christopher Burnham, who are taking the time for some needed theoretical clarification.

NOTES

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

According to Karen R. Melton, the Director of Marketing for Bedford/St.
Martins, more than a quarter of a million copies of Ways of Reading had sold
as of December 2, 1999. This total “makes it one of the most successful readers on our list (an impressive feat) and in the industry as a whole.”
W. Ross Winterowd traces a similar genealogy. “Plato represents and is the
father of a tradition that sees the goal of composition as helping the writer
develop his or her own ‘voice’ or expressivity, just as Aristotle is the ultimate
source of composition as entering a discourse community” (xii).
Susan Wall points out that Berlin’s critique of expressionism emerges from
his responses to scholarly texts and not from “qualitative research that might
contextualize expressivism in speciﬁc teaching situations.” There is a certain
irony in a social epistemic critique which fails to examine context because of
“its own theoretical claim that discourses . . . are socially constructed and
politically interested, shaped by speciﬁc and historically contingent material
circumstances” (252).
Again I am not alone in my objections to Berlin’s work. Cassity notes that,
writing in 1987 (Rhetoric and Reality), Berlin only comments on Elbow’s
ﬁrst book Writing without Teachers (1973) and ignores Writing with Power
published in 1981. Wall argues that “in the expressivist works [Berlin] critiques (publications of the sixties and seventies), the authors do not generally deﬁne the self as isolated or knowable apart from language. . . .” (241).
In contrast to Berlin’s characterization of Elbow’s groups, Cassity writes, “The
small groups were not designed for the purpose of assessing any writer’s
‘authenticity’ or ‘sincerity’; instead, the techniques of showing, telling, summarizing, pointing, and relating ‘movies of the mind’ (all described in
Writing without Teachers) allowed for reader response and negotiation of
meaning between readers and writers” (171). In short, they were dialogic.

9

L I F E WO R K T H R O U G H T E A C H I N G
AND SCHOLARSHIP1
DIANE P. FREEDMAN
Writerly writing is personal writing, whether or not it is autobigraphical.
Marianna Torgovnick
“I learned that what I have to say is valuable in and of itself and does
not need to be generalized into obscurity.”
Susan Krieger, quoting a student
One must ask whose privacy we really protect when we deny students
the right to address these [personal] topics, and whose interest it
serves to maintain the traditional taboo on these topics.
Cinthia Gannett

One appeal of the personal voice in academic writing is its ﬂexibility, its accessibility, and potential literariness—that is, its reliance on rhythms and word
music, imagery, speciﬁcity, allusions. Another is its capacity for principled
disclosure—of research goals and practices, of researcher stakes, of implications for problem, ﬁeld, and author. That is the aspect I am interested in as a
researcher, as a writer, and in my graduate courses in autobiographical scholarship. But the aspect on which I will focus here is the capacity of personal classroom writing—personal responses to course readings and disciplinary issues
and the use of personal forms—to negotiate the divide college students often
feel between school and work or school and home, their writing and their caring, their knowing and their being. Allowing our students, for a time anyway,
to posit connections, can encourage discouraged and dislocated students, give
them a way into the disciplinary conversations that might otherwise daunt and
distance them.
When I invoke the personal as pedagogy, stance, or style, what I am really
endorsing is connection, between student and subject, teacher and student,
reader and writer, student and student, coursework and the work of the discipline and the world. I’m not asking for easy writing with pat or unambiguous
conclusions about life or intellectual problems. No, the “personal” is a multipurpose route or ruse that invigorates academic learning, academic publishing,
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our various disciplines. Many disciplines have been “getting personal” in various ways. Postmodern versions of selfhood posit its constructedness in and
through discourse, including the “I” voice of a discourse that, in a more innocent time, seemed private, deep, authentic. Now to speak of the personal “always
already” means to ask for a poetics of the personal and to recognize its rhetoricity. We know even our freshmen (emphasis on fresh) come to us socialized and
not “pre-sexual” or “pre-economic,” such that even when writing emotionally
or narratively about immediate or past personal events and feelings they write
out of ideas and with discourses formed or inﬂected by others.2 Moreover, to
quote Jane Tompkins, “What is personal is completely a function of what is perceived as personal” (36). Tompkins acknowledges that “what we are really talking about [may] not be the personal as such, what we are talking about is what
is important, answers one’s needs, strikes one as immediately interesting. For
women,” she believes, “the personal is such a category” (36). All of this is to say
that so-called personal writing is also inevitably varied, complex, and likely in
ﬂux even within one writer’s experience.
In my classes and in this paper, I build on the pedagogical work of David
Bleich, Norman Holland, and other early “subjectivist” teachers or readerresponse theorists in composition and women’s studies, including Louise
Rosenblatt, Charles Moran, Anthony Petrosky, Nancy Hoffman, Jean Kennard,
Suzanne Juhasz, Patsy Schweickart, and Jane Tompkins, among others.3 I also
draw on postmodern debates and the educational approaches deemed
“applied” or “service-learning.” Personal scholarship teaches that knowledge
work involves the whole person. Axel Nissen, in a special PMLA issue on the
personal, writes, “The will to know, which is at the base of all scholarship, is
located not only between the ears but equally under the sternum and in the
crotch. Intellectual curiosity, love, and desire are intimately intermingled in
our work as scholar” (1149). And service-learning teaches that education does
not come in isolation; it involves the whole community.4 These theorists seek
not just the personal, nor just anything else, but a comprehensive pedagogy
that goes beyond a goal of disinterested, hands-off intellectual activity.
Such a pedagogy underscores what many teachers of writing and literature
and especially many women teachers know, that students are unavoidably
bringing their personal lives into their academic work, the classroom space,
and their conversations with teachers and peers. One response is to draw out
the personal connections and develop them as scholarship—or as material recognized as interfering with student understanding of a text and its critical
reception to date. If the personal is to remain in the ﬁnal draft of a paper, it
must serve to illuminate the text or issue under discussion; if, on the other
hand, to quote Douglas Atkins, “the experiencing, responding critic is not
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interestingly and effectively represented . . . why [would] anyone else want to
read him or her or . . . be expected to do so?” (97). The classroom permitting
experimental critical writing and encouraging service-learning projects can
help students ﬁnd academic work more rewarding, bring student work closer
to the “masters” and models students usually study, connect home life or past
life with school life, and join one person’s “unique” experience with that of a
larger community group.
Besides encouraging students to explore personal and associative responses
to academic texts and issues, I encourage students to take classroom work into
the ﬁeld (an effort aided by large bulletin-board or career-center lists of organizations seeking volunteers, intern-for-credit programs, and the many new state
and university organizations for public and community service). A disclaimer:
this work has been done and much more extensively by those more skilled in
ethnographic work and who teach more writing courses or service-learningbased courses than literature teachers like myself. While I have a good background in and a degree in teaching writing (and another in creative writing)
and all courses in my present department are termed “writing-intensive,” I was
hired most recently as an “Americanist” with special expertise in contemporary
American literature, especially poetry and autobiography. Students in my
classes are invited but not expected to write personal criticism. And although I
have been appointed by the Governor to the New Hampshire Commission for
National and Community Service, and while I do encourage all of my students
to consider undertaking community service related to writing and literature, I
do not require that the “project” component of each of my courses consist of
service—it may instead involve music and art or independent research.
Nonetheless, I will share some student testimonials regarding reading and writing personally, offering them against a backdrop of important work and debates
in autobiographical scholarship—the subject area about which I can claim
greatest knowledge. As Joseph Boone has written, “While the proliferation of
autobiographical narratives by scholars is a signiﬁcant development, the role
that the personal plays in pedagogy is equally important” (1153). Indeed, selfinclusion has become a valued scholarly genre, one that both authorizes and
learns from its use in composition and lit.-comp. classrooms.
Most of us are familiar by now with the genre of autobiographical or interactive scholarship and the experiments in the personal voice and blurred genres it offers and advocates.5 It is most widely practiced in literary studies.
Specialist in African-American literature Claudia Tate sees “no boundary
between our scholarship and our political commitments” (1148). Michael
Berube, English professor and one of the new “Public Intellectuals” writing
and speaking (even on the radio) for a broad audience, answers critics of the

202

Personal Effects

new subjectivity. Berube refuses to see “personal narratives as some kind of
generic violation of scholarship in the human sciences,” adding,
as long as the scholarship in question concerns humans and is written by humans,
readers should at least entertain the possibility that nothing human should be alien
to it. . . . In ﬁelds like history, anthropology, sociology, or literary study . . . the interests of the observer are an integral element of research, so much that to ignore those
interests is to run the risk of pretending (or at least assuming) that the human sciences might aspire to the accuracy of the physical sciences if only humanists (and
antihumanists) would conduct human sciences without hermeneutics. (1065)

Some investigating or practicing “personal criticism” set it against postmodernism, feminist theory, or post-structuralism (in the name of the everyday, of
writing pedagogy, of accessibility and anti-elitism), but most recognize that its
current growth is very much a part of or in keeping with feminist critical, theoretical, and pedagogical practices not to mention postmodernism. Sociologist
Laurel Richardson aptly assesses the current situation in Fields of Play:
Constructing an Academic Life (1997), announcing, “Today, the domininant
intellectual context challenges . . . all claims for a singular, correct style for organizing and presenting knowledge.” In her book, Richardson offers conversational writing, an ethnographic drama, and poems, among other experiments.
To Richardson, president of the North Central Sociological Association, a personal, creative, and non-authoritarian approach is appropriate in academia
today. She confesses heretical leanings and a “penchant for mingling the personal, the political, and the intellectual” (12). She borrows from anthropologists, who describe the present as a period in which we have the loss of
authority of a “general paradigmatic style of organizing research” (Marcus and
Fisher 1986, 8; qtd. in Richardson 13), and observe that “ideas and methods are
freely borrowed from one discipline to another, leading to a ‘blurring of genres’” (Geertz 1980, qtd. in Richardson 13).
Indeed composition and literature teachers now also speak of, demonstrate,
and offer courses in the blurring of genres. (Tom Romano offers such a summer course in the Reading and Writing Program for teachers held at the
University of New Hampshire, where Pat Sullivan and I each offer similar
courses in academic autobiography during the year; at other campuses, Brenda
Daly, Madelon Sprengnether, and Olivia Frey have taught related courses as
well.) Richardson, like others, perceives that
the loss of grand theory has affected all the disciplines, although their responses
have differed. In literary criticism, literature is aesthetically equivalenced [such that
writers on literature, or deconstructors of literature, are on par as writers]. . . . In law,
critical legal studies . . . abrogates the legal reasoning model (Livingston, 1982). In
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philosophy, the principles of uncertainty and contextuality undermine the possibility of universal systems of thought (Rorty, 1979). In physics and mathematics, the
focus is on the inelegant, the disorderly, indeed, even “chaos” (Gleick, 1984). In sociology and other social sciences, sociological production, like other human productions, is seen as socially produced (cf. Fiske and Shweder, 1986). (13)

Since professionals in these various ﬁelds have questioned grand theory and
passive-voiced, author-evacuated prose and science envy, it is not misleading to
our students to have them write differently and expect that their work can still
be taken seriously or lead them to the ﬁelds or grad programs of their choice.
Nellie McKay, renowned scholar and editor of African-American literature,
concludes, “I am convinced that the personal voice, used seriously and responsibly, has an important role to play in the education of young people” (1155).
Of course, personal and experimental essays, the memoir, the confession, and
so forth have long writerly histories. “If I tell how I chose this topic, what
serendipitous encounter with book or friend put me onto this approach” and
so forth, George Wright insists, he is “only following lines laid down by
Augustine, Montaigne, Coleridge, Keats, Woolf [and many others]” (1160). In
the eighteenth century, George Campbell said of persuasive writing, “passion
must also be engaged” and “Nothing . . . keep[s] our attention alive and vigorous [more] than the pathetic, which consists chieﬂy in exhibitions of personal
misery” (113, qtd. in Paley 17). In the nineteenth century, another rhetorician,
Alexander Bain, praised Plato for his relief of “the severity of philosophical discussion with touches of general human interest. . . . The debate is interrupted
by dramatic displays of personal feeling” (202, qtd. in Paley 17). Jules Lemaitre
and Anatole France “defended the free play of the appreciative mind,” the basis
of the “impressionistic” criticism much maligned by the “New Critics.” In
1910, J.E. Spingarn described such critics as being sensitive to impressions,
capable of expressing themselves well, and (thus) producing new works of art
in response to the sensations generated (“The New Criticism” 5). If accused of
straying from the work of art, these critics reply: “Do not deceive yourself. All
criticism tends to shift the interest from the work of art to something else”
(Spingarn 7). In the 1960s, Irving Malin and Irwin Stark extolled the work of
Jewish-American critics writing against New Critical tenets. In Breakthrough:
A Treasury of Contemporary American-Jewish Literature, they explain:
Many of these [anthologized] critical essays emphasize the value of suffering. In this,
they are noticeably different in temper from the pure, scientiﬁc, rather aloof criticism
of the “New Critics” who avoid committing themselves to any real understanding or
sympathy. . . . The refreshing quality of American-Jewish criticism lies precisely in
this involvement with passionate spiritual questions, which is certainly a more
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humanistic involvement than close scientiﬁc explication. This is not to say that
American-Jewish critics are merely impressionistic—they think as well as feel. (18)

A decade ago, I noted that blurred or mixed-genre texts have been “produced and theorized by feminists, deconstructors, French psychoanalytic critics, reader-response critics, and composition teachers, not to mention past
poet-critics from Sir Phillip Sidney and Walt Whitman to W.E.B. Du Bois,
Gertrude Stein, and Charles Olson along with anthropologists Clifford Geertz,
James Clifford, Renato Rosaldo, George Marcus” (An Alchemy of Genres 83).6
Today’s alternative forms also have echoes of nineteenth-century women’s
work in such “nontraditional genres” as sketch, letter, diary, newspaper column
as well as of the testimonial mode of slave narratives.
In terms of the personal as pedagogy, however, let us only go back to the
early twentieth century for now. Drawing on James Berlin, Karen Paley
reports, “in 1928, Richard Reeve encouraged the use of dreams for invention in
writing personal essays. In 1932, J. McBride Dabbs had his students keep journals and made their texts the central reading of the class. In 1938, Edith
Christina Johnson saw writing as a way to form identity and gain self-knowledge” (Paley 42). Also in 1938, Louise Rosenblatt brought out Literature as
Exploration, the text that gained great critical attention when it was reissued in
1976. Rosenblatt had asserted that “the reader counts for at least as much as
the book or poem itself . . . through books, the reader may explore his [or her]
own nature,” and “just as the author is creative, selective, so the reader also is
creative” (Rosenblatt 42).
Back in the 1970s, when I was an undergraduate, Cornell University offered
many sections of a freshman writing course entitled “Writing from Experience.”
I myself taught “Writing Family Histories” in Cornell’s “Experimental College.”
As a graduate teaching assistant at Cornell, however, I assigned my students in
“Film and Rhetoric” and “Practical Prose” only academic writing exercises—
summaries, analyses, reviews. At the University of Washington, in a writing program under the direction of Charles Schuster, I taught several courses
(expository writing, writing about literature, essay writing) in which personal
essays served as models for student writing. In the advanced writing courses, in
particular, my students modelled essays on those in Robert Lyons’ collection
Autobiography: A Reader for Writers (Oxford, 1977), Nichols’s Writing from
Experience (now out of print), or David Cavitch’s Life Studies: A Thematic
Reader (St. Martin’s, 1986).
Even traditional composition classes, taught in the modes (description,
narration, classiﬁcation, comparison and contrast, process), like those offered
(including by me) at the State University of New York in Cortland in 1979,
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relied on personal narratives, although students were to “progress” from these
chronologically arranged essays to argumentative essays organized by the reasons offered in support of the thesis that appeared in an opening paragraph.
But by the time I taught “expository writing” at Washington and at Skidmore
College (as an assistant professor) feminist-theory groups discussed essays in
feminist theory and pedagogy; friends and colleagues shared their syllabi and
writing exercises—the personal was the political, and it was in. Composition
and Gender Studies conferences had sessions in which the evocative and
nuanced personal narrative ultimately was celebrated as a possible capstone
project of a course rather than considered an easy, throwaway, warmup exercise to be used only in the beginning of a course. Paley describes a class she
taught at Boston College in which several students wrote moving personal
essays and others wrote more conventional academic essays. A student who did
the latter “apparently did not ﬁnd writing narratives to be easy. In fact,” writes
Paley, “he found it to be more challenging than writing papers about the
thoughts of famous philosophers” (my emphasis; e-mail excerpt, 19 February
1999). Rather than a copout genre, the personal essay or the hybrid personalscholarly essay requires practice and antecedents. Moreover, it is a real genre
called for across the disciplines and in the “outside world” though perhaps rendered predictably and poorly in some places.
Wouldn’t it be a delight if those college and graduate-school admissions
essays were truly evocative and interesting? What about cover letters in jobapplication packets? Grant and TA applications? Letters of welcome to new
students, stockholders, or community members? The question is not whether
real writing or real scholarship is personal. It is inevitably so, as most of the
twenty-six contributors to the PMLA Forum on the subject and others attest.
Moreover, I accept what Bleich in 1978 found to be a basic principle:
an adolescent student—ages 12 to 22—is intensely preoccupied with his [or her]
own person—physically, psychologically, and socially. He[/she] shares in common
with people of all ages a fundamental concern about the relationships and people in
his[/her] life. These preoccupations and concerns are the key to bringing out a new,
serious awareness and understanding of the role of emotional life in intellectual
development. (18-19)

It is inevitable that much if not all scholarship, student work, and real-world
writing is personal. I’ve elsewhere asserted that “joining the personal and professional, analysis and emotion, ‘self ’ and other,” personal scholarship “powerfully connects readers to texts, to their own writing, to our own (if previously
unacknowledged) critical process, and to one another” (“Autobiographical
Literary Criticism as the New Belletrism” 12). The questions then become:
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when and how the personal should be given expression in a scholarly text
(Nissen 1142); are there more or less productive ways of getting personal
(Gallop 1150); must an openness to personal writing mean a naive acceptance
of the notion of a rational, coherent, and uniﬁed “self,” a notion critiqued by
postmodernists and thought to inhere in all personal writing; and how can a
teacher avoid getting overly involved in or upsetting students’ emotional lives
when personal, even passionate, essays are permitted or solicited.
E V E R Y D AY W R I T I N G A N D T E A C H I N G : P E R S O N A L N A R R AT I V E S

I begin this next section with a braided epigraph, a student taking off, in a
personal-scholarly way, from a writing theorist’s ideas:
One idea that Farrell discusses is . . . that the “female” mode is more relaxed for
both the writer and reader [because] it comes close to “recreating the process of
thinking as it normally occurs in real life” (910). Everyone has a “real life,” and every
day of this real life people think (even though we often wish we could avoid it).
Since this idea is so universal, I think that writers should use their “every day” mode
of thought to structure their writing and thus allow themselves, as well as their readers, to relate to their work. As a writer trained in Farrell’s “male mode” [that is, “logical, controlled, framed, and contained” as opposed to “open-ended, generative, and
process-oriented” (910)], I . . . distance myself from my work. This is very unnatural
and tedious. However, I think that by using my “I” voice and being able to retrace
my thoughts on the page, I can be more free . . . as a writer.
Cory, undergraduate student

An important and inevitable cautionary note is sounded fully by Brenda Daly
in the following passage from Authoring a Life. Daly is thinking about ﬁction and
personal narratives detailing childhood sexual abuse, including her own:
The decision to speak or write autobiographically must be made again and again. As
each situation arises, we must ask: What is the nature of the constraint? What are the
risks of speaking openly? Who beneﬁts from my silence? Who beneﬁts when I speak
out?

Now to my own real life, my teaching life.
I had been carrying around a folded departmental envelope daily for nearly
a year on which I’d recorded my telephone authorization code—as a faculty
member I get a code and department stationary—only to realize suddenly one
day that the envelope had ﬁrst been someone else’s, an unknown, ungendered
student whose “to do” list (jotted on this very envelope) had included:
Freedman’s ofﬁce, thank you note to Jill, condoms, and call Mom. What message about my calling was I to read in the envelope then?
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Is the year it took me to notice all that a measure of the level of facultymember-student disconnect even a personally-oriented teacher like me sustains? Am I just one among hundreds of faculty members intent on his or her
private code, secure that an envelope with a departmental address is necessarily one of her own? Or does the overwritten envelope signify that students and
teachers are in fact on the same page and that it is every day about the body?
Teachers in my department (English) have always taken into account student
needs overtly and because literature and writing have healing effects. But as
student needs grow every day more apparent and psychically acute, must our
pedagogies grow ever more personal? What would that mean? And how can we
avoid overwhelming students and ourselves by our classroom modes and
materials? Dan Morgan, in “Ethical Issues Raised by Students’ Personal
Writing,” describes well the situation (which has intensiﬁed since Bleich
described the preoccupations of adolescent students, just as some think the
period of adolescence has lengthened into what was formerly adulthood):
A teacher’s responsibilities always did entail more than content expertise and classroom management, always did include listening, encouraging, mentoring, and even,
occasionally, some degree of informal counseling. But we now live in a time when
many more college students have “special needs,” when we see a much higher proportion of students who have led nontraditional lives, a larger number of what I call
“broken wing” students. And so, our roles have of necessity become even more timeconsuming and challenging. (139)

More and more students remain on campus more than four years or begin
college after age eighteen. Most at my campus work, often at more than one
job, sometimes more than forty hours a week, while taking a four-course academic load. A good proportion are ﬁrst-generation college students; several
have told me their parents cannot read. Many students everywhere today are
also victims of some kind of abuse or of “everyday” accidents, errors of judgement, loneliness, or intellectual isolation.
I know this not because my students have appeared in the hallways drunk
or stoned or weeping or otherwise marked as troubled. I know it not because
of articles like Morgan’s or Bleich’s early book or what I learned in TA-training
or in new-faculty orientation, but because of what my students say and what
and how they write. Especially, I venture to guess, in the American-literature,
writing, and women’s-studies classrooms, perhaps also philosophy, psychology, and sociology courses, student self-disclosures have increased in and
through writing. Whatever the complex cultural forces at work, the result is
that more of our young people have had difﬁcult, even traumatic, experiences,
and those experiences are erupting in college classrooms, whether disclosure of
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them is sanctioned or not, overtly related to course materials or not. It is no
accident that at the same time, we have a “memoir boom”—the increasing
publication not just of tell-all tv-talk-show-like narratives, but literary memoirs and “self-inclusive” or “personal scholarship.” Subject matters previously
taboo are no longer so; either we are a culture no longer in denial or more and
more of the world’s citizens are traumatized. One of my graduate students,
who is also an instructor of ﬁrst-year composition, deems our entire culture a
traumatic one, by which she means nearly all of us are touched by traumas—
our own or others. Dan Morgan offers ways of perhaps heading off excursions
into the personal in composition class (tightly assigned topics, a greater concern with audience and purpose, announcing a lack of preference for papers
dealing with past or present illegal activities, eliminating personal narratives).
But they’re not necessarily desirable—even to him—and certainly not foolproof; Morgan acknowledges students will still ﬁnd ways to write what they
want. Instead, our curricula and methodology in the university classroom
can—should—reﬂect an awareness of the students’ inner and everyday lives
without overwhelming ourselves or our students. One’s innermost experiences
and values are fair grounds for teaching and research, and classroom learning
is enhanced by acknowledging inevitable and necessary connections between
life and learning. In fact, the prevalence of new experiences and new genres
means we have more pedagogical and socially-grounded writing options to
explore with our students.
How can we build bridges between the major (for which we teachers have
too often served as Major General) and the student every day—whether traumatic or more happily connected to the ﬁgures inscribed on the coveted envelope: “Mom,” “Jill,” and the lover implied in the jotted injunction to [buy]
“condoms”?
I certainly do not propose that we should all get re-degreed as counselors
or install couches in our ofﬁces or even that we should spend more time just
chatting with students during our office hours or on e-mail. I argue for the
cultural and ethical work of facilitating lifework through coursework, the
writing and reading of personal-scholarly narratives. Nearly all disciplines
offer narratives. However, many scholars have pointed out that we sanctify the
study of narratives as perhaps the chief coursework of the literary studies
ﬁeld, for example, and yet cordon off the narrative mode from further application. Thomas Newkirk comments on the “strange schizophrenia” regarding
narrative in English departments: “On the one hand, [English departments]
are built upon the narrative—it should come as no news that students
become English majors to get academic credit for reading narrative fiction.
Yet in writing classes there is a sense that narratives are relatively easy to write
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and academically suspect” (20). I consider it no crime to let students respond
in kind. Even “in atomic physics,” according to physicist Franz Capra, “we can
never speak about nature without, at the same time, speaking about ourselves” (The Tao of Physics). While there is theoretical justification for this
reflexivity in the work of so- called “expressivists” such as Donald Murray,
Peter Elbow, Lad Tobin, and Newkirk; reader-response “subjectivists” such as
Bleich and Michael Steig; feminist critics such as Louise DeSalvo, Adrienne
Rich, Michelle Cliff, Jane Tompkins, and Brenda Daly; in the new “ecocriticism” practiced by Scott Slovic and Ian Marshall;7 and others, a case can also
be made on the basis of the experiences and writing of college students. In the
end, I do not suggest that everyone should or can regularize the use of personal narratives in the classroom, just that linking course work to life has
been of major and increasing importance for students and scholars. It has
helped bring students into positive relation with one another as well as all
facets of their educations. It has produced “good,” “close,” and “strong”8 readings and powerful and eloquent writing.
As an example, an undergraduate student, Kelly,9 discovered writing about
and reading literature was not only signiﬁcant for herself, but, she imagines,
for her classmates and other readers, “I hope my sharing . . . can encourage or
uplift you or maybe make a difference in your life. If I didn’t speak, that would
be a burden. I believe it is wrong to hoard things to yourself that have the
potential of encouraging others.” Erica invoked poet Muriel Rukeyser when
she opined, “However confused the scene of our life appears, however torn we
may be who now do face that scene, it can be faced, and we can go on. . . .
Poetry helped me to face the scene when my life was confused.”
Classmate Lolly agreed, “There is a sense of connection that I feel when I
read and analyze different literary works because in everything that I read I
ﬁnd a connection within it to my own being.” Literature continues to be what
educational theorist Paula Salvio terms a “technology of self.” For most college
students the dynamics of any classroom and discipline are a technology of,
guide to, and test of selfhood. And the inverse is true: through the self or personal experience students access and create disciplinary knowledge.
Neither the emotional intensity of some student narratives nor the questions, cautionary tales, and postmodern denials of agency have made me abandon the comprehensive curriculum that relates the personal to the academic.
Kate Redﬁeld Jamison, a psychologist who writes of her own mania, depression, and psychosis in An Unquiet Mind (1995), announces perhaps an
extreme view: “I have no idea what the long-term effects of discussing such
issues so openly will be on my personal and professional life, but, whatever the
consequences, they are bound to be better than continuing to be silent” (7). I
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cannot but share her position based on faith, student and professional testimonies, and contemporary literary and pedagogical theory.
At the outset of her book Vertigo: A Memoir, published in 1996, literary
critic Louise DeSalvo writes:
Without books, without talking about books, where would I be now? . . . would I
have created a life for myself so different from my mother’s, from my sister’s? Filled
with pain, yes, but not disabled from pain as they were? I don’t think so.
Books were, at ﬁrst, solid objects to hide behind. Hawaii, The Brothers
Karamazov, Exodus were substantial books I could get lost in, safe screens to prevent
me from watching my family. Something to hold in front of my face so I could not
see what was happening. . . .
Events in books became a universe against which to measure what I was living
through, a world through which I sought understanding. . . . (6-7)

She concludes, “It is as simple as this. Reading, and writing about what I
have read, has saved my life” (7).
Many of us in the profession agree. Sometimes reading or writing narratives
whose themes are the very things that cause one’s pain is even more useful. It is
worth noting that DeSalvo’s testimonials on the life-saving effects of both pleasure reading and scholarly writing come in the wake of one of DeSalvo’s most
poignant undertakings, a book about the relation of Virginia Woolf ’s early sexual abuse to her later life and work. DeSalvo further conﬁdes:
When I started my work on Woolf, I did not realize how similar her family was to
mine—did not know my sister would kill herself as Woolf had; did not see depression as the core of my mother’s life as it was the core of Woolf ’s and her mother’s;
did not realize that I, too, would ﬁght depression; did not see that we were both
abuse survivors. And that I would learn, through studying her, the redemptive and
healing power of writing. (11)

The reciprocal and layered process of discovery depends on such identiﬁcation, conscious and unconscious.
In anthropology, Ruth Behar calls the making of such connections
between one’s life and one’s work, “vulnerable” anthropology, emphasizing,
“Vulnerability doesn’t mean that anything personal goes. The exposure of
the self who is also a spectator has to take us somewhere we couldn’t otherwise get to. It has to be essential to the argument, not a decorative flourish,
not exposure for its own sake” (14). In this era, she argues, “we need other
forms of criticism, which are rigorous yet not disinterested; forms of criticism which are not immune to catharsis; forms of criticism which can
respond vulnerably, in ways we must begin to try to imagine” (175). Laurie
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Stone, author of Close to the Bone: Memoirs of Hurt, Rage, and Desire, offers a
similar view of what makes memoirs “literary” or successful instances of cultural autobiography:
[Their authors] are vulnerable on the page, digging at their actions and emotions. . . .
They are interested in their layers, their ambivalences, their irresolvably mixed feelings. . . . All the rage, self-pity, and self-importance have been spent. . . . What’s left is a
voice that may once have told its story as a weeper but now knows, ineluctably, it is
threaded with comedy. (B9)

Student work increasingly too exhibits this wonderful layering. Moreover,
students writing for self-analysis and self-help have usually begun this process
and the making of the literary before we meet in the literature classroom. They
merely extend it in the presence of contemporary narratives that serve as models of thought and expression. I teach with the expectation, now, that difﬁcult
themes will emerge sometime in the semester, in reading, perhaps discussion,
often in conferences. But I’d rather have them emerge in the writing than in conference alone.
For those students for whom or for those topics for which writing personally is not a welcome possibility, students and syllabi offer other strategies—
such as visual narratives—for relating course materials, the class, to life.
Projects have included painted and dyed triptychs, a quilt of the bedding that
dates back to early scenes of incest, photographs of a consoling and invigorating network of wooded trails. Other students, working in community-based
programs, have helped men and women to read or to prevent or deal with sexual harassment or sexual abuse. Still others read to local children in schools
and daycare centers, offering children more of the literary solace on which they
remember having so depended. These are academically legitimate narrative
interventions as well, especially when they are further described in term-end
journal entries or classroom presentations consisting of personal stories and
visual aids.
Newkirk sensibly insists that:
writing situations can be therapeutic precisely because we [teachers] don’t act as
therapists . . . In fact, the therapeutic power of such writing may be the experience of
having it treated as “normal”—that is, writing that can be responded to, critiqued,
even graded. Writing may have healing power because it represents a third part of
the relationship; it is an artifact, a construction, a relatively stable representation of
experience. (19)10

The text and the writing are stays against confusion. Writing about Ann
Petry’s short story “In Darkness and Confusion,” a graduate student in
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“Autobiographical Scholarship” addressed her new understanding of the riot at
the center of that story, moments of intense rage in her own life, and the central role of literature in life:
I know that rage destroys both its object and its host, and I have used the study of
rage in literature to prevent my own hatred from destroying me. It is not a coincidence that I was depressed for months before that night when I attacked my father,
nor is it a coincidence that William [from the story] was stiﬂed in his dismal
surroundings. . . . After encountering rage within this story I realized that it was possible to discover literature that deals directly with my own problems and concerns. . . .
This threefold nature of literature is essential to an understanding that human emotions and the human condition are best comprehended when studied simultaneously
through individual, private, public, and artistic means. If I had not discovered that literature can be therapeutic, my own pain and anguish would have remained buried
within me and would have boiled to rage again sometime in the future, just as my
inability to speak initially brought upon my rage. (my italics)

After teaching the graduate seminar, I developed an undergraduate seminar, “Poems and Essays that Matter.” This course acknowledges student wariness and concern about the use(s) of literature from the beginning. The course
description, which begins with an epigraph by contemporary New York poet
Sharon Olds, follows:
English Major Seminar: Poems and Essays that Matter
For twenty years I’ve lived in New York City on a block with two “heroin
hotels”—a lot of middle-of-the-night screaming, cop cars, loud radios, and over
the years occasional singing, laughter, and gunshots. So I’m often hearing sounds
of suffering, and seeing its signs. Deep down, I have a fear that poetry is useless, I
guess I mean my poetry is useless, a self-indulgent activity—that it’s obvious I
should, instead, be holding infants in a hospital orphanage, or working at a good
kitchen for the homeless. Other times I feel extremely lucky to be able to spend
time on what I adore doing and need to do. But it’s obvious that a worker at a shelter for battered woman, or a tutor in a ghetto, is a more useful member of society.
And yet my wild hope is that poetry somehow, secretly, matters as much as
anything.
Sharon Olds
With opportunity for student input, but with an emphasis on recent U.S. women
writers, this course will focus on poets and essayists of political, personal, formal
(stylistic), or local importance to course participants. Students will work on their
own poems and essays that matter as they consider—as subject matter, inspiration,
and models of good writing—poems and/or essays by Adrienne Rich, Patricia
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Williams, June Jordan, Annie Dillard, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Wendell Berry, Nancy
Mairs, Alice Walker, classmates, UNH faculty members, and other suggested
activists, feminists, ecocritics, and literary critics and theorists whose writing moves
us. There will also be guest visits by UNH faculty members; student-led discussions;
outside poetry readings; special projects, ﬁeld work, or service work.
Directly or indirectly, this course may answer such questions as: Why study literature? How do we deﬁne the literary? Why write? What might we do with an English
major? (Or a Women’s Studies major or minor with an interest in writing?) What
will we choose to read and write in years to come? Where might we ﬁnd what we
want and need? What literature have we previously found inspiring, important, irresistible? Why? What might we share with friends, parents, children, and/or the larger
community? What else constitutes current issues and debates in literary studies and
its value for teachers and students and the country at large?

Three books and a packet of readings were required, though students collectively decided which readings would stay in and which go out for classroom
discussion. To these we added other student-recommended contemporary
U.S. poems and essays that fell under one or more of the three course rubrics.
Writing on poems or essays of nature and place, Erica described poems in
relation to her past depression, illuminating both:
It seems as though that whole time was Frost’s “Desert Places.” I had always loved
the soft “s” sounds, thinking of them as replicating fallen snow. But now I understood the last lines, “I have it in me so much nearer home/To scare myself with my
own desert places.” I also understood why Frost’s woods are “lovely, dark, and deep.”

Helped by a second look at the literature and by others’ personal-literary
essays, Erica identiﬁed and communicated to others her situation and that of
the poems, understanding them both more than she might have previously.
Lana, who made a quilt of her childhood blankets, was also able to write
“Deconstructing the Bed,” emulating and empowered by course reading. She
explained:
My bed is a metaphor for my disease. My dis-ease is the covering over of painful
memories. Each night, I slide into bed between sheets that are as old as I, and a pile
of blankets I’ve been collecting since those sheets were purchased. They are meant
to cover something huge, something unbearable, something so ugly it must be concealed. In my bed, I suffocate under my own attempts to heal, which are really only
attempts to avoid naming an unutterable thing—the abuse I suffered at the hands
of my father from the time I was three to the year of my parents’ divorce, abuse that
is best described by the following poem, based on Joy Harjo’s poem “I Give You
Back”11:
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I BRING YOU FORTH

I deliver you, my lustful and vengeful
child. I deliver you. You will be the symbol
of muted words, brought forth in a scream of
pointed blame.
...
I bring you forth to the naked children
who were made ugly and seductive creatures
by ignorant fathers, and voiceless mothers.
...
[The bed] is on a pedestal, it is a sacred space, and yet it is a detestable thing,
a corner of the room blazing in lust and blood and ﬁre, and all the things
from which we are taught to avert our eyes. . . . I’ve been covering a scar with
gobs of makeup which have made their own mess.
...
Somewhere beneath
this expression
I am not afraid.

Lana detailed the inﬂuence of Harjo and of autobiographical scholarship
on her work, sharing her foreword and her mixed-genre autobiography in the
seminar as well as at a year-end departmental conference, by which time the
piece had become part of a portfolio, creative and research-based, that constituted a senior honors thesis.
Like several students in classes taught by Karen Paley, several of my students
turned their private or hybrid discourses into public documents or presentations. Paley reports that one student wrote an essay regarding campus security
at another university in the form of a written complaint; she mailed the letter
to ofﬁcials there. Paley herself published an essay about how one student’s
experience of harassment became the subject of a class, and the letters classmates wrote became public documents in the struggle against racism on her
campus.12 Some students had essays accepted in the campus publication Fresh
Ink, a juried collection of freshman essays passed on to the next year’s freshman. Some are even reprinted in the college’s alumni magazine, circulation
130,000 (35). Paley notes too that three essays from her advanced writing seminar are being considered for publication in that magazine, and they are all
ﬁrst-person narratives (whose topics speak to outsiders and well as community members: drinking, losing grandparents, a visit to Auschwitz). She concludes, “When such essays emerge from the process writing classroom into
more public domains, the discourse is not as contained as [some detractors]
claim [personal writing] is” (35).
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For another of my undergraduates, writing was at times a substitute for complete (which, to her, meant oral) disclosure, and she was not yet ready to have her
academic work in classes outside the seminar be joined with this special kind of
writing: “Writing is my chance to say what I can never say in real life. I have all
these thoughts and ideas in my head that are never expressed verbally, so I have
to write them. Otherwise I might go crazy.” But this very private sentiment was
one shared during peer-critique sessions in the seminar—as if to disturb again
the false or provisional line between inside and outside, private and public.
Other students also might not have made a formal presentation of their
personal or hybrid personal work or published their work, but at term end
they made their essays available to classmates through the library Reserve
Desk. They claimed to ﬁnd the class assignments good practice for reading and
writing sensitively in other contexts, and they linked even their practice work
to professional writers and writing. Marianne reported:
This is what I try to accomplish with my personal writing. It is not very productive
in the sense that there is no real goal. I don’t know where I am going with it. I have
not written a complete, ﬁnished poem or a complete work of short ﬁction since I
was a little kid. . . . My writing is what Natalie Goldberg would call practice. I like to
think of it as an exploration of myself.

Chris found words to name her writerly version of Du Bois’ double consciousness:
I am a writer with two voices. But I am now more aware and appreciative of both
voices. After reading Farrell’s and Frey’s pieces, I now recognize the difference
between my “male” and “female” modes, my “direct” and “indirect” voices. Both
have their advantages and disadvantages. Both play important roles in my life, professional or personal. Perhaps with my new awareness, I will be able to enjoy both
styles more and exploit better the advantages of both.

Chris moves back and forth between modes and genres, a versatility I
encourage in even the most autobiographically inclined students, and this
dynamic is both socially potent and socially dependent. It is in the company of
others’ stories and voices that we acquire the skills we need—creative, stylistic,
interpretive, attitudinal—to make writing matter in life and school.
Kelly writes in several places about the pedagogical and healing effects of
inter-animated, facilitative narratives, taking off, again, from an observation of
Farrell’s, when she states:
I suspect that the female mode can be learned but cannot be taught. Is faith something that can be learned but cannot be taught? Is high school writing? Would my
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friend’s comment about fellowship in suffering have meant anything to me at all if I
was not learning something about pain and suffering for myself? [She was ill while
her friend had lost her husband to cancer.] Is that what teaching is—what learning is?
Making things be or bringing things to such a personal level that the student feels or
begins to feel some connection with what I’m saying? How do I do that? Then I
thought about the difference between learning something and being taught.
I’m left-handed and have always wanted to learn to crochet, but I’ve only ever
known women for some reason who were right-handed and said they couldn’t teach
me. Then, just recently, I had two different right-handed friends attempt to show me
the process. With one, I was taught. With the other, I learned. . . . [Patty showed her
an old-fashioned handout, while Lynn told her that her left-handed grandmother
had taught her to crochet by sitting across from her and providing a mirror-image
for her to see. ]
So what was the difference? Both friends wanted to teach me, both were sincere,
but when I sat next to Patty and watched her show me the stitches, I could think
only of my inept hands and her nimble ﬁngers. When I sat across from Lynn, I listened to her story.

What students need to know and how can often be found in everyday, “personal,” language and spaces, classroom or kitchen. Kelly, whose father cannot
read, taught the next semester in a local elementary school and compiled a
scrapbook of poems about the experience. Then she served as a literacy volunteer, was nominated for a student service award, and is currently completing
her education while teaching literacy and literature in a local prison. She
argues that being able to write personally and analytically gives her a combined
sense of herself as writer, editor, teacher, and scholar.
Models and open-ended assignments, careful editing, and peer review
move students toward what Behar and Stone and other academics and general readers prefer. Others might object that the domestic spaces explored
are too dangerous—or dull. But these are strong students, supported by
strong texts. Four from the undergraduate seminar subsequently completed
undergraduate theses and supported one another in a writing group. Two of
the graduate students wrote personal M.A. theses. Against the worry that
these writings are sub-standard or non-standard, one might counter that
“vulnerable” or personally-inflected writings are becomingly increasingly
numerous and well respected, and few classroom papers are or ought to be
published, even the objective, unemotional ones. Either there will be time,
there will be time, for decisions or indecisions, before the taking of a toast
and tea, or, once off to graduate school or teaching or business writing, our
students will continue to balance anew the personal and professional, private and communal. Two of the undergraduates are already enrolled in
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graduate programs welcoming their creative criticism, and several more
continue their service work reading to children and helping them improve
their reading and writing.
“In telling what feels like one’s own unique story based in childhood
trauma, the writer can be propelled into producing a highly political narrative,” Paley asserts. She quotes Bonnie Sunstein and Elizabeth ChiseriStrater approvingly: “To understand someone’s culture, we often to
understand the person’s family, too. Through the individual we come to
understand the culture, and through the culture we come to understand the
individual” (206; qtd. in Paley 2). The personal is inevitably shot through
with the social.
Norman Holland speaks of “another kind of productivity” than the conventionally academic: “the writing of things that are pleasures to read,”
adding, “How do you evaluate a personal essay? You evaluate it as you would
evaluate any essay” (1147). In answer to the question, “Why now?” He
suggests:
Could it be that a growing number of academic critics are realizing that academic
writing about literature or “culture” has lost political support by cutting itself loose
from the concerns of ordinary people? There in the back of the bus are some nonacademics who might just support the NEH, the NEA, tenure, or better salaries for
teachers—if they could ﬁgure out how our essays matter. In this harsh time, could we
be returning to the battle cry of another harsh time, the sixties? To relevance? (1147)

I shall close by quoting another undergraduate student’s recent testimony.
Domenica Gorini writes of the relevance of Alice Walker’s words in “Saving the
Life That Is Your Own.” She echoes and enhances our understanding of not
only Alice Walker’s words but of “personal” writing:
Walker ends her essay by stating, “It is, in the end, the saving of lives that writers
are about” (14). Writing has saved my life, given me a sense of accomplishment—
writing has allowed me to sleep at night by giving me a way to deal with the world
around me that seems too complex and harsh at times. Reading authors like Walker
has also saved my life, by opening the door to worlds I would have never known,
feeling and ideas I thought I bore alone, as well as providing hope for a better world,
but most of all, a better me. . . . To be a writer is to be an investigator, one who is
willing to search for what is being longed for or answers to endless questions. . . .
Writing has permitted me to “inquire further” (as in Anne Sexton’s poem for
John Holmes) into what might be viewed as shameful or crazy. Writing has helped
me understand my human experience as a white, middle-class American, a young
woman facing adulthood, an Italian, a Catholic, a feminist, . . . environmental
activist, and seeker of joy.
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I wish to extend my thanks to the many persons whose work and support
have helped me in the completion of this essay and motivated my teaching,
among them David Bleich, Karen Paley, Rachel Trubowitz, Brenda Daly,
Martha Stoddard Holmes, Paula Salvio, Laura Duhan Kaplan, and other
writers cited, my students in English 697 and English 935, and Brian and
Abraham McWilliams.
Here I agree with Karen Paley’s critique of Susan Miller’s claims in Textual
Carnivals about the classroom community of the beginning student (Paley
34).
See, for example, Bleich, Subjective Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP,
1978) and Know and Tell: A Writing Pedagogy of Disclosure, Genre, and
Membership (Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Cook/Heinemann, 1998); Holland,
“Transactive Teaching: Cordelia’s Death,” College English 39 (Nov. 1977):
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1146–47; Rosenblatt, Literature as Exploration (New York: Appleton-Century,
1938; MLA, 1976); Moran, “Teaching Writing/Teaching Literature,” CCC 46
(Dec. 1984): 756–66; Petrosky, “From Story to Essay: Reading and Writing,”
CCC 33 (1982): 19-35; Hoffman, “Reading Women’s Poetry: The Meaning of
Our Lives,” College English 34 (1972): 48–62; Kennard, “Personally Speaking:
Feminist Critics and the Community of Readers,” College English 43.2 (Feb.
1981): 140–45; Juhasz, “The Critic as Feminist: Reﬂections on Women’s
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113–27; Schweickart, “Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist Theory of
Reading,” Gender and Reading, ed. Schweickart and Flynn (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins UP, 1986) 31–62; Tompkins, “Me and My Shadow,” The Intimate
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“Criticism and Feelings,” College English 39.2 (Oct. 1987): 169–78.
Debra Nitsche-Shaw, citing Ernest Boyer, in her New England College
Service-Learning Guidebook (Fall 1997) 1.
For fuller deﬁnitions and examples, see Diane P. Freedman et al., eds., The
Intimate Critique: Autobiographical Literary Criticism (Durham, NC: Duke,
1993); Nancy Owen Nelson, ed. Private Voices, Public Lives (Denton: U N
Texas P, 1995); Judith P. Hallett and Thomas Van Nortwick, eds.,
Compromising Traditions: The Personal Voice in Classical Scholarship (New
York: Routledge, 1997); and H. Aram Veeser, ed. Confessions of the Critics
(New York: Routledge, 1996).
See Sidney, “An Apology for Poetry” (1595); DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk
(1903); Whitman, Preface to 1855 Leaves of Grass; Olson, “Projective Verse,”
Poetry New York 3 (1950); Geertz, “Blurred Genres,” Local Knowledge: Further
Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic, 1983) 19-35; Clifford,
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Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Berkeley: U
California P, 1986); and Rosaldo, “Grief and the Headhunter’s Rage,” Culture
and Truth: Renewing the Anthropologist’s Search for Meaning (Boston:
Beacon, 1989).
See, for example, Murray, Write to Learn (Fort Worth, Texas: Holt, Rinehart,
Winston, 1989); Elbow, Writing Without Teachers (New York: Oxford UP,
1973); Newkirk, The Performance of Self in Student Writing; Tobin, Writing
Relationships (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann/Boynton- Cook, 1993);
Haroian-Guerin, ed. The Personal Narrative: Writing Ourselves as Teachers
and Scholars (Portland, ME: Calendar Island, 1999); Steig, Stories of Reading:
Subjectivity and Literary Understanding (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1989);
DeSalvo, Vertigo: A Memoir (New York: Penguin/Dutton, 1996); Cliff, “A
Journey into Speech,” rpt. in Multicultural Literacy, ed. Rick Simonson and
Scott Walker (St. Paul: Graywolf, 1988) 57–81; Tompkins, “Me and My
Shadow,” rpt. in The Intimate Critique: Autobiographical Literary Criticism,
ed. Diane P. Freedman et al (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1993) 23–40; Daly,
Authoring a Life (Albany, New York: SUNY P, 1998); Slovic, Seeking Awareness
in American Nature Writing (Salt Lake City: U of Utah P, 1992); and Marshall,
Story Line: Exploring the Literature of the Appalachian Trail (Charlottesville:
UP of Virginia, 1998).
These are traditional attributes of good, traditional literary criticism. For a
fuller discussion, see Frances Murphy Zauhar, “Creative Voices: Women’s
Reading and Women’s Writing,” in Freedman et al. 103–116.
All students are identiﬁed in ways they chose to be were I to quote, with their
permission, from their work—by ﬁrst name, ﬁrst and last, or by pseudonym.
See also Tobin, Writing Relationships (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann/
Boynton/Cook, 1993), and Salvio, “Student Autobiography and the Project
of Self-Creation,” Cambridge Journal of Education 20.3 (1990), for instance.
“I Give You Back” appears in She Had Some Horses (New York: Thunder’s
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See Paley, “Writing and Rewriting Racism: From the Dorm to the Classroom
to the Dustbowl,” JAC 16.2 (June 1996): 285–296.
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Taste and Good Taste have become so separated from active human
senses, and have become so much a matter of acquiring certain habits
and rules, that Wordsworth’s attack [on them] is still relevant.
Raymond Williams

PA R T 1

Keith says he thinks Jane Austen is “naughty”; Sarah purses her lips. He draws
big gay quotation marks around the word with his gay voice, reminding the
class that nice as pie though he is he’s also naughty and knowing; she looks
demurely down through the bottoms of her bifocals, quietly amused, refusing
to meet his campily candid blue gaze. There is a sense, in the room, that the
bartender and the schoolteacher—members, this semester, of my graduate
seminar—are playing themselves to an audience of intimates, like the amateur
actors at Mansﬁeld Park. Both of them are sure they understand Jane Austen,
sure she would have understood them. Each is one of those “true admirers”
who read Jane Austen cherishing the happy thought, as Katherine Mansﬁeld
put it, “that he alone—reading between the lines—has become the secret
friend of their author” (qtd. Booth 265). For both of them, it is as if (in spite of
the notorious failures of her biographers) they know Jane Austen personally,
know—in spite of her careful, cagey obliquities—what she really thinks.
(People tend not to read Tolstoy, or even Henry James, in quite this way.)
As often in a graduate seminar, more is at stake than interpreting a text: for
the dramatic moment, lives seem to be, or at least lifestyles. Keith is about
twenty-ﬁve, with a shaved head, a leather jacket, and three graduated gold rings
in one ear; Sarah, more unusual, is over ﬁfty. Keith has been provocatively
maintaining all term that Jane Austen’s notoriously chaste novels are all about
sex, sex ﬁrst of all: sex is their “ground,” he says excitedly now, and as he interlaces his long white ﬁngers he explains it’s in everything in the novels, it can’t be
separated out, because it isn’t “just sex, by itself,” which is what’s so very good
about it, so, well, sexy. It’s clear to me that sober-suited Sarah thinks Jane Austen
is (like her) beyond sex—and so very good precisely because she transcends it.
Sarah cannot speak compellingly here as a member of a marginal group, the
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way queer Keith does; the others aren’t eager to agree with her, his party being
much more exciting; but I personally have considerable sympathy for Sarah’s
position, being closer to her age than Keith’s—also distracted by the vagrant
thought that it’s easier to come out as gay, in the late nineties, than menopausal.
But no one here is coming out, around Jane Austen of all people: Keith is
merely claiming the novelist for his party (the transgressives) as Sarah is claiming her for hers (the ironists). Appropriation is what literature students engage
in these days, illusions of objectivity having been put away. For their separate
reasons, Keith and Sarah treasure Jane Austen’s skepticism about the gendered
status quo. They share her acute sense of what’s socially appropriate in looks,
behavior, bearing, being—and the as acute sense of being themselves, personally, both more and less than what is generally expected. “Personally,” that is, in
the near-archaic sense of that word which signiﬁes the person or the body: the
aging woman, the gay man, hear their own odd inﬂections echoed in the voice
of George Austen’s not-handsome, not-rich, but extremely clever younger
daughter. Keith is correctly costumed for his role as Sarah is for hers, and just
like her in his love of decorum and the pleasures of parsing epigrams. He too
prefers the oblique, wrapped-up, and elliptical to the explicit, bald, and blatant; he ﬁnds it more sexy, as I do. That’s why they’re both here in my classroom reading between Austen’s lines instead of Blake’s or Bronte’s or Ellison’s.
Jane Austen might have called it a matter of taste—a perfect word, with its
(sexy) suggestion of talents of the tongue that tongues can’t articulate.
No theorist, the top-ranking genteel lady novelist of all time cuts a ﬁgure in
the conversation about taste that has been going on from Hume and Addison
through Wordsworth and Ruskin to Raymond Williams and Pierre Bourdieu.
She has been widely considered an avatar of taste at least since the beginning of
this century, when a representative American critic wrote ﬂatly, “The appreciation of Miss Austen has come to be one of the marks of literary taste” (qtd. in
Southam 7). In spite of the recent feminist emphasis on her professionalism,
most of her true admirers have been unable to shake the ﬁrst impression made
by her brother Henry’s inﬂuential assertion: “She became an authoress entirely
from taste and inclination. Neither the hope of fame nor proﬁt mixed with her
early motive.” (Austen V, 6) By naming “taste” and “inclination” as two different
things, Henry Austen begins to suggest the distinction and the connection
between Deﬁnition 6 of taste in The American Heritage Dictionary, “A personal
preference or liking,” and Deﬁnition 7a, “The faculty of discerning what is aesthetically excellent or appropriate.” He points, as well, to 7b,“A manner indicative
of the quality of such discernment.” Implying links between feeling, intelligence,
and manner—between the senses, the critical mind, and appearances—the
sequence of deﬁnitions might have been conceived by Jane Austen herself.
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By signing her novels “A Lady,” she lent herself to being read as an arbiter of
taste—as the proper lady who, as Mary Poovey and others have pointed out,
ruled the drawing rooms of England where propriety (along with civility, and
civilization itself) was being deﬁned. For women like the historical Jane
Austen—landless and portionless members of the gentry with tenuous tantalizing connections to the aristocracy—claiming distinction by making distinctions was a way of life. (Latter-day English professors and graduate students
may be in a somewhat analogous position: witness Keith and Sarah, both of
them working hard at low-prestige jobs, both of them tuned in to the intelligence-taste-superiority nexus, each on the qui vive to note the other one’s gaffe
or lapse.) In Jane Austen’s England, as people with new wealth and works of art
and leisure aimed to ape aristocrats, there was a question of whether true distinction was based on blood or something more ambiguous that was then
(with another nod to the body) sometimes called breeding. Clever or artistic
people could stake a claim to personal superiority on a (tasteful) display of
their taste in clothes, furnishings, feelings, personal habits, and/or in music,
drawing, and poetry. Class and its markers concern the characters in Austen’s
novels; the plots pivot on lapses of taste, and the people tend to be anxious
about how their taste measures up to the very best people’s, and to pride themselves on how it surpasses that of the vulgar. A glance at some uses of the word
in one Austen novel suggests her awareness of the range of its meanings.
Taste is sometimes fairly value-free, simply personal inclination: Lady
Russell, in Persuasion, has “little taste for wit” (P, 27); because they have similar
tastes, Admiral and Mrs. Croft are happily married. More often, taste means
good taste, a positive aspect of genteel femininity. Anne Elliott is distinguished
by “the fastidiousness of her taste” (P, 28); she has “a mind of taste and tenderness.” (P, 84) (The alliteration associates the mental faculty with the emotions,
or sensibility.) Seven years before the action the novel chronicles, Anne’s taste
overcame her tenderness when Lady Russell convinced her, against her inclination, not to marry Frederick Wentworth because the sailor was socially inappropriate for a baronet’s daughter. Taste is socially conservative, being the ability, as
Bourdieu writes, to “sense or intuit what is likely . . . to befall—and therefore to
beﬁt—an individual occupying a given position in social space.” (Bourdieu 466)
But Austen’s language characteristically registers and seems to embrace opposite meanings: taste, a mark of high civilization, is also a nearly physical feminine attribute that makes a woman attractive to men. The narrator explains that
Anne, in early youth, was “an extremely pretty girl, with gentleness, modesty,
taste, and feeling,” perfectly suited to match the dashing Wentworth, whose
more masculine attributes are “intelligence, spirit, and brilliancy.” (P, 26)
Elsewhere taste is not gendered but simply sexed: back on shore years later,
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Wentworth is described as “ready to fall in love with all the speed which a clear
head and quick taste could allow” (P, 61). Taste sexily mediates between the
poles of maleness and femaleness as the less than masculine Captain Benwick,
who has “considerable taste in reading,” inﬂuences bumptious Louisa Musgrove
to develop into “a person of literary taste, and sentimental reﬂection” (P, 167).
Literary taste, in Jane Austen’s novels, is a sure sign of sensibility, a quality of
mind and heart that can be excessive and debilitating but is also civilizing. Her
reading heroines are the ones whose color changes most often, Marianne
Dashwood and Fanny Price. (Jane Austen always lays snares for would-be generalizers: bookish Mary Bennet, who recites by rote from the readings assigned
to girls, lacks both tact and taste.) The aesthetic faculty seems to be socially
benign, but it can nourish a preference for luxury and excessive pride in the
distinctive, distinguishing signs of membership in the upper class. This is true
in the case of Anne’s snobbish father and older sister, whose desire to “reduce
their expenditure, without involving the loss of any indulgence of taste or
pride” (P, 10) motivates their move to Bath. Too-fastidious taste can produce
those overly nice distinctions that embarrass even devotees of Jane Austen.
Comparing Mrs. Musgrove’s tolerance for domestic noise to Lady Russell’s for
the street noise of Bath, the narrator disdains both: “Every body has their taste
in noises as well as in other matters; and sounds are quite innoxious, or most
distressing, by their sort rather than their quantity.” (P, 135) The show of distaste for noise of all kinds—the implicit boast of delicate, distinguishing, and
therefore distinguished superior ears—is nearly offensive. Worse yet, good
taste borders on bad in the scene where Anne and Wentworth try not to laugh
at fat Mrs. Musgrove weeping over the death, years ago, of her son: the hardhearted attack on maternal feeling distresses many twentieth-century readers.
“Personal size and mental sorrow have certainly no necessary proportions,” the
narrator elegantly and wickedly intones. “A large bulky ﬁgure has as good a
right to be in deep afﬂiction, as the most graceful set of limbs in the world.
But, fair or not fair, there are unbecoming conjunctions, which reason will
patronize in vain—which taste cannot tolerate—which ridicule will seize.” (P,
68) We have come full circle: far from taming and civilizing unruly individualizing passions, taste here leads to an anarchic giggle that threatens mannerly
self-control. Tellingly, it is a response to a body.
Wordsworth worried whether taste was active or passive; Jane Austen’s critics
attack her for being conservative, judgmental, coercive. “Taste classiﬁes, and it
classiﬁes the classiﬁer,” writes Bourdieu (6). Jane Austen’s novels are fun for graduate students to analyze; developing a taste for them, one develops a taste for
making distinctions, and a more developed taste for distinction itself. Austen’s
distinguished prose may make the students in my seminar ﬁnd less complex and
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nuanced texts too boring and bland; by over-reﬁning their taste, it may even
make them unﬁt for ordinary writing, noise, behavior, society. What price reﬁnement? We don’t ask; we take the risk. Talking about Persuasion and manners and
language and what Keith calls sex, which is to say ourselves, we are having a very
good time—in spite of the fact that graduate students today are in no position to
linger over what suits their taste and inclination, or to write without the hope of
fame or proﬁt. Seminars like mine have no clear, direct relation to the academic
work of teaching composition or literary history, or publishing scholarly papers
that spell out meanings (we enjoy the process of teasing them out). Would Keith
and Sarah and the rest be better off doing—and reading—something else? Are
we, in this seminar, open to the charge of escapism that is so often leveled against
amateur readers of Jane Austen’s novels? Am I wasting their time?
Could be. The most successful of my students will write persuasive papers
that consider Jane Austen’s relation to the jurists and journalists and poets and
playwrights of her time, and/or to the theorists of ours—some of whose language is (if for different reasons) as dense and demanding as hers. Will they be
betraying their personal stake in interpretation, their giddy, charged excitement
about tiny shifts and slippages of meaning? And what of the others who are
unable to stake out territory of their own in the well-tilled terrain of Austen
studies? Will they be equipped to move over—as one is encouraged to do,
now—to the less interesting language of Mary Robinson and Charlotte Smith?
PA R T 2

[T]he question is . . . not only how to understand and with what to
connect Austen’s morality and its social basis, but what to read of it.
Edward W. Said

People read and study what other people have written in order to situate
themselves among others, to gauge and locate and deﬁne more precisely their
own feelings and experiences, some say their humanity. (“I’m back in school
only to ﬁnd out who I am,” a student conﬁded recently, as if no one had said that
before.) It is not a matter of being narcissistic or solipsistic or simply selfinvolved. To put ideas and feelings into language is to put them into a shared
social world; to see how the best writers deploy words is to learn what can be
expressed. When high school seniors argue about why Hamlet dilly-dallies, their
own fears about taking action are discernible in the things they say. Some readers
are turned on by ﬁnding that in its very difference and distance, formality and
dignity, Shakespeare’s dialogue or Jane Austen’s speaks to (and about) them; others prefer the writing of a lyric poet or a contemporary memoirist who is more
concerned with the solitary self. But no matter what text you talk about in an
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English class, a teacher always aims for personal reactions: it’s a sign you have
sold the book. And in the process of exchanging responses to a book everyone
has a chance to discover something new.
I was initially annoyed by the sweet young undergraduate who smugly
argued, in one of the ﬁrst classes I ever taught, that Jane not Elizabeth Bennet
was her favorite character and the heroine of Pride and Prejudice, being prettier
and nicer than her sister. I despaired of a reader so blind to the shape of the
book. But Linda’s discomfort with Elizabeth’s wit (and perhaps with mine)
ended by taking the class in a useful direction. The same sort of thing happened
in another class, when John, also an undergraduate, startled me by arguing the
novel was really about Mr. Darcy, who had nothing on his mind but relationships and arranged everyone’s lives in the end. Linda couldn’t see herself in
Elizabeth; John, brought up to believe that men went to work while women were
in charge of family life, envied Darcy’s leisure as well as his power. Decades later,
I remember their distortions of the novel, which led me to tell the class about
Austen’s condemnation of most (pretty, nice) novel heroines, and her admiration of Richardson’s Sir Charles Grandison, a novel about a heroically domestic
man. My students’ misreadings taught me something. But mostly clearly, I recall
the drama of their charged, barely articulated discoveries about themselves.
Teaching Mansﬁeld Park to undergraduates in Brooklyn, one semester in
the early eighties, I was forced by my students to look harder than I ever had
before at a minor moment in the plot—Edmund Bertram’s response to his sister Maria’s engagement to Mr. Rushworth. “Edmund was the only one of the
family who could see a fault in the business,” Jane Austen writes apropos of
Maria’s having closed the marital deal in her father’s absence; “but no representation of his aunt’s could induce him to ﬁnd Mr. Rushworth a desirable
companion. He could allow his sister to be the best judge of her own happiness, but he was not pleased that her happiness should centre in a large
income; nor could he refrain from often saying to himself, in Mr. Rushworth’s
company, ‘If this man had not twelve thousand a year, he would be a very stupid fellow.’” (MP, 40) The punch line, for most readers, makes you forget what
goes before. But Teresa, the cleverest young woman in my class, wanted to talk
more about what she called Edmund’s self-absorption and his passive complicity: taking up what had seemed to me a marginal point, she insisted that he
should have intervened and told his sister what he thought of her ﬁance.
Popular magazine articles about “co-dependency” were in the background of
her indictment of the hero who Jane Austen is said to have admired above all
her others (except Mr. Knightley); still, Teresa was feisty, ﬁery, and eloquent.
Her passion provoked tall, taciturn Steve to rise to the defense, not exactly of
Edmund but of Rushworth. Maria, he insisted, should be allowed to marry as
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she chose. As the debate heated up uncomfortably, pitting the rights of stupid
people against the responsibilities of those who can identify them as such, I
tried to change the subject and bring the conversation round to what then
seemed to me an important theme of the novel. I pointed out that when Sir
Thomas Bertram comes back home and meets Mr. Rushworth, he takes it for
granted that Maria is marrying for money, complacently telling himself she
doesn’t have “strong feelings,” which is Jane-Austen for sexual ones. Tender
Fanny Price, I observed, who blushes easily and refuses to give up her tenacious
love for Edmund, does have strong sexual feelings—of a different quality than
those of Maria, who ﬂirts adulterously with Henry Crawford while she’s
engaged, and runs off with him after marrying Rushworth.
But my students were less interested in distinctions among forms of female
desire, which is what my fellow feminist literary critics were talking about in
the eighties, than in the morality of marrying for money’s sake and matrimony’s, which is openly discussed in every Austen novel as desire is not. There
were two reasons for this: ﬁrst, they were unsophisticated readers, better at
noticing the said than the unspoken; and secondly, Brooklyn in the eighties, as
regards what was said and left unsaid, was just like Hampshire in Jane Austen’s
day. These young people could no more talk about than during sex, for them a
furtive, rebellious, ecstatic, or drunken release from consciousness into the
purely physical. On the other hand, they did have a lot to say about marriage
and money. I let them say it. As the conversation raged it became clear that
there was a personal matter at stake. To my surprise but nobody else’s, Steve
ﬁnally admitted to the group that his own sister had just gotten engaged to a
rich man, a nice guy but nothing special, and that while he personally didn’t
think she really loved him he also didn’t think there was anything wrong with
her marrying money and having a big diamond to show for it. Teresa indignantly insisted that Steve was morally obliged to ask his sister to think about
whether she really loved the man; he maintained that it wasn’t his business any
more than it had been Edmund’s. But he left the room dropping a remark
about maybe having a little talk with his sister that evening.
On my way home on the subway, I thought about how good the class had
been and how close, in spite of everything, the discussion had come to the
important themes of Mansﬁeld Park. We had begun to consider the theme of
permissible and impermissible intimacies, which is ﬁrst broached when Sir
Thomas Bertram meditates darkly about “cousins in love.” We had come close
to the theme of exogamy versus the countervailing pull of the familiar and
familial; and we had dealt with the theme of the responsibility of brothers and
sisters for one another, and raised the question of whether we are not all brothers and sisters. (Critics would develop these themes in interesting ways in the
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next several decades.) I congratulated myself on orchestrating the interaction,
around common concerns, of ethnically diverse people (Teresa was Hispanic,
Steve Jewish) who ordinarily wouldn’t meet or talk like that, outside the classroom. Basking in rather presumptuous contentment, I thought about how literature (and English classes) could alter lives for the better (Steve would ﬁnally
talk to his sister). But I was under no illusion that I’d created lasting enthusiasm
for Jane Austen’s novels. Maybe Teresa, who was in the throes of a long engagement, would develop a taste for canonical literature—which might alienate her
from the sweetheart she’d been going with since high school. All the others
would leave at the end of the semester with perhaps a tiny bit of cultural capital
they could conceivably parlay into cash and nice things—big diamonds, maybe,
that were not in the best taste. Reading and discussing Jane Austen was no more
likely to advance these students in life than to radicalize them.
On the other hand, it might begin to make them look harder at words and
people, and to talk more together about what matters. Our discussion of
Mansﬁeld Park had led to an exchange on a deeper-than-ordinary level; analyzing the motives of Jane Austen’s characters had led the students to talk to one
another more directly, more seriously, passionately, personally, than they habitually did. Real talk doesn’t happen among most friends and families; in most people’s lives today, there is a dearth of what Anne Elliott, in Persuasion, calls “good
company, the company of clever, well-informed people, who have a great deal of
conversation.” (Even in Jane Austen’s time that was hard to ﬁnd: Mr. Elliott—
ironically, the villain of the piece—corrects Anne, saying “that is not good company, that is the best” (P, 150). People in the habit of exchanging banalities ﬁnd
few occasions to exchange more than that, and less and less need, perhaps, to do
so. In the temporary community of a classroom, or in an informally organized
reading group, we enact the phenomenon that so interested Jane Austen, the play
of language generated by the differences and similarities among very different
individuals. It is pleasurable, human, even socially useful to weigh one’s own perceptions against other people’s, to gauge the difference between what can be said
and what must remain unspoken, to notice how much good writers can manage
to say by focusing on some things and leaving some things unsaid.
PA R T 3

[T]he most crucial lesson in composition; namely, that what makes a
narrative good is not the story itself but what follows what.
Joseph Brodsky

Jane Austen herself went to school for barely a couple of years. But the
schoolgirl habit of ganging up and giggling at the duller kids can be traced
through not only the Juvenilia but also her mature works: it fairly sends you
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back to ﬁfth grade. Consider, for instance, this exchange between his favorite
daughter and Mr. Bennet, over Mr. Collins’s fatuous and over-written letter:
“Can he be a sensible man, sir?”
“No, my dear; I think not. I have great hopes of ﬁnding him quite the reverse.”
(PP, 64)

Many latter-day readers feel constrained to condemn Jane Austen’s linguistic
(therefore social) elitism: Geoffrey is one of them. He was a quiet member of the
graduate seminar that starred Sarah and Keith, and he has come to my ofﬁce
now to pick up a letter of recommendation. Irrelevantly, I recall the pain that
crossed his sensitive face when he observed that Jane Austen made it impossible
for people like Lucy Steele—narrow-minded, grasping, and ungrammatical people, that is—to read Sense and Sensibility. (Lucy would not be able to pick up the
book, he complained; but can anyone who does pick it up see herself in Lucy?)
Committed to the belief that anyone can be educated and improved, Geoffrey is
a dedicated teacher of composition. Jane Austen is way off his screen, now: in the
three institutions that employ him, only regular, full-time faculty members have
the privilege of teaching the great literature of the past. No problem, he tells me:
he likes teaching comp. The son of a tax lawyer, he has decided to take his
chances in an uncertain profession; not only does he love to read and write, but
for him (he says it without pomposity) teaching is a vocation. He protests that
his taste runs to torn sweaters, rice and beans, and free music on public radio—
but he does get huffy when colleagues with tenure condescend.
As he prepares to interview for a full-time job that would give him three
sections of composition per semester, Geoffrey cheers himself up by reviewing
his best moments in the classroom.
“I always teach only one thing,” he tells me. “I try to show them how to
make an argument; sometimes it works, sometimes not. I remember a student
I had once—I can’t believe I forgot her name—who got it straight off. ‘You
have too many ideas in this paragraph,’ I told her, ‘you need to choose one of
them, and have the conﬁdence to develop it.’ I explained that throwing out so
many ideas was a sign of lack of conﬁdence, and she got it right away and I
knew right away that she got it. In the next paper she did exactly what I told
her to do, and she was all right from then on. Other times, you say exactly the
same thing and it doesn’t work, they don’t understand what you’re saying, they
come in and they say, ‘But you told me to do it this way, and I did, and now
you’re telling me it’s wrong.’ I can’t believe I can’t remember her name.”
She might not be able to remember his name either, but their connection for a
critical moment had been real, close, intimate, personal. Something made it possible for him to move in past her paragraph to her sense of self; something made
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her feel recognized rather than threatened, and able to build self-conﬁdence on
what she might have heard from someone else as damningly faint praise (so
many ideas!). Was the exchange charged by an erotic element? I wouldn’t know.
But I’m not sure that he or she would be able, either, to list the factors that contributed to their momentary perfect understanding: the weather or a recent
encounter, successful or not, with someone else; a quality of voice or expression;
the hole in his sweater; the paint on the wall; the subject she had so many ideas
about; a certain slant of light. My point is that in the process of teaching composition, especially if you teach it well, you often get personal. (An ancillary point:
this work is vital, and people like Geoffrey should be paid well for doing it.)
But I am being disingenuous: “personal criticism” as the phrase is used in
academic parlance today is something quite speciﬁc and particular. Usually,
the term refers to books and essays by literature professors who acknowledge
or explore their own subjectivity, sometimes as a point of departure but sometimes, especially when the critic is well-known, as the subject itself, more or
less shocking, revealing, and/or accessible. The cultural sources of this kind of
writing are multiple and various. One, surely, is seventies feminism and its
central insight that the personal is the political, which gave women—and then
men—permission to make the private life public, to ﬁnd pleasure and perhaps
empowerment in sharing once unspeakable experiences. Literary or literate
feminism by the way created new kinds of marketable literary products
charged with sexual interest: Everywoman’s life, in newly explicit detail, went
public and found readers. From another angle, writing about the literary-critical self was encouraged by very different groups of scholars, who analyzed
readerly practices and responses, or critical canons and approaches, or the history and politics of English studies. When they emerged, identity politics and
queer theory nourished writers who spoke “as” or “for” different groups, and
others (sometimes they were the same people) who were moved to confess
they hated theory and jargon. The simple human interest that professors, like
everyone else, have in their own lives and words was encouraged by their
admiring, envious, prurient students, and by the media’s embrace of some
lucky academic stars, whose colleagues also aspired to cross over. Meanwhile,
of course, off and on campuses, everyone was affected by confessional talk
shows, the vogue for biographies of literary ﬁgures, politically motivated
searches for sexual scandal, and the general tendency to let it all, sex especially,
hang out. Forty years ago, no one dared talk about the erotics of reading Jane
Austen in the manner of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick or my student Keith or
Richard Jenkyns, who wrote wonderfully in The New Republic, about her
enduring popularity, that “she has possibly given pleasure to more men in bed
than any woman in history” (Jenkyns 33).
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But bringing personal matters and personal feelings into the literature
classroom is not new; neither is questioning the hierarchical relation between
digniﬁed professor and respectful student. Gossip has always been a staple of
English departments, whose members after all have read Jane Austen.
Graduate students have been calling even the professors they aren’t sleeping
with by their ﬁrst names since the mid-seventies—those heady years of student-faculty interaction when one man in my department regularly spent his
ﬁrst class walking around the room with his composition students, encouraging them to bump gently into one another and him, before sitting them down
in a circle to discuss the experience, and write about it from their different
points of view. Freshmen have been encouraged to write “personal experience
papers” for decades, at least since the early sixties, when I started teaching—
accounts of their summer vacations, descriptions of their relatives and their
rooms, or responses to the ingenious essay topic that a colleague of mine
devised, “How it Feels to be a Neat Child in a Sloppy Family,” or an otherwise X
child in a Y one.
What’s somewhat new, perhaps, is the creation of a genre of professorial
self-revelation, and the emphasis on performing selves rather than the earnest
authentic one that was in vogue twenty years ago. Performing in their classrooms, on the page, even on the screen, teachers and critics stage a relation to
other people. No matter how distanced or abstracted, whether or not it makes
an outright claim to be representative of a group, this politicized self demands
more than merely personal attention. Nevertheless it rests its claim to attention
on the personal: the assumption of real intimacy, the insistence on a gendered,
sexed, racialized self, the in-your-face physical body.
Personal criticism also appeals to writers whose impulse is not only or not
exactly confessional—people with a taste for the revealing anecdote told
almost, if not quite, for its own sake. Often offered in the ﬁrst person, such an
anecdote is not necessarily, not strictly, derived from a meaningful personal
experience. It might be, rather, a story in search of a meaning, an insight, an
irony, a perception, a connection that eludes ﬂat-out, ﬂat-footed exposition.
Academics of my generation, especially those of us who “work on” ﬁction, are
drawn to such anecdotes. In the late ﬁfties, when I was in college, my friends
and I made jokes about the existentialist at the local hang-out who explained
he was an actor not a waiter, and for that reason slow in bringing the ketchup.
Me, personally, I’m a novelist not a theorist. It’s a matter of style and taste, for
which as we all know there’s no accounting. I write what has been called personal criticism because I’m most moved to say something by an incident that
seems to me somehow telling, because I tend to reach for an anecdote when I
think I have something to say.
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The writing game is partly, crucially, a matter of deciding how much of
your hand—of your self?—you want to show. Reading, we imagine ourselves
to be intimate with other, real or imagined, people; writing, we aim—not only,
perhaps, but always also—to connect. The best student papers—and dissertations—have always been the ones most strongly inﬂected by the writer’s voice,
probably the ones that crystallize around a personal conviction or preoccupation, an idiosyncratic perception. The most memorable classes are those in
which the people make connections with one another and with new sides of
themselves around the book they’ve read. Discussions of what’s said and
meant in a story, of other people’s motives, morals, and language, generally
leads to some measure of self-reﬂexiveness, therefore of self-revelation. Book
groups meet, authors read aloud to audiences, for these reasons; although we
are bafﬂed, as a society, by the question of what education is and what it is for,
making connections with others on or around words is something that people
seem to continue to crave. Contemporary analysts of taste and distinction, and
gender and race, have made it hard to keep the awareness of bodies and persons, and unexamined tendencies to secrecy and sharing, out of even the most
aestheticizing classroom—where they always have been. Interpreting texts, we
cannot but hear ourselves moving in and out of character, performing our
more and less representative selves. Isn’t telling yet not telling, telling by not
telling, what English class has always been about?

1 1 “ T H E WO R L D N E V E R E N D S ”
Professional Judgments at Home, Abroad
JOYCELYN K. MOODY

In my Cape Town diary, I wrote:
7:39 a.m. Thursday 5-18-00
Woke up in great anger: last night I ﬁnished grading the papers on Derricotte’s The
Black Notebooks. Two students of color—Mimi and José—never even turned in their
papers. Mimi said she’d turn her paper in to me on Tues. night, but then she went to
the movies w/Dagni! This is the hazard of living with one’s students! But I know she
decided not to submit it—or shit, to write it—after I spat out at her, “Not without a
penalty—but do turn it in,” when she asked—or told me, rather—if she could hand
it to me later that evening. I was furious with her for not making the paper a priority
last weekend. As for José, he has been ill with his wisdom teeth impacted, but by my
observation, not so much that he could not have submitted his paper before leaving
for his oral surgery, as he’d called to tell me he would. But my anger is really directed
at Jennifer and Andrea: they both wrote lousy, for-shit essays that have left me truly
insulted. I don’t know if they meant to insult me as much as they seem to have
wanted to insult Derricotte, to mock her injunction to “tell the truth” by presenting
papers that so clearly are falsehoods of their feelings. Andrea told me while doing
my hair the other night that she read The Black Notebooks as arguing for the kind of
“color blindness” that two students had insisted in class is possible between
“friends” of different races. I just said, “Oh, no; not at all.” I didn’t engage her on the
issue in part because I was sick of the book after a weekend of absorption with it, in
part because it was so late at night (nearly midnite), and in part because I knew
Andrea and I would not come to an agreement about the book’s worth. I don’t
regret that decision. But I am certain that my reading of the book is right on this
issue. I am interested in hearing Andrea talk about how she reaches this conclusion
about “color blindness”—but only if, IF she’s also willing to disclose her feelings
about other aspects of the book—less her rational inferences than her genuine feelings. That’s why I’m so perturbed: neither she nor Jennifer was willing to make the
stretch that Derricotte demands. In this reading, I ﬁnd that Derricotte is not as honest as I’d ﬁrst thought, and I am happy to be critical of her book and some of its
contentions, but there’s no getting around the challenge the book makes for readers
to do what Derricotte claims she does.
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Oh shit, I am just pissed off! I don’t want to be friends with two women who are
so damn smart and so damn afraid! I have invested so much time and energy in
them in many more ways than with others on the trip because of what I inherently
believe about their politics and their past experiences. That’s it: I feel betrayed by
them. As always, I ask that my friends and students put themselves on the line no
more or less than I am willing to myself, and I feel failed by Andrea and Jennifer in
this instance. Andrea did try to talk with me about her paper—no, she tried to talk
to me about her resistance to the text, but I did not give her much latitude to do so:
instead I asked her how far she was and inasmuch as she admitted that she had not
ﬁnished the book, I insinuated that I would talk with her about the book only after
she ﬁnished it. I suppose she inferred my admiration for Derricotte’s “candor” or
well, her performance, for the ﬁnal product, and doesn’t share it. I still think it is an
important book, one that demands our introspection.
This is another problem with living among students. With Rebekah I came to
infer that the students have been unwilling to take certain risks in the classroom, but
now I am seeing that they were actually unwilling to take risks in their papers as
well. I mean, over and over all term I have heard one student or another allude to
conversations about the text to which I have not been privy: they have had these
conversations in small groups with each other. Partly I’m glad to know that the texts
have provoked and inspired them; that’s terriﬁc! But partly I needed to be in on
these conversations or to have them represented to me in more formal, less casual,
ways if the students are to have earned credit for them. Their papers are by and large
so lousy that the beneﬁt they’ve gained from those conversations without me do not
show up in their writing. Maybe they keep journals and their insights are there, but
anyway while I trust that they have been talking about the books among themselves,
I have no way of knowing the extent and utility of those other conversations—only
the ones in the classroom, which have been so disappointing.
Partly I’m feeling brought up short, foolish, sheepish, victim of the mask—
Andrea’s black mask that made me suppose that based on her class participation in
the discussion of The Black Notebooks her paper was sincere, that at the very least,
she would be no more evasive of the critical issues for her re Derricotte than she was
of the critical issues that Sapphire’s book brought up for her. And Jennifer’s lesbian
mask, perhaps strengthened by her sometime need to closet her queer identity. In
other words, partly my anger is with myself and my own assumptions and desires.
It’s hard not to have the desire that those FOUR students in particular would engage
the text more “honestly,” more personally. What would I have done if I’d been asked
to do what I asked them to do? Well, I think my personality is too much like
Derricotte’s for me not to have written a paper like Jacquelyn’s, doggedly trying to
clarify my own racialized subject position. Shit, I know I would have. All day everyday, goddammit: there I am with my heart out.
What’s the lesson here? That perhaps I should be more generous in my consideration of the students’ reticence. No, I will not. At the very least, I would have wanted
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the kind of engagement that I got in the Sapphire papers—like Rebekah’s: this book
bothers me because ________. It’s hard to feel generous or sympathetic when I simply
feel left out of their process or frustrated that they resisted a certain process. It occurs
to me that Mimi, Jennifer, and Andrea might actually have done some soul searching
with each other in their conversation, but that particular combination of women—
all Othered in at least one way—indeed, each (self-) Othered in several diverse ways
by class, race, sexual orientation, chosen family, and so on—they would not be honest with each other because in the end they profoundly distrust each other. I guess
that’s what this boils down to—not voyeurism, or petulance that my friends had a
party to which I wasn’t invited, but that my friends and my students did not seize an
opportunity I tried to provide for them—perhaps because they couldn’t, perhaps
because they wouldn’t, perhaps because they did not perceive it as any “gift” on my
part at all. Jennifer told me that she’d written in her journal exactly what I was complaining about re The Black Notebooks, that in it Derricotte asks me to meet her challenge of honesty and I just feel revolted and inadequate. I don’t want to be as honest
as she says she is, as she intimates I need to be; I already feel inadequate to meet the
challenge and I don’t want her insistent notebook to remind me of my inadequacy
around exploring the depth of my internalized racism. I’m the more hurt that
Jennifer would concur in my kitchen, but not in her paper. I’m angry with her, and
ashamed of her that she wouldn’t take this risk. And yet all week I’ve been wondering
and worrying just how—if—I can deliver on the proposal to turn this teaching experience into a chapter on the personal in pedagogy. Exactly a year ago, I was agonizing
over whether or not to publish an account of my experiences as a pregnant college
coed on welfare1; now I ﬁnd myself again having to decide just how much to disclose
of my private life, my personal pain, how much to share in the name of effecting
social and academic change. I wonder if this isn’t megalomania or narcissism or just
plain nuts. I must have a monstrous ego. Well, as ever, I can still say no or choose
another focus. Everything doesn’t have to be so personal, for Pete’s sake.
[End of diary entry]

It is the ﬁrst Sunday in June 2000, the last morning I am to spend in Cape
Town. I am sitting in Mug and Bean, the Waterfront store of an extensive South
African coffee shop chain. I have just ﬁnished a brisk walk in dense fog with
Rebekah and Aaron, two of the University of Washington students in the Study
Abroad program that we have all recently completed. Before departing, I want
to take advantage of this opportunity over breakfast to get some insight from
them, ideas I can apply to a paper I have agreed to write on the intersection of
the personal and the professional in the academy. As it happens, they are two of
my brightest students, and I am already feeling nostalgic for our quarter-long
course (African American Women’s Autobiography), only ﬁve days over now,
for their enthusiastic participation in it. It is my ﬁrst mention to them of the
professional paper that will come out of the course, and truly curious students,
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they are immediately captivated—and they have an opinion or two to share. I
tell them that I am thinking of starting the paper by revealing that all ﬁfteen of
the students in the program, save two or three, have seen me in my underwear,
including Aaron, who narrowly escaped a glimpse of my bare brown thighs one
morning as he eagerly entered my studio ﬂat to ask about his grade on a class
presentation. Aaron interrupts me—Aaron interrupts everyone, he is so garrulous—though he struggles touchingly not to be so. He launches into the memory of his growing awareness in the ﬁrst few days of the program that there
would be few if any boundaries between the program participants, between the
program components. He remembers an agonizing moment after class one day
when he realized, and warned his roommate about, the encroaching borders—
or rather, the lack of them. This June Sunday, the program nearly a week over,
he shakes his head in passionate resistance still. “The world never ends,” he
announces in a mixture of anguish and awe.
Indeed not: how many times was there a knock at the door to my studio
ﬂat, followed straight away by its bellowing open to admit a four-year-old imp,
demanding to know if her mother, the single most intelligent student I have
ever taught (luscious wonder!), can borrow today a bit of butter, yesterday
extra batteries for a Walkman, the day before my dictionary.
How did having students casually borrow from me or find me in various
stages of undress affect my teaching, especially in a graded, ﬁve-credit course?
It was sometimes very hard to keep my authoritative teaching persona separate from the more sociable “me” I wanted to cultivate at the Cascades
Holiday Apartments where we lived for eleven weeks. While I rarely, I want to
say never, found it difficult to perform my teaching self in the classroom, it
was challenging, however, to keep my teacherly self at bay when class was not
in session. I remember how proud I felt when Savitri unexpectedly
announced her admiration for my ability to do so. I too was surprised that
some situations blurring the lines of my disparate “selves” did not burden me
more. I could see, for example, that Savitri is sharp and used to getting good
grades. Yet she worked only minimally to improve the middling grades she
consistently earned in my course. Her apathy did not disconcert me: I recognized it as a greater privileging of the adventure of foreign life; in her place as
student, I might easily have made the same decision. At “home” in the
Cascades, I found it relatively easy to separate the critical, “professional” self
who marked Savitri’s papers from my black woman self eager to befriend this
fascinating British-black, Sri Lanka-born American woman. When she
remarked my ability to draw a clean line between my professional self and my
personal identity, I realized, as she apparently did not, that constructing such
a distinction required ﬁerce concentration.
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For her part, at breakfast that last Sunday Rebekah observed that I had had a
tendency to mother the students. I vehemently denied it. The characterization
of my professional work as “maternal” burdens me still, for though I am certain
that Rebekah was unconscious of the connotations it has for me, the label disparages my work among predominantly white students as mammying. But the
charge did ﬁt. It was impossible to feel detached from them in a maternal way
when I felt so keenly responsible for their safety, especially in as capricious a
place as Cape Town is: its current crime rate against women especially daunted
me, traveling as I was with twelve women students and a woman co-director.
But Rebekah added that she appreciated my balanced sense of when to back off,
which, coupled with my maternal “nature,” provided her own sense of security.
Looking back, I realize I endeavored to ensure my own self-assurance as much
as theirs: I dreaded the prospect of having to telephone their parents or loved
ones with tragic news. Undoubtedly, this acute fear had much to do with the
fact that the students were approximately the same age as my son Patrick.
Initially, I had expected to make here a case against what I deemed the
ridiculous notion that it is possible, even desirable, to be objective in academic
work. (Writing this now, the concept of “objectivity” seems ﬂuid, even elusive;
my comprehension of its meaning shifts with each usage.) Imagining an audience composed primarily of professors of English, I expected my readers also
to devalue objectivity as impossible and undesirable. Inﬂuenced by post-structuralism, we no longer regard “reality” as hard, fast, and concrete. I believed
that English professors of every ilk resist the fallacy of objective reality, and in
its place erect something like perspective or performance. But as I write now,
this seems an irrational expectation; after all, I can readily name professors
who do not meet it. Furthermore, I had imagined arguing that my experiences
in Cape Town taught me that the personal and the professional necessarily
commingle and complement each other—not only when one is a Study
Abroad coordinator/ professor, but in any academic situation. Indeed, I have
published essays arguing that literary analysis and pedagogy are sharpened,
strengthened when one takes personally one’s scholarship and teaching, no less
than the traditions with which one works. Now, to my amazement, I ﬁnd my
perspective has shifted, for I have learned in unexpected ways that my own
sense of “professionalism,” however tenuous, requires me to honor barriers
between my so-called professional identity and my so-called private life, borders that keep the world’s multifarious locales from bleeding into each other.
I am thinking of the Saturday morning that I lingered in bed recovering
from a severe cold and reading J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace. A small group of us
were waiting to see if the thick fog over the Atlantic in the harbor at Green Point
would lift to permit an afternoon hike up Table Mountain. (As Disgrace is a
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novel about an English professor at the Technical University of Cape Town who
fuses his professional and personal identities with devastating consequences,
my reading of it among students at the Cascades forms one more episode in this
saga.) As I recall, Andrea came in ﬁrst to share her six law school acceptances;
she was followed by Jennifer, followed by Savitri, Mimi and Khathulla, followed
by Dagni, followed by Jessica. Before I knew it, still lying in bed in my pajamas, I
was surrounded by a roomful of women wanting my “undivided” attention for
a variety of purposes—to plan the hike, but also to gossip about a lesbian love
triangle, to discuss strategies for revising an essay, to nurse—if not medicate—
an unrelenting cough, to mirror a black woman self-image, to dole out program
funds for an individual ﬁeld trip. I remember talking earnestly with Andrea—in
my pajamas, still in bed—now as Professor, now as Black Woman Mentor on
the Continent, when Jennifer walked in. Immediately, I shifted to a much more
casual, relaxed persona—to signify to Andrea, Jennifer’s best friend, that our
“formal” time was momentarily over. Perhaps because we had both been tending colds, Jennifer (a buddy from the Seattle lesbian community) and I had not
had any time for private conversation in several days. The last time I had seen
her literally had been the previous Thursday, the same morning I’d awoken in a
rage at the poor quality of her essay on Derricotte’s The Black Notebooks. That
morning when I had mentioned to a small group of students that I would be
returning their marked papers later that afternoon, she had spoken up: “Oh, I’d
like to schedule some time to meet with you about that paper.” I remember
tucking my chin to hide whatever expression was in my face: fury, hurt, disappointment, amazement at her casual audacity. I remember struggling to assign
her and Andrea the same grade on those wretched ﬁrst versions of the
Derricotte paper: my temptation had been to award to Jennifer a higher mark,
to ﬁnd more redeeming qualities in her equally inferior work, though in the
end, after several rounds of reviewing them “with detachment,” I ﬂatter myself,
I had to award them the same unsatisfactory grade. I had been considerably
more disappointed in Andrea for what seems to me her greater descent into
poor work. I had realized almost immediately in our living arrangement that
Andrea procrastinated in preparing her coursework. But that seemed only
minorly operative in the Derricotte debacle: she procrastinated in this instance
because she did not want to write the paper at all. When she and Jennifer
revised their respective papers, each took extensive time, I believe because they
were then committed to doing better—not simply in terms of higher grades,
but also expanding the quality of their reasoning and their articulation of their
revised perceptions. I took each woman’s steadfast, exemplary effort made in
her revision over the next weeks as a personal triumph—hardly an “objective”
perspective.
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What is it about the ﬁction of “objectivity” that renders it so powerful in
our profession? Why is it that the academy insists on it? Surely the answer has
something to do with so-called empirical knowledge, with the lies we academics tell ourselves about the nature of truth. Even among literary critics,
objectivity’s siblings—“detachment,” “rationality,” “disinterestedness,” “impartiality,” “neutrality”—are thought to yield a fairness deemed vital to knowledge. As if.
Back at home for only a week as I begin this essay, at some point in each day
I wince at my aloneness, my separation from the group. I miss the students terribly. This is unusual for me: when I teach a course at UW, not simply for UW,
I leave my students after two hours twice a week. Occasionally, one or two of
them drop by my ofﬁce for an additional half-hour of my time. I do not
develop an abiding attachment to them as I did to the students I lived with in
South Africa. At home, I thrive on solitude; by preference I live alone with my
cat. I feel very fortunate in this regard, especially as a black woman. Not many
of us have the means to live alone, especially in the afﬂuent conditions as I
enjoy in my private space. Conversely, many do not consider it culturally feasible or desirable to live alone, a fact that sometimes activates my black authenticity complex. At any rate, even when I feel particularly close to a group of
students, such as I did in Winter 2000 with my mostly Women Studies and
English majors to whom I spoke through tears about a student-cum-friend
who died at age 34 of cancer, I still do not feel particularly disoriented when
the course ends. More rarely, a class establishes an attachment to me, as was
also the case last winter with my seminar students who manifested tremendous separation anxiety at the end. Those recent examples strike me as extraordinarily different from attachments I have had to earlier courses (though
perhaps only because they are recent). However, it may be that cultural and
geographical adjustments fall along a single continuum. For two consecutive
nights in the week I returned from Cape Town, I dreamed of the students, and
I continue to think of them in my waking hours. Although I did not enjoy the
same degree of connection to each of the ﬁfteen, I still feel very bound up with
our group. Ironically, while in Cape Town, I constantly sought privacy and
often locked the door to my apartment even when I was home and receptive to
guests, simply because I felt it a measure of privacy and control and distance to
have to choose to admit students. Had I locked the door less often, surely they
would all without exception have managed to catch me in some state of
undress. I quipped to my friend Barbara via email that the students seemed to
intuit when I was grading their papers, for a veritable pall fell over our sixth
ﬂoor ﬂats at those times. Perhaps I should have pretended to grade papers
more often so as to carve out some additional private time. For we all needed

“ T h e Wo r l d N e v e r E n d s ”

239

“space” from each other’s intrusions and demands, from the sense that, as
Wordsworth grieved, “the world [was] too much with us.” Not only did I need
it as a private, introspective person used to living alone, but I needed it especially because my duties rendered me so intricately immersed in their lives as
teacher, program coordinator, mentor, and neighbor—each an identity
wrought with complexity and contradiction.
Students sometimes have ironically different understandings of notions of
separateness and objectivity. More than one Study Abroad student mused
(naïvely, as it happens) that they were all probably going to work harder for my
course than for any other in their college career: it would be too shameful to
encounter the prof in the Cascades having done less than their level best in the
course. They implied that our proximity would make it impossible for me to
remain objective, not to develop bias against their indolence or apathy. And yet
the standard of objectivity seems rooted in part in defense of students, that is, in
place for their protection. Like the U.S. legal system and other social institutions,
the academy promises assessment—of ideas, of intelligence, of performance—
controlled by theoretical paradigms rather than professors’ prejudices. Indeed,
this promise constitutes one measure of what we call academic freedom.
Talking with Aaron and me that last Sunday morning Rebekah singled out
as one of her best program experiences dancing with me at Café Manhattan
one memorable Thursday night. Our dancing together distinguished for her
the maternal hovering she experienced from me at other times. She would
have pronounced me entirely (too) maternal, she reported, but for occasions
like Women’s Night when I released both dorm director and prim professor to
become her dancing partner. (That night also she ironically exhibited her own
maternal concern for me). In my diary a few days later (on May 1) I wrote:
Rebekah and I both enjoyed ourselves—often dancing w/each other,
w/Bernedette, and w/Kellye. We danced on the jam-packed little ﬂoor, and I drank
red wine ﬁrst, then switched to shots of tequila, mostly so that I wouldn’t have to
slosh my drink or get someone to hold it for me while I was dancing. Fortunately, I
also drank several tall glasses of water and kept dancing, and Rebekah and I kept
going outside to give our lungs a break. She was worried that her severe allergies
would act up from the heavy smoke. Plus we were sort of ﬂirting with a lovely woman
selling queer souvenirs outside. If we hadn’t been careful of the smoke and the booze,
I might’ve ended up in worse shape. As it is, Rebekah insisted on my staying at the
Cascades instead of taking a taxi across town back to Kenilworth [a suburb where I
house-sat for ten days during our spring break]. Then Friday she and I took the train
from town to Claremont with Andrea and Zipporah. The four of us spent a slow,
desultory afternoon in Kirstenbosch Gardens, some one of the 9,000 different species
of plants bringing on a sinus attack I suffered the rest of the evening.
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Last night I babysat Zipporah while Andrea was at the Mary J. Blige concert with
a UCT student. After I put her to bed, I spent a couple of hours talking quite intimately with Rebekah in her room next door. So weird how closeness develops after a
certain amount of sharing. We began talking about tomorrow’s class and about
teaching, about the differences between Kareem’s course [on changes in education
since the end of apartheid] and mine [on black women’s autobiography], about
Kareem’s personality and mine. Where his is relaxed and cozy, my class feels tight,
overwrought. Of course, central to the differences between our courses is that he
does not live with the students; he is not Rebekah’s next-door neighbor, for example.
I tell her that, whatever Kareem thinks he is doing with the students, for myself, I
want them—my white students especially—to forge signiﬁcant and speciﬁc impressions of life among African American women. I say that what they take from the
course not only means something to me, it means something about me: their behavior as adults in my society has far-reaching implications. I tell her that I have
become a professor in large part precisely to have this kind of access to shaping the
opinions of my fellow citizens. The investment Kareem makes in them as an indigenous South African is different from that I make, whatever his pedagogical goals:
they will leave South Africa, he knows, whereas I am not willing to chance that any
of my students will not leave the US. He is a man, too, with a man’s “natural” authority, and that matters, even to the Women Studies majors on this trip…. It was a fascinating talk, but I don’t think I learned anything that will make our class sessions
more relaxed. But is being relaxed essential to learning? I dunno…. I do know it’s
hard living so close together, and I guess I did come to realize that that proximity
not only makes it hard for the students to share with me, to trust me, but also to take
risks with each other. Rebekah and I were talking about a kind of anonymity we
both covet, especially scholastically—how we create diverse personae for different
courses. That can’t be done here since we live so closely together, so with each other.

I read the excerpt from my diary entry of May 18 with which I began this
essay, and marvel at the shifts in terminology within my own discourse: the
conﬂation of student with friend exposes the violation of a personal code of
ethics. I have virtually never thought of students as friends while they were still
under my tutelage. Instead, I have asked friends who are UW students—like
Jennifer—not to take my classes so that I will not have to evaluate friends’
work. In Cape Town, however, something changed as a result of having
Jennifer in my course, and also perhaps as a result of having Andrea in a fourth
course. Something changed as a result of living among my students, of interacting socially with them, of having dinner together regularly, shopping
together, and moreover, of facing the unknown together, of protecting each
other when possibly in harm’s way, of bolstering each other against culture
shocks. I ﬁnd in my diary page after page lamenting my lack of privacy in the
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Cascades. During the chilly, rainy week that I lived alone with a strange cat in a
suburb called Kenilworth, I wrote long passionate paragraphs luxuriating in
the respite that solitude wrought at Easter. In the emails I sent back to the
States, I relentlessly complained of constant interaction with the group. We
could not even walk alone. Though many of us exercised alone in Seattle to
gain clarity and peace, there doing so seemed fraught with danger: we dare not
“lose ourselves” in our thoughts while walking unaccompanied on the Sea
Point Promenade for very fear of “losing ourselves” in some dangerous
predicament. No wonder, then, that my May 18 journal reveals such awesome
paradigm shifts as the discussion of a course text with a current student in my
kitchen and the avoidance of a similar discussion with a current student who
grooms my hair in my living room at midnight. By the time that I came to write
that entry, contrary to previous restrictions in my personal code of professional ethics, I had developed a closeness with several of the students in the
program—had even developed a dependence on them, and I felt protective of
all ﬁfteen of them. Although I have always cared deeply whether or not my students learned and though I have often been acutely affected by classroom
dynamics—behaviorists tell me that I do not quickly “return to baseline”—I
have also not cultivated relationships with students beyond the ten weeks
when I am teaching them. Hundreds of undergrads have sat in my courses at
UW without my developing the slightest interest in getting to know them personally; what I do care about is whether or not they learn from me. I have sufﬁcient friendships in other areas of my life such that searching for friends
among my students is for me neither ethical nor desirable. For all that, however, living among students in Cape Town transformed me into the kind of
professor who drinks and dances with her students without experiencing an
ounce of anguish about ethicality or propriety.
After dancing with Rebekah, I do not recall a moment of doubt that I would
be able to read her paper “objectively.” When I am training graduate student
assistants to mark my undergrads’ papers, I caution them to address the quality of the paper, never of the student. “Refer to the essay when you’re writing
comments,” I tell them. “Don’t write ‘You did not . . .’ when you mean that the
essay did not do a particular thing. After all, you are not judging the student;
you are judging her work, the paper itself.” Thus, dancing with Rebekah at Café
Manhattan surely did not render me unable to assess her work “objectively.”
Despite our exhilarating revelry on Thursday night or our compelling tête-àtête the following Sunday, I did not worry that I could not mark Rebekah’s
paper with dispassion, even with severity. We had talked brieﬂy, haltingly of
her difﬁculty in reading Sapphire’s American Dreams; it was a text she would
not discuss with me except to say that she found it “painful to read.”
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Unfortunately, her essay did not clearly articulate just what distressed her, why
she was so repelled and captivated at once by the text’s horriﬁc imagery.
Indeed, after the extraordinarily close time we spent together during the last
days of our interim vacation, I confess that I was the more disappointed that
Rebekah had produced so ineffectual a paper—and once I returned it marked
and graded, she and I never alluded to it again. To what degree, however, was
my assessment of her work inﬂuenced by that enjoyable time we shared during
the break? Am I right—that is, both precise and fair—to think that the pleasure of her company then did not affect my grading? Is my being in a situation
that gives rise to such questions a betrayal of my own professional code as a
professor of English?
Undergraduates in English courses, like their peers across the university,
rightly trust not only that an “objective” set of criteria will be used to evaluate
their work, but also that the discipline is disciplined by a concrete set of rules
and norms that form it. My association with Rebekah aside, a paradox often
develops in English courses in particular, however. On the one hand, students
regard English professors with suspicion because those disciplinary conventions can seem so elusive, so nimble, as to leave the students’ work frighteningly prey to professors’ opinions. Yet on the other hand, those same students
often insist on the legitimacy of their own undisciplined readings on the
premise that literature by deﬁnition is so “open to personal interpretation” that
any reading goes, that individual readings are only “opinions” anyway. And in
the case of black professors teaching race(d) literature, are not (white) students
in still graver danger of being subject to whim, to political correctness, to
assessments not of their comprehension or competence, but rather of their
personal attitudes toward blacks?
Disciplinarity is not the only determinant of reliability, though. For even
when the professor—whatever her or his ethnicity—is a social scientist teaching about race, respect for experiments and analyses, in other words for objectively collected data, falls away.2 Anxiety about harmful discrimination and
unethical academic practices—within and outside of the academy—has led to
vast changes in national law. Certainly, grievously, the effect of this kind of distrust is the aberration of tighter regulations for greater adherence to “objectivity.” Witness Bakke, Hopwood, California’s Proposition 209, and Washington’s
Initiative 200—all cases based on a perceived need to protect citizens. The
recklessness of these decisions and the students’ misapprehensions undergirding them help me to recognize that whatever disappointment I had in
Rebekah’s paper on American Dreams, that paper did not meet the disciplinary
criteria for satisfactory work by which I evaluated all of my students’ papers on
Sapphire’s text.
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One student’s question about theories of objectivity and professionalism still
has me reﬂecting on these issues. Andrea, my most outstanding student, came
to me in that oblique way she sometimes deploys, to ask about the staff ’s decision to get to our UCT classroom earlier that day, despite our arriving an hour
late. Every Tuesday afternoon we gathered up our books and papers, and herded
ourselves to the Center for African Studies for our three-hour class period. On
the ﬁrst Tuesday after the break, our pre-arranged driver failed to show, so we
stood at intersection of Vesperdene Road and the Main Road in Green Point,
desperate to hail transportation to school. No matter what time class began, we
were rigidly committed to returning to the ﬂats by ﬁve, in order to get Zipporah
before her day care center shut down for the day. The money collector for the
kombi (i.e., taxi) that we’d verbally contracted to take to school assured us that
the driver would be along within seconds; in the meantime, a second kombi
drove up to whisk us away. We wanted to honor our word to the ﬁrst man, but
then realized that the driver he accompanied was being given a trafﬁc ticket a
block away. We were already half-hour behind schedule at this point, and it
seemed that a dispute had evolved between the driver and the cop ticketing
him. So we cautiously opted to go ahead with the second driver—painfully
aware that kombi negotiations often end in fatal and near fatal shoot-outs
between these desperate drivers. By the time we got settled in our classroom at
the Center, we had only two hours of class time left, one of which was to be used
in discussing Jennifer Haaken’s complicated theoretical essay “The Recovery of
Memory, Fantasy, and Desire in Women’s Trauma Stories”3 (which most of the
students had either altogether neglected to read or had only skimmed over the
vacation). I planned to use the remaining hour to begin our discussion of
Sapphire’s complex and unexpurgated collection of autobiographical poems
and stories about psychosexual and physical violence in American families. I
knew that the students had very deﬁnite impressions of American Dreams, and
wanted to spend some time addressing those concerns about what language
ought to be used to do and to express, as well as about how different Sapphire’s
little book was from the previous autobiographies we had read.
That night Andrea wondered if our decision to spend the time waiting for
the taxi, then settling the taxi driver dispute that had ensued had been worth
the use of class time. Speciﬁcally, she said that we had had “everything we
needed”—professor, students, texts—even before we left the sixth ﬂoor. Why
hadn’t we simply opted to stay in one of the apartments for the class period?
Not only that day, but also each class day, especially considering that we were
doling out a hefty amount of program funds to get to campus. Having had
three courses with me already, she was proud of my authority. Andrea says she
told the other students at the outset that no matter how casual and open I was
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with them outside of the classroom, they would know that in the classroom, I
was very serious. She herself marveled at the difference in my persona. I knew
it was a matter of racial pride for her. If she admires anything about me, it is
clearly my tacit command of each class session: “This is my time and we will
use it wisely.” Her penetrating question goes right to the heart of the arbitrariness of fundamental academic idea(l)s, among them objectivity and propriety.
“So you want to have class in someone’s bedroom?” I responded. But of course,
we held program meetings all the time in “someone’s bedroom,” in the living
space of the student assistant—signiﬁcantly never my own ﬂat, with the exception of the spontaneous gathering of women that morning I lay reading
Disgrace while waiting for the fog to lift. In the student assistant’s ﬂat we played
Spades, decided program ﬁeld trips, met with somber visitors, made “bringand-share” (i.e., potluck) dinners for each other, and watched a South African
soap opera called “Backstage” that featured a vibrant diva who regaled us with
stories of her childhood in a local township. Why not also hold class there as
well, Andrea insisted. Why maintain the fallacy of separate spheres even here,
in this foreign place? Why maintain the illusion that “the world” never ends?
I remember my initial struggle not to be teacherly at the Cascades. I
remember the nearly crushing exigency of clearly demarcated lines between
power and neighbor.
Pondering her question, I think, If we say we can only have class in university
classrooms, then we contend that there are borders in our lives. School is only
There, not Here as well. If we say we can have class wherever we have professor,
texts, and students, then we expose the fallacy of separate borders in our lives.
Paradoxically, however, our group afﬁrms the reality, the ﬁxity, as well as the
permeability of separate national borders since we were in fact outside of the
U.S. borders. Moreover, my (in)valid reasoning troubles the conceptualization
of “class” or “school,” and provokes the juxtaposition of class with learning. For
surely my students were learning when I was not with them every time they
discussed the course texts in signiﬁcant ways—in a kombi to or from the UCT
campus, in a Cascades ﬂat, on a walk to the Waterfront, wherever a small group
chanced to be—sans professor. Perhaps Andrea includes erroneously “professor” among requisite signs of learning. Musing even further, I wonder whether
the excision of “professor” from learning contexts is not increasing, as universities move to learning communities comprised solely of individuals and their
(im)personal computers. Is that a move toward greater objectivity? Will the
elimination of professor in the twenty-ﬁrst century produce more objective
“long distance” learning?
Having returned to the UW in Seattle, will I remain a “transformed” professor? I know that I cannot: there is too much at risk here. One reason that the
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students were so silent during class is that they were unwilling to risk exposing
the extent of their own social ills. We had started the course with Jamaica
Kincaid’s A Small Place, in which she names the North American a particularly
“ugly tourist.” Her little polemic stings with its vivid reminders that here in the
West we are trained from birth to be imperialists. My students in Cape Town
did not relish this book, even though virtually each of them thanked me for
the exposure to it, and so immediately upon our arrival in South Africa. When
I taught A Small Place in Seattle during the months before departing for Cape
Town, many of my students resented Kincaid’s “angry” tone and repelled her
virulence for Americans; safely at home they could insist that they were
exempt from Kincaid’s vitriolic charges. But the students abroad had to confront Kincaid’s charges in the geopolitical context of RSA (Republic of South
Africa), where we formed a small homogenous community transplanted into a
different world. Perhaps one interpretation of Aaron’s extraordinary pronouncement that “the world never ends” is that wherever westerners go, we
inevitably, as Kincaid castigates, take our values and biases with us. Perhaps my
students feared that they would reveal too much of themselves in that context.
But again, in considering the impediments to my maintaining the same
“professional” attitude in Seattle as I manifested among students in Cape Town,
I have to identify students’ attitudes towards race, speciﬁcally towards blackness, and therefore towards me. Not all of my students abroad were white; more
than one-third of them represented American ethnic minority groups: a
Filipina, a Chicano, an African American, an American Paciﬁc Islander, a
woman of both African American and Korean ancestry, the black Sri Lankan
who praised my intact boundaries. And yet even were I to have in Seattle a class
composed of only students of color, I could not relax my professional demeanor
here in the same way that I could—by compelling circumstance—there. Above
I noted that standards of objectivity, however illusory they are, are designed to
protect students—students of color from racist professors and practices,
women students from sexist policies, and so on. Indeed, these same standards
are those to which Katouria Smith appealed when she charged the University of
Washington Law School as having admitted an “inferior” student of color but
rejected her (whiteness) in the late 1990s. Those same standards are in place to
protect me as a woman professor of color—from allegations of unfairness,
favoritism, bias.
In Cape Town, I wrote:
Just as the students live on the same ﬂoor of the apartment complex with me, they do
so with each other. Just as they cannot leave class after performing this persona today,
that persona tomorrow, they also accompany each other home after class where each
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remembers the classroom discussions—and at least tacitly expects and depends on a
measure of consistency. Performing a self at home in the Cascades that differs from
that in our University of Cape Town classroom would violate a taboo and destabilize
the group. And because terms like “performativity,” “destabilization of the autobiographical self,” and “in-law” and “out-law” performances permeate our theoretical
course readings4, we are especially sensitive to their implications for our lives in Cape
Town.

Back in Seattle, I recognize the academic code that requires my own complicity: I must not not be professional, no matter where I am.
In the ﬁnal week before submitting this essay to the co-editors of this volume,
I spoke with Jennifer, Andrea, and Rebekah about my representations of our
mutual experiences in Cape Town. In the initial voice- or electronic- mail
requesting that they contact me for consultation, I provided both my home and
ofﬁce telephone numbers; as it happened in each case, I spoke with the student
by phone from my UW ofﬁce. Our conversations, still richly laced with the intimacy we shared in the Cascades, were yet distinctly different from former ones. I
was myself notably different. My own voice no doubt dropped a few notes into a
register of something I fancy sounds like “authority,” theirs were hesitant, cautious with concern about the need for such a conversation, given the trust they
had come to place in me abroad. With each student I try to convey that I am acting from an ethical place, that the call is not to alarm her, but rather to reassure
her. It has come to this (again), now that we are “home.” Thus in explaining how
my essay tries to protect each of them individually, to maintain as much as
anonymity as they deem warranted, and yet serve the profession with some
insight into the intersection of the personal and the professional, I must needs
try to protect myself. I am aware as I speak, as I disclose the contents of my
diaries to them, that yet again my heart must open in this professional capacity,
and that conversely, in this instance the students are guarded—by their physical
absence that the telephone permits, blocking my access to their faces or body
language, by no obligation to comment on how I have drawn our experience—
only to grant or withhold their permission of my reconstruction of that experience. I am also aware that as students they need and merit this very border. Less
than a month after our return, professional ethics, the academic dance, and ironically proximity all restrict the nature of our interactions and exchanges. The old
barriers fall into place, whatever I choose to reveal; the world has edges again.
C O N C LU S I O N

Thinking now about what it means that my teaching in Cape Town seemed
so different from my teaching in Seattle, I realize that in fact my teaching in the
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two locations has been less divergent than I initially thought. For one thing, it
is worth noting that the students traveling with me were voluntarily in class.
None of them opted out of my “required” course altogether, though certainly
that option was open to them. It is easy to imagine that morale and collectivity
might have suffered, had even only one of them chosen to complete Kareem’s
course and the program’s required internship but not the third curriculum
component that my course formed. More than one student, I learned when we
returned, had elected to take my course for “Credit/ No Credit,” yet while
abroad I had little reason to believe that they weren’t committed to my course,
Savitri included.
Similarly, institutional structures followed us to Cape Town. We were governed by UW standards as much abroad as if we had been at home. For all the
intimacy we developed, I do not ﬂatter myself that there were not “situations”
involving my Gen X students of which I was unaware. The required internship
was designed in part speciﬁcally to allow students to cultivate an independent
identity, an international responsibility apart from our group. My co-director
dazzingly established, then supervised working relationships between our 15
and the local organizations, activists, and institutions to which they promised
volunteer service. In one instance, she and I were chagrined that some students
ended up volunteering together, as this shared experience nulliﬁed a crucial
aspect of the program. (In another instance, though, we were relieved that men
students accompanied several women to a township medical clinic outside
Cape Town.) That some of them did end up working together, however, validates all the more our faith that we directors still remain completely ignorant
of some student experiences during our stint. Surely, just as I was desperate for
my own separate peace and realized it, so must have my students. They created
their own barriers shielding out authority—in some cases through means as
simple and transparent as addressing me professionally, formally; in other
cases far more egregiously, as by drinking excessively. In Cape Town as in
Seattle, young people impeccably cement each other’s secrets against folks
Over Thirty. In terms of professional objectivity and ethicality then, I must
own that as conscientious as I tried to be, as conscious as I truly was of institutional procedures and demands and of being ever “on duty,” there as here some
situations were simply beyond my control. And I won’t pretend to want to
know what they all were.
However, the faculty and staff of the UW Study Abroad Program for South
Africa did all we could to try to mitigate as many problems as possible. I tried
to make my course as “typical” as possible, as predictable as possible. And I
believe that most of the students appreciated my complex shifting of parental,
personal, and professional attitudes during those three months. Perhaps what
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our program illustrates is the time and space speciﬁcity of virtually every
teaching experience; perhaps no learning experience involving professor, students, texts is ﬁnally formulaic, merely “academic.” Moreover, in the quarter
before our program, two professors quite unsuccessfully led a Study Abroad
group through southern Africa and barely lived to tell about it, they moaned.
They had worked under conditions very similar to those my co-director and I
faced with very happy results. One key difference, ironically, had been that they
did not live among the students in their group. And when a younger colleague—black, and queer like me but male—approached me last fall for advice
as he set out unaccompanied with 15 students, I heard myself blurt without
hesitation, “You will want to live among them.” But who is to say that were
Dagni and I to return with a different group of students—or the very same
ones, for that matter—that our experience would be as gratifying? Academic
success too often depends on fortuity. Perhaps the best one can do is trust
one’s own sense of humility, one’s own ethicality, wherever one is.

NOTES

I acknowledge the valuable insight and supportive assistance of Dagni
Bredesen, D. Merilee Clunis, Kathie Friedman, Angela Ginorio, Susan Glenn,
Lorraine Martínez, Caroline Chung Simpson, and Shirley Yee.
1.

2.

“To Be Young, Pregnant, and Black: My Life as a Welfare Coed” is part of a
collection of essays on women, rights, and welfare, currently under consideration by Temple University Press. The volume’s editors are Vivyan Adair and
Sandra Dahlberg.
See Vanessa Bing and Pamela Trotman Reid, “Unknown Women and
Unknowing Research: Consequences of Color and Class in Feminist
Pedagogy,” in Knowledge, Difference, and Power: Essays Inspired by Women’s
Ways of Knowing (New York: Basic, 1996). They instructively underscore
“unknowing research” which they deﬁne as scholarship conducted by psychologists who refuse to know multiple dimensions of the lives of their subjects. Bing and Reid condemn a psychology studies methodology that uses
“women of color when researchers are seeking to uncover atypical phenomena…. The primary consequence of this approach is to pathologize women
of color while leaving their other concerns unaddressed. The continued
exclusion of culturally and economically diverse women from research on
ordinary problems and issues allows the entire discipline to remain ignorant
of the experiences of these women” (186–87). Equally instructive, Bing and
Reid identify feminist scholars who insist that “Science . . . is not value-free
and theories are riddled with biases, inasmuch as ideological biases inﬂuence
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the kinds of research questions raised and the results obtained” (194). And
they remind us that “self-interest need not be construed as having a deleterious inﬂuence. In fact, it can be credited with bringing investigators’ assumptions into clear view” (194).
Haaken’s essay is included in Women, Autobiography, Theory: A Reader, ed.
Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson (Madison: University of Wisconsin P, 1998).
pp. 352-361.
Chief among these readings were Sidonie Smith’s “Performativity,
Autobiographical Practice, Resistance,” Julia Watson’s “Unspeakable
Differences: The Politics of Gender in Lesbian and Heterosexual Women’s
Autobiographies,” and Carla Kaplan’s “Resisting Autobiography: Out-Law
Genres and Transnational Feminist Subjects,” all of which appear in Smith and
Watson, eds., Women, Autobiography, Theory: A Reader.

PA R T F I V E
The Social Character of Personal Narrative

1 2 L E A R N I N G T O TA K E I T P E R S O N A L LY
KATE RONALD
HEPHZIBAH ROSKELLY
There’s not much about academic life that’s personal. At least, no professional
academic is supposed to take any of the activities that make up an academic
life personally. The trajectories of our careers—getting hired, published,
tenured, promoted, reviewed—are documented in terms of qualiﬁcations, criteria, standards. These words feel scientiﬁc; they carry with them the
respectable aura of observation and impartiality, and academics are encouraged to take comfort in the procedures that determine how—and whether—
they will live their professional lives.
Yet of course all academics know how personal a professional life in a university is. What could be more personal than your job interview, sitting on a
bed in a small room in the Washington Hilton explaining what you have to
offer while They—the nodding Search Committee—declare what they want?
How does a writer not take personally a letter rejecting a deeply thought-out
essay that begins, “Must we have these ‘a funny thing happened to me on the
way to the cocktail party’ openings?” (First line of ﬁrst rejection letter of ﬁrst
article sent out by HCR to College English.) Or the rejection of a manuscript
from a group of Anonymous Reviewers, one of whom begins his/her response
with a pitying “I always admired Ronald and Roskelly’s work before. . . .”
(Comment from reviewer of book manuscript by HCR and KJR, later published.) How is a tenure-track professor supposed to use this anonymous evaluation of her published work: “I ﬁnd this popular, chatty, and obvious.”
(Written comments from KJR’s fourth-year tenure review.) How does a member of a departmental community fail to feel personally hurt by a tenure vote
that will cause him to leave that community, lose his job, his house, his students? (Both of us have lost good colleagues and friends to such tenure votes.)
The academic life is a personal life. Professional activities and decisions are
also deeply personal ones in great measure because writing and teaching are
activities of the spirit and imagination. Evaluations, recommendations,
reviews and other instruments that document performance comment on those
spiritual, imaginative enterprises. Why can’t we get real about just how personal our professional lives are and stop pretending that what goes on in a
classroom, a department and in our profession is “just business?”
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And yet the pressure to reject the personal is strong. The bias in a profession
still trying to believe its own press remains with the objectiﬁable and standardizable. (As the comment from the CE reviewer above suggests: it denigrates personal narrative as a “proper” form for an article as much as it criticizes the essay
itself. And, as the comment from Kate’s colleague’s shows: it rejects personal
narrative and objects to her personalized relationship with her audience. As you
can see, neither one of us has ever forgotten these comments.) In the face of
that pressure, and an odd, though real need to feel protected from the personal,
academics have a hard time asserting it in their writing, teaching, and—maybe
most damaging—in the decisions they make with and about one another in
tenure votes, curricular decisions, and promotion and merit evaluations.
Maybe this desire for escape from the personal is especially strong in English
departments, where writing forms the essence of both subject and method. The
inherently and inescapably messy, idiosyncratic, and deﬁantly subjective nature
of writing and reading is a burden to teachers trying to work within a system
that forces quantiﬁcation, data, results, and hierarchy. So teachers assign grades
to stories written by eighteen-year olds about parents dying; they evaluate language clearly shaped by poor schooling; they try to justify—in some terms they
can live with—a grade for the performance of self that writing is and must be.
Yet, we recognized the depth of the conﬂict between personal and professional in teaching and in the whole academic life only dimly at ﬁrst. As graduate students who had returned to school “late”—Hepsie was a public school
teacher; Kate a secretary—we knew our decision, and thus our work, was personal, requiring the sacriﬁce of security, family time, and money. And as beginning professors who rode the ﬁrst wave of rhetoric and composition (Kate
graduating in 1984, Hepsie in 1985), we understood less of the “professional”
side of the conﬂict than the ever-larger groups who followed us. No one talked
seriously to us in graduate school about publication. There was scarcely a conversation about the job search and MLA interviews. It took us a while—and we
realize that this admission makes us sound foolishly naive—to understand that
being academics—going pro—would mean that we’d leave our home and one
another.
This essay is a personal history of two academics’ struggle to stay together in
a deeply competitive environment, to ﬁnd, keep, and use the personal within
their professional lives. It’s certainly not a how-to guide for constructing a life
in academe. We have no real model to offer, no reasoned position to defend.
But we stumbled upon and then deliberately followed a path around the serious, professional/personal dilemma in our ﬁeld by using our friendship—and
our professional collaboration as writers—as a solace and a guide. Our friendship has, with no exaggeration, allowed us to stay in the profession. So if we
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don’t lay out a plan to follow, or announce a universal truth, we do here what
good teachers always do: we tell a story that may suggest something useful to a
reader about how to rethink an old problem, or how to offer resistance rather
than accommodation to a system intent on ignoring, reducing and constraining the personal dimensions of our professional lives.
I N T I M AT E M O T I V E S

Collaboration, especially group work and peer revision, has become a commonplace in many composition classrooms as teachers have realized the beneﬁts of active talk and listening among students: livelier discussions, deeper
investment in writing, awareness of alternative ideas. The pedagogical strategy
of creating small groups who talk and write together comes as well from a
clearer understanding of theories of learning that suggest people learn more
effectively when they articulate, respond to and challenge ideas in social and
connected ways. Academic writers in the humanities, especially in composition
and rhetoric, have begun to realize some of the same beneﬁts in their own collaborative efforts.
We have been collaborators now for twenty years, writing and speaking
together in many classrooms and professional venues. We have team-taught
classes, administered programs as a team, presented conference talks, papers
and workshops together, co-authored articles, co-edited one collection, and
most recently written together a book. But our collaboration did not stem
from our sense of applying theory to the test of practice in the classroom or in
our own writing. Although we have discovered professional rewards for our
work together, that’s not the reason we write together either. While our collaboration has developed simultaneously along with the ﬁeld’s embrace of social
constructionist theory and practice, working together, for us, has always been
more personal than professional.
As graduate students at the University of Louisville in the early 1980s, we
were assigned the responsibility of helping direct the composition program. But
we soon discovered that more than the contingency of our jobs as co-assistants
drew us together. We had both grown up in Louisville, although in different
parts of the city. Our educations had been different, too—Hepsie a graduate of
public schools and a public university; Kate a product of a Catholic girls’ high
school and a private Catholic university—but our ideas about learning were
much the same. We found similarities in our pasts as well: we both had strong
fathers with a clear sense of duty and ethics, supportive mothers who believed
in our abilities, complicated webs of family expectations and interactions. And,
as we shared family stories, we realized we had been brought up with almost
identical aphorisms to guide our behavior and our choices, aphorisms that

256

Personal Effects

seemed to be (or at least were put to us as) Southern in sensibility: “Be polite,”
especially to strangers and guests; “Don’t toot your own horn”; “Pretty is as
Pretty Does”; and “Act like a Lady, no matter what you are.”
We found that we were alike in lots of ways. We both used humor to deﬂect
our own fear and others’ potential criticism, and we laughed a lot. We were
energetic and optimistic. Maybe most important, we shared a beginning
understanding of our calling to teach, and a dawning, shaky awareness of the
personal changes that calling might require us to make. All these characteristics made us feel like a team even before we made our ﬁrst presentation
together, at an orientation session for teaching assistants and part-timers at the
beginning of the fall semester of 1980. We might have begun that ﬁrst session
by dividing up the responsibility for the presentation; that would have been
the way we had been trained to think of collaboration. Kate probably wrote
out an outline and presented a prepared bit on the role of the Writing Center,
Hepsie no doubt winged it as she described the construction of a syllabus. But
near the end of our ﬁrst session as Assistant Directors of Composition, somebody asked a question about drop/add or their schedules or something. We
were standing together on the stage and without hesitating we responded in
unison: “In the ofﬁce.” We looked at each other apologetically, and then turned
back to the group. “Check next week” we said again. Together. The crowd of
slightly bored old hands and more than slightly fearful new instructors
laughed. That workshop, and the ones that followed it, began to teach us that
together we had a more powerful voice than each of us could muster individually. We had been given the position from which to speak, but neither of us yet
had the authority that comes with a terminal degree, publication, tenure, or
years in service. Our two voices together, though, somehow could speak to
audiences that might not have listened to either of us alone. As time passed,
people around us started to run our names together, speaking of us almost
always as a unit, and we began to talk consciously about ourselves as a team
and cultivate our doubled presence. With this story, we write this reﬂection
down publicly for the ﬁrst time.
When we spoke together, in meetings and presentations and workshops, we
delivered ourselves together, making ourselves open and accountable not only to
our audiences but also to one another—honoring and using our individual
styles, pace, and predilections. As speakers together, at once performer and audience, we learned how to improvise and use nuance. We became more than usually attuned to each other’s words, and more that usually open to modifying our
own. The oral beginning of our co-authorship is important to this story because,
for us, collaboration remains primarily a matter of talk. The two books we’ve
worked on together both began in offhand conversation about our lives and
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interests. The preface to each one acknowledges the role of our talk in cultivating
our ideas and sustaining them through writing and more talk; the ﬁrst describing a conversation in the car on a backroad in southern Indiana about why we
felt pulled in such opposite directions—in Massachusetts and Nebraska, we were
being forced to choose between teaching and research, expressivist and social
theories of learning, just to name two of the most pervasive dichotomies that still
deﬁne the academic life—and the second in the attic at Emerson’s Old Manse,
where we excitedly talked with one another and the guide who had taken us
through the house about Emerson’s grafﬁti and the impact of the personal
within the historical. But the important point here is that we were traveling
together to be together; the ideas, the writing, grew from that impulse.
Our writing together has always in large measure been a way to keep our
talk, our friendship going. From the beginning, we made choices that perhaps
seemed less than professional but which turned out to be the most professionally astute moves we could have made. After our stint as Assistant Directors
was over, Kate was appointed Director of the University Writing Center, a
move which would take her to a new ofﬁce. Kate had started out in the Writing
Center as a tutor when she quit her secretary’s job and tentatively entered
graduate school. Hepsie had never taught in the Writing Center. Yet, faced with
separation, we decided that Hepsie would just move into the Director’s ofﬁce
with Kate. Thus, we continued our administrative collaboration whether the
university made it ofﬁcial or not. We team-taught English 098, the most basic
basic writing course, the back door to the University, and there we learned
even more about how to move, talk, and think together with students. The
Writing Center staff came to view us as co-directors, and when Kate left to take
her ﬁrst job at Nebraska, Hepsie moved ofﬁcially into the Director’s position.
In the ﬁfteen years we’ve been separated by several states and even the
Mississippi River, having an excuse to talk has been central because our collaboration was born mainly from separation, bound up with our memories of the
presence we had enjoyed in graduate school versus our present reality working
alone. We made all the right professional decisions, accepting the best tenure
track jobs we were offered, and those decisions made it seem important at ﬁrst
to carry on the kind of talk that had allowed us to make those professional
moves in the ﬁrst place. One of our most powerful memories is a moment outside the Writing Center, after comps, when we were hit (again, naively) with
the realization that all this good work meant that we would have to leave. We
burst into tears, held onto each other, and laughed while we cried over how
much we would have to give up in order to reap our professional rewards.
We no longer shared work in one place, and we missed it. So we decided to
write and present research together at the CCCC meeting in 1984, our ﬁrst
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professional meeting as professors. We proposed the paper together, drawing
on our team teaching in U of L’s Writing Center. We were cautioned by convention organizers that, together, we only had twenty minutes. At the session,
it was clear that we were expected to deliver separate performances, and there
was some confusion about how to introduce two people with only one paper
title. The physical space at the podium was too tight to allow us to stand
together. It was awkward: while one spoke, the other had to stand a step
behind, making our usual delivery—where we watch one another, interrupt,
make fun, refer back—difﬁcult to pull off. But we managed it. Many people
came up afterwards, not to comment on the substance of our “paper,” but on
the fact that we delivered it together. The audience seemed surprised, sort of
delighted, as though our talk let them become part of the interaction. People
wanted to talk to us not professionally, but personally, about how natural, easy,
and intimate our performance had seemed. That presentation became our ﬁrst
co-authored article, and working long-distance to prepare it for publication,
talking about working on it, we realized we had a scheme for protecting the
personal in our new and separate professional lives.
In the ﬁfteen years since then, we’ve taken on more and more professional
responsibilities—chairing composition programs, directing graduate studies,
directing dissertations, leading teacher education and writing across the curriculum programs—and we’ve sacriﬁced more and more of our personal lives
to those responsibilities. But we’ve perhaps lost less of those personal lives than
many academics because our talk always blurs the line between friendship and
work. We’re now always writing together, or planning to write together, or talking about writing together. We never compartmentalize, even in stolen weekend sessions supposedly devoted to writing a chapter. In the middle of a
discussion of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, we’re likely to go off on a fantasy
about where and how we’ll retire together. Instead of chastising ourselves for
inefﬁciency, we have learned to value the way our talk slips between personal
and professional. It’s no accident that our latest work together has explored the
uses of romantic rhetoric and pragmatic philosophy for the teaching of writing; our collaborative lives have been sustained by a spirit of hope and belief,
but at the same time carefully managed by practical moves and decisions that
keep us talking and writing together.
Academics will tell you that they write for many reasons; because they have
an idea they think is important, because they have to publish to get ahead,
because they want to teach others. All writers will tell you that they write to
connect; we simply add one more, very important connection to that process:
the connection with each other. But there are lots of other advantages of collaboration too. Looking back at the beginnings of our work together, it’s easy
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enough to see us as two women in search of a voice within an academic world
where we were not at all sure we belonged. We remain in this world largely
because that voice has been created in our collaboration. We were able to ﬁnd
an “other, “ a responding voice, that was not alien. And we discovered another
big advantage as we practiced this way of writing together: collaborating in our
talky way allows—even insists on—a speech-like quality in the discourse that
gets inside even our most academic prose. And we like that. Our talk easily
turns into writing, and our writing becomes a way to image our talk. We see
ourselves speaking together as we write and rewrite, rather than reading alone.
As we write, we imagine not reading the text, but speaking it together. And
because we now theorize this double-voiced relationship consciously, we now
recognize the process and the style that has come out of it as one strategy of
resistance to the formal, impersonal, discourse and modes of the academy.
As the opening to this essay shows, not every audience approves of this oral
style or for that matter understands this kind of collaborative relationship. We
have had to counter and respond to criticism about the collaborative path
we’ve followed in our professional lives. For, despite new attention and theoretical support for social theories of learning and discourse, myths about collaboration remain: that there’s always a ﬁrst author and a second; that one
member of the team is the creative spark, the other the plodding worker.
Perhaps this picture of collaboration comes from science, where research
teams have a deﬁnite “team leader” with the vision and a bunch of other scientists who work the lab experiments and get to put their names on the ﬁnished
papers. Or maybe it comes from traditional graduate student/professor collaborations, where the student who dug through the library is allowed to “coauthor” with the professor who had the brilliant idea. Whatever its source in
academia, there’s a pervasive sense that in any team effort, there’s no real team.
Underneath all the myths about co-authorship is the belief that two people can
never have (or be credited with) the same idea.
In our experience, sometimes Kate has the idea; sometimes Hepsie, but the
idea very quickly becomes “ours” because it moves between us so fast. When we
were in graduate school, we used to joke about having it—the creativity, the
power, the authority a struggling graduate student needed to teach engaging yet
rigorous classes, write stunning major papers, read The Wings of the Dove and
The Rhetoric of Motives in one week, comment with wit and eloquence in seminars, go to the grocery, pick up the kids, and visit aging parents. We’d ask each
other, “Do you really need it today, or do you think I could have it?” We worked
the same metaphor in the process of getting tenure and promotion. It seems to
be something we share, lend out, trade off, just as we wear the same size in shoes
and the same prescription in glasses. Now that this particular essay is completed,
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for example, just like every other piece we’ve written together, we can’t tell who
had the idea that generated its ﬁnal shape. Our knowledge is joined, shared, and
communal—in inception, conception, and delivery.
So we have given up the notion that anybody’s idea is hers alone, although,
as we’ve discovered, much of the academy proceeds that way. We have talked to
other collaborators who admit “holding the best ideas back “ for their individual, future projects. We’ve heard professors say that they don’t want to give
their graduate students “too many of their ideas” or they’d have nothing left to
write themselves. “What section were you responsible for?” a colleague might
ask. In fact has asked. Repeatedly. Of both of us. We always reply “All of it. Both
of us. “ We simply don’t buy that belief in ideas or language as individual property. Hepsie wouldn’t have re-thought Plato without Kate; Kate wouldn’t
understand Emerson without Hepsie. We resist the academy’s standard of the
truly “original” idea, for our collaboration has shown us that all good ideas are
remade in the words and minds of others. In our work, there is no clear division of inspiration or labor.
PERSONAL METHOD

Another myth about collaboration is that it divides up work and makes it
easier. Sometimes we think that the humanities—which often seems to take
perverse pleasure in the difﬁcult—is wary of collaborating writers because
there’s a suspicion that writing together is somehow easier than writing alone;
that somehow the writers escape work by halving their work load. In drafting
our projects together, we’ve found that the writing load doesn’t split in half; it
doubles. We do not, for example, write separate chapters and then submit
them to the other for comment and revision; we don’t assign separate tasks or
sections although we do play to the strengths we discovered in each other (Kate
will do bibliographies and manage the computer disks; Hepsie will write
inspiring endings; Kate will write the funny line; Hepsie will ﬁnd the perfect
quote). Our way of writing together has become so integrated that even these
examples, however, sound false to us as we write them.
Our organic process of writing together, obviously, is always pretty messy.
When we get an idea—from what we’ve been reading (and we often read very
different things), teaching, observing around us—and we decide that we’ll
pursue it together, we start talking: “Let’s take your freshmen and my business
writing students as an example.” “So what’s going on with Rorty?” “How about
using that Anna Quindlen book as the lead-in?” “OK, but let’s not forget to
bring the Octavio Paz quote back in some way.” “I was out working in the roses
this morning when our title came to me.” As with all the stages in our collaborative composing process, our jumbly drafting or invention is grounded in this
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kind of exploratory conversation. The talk quickly becomes a stimulant for as
well as a record of our thinking. We not only begin to plan and draft the essay
in our talk about it; we begin to shape how we’ll talk about it.
If we’re in the same location, we usually do this talk at the computer, making notes or outlines, then moving to the machine, taking turns at the keyboard. One talks, one writes, and both revise talk and writing as we proceed.
The pace is halting, sometimes the ﬁngers of the one on the computer can’t
move fast enough on the keys; sometimes there are long pauses while we think.
“Why is this so hard?” one will complain. We digress and ramble; one walks to
the bookshelf, the other says “I’ve got it,” and starts a new paragraph.
Sometimes the ideas and revisions come too fast: we’ve often rebuked ourselves for not using a tape recorder. (Once or twice we’ve managed it, and it
does help, but it also somehow interferes, makes our talk seem too professionalized, too deliberate.) When we’re exhausted or our other lives intrude, we
print out, read, then make more notes for ourselves for our next session. We
proceed this way for as long as we are together or until we have a complete
draft. When we are writing together long distance—a much more common
occurrence—we talk, write, email, fax, read over the phone, revise separately,
revise together. We’ve never before consciously described this procedure; it
hardly seems like one. And yet, we do follow a consistent if meandering path,
always listening, responding, backtracking, building, changing.
We usually have a rough sketch very quickly, and then we read separately,
talk about what we’ve read and talk through the whole piece together. Because
we are used to working this way, and because we trust the other’s words, something interesting happens in this process. Although it’s arduous, taking much
longer to get from start to ﬁnish than a piece either of us might write individually, we ﬁnd ourselves anticipating the other. One of us might be writing a
paragraph and stop to imagine the voice that responds to the thought. Or to
imagine not just the other’s reaction but the other’s production. “Kate will
think that’s an awkward pile of words”; “Hepsie will ﬁnd another metaphor
that’s more eloquent.”
We have found, in our disorganized, inefﬁcient method of drafting and
revising, the same rejoinders and responses all writers listen for in their audiences. Here, in the process of getting the ideas on the screen, on paper, in the
mail, our reasons for writing together in the ﬁrst place also come into play. Not
only will we tell each other, often through silences, that our ideas are simply
boring, no good—we also “rejoin” with the kind of support and encouragement that every writer needs. Hepsie writes in a letter to Kate, with the latest
version of an introduction “This is a great story to begin with.” Kate faxes revisions to Hepsie and says that her explanation of Peirce’s triadicity make sense,
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which is no small feat. At the lonely moments in front of the computer, it’s easy
for a “single author” to abandon an idea; solitary writers have to conjure up the
belief themselves. Acting simultaneously as writer and audience, we work out
belief together; in other words, we give it back and forth to each other.
It’s a theoretical commonplace now that the solitary writer’s voice doesn’t
really exist, that all language is constructed in communal contexts. And yet, in
academic contexts, the continuing belief in the original and separate voice
leads to the false assumption that collaboration causes an individual writer’s
voice to get lost, that writing produced in tandem becomes devoid of personality, responsibility, and creativity. Our process of writing together does indeed
change and challenge the writer’s unique voice, but in creative, rather than
deadly, or deadening, ways.
It is true that the voice all writers struggle to ﬁnd and maintain gets altered
by working with another writer, by listening and responding to another voice.
The ﬁrst time the other voice says “Do you really need to use the word organic”?
or “I’d like to begin the paragraph with the story of the train instead,” the
writer’s ego bristles a little. When those sorts of comments continue on both
sides, writers can only defend “their” choices, “their” voices, rather than listen
for a new one, and that’s why, we suspect, so many ﬁrst time collaborators never
become second time practitioners. What we’ve discovered about voice is that
successful collaborative tone doesn’t emerge as a duet, or a round, one writer’s
voice followed by another in uneasy compromise or certainly not from a shouting contest where one voice claims victory over another. The tone in a good collaboration comes from a new third voice that emerges in the process.
The great advantage of knowing each other well before we began to write
together may have helped us to avoid ego-bruising debates about additions
and changes to a growing text. But our earliest attempts were sometimes
marked by hesitation as we painstakingly listened for that third voice to assert
itself. “Why don’t we put Eudora Welty here?” one of us would say. “Then we
can talk about reader-voice in the students’ writing later.” The shift to “we need
to” from “I think you need to” led us to take responsibility for all the sentences
that we were producing. Using that “we” soon became a method for establishing our third, collaborative voice, to hear it and nurture it along. This small
stylistic matter clearly illustrates our collaborative voice: we quickly realized
that, to avoid confusion, the only “we” that could ever appear in our work
together had to refer only to us—Hepsie and Kate—not to teachers in general,
the profession, or humanity. Forced, then, to eliminate the royal “we” from all
our prose in favor of the particular, intimate “we” of our partnership, we write
perhaps more humbly and with more immediacy and accountability than we
might have otherwise.
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You don’t lose your individual voice by writing together. If anything, we’ve
discovered, you ﬁnd it more easily, hear it more directly as a result of writing as
a team. We are as single writers more conscious of style and of effects on an
audience now. Here, in single-authored words, so rare for us, are some of the
lessons we’ve learned about our own writing from one another:
Hepsie: From Kate, I’ve learned the value of attention. I’m a writer who generalizes,
who makes sweeping—often sermony—statements. I’m a writer who’ll sacriﬁce too
much to a metaphor or to a clever turn of phrase. Kate keeps me honest. I wouldn’t
have known these things about my writing had it not been for Kate’s example of
careful reasoning, thoughtful presentation, meticulous stylistic decisions. I’ve
learned to move down in my writing as well as out, and I’ve learned just how important the merger of support and generalization are. Plus, Kate’s funny on paper and
in person and her clear sense of humor permeates my own thinking now.
Kate: From Hepsie I’ve learned to let go and to believe. I’m a writer who hesitates, who
edits too quickly, who writes in ﬁts and starts. From her I’ve learned to follow and
trust a metaphor, to mine it and not be afraid to stretch. (From her I’ve learned to start
sentences with “from her”; she claims she’s not a stylist, but her parallel constructions
give her writing an oral style that is terribly effective.) More than anything, she’s
taught me that the process itself is what matters. Hepsie resists closure; for her, it’s the
exploration of the idea that’s important. Where I tend not to look down the sideroads,
not stop at historical markers along the way, because I want to get there and be ﬁnished, Hepsie’s continually looking around, wondering about connections, taking the
scenic route. And she’s also a very funny traveling companion.

As you can see, our approaches to writing alone have been strengthened by
hearing the unexpressed query or afﬁrmation of our partner’s response. In
other words, the “rejoinder” has become an overt part of our individual writing. We automatically hear the other’s voice. And now, since we write together
so often, looking for that voice leads us to the point at which we no longer
remember which one of us wrote which sentence. More importantly, it
reminds us to remain tentative in the face of an evolving draft, to remember
that the “we” being created is more important than the “I” that we’re letting go.
Bakhtin talks about how every word is in reality “half mine/half someone
else’s.” Our composing together extends this deﬁnition of meaning to something more like “all mine and all hers.” And, this realization of community, of
communion, is the reason, years ago, we entered academia in the ﬁrst place.
THE PERSONAL IN THE PROFESSIONAL

The ideology of individualism, ﬁrmly in place in American culture, especially in school and most especially in the humanities, often prevents collaboration or makes it less powerful and successful than it might be. The icons of
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American literature, at least up until the last part of the twentieth century, have
depicted the individual, heroic and embattled, against a group or a society that
limited and tried to defeat individual choice or belief. Hester Prynne, Nick
Adams, Jay Gatsby, Edna Pontelier, Bigger Thomas, and dozens of others that
come to mind, all faced unfeeling or repressive groups that prevented them
from becoming or enacting themselves. As well, some of our most cherished
cultural ideals in this country—the cowboy, the entrepreneur, the poor boy
who becomes president—celebrate individual striving and accomplishment in
stories and songs, in movies and comics, and in history books. (It’s unsurprising, although worth noting, that these heroic individual models have, for the
most part, been decidedly male). No wonder then that school replicates and
reinforces the cultural prescription. Achievement in school, in sports or academics, is by and large all about competition, what an individual (or group acting as an individual) can do, above and against group norms or predictions.
We love the Cinderella story in life and in basketball.
Because English studies is at heart about the production and reception of
writing, premised on cultural and literary models that glorify the individual
creator, teachers carry the myth of the individual ﬁrmly into classrooms as we
teach and into our ofﬁces as we write. Despite all the theory of how writing
actually happens, how creativity is sparked—socially, communally—and
despite acknowledgments pages at the beginning of books and dissertations,
the academic model of success too often fails to make theory practicable in
writers’ own working lives. The recent ﬁlm Shakespeare in Love shows young
Will Shakespeare practicing writing his name rather than penning Romeo and
Juliet until he talks to his friends in a bar. He uses the words, the ideas, and the
experiences of everybody around him to ﬁnd and illuminate his own creative
energy. All writers know from their own experiences as writers that ideas are
engendered and transformed in conversation, in collaboration, with those
around us, with books we read, with stories we hear. But academics ignore that
truth too often.
It may be because academics are so driven to assess achievement that we continue to promote and perpetuate the individual at the expense of the communal.
It seems hard to reward two rather than one. The system drives us to ask: Who
did what? Who had the idea ﬁrst? Which part is yours? We want to make sure
that the individual gets credit. Our students feel this conﬂict too when they work
together. Most teachers and students have had unhappy experiences with “group
presentations” where “one person did all the work” but all the others get similarly
rewarded for the ﬁnal product. When teachers do assign team writing, it’s often
in the name of efﬁciency rather than a nod to the social nature of language, a
practical attempt to cut down the workload of evaluating individual writers. And
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one of the mainstays of collaborative writing assignments is the individual’s
statement of contribution to the project, or the team’s assessment of each individual’s work. Despite what the academy is learning about team writing in professional and business contexts, collaboration remains suspect.
In spite of the humanities’ problems with collaboration, there are some well
known and successful practitioners of dual authorship and dual presentation
style. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar have written together for years, and from
their initial study The Madwoman in the Attic (1984) to the Norton Anthology of
Women’s Literature (1999), the profession has tended to think of them as always
together, always as Gilbert and Gubar. Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford form
another writing team that has merged into one unit—almost; moreover, their
co-authored articles and their study of collaboration (Singular Texts/Plural
Authors) have helped the profession take collaborative writing seriously as a
practice and as an area of research. In fact, at a Coalition of Women Scholars
meeting during the College Composition and Communication meeting in the
Spring of 2000, Lunsford argued that the “structures of the academy get in our
way” and must be changed to allow and reward collaborative writing, particularly collaborative dissertations.
We think that change would require a real shift in the academy’s conception
of effort, achievement, and reward. The individual still holds center stage, often
even within collaborations themselves. We’ve noticed that many collaborative
pairs of writers steadfastly retain the markers of individual effort, perhaps
because collaborators feel the pressure of the individualist model so strongly. For
example, in their latest collaboration, John Dewey and the Challenge of Classroom
Practice (1998), Stephen Fishman and Lucille McCarthy sign individual chapters
with individual names, even marking each one’s contribution in co-authored
chapters with “ﬁrst” and “second” authorship. This convention is an acknowledgment of a method of collaboration that doesn’t risk a loss of individual
autonomy or threaten academic, literary, and cultural models of individual
achievement and accountability. The work is divided rather than combined. The
two writers are in dialogue with one another and with their subject, but they
retain their own selves as they write. As we’ve shown, our writing together doesn’t work that way. We’re interested in what happens when we create a new voice
and blend facets of an idea; we use our talk as a method of creating that third
voice or idea, rather than as conversation between our separate selves.
We’re not saying that this process is easy, nor are we necessarily recommending our method, or any method, of collaborative writing to any of our
readers. We still exist in a profession dominated by an individualistic, competitive model, and, as writers, we had to understand, early, that the academic life
we entered expected and tried to require us to be in competition with one
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another. That model is the source of questions like “What percentage of this
article did you write?” Or “Why is she listed as ﬁrst author?” We have to resist
that model, not only to write together, but also to be friends, which has always
been the basis of our writing together at all. The process we’ve described is our
way, not necessarily the way, to resist such a model.
But because of our friendship and the values and insights we’ve gained
through writing together, we have continually (and successfully) fought against
the destructive effects of professional competition. Just as we were taught at
home, we are still polite; we still believe that pretty (or scholarly or teacherly) is
as pretty (or scholarly or teacherly) does, as we serve as supporters but also critics and watchdogs for each other’s temptations toward professionalized stances
and language; we still try not to toot our own horns too much (although we toot
the other’s, a much more “ladylike” and happy stance). And we have retained,
thank god, the silliness of those ﬁrst years as co-administrators and team teachers, our ability to see the hilarity of so much of the academic life, as well as its
high seriousness—the lives at stake, including our own—in our teaching.
Our writing together has remained one way, and a signiﬁcant one, that
we’ve been able to stay in a profession that routinely suspects its members and
to confront the over-specialization in our ﬁeld, the esoteric, dry voices that too
often dominate oral and written performance, the destructive over-competitiveness that stymies real growth and learning and risk-taking. Our writing as a
pair has become a way to keep believing in the personal worth of what we’re
doing, to remember that the professional is always personal. For us, the personal collaborative relationship that we’ve nurtured in writing and in talk—
both privately and publicly and in real attempts to blur that line—remains the
ground of all our work and its method.
We’re better writers and thinkers, storytellers and teachers in part because
we both remember and use each other’s memories (sometimes we remember
them better than our own.) We count on one another’s words to help us teach,
and we use our friendship to mentor younger members of our profession as we
assert, implicitly and explicitly, its importance in our academic lives. And in
our administrative, departmental work, in the painful decision making
processes that all academic units engage in, we are braver colleagues than we
would be without the example and sympathy of the other. Whether it’s a policy
matter or a tenure decision, we’re less willing to accept objectivity as a defense,
secret ballot as a refuge, tradition as law. Simply put, our collaboration has
taught us that the personal is never merely that; “taking it personally” is not a
condition to be overcome but a platform from which to act.

13 CUENTOS DE MI HISTORIA
An Art of Memory
Víctor Villanueva
A Memory. Seattle, 1979.
She is a contradiction in stereotypes, not to be pegged. He likes her
right off. She wants to go to Belltown, the Denny Regrade, to take photos. He wants to go along. He does, feeling insecure and full of
bravado, slipping into the walk of bravado he had perfected as a child
in Brooklyn. Stop into a small café at the outskirts of downtown, at the
entry to the Regrade. It’s a French-style café, the Boulangerie, or some
such. To impress her, he speaks French.
“Un tas de café, s’il vous plais. Et croissants pour les deux.” Don’t
correct it. It’s how he said it.
He’s an English major, a senior, quite proud of having gotten this far
in college. But insecure about what this will lead to (since he had only
gotten as far as deciding to stay in college till he’s ﬁnally in over his
head), he tells her of a novel he will write some day. His description
goes something like:
I’ve been thinking about a novel about a white Puerto Rican
kid who buys into the assimilation myth, hook, line, and sinker.
He does all the right things—learns the language, learns how to
pronounce “r’s” in words like “mother” and “water” and how
not to trill the “r” when he says “three,” and he does well in
school. He’s even a war hero. Does it all, only to realize that
assimilation just can’t happen. Yet he can’t really be Puerto
Rican. And he isn’t allowed into the Assimilation Club. So maybe
he goes to Puerto Rico to ﬁnd out who he might have been and
what he is tied to. I don’t have it all worked out.

The plot line might not have been worked out, but this was the impulse
nevertheless—to keep alive the memory of assimilation denied, a truism
turned to myth, to try to hold on to, maybe even to regain that which had been
lost on the road to assimilation.
In some sense, the impulse gets worked out some years later with Bootstraps,
the assimilation myth explicit in the title; the story told then elaborated upon
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with research and with theory. It’s an attempt to play out a kind of Freireian
pedagogy: the political explored through the experiential. And it does more. It’s
an autobiography with political, theoretical, pedagogical considerations. The story
includes ethnographic research. The story includes things tried in classrooms. The
story includes speculations on the differences between immigrants and minorities,
the class system and language, orality and literacy, cultural and critical literacy,
Freire, ideology, hegemony, how racism continues or the ways in which racism is
allowed to continue despite the profession’s best efforts. And in so doing the story
suggests how we are—all of us—subject to the systemic. This is the personal made
public and the public personalized, not to self-glory nor to point ﬁngers but to suggest how, maybe, to make the exception the rule. (xviii)

Now some part of that ﬁrst impulse re-asserts itself, ﬁctionalizing, telling
the story, reaching back to the heritage that is at risk of passing away quickly.
Remember to call your grandpa “abuelo.” He’ll like the sound of
that, since none of my sister’s kids have called him that. If you let him,
he’ll just watch baseball day and night and not say much. Push him for
the stories of Puerto Rico during his childhood. Ask him about catching
shrimp with his hands, and the stories of how the neighborhood boys
got a Model A Ford, about the revolutionary who hid out in el Yunque,
about his time in the Army. Ask about my grandfather, Basilio, and gardening, and working as a groundskeeper and gardener for the
University. And ask about Tío Vicente, the tall farmer, inland, on the coffee hills. “Inland” is important about knowing about being Puerto
Rican, about Puerto Rico. I remember when I met him. A tall PR Man,
that was very cool. And he gave me sugar cane from his farm, and a coffee bean, and a lemon that he had cut a hole on the top of. And he told
me to chew on the been, squeeze lemon juice on the tongue, and chew
on the cane. I wish I could give you that memory, mi’jitas. Now, Mom is
easier. She loves to talk. But she’d rather forget the past. And I don’t
want the past forgotten, so press her too.

The ﬁction, the bootstraps retold and ﬁctionalized would have to begin
back then, not quite a generation after the change of hands, when the Spanish
colony was handed over to the U.S., the changes seen by three generations—
Boricua to Nuyorican to the middle class of color far removed from the cultural
soil of either of the generations, maybe even a wheatﬁeld in Eastern
Washington. It’s important. The memory.
So many have said this so well, that it’s hard for me to reiterate without
breaking into the academic discourse of cite-and-quote—Adell, JanMohamed
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and Lloyd, Omi and Winant, Saldívar, E. San Juan, Singh, Skerrett, and Hogan,
Smorkaloff, and the “standards” like Anzaldúa or hooks—all have written
about the connections between narratives by people of color and the need to
reclaim a memory, memory of an identity in formation, constant reformation,
the need to reclaim a memory of an identity as formed through the generations. And, I’d say, the need to reclaim and retain the memory of the imperial
lords, those who have forcibly changed the identities of people of color
through colonization.
Nelly, the department’s graduate secretary, hands me a ﬂier for a
meeting of the Paciﬁc Islander’s group, inviting me to join the students,
staff, and faculty (which includes two department chairs I work with
often). We smile at each other. Her cultural ways—Filipina—and mine
are so different really—except that we have two out of three imperial
lords in common: Spain and the US. It binds us. Our ﬁrst were before
the world got large, more local: the Japanese and the Caribes. We
laugh, while others look and listen on with looks of wondering. It’s not
their memory.

Memory simply cannot be adequately portrayed in the conventional discourse of the academy.
I am grateful for the acknowledgment of perceptions that academic discourse provides, for the resources the conventions of citation make available,
for the ideocentric discourse that displays the inductive or deductive lines of
thought, a way to trace a writer’s logical connections. But the cognitive alone is
insufﬁcient. It can be strong for logos. It can be strong for ethos. But it is so very
weak in pathos. Academic discourse tries, after all, to reach the Aristotelian
ideal of being completely logocentric, though it cannot be freed of the ethical
appeal to authority. Here: A demonstration. Agustín Lao, in “Islands at the
Crossroads: Puerto Ricanness Traveling between the Translocal Nation and the
Global City,” writes that
Puerto Ricans (as other racialized diasporas) function within multiple and ambiguous registers of race and racism. As colonized subjects, all Puerto Ricans are “colored”
by colonial discourses. On the other hand, differential processes of racialization can
either nominalize Puerto Ricans as “ethnic” and/or allow some light-skinned Puerto
Ricans to “pass” as “white.” . . . A single Puerto Rican “transmigrant” can be classiﬁed
as trigueña on the island, black in Ohio, and Latina in New York. (178-79)

Now consider the rhetorical effect of Professor Lao’s assertion (though with
qualiﬁcation) and a couple of stories from a light-skinned Puerto Rican. Both
take place during the Summer of 2000. First story:
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He was picked up at the registration desk of the hotel in Iowa City.
The limousine (really a van) driver walks up, a man in his late ﬁfties or
early sixties, buzz cut, thick build, surely one more accustomed to hard
physical labor, a farmer, one would imagine given the locale. Says at
least the guest is on time, kind of to the person behind the registration
desk, kind of to himself, maybe even to the guest. He goes on to say
that the last guest he’d picked up had been ﬁfteen minutes late then
didn’t pay the fare.
Once in the van, the story of the deadbeat develops. It was a family
of four, including an infant. No car seat.
“I coulda had my license pulled, with no car seat for the baby. Then
he tries to pay me with a $100 travelers’ check, like I carry that kind of
money at ﬁve in the morning.”
“Were they foreigners?” assuming the passengers would have overestimated the ﬂuidity of travelers’ checks.
“Who can know these days. The guy wore a turban. What are you?”
Internal soliloquy: He didn’t say “rag head,” so maybe this is more
the condition of the international seaports ﬂowing into the middle of
America, the in-migration of the newest immigrants and those new
immigrants from the 1930s, a land no longer completely owned by
those of Scandinavian and German ancestry. But 1898 and 1917 really
should mean something in a situation like this. [NB: 1898: the US
acquisition of Puerto Rico; 1917: US citizenship conferred on all
Puerto Ricans].
“Me? I’m American.”
“Coulda fooled me!”
“Yeah. I’m from New York.”
The conversation ends. The next passenger turns out to be a black
man with a crutch coming out of an upper-middle-class home in the
suburbs of Iowa City. Kind of felt sorry for the driver and his comfortable assumptions.

Second story:
It was another one of those receptions produced by the dean of the
graduate school. This one was to welcome Doctoral Fellows in
Residence. Most were persons of color. I was there as a department
chair and as one of the mentors to a couple of the fellows.
The scene: Back porch of the house, clusters of folks with drinks in
hand or paper plates with guacamole and chips, talking, smiling, over-
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looking cows grazing in the valley below, and green soft rolling hills
nearby, maybe 300 yards away, where there will soon be wheat, blowing beautifully in the wind.
A conversation ensues with one of the fellows, a woman who grew
up in the black area of Boston, Rockport (CH). Listening in is an associate dean (MT), originally from Central Asia, overtly happy to be away
from Russian bureaucracy. The conversation turns to race in the wheatland.
VV: “Around here folks don’t know if I’m Spanish, Jewish, Italian,
from the Middle East, or from South Asia.”
MT: “I would have thought you were Italian”
CH: “I don’ know. He looks pretty Portorican to me.”
Sure, she knows the hue, she sees the “niggerlips,” one of those
names I endured as a child, just like Martín, Martín Espada:
Niggerlips was the high school name
for me.
So called by Douglas
the car mechanic, with green tattoos
on each forearm,
and the choir of round pink faces
that grinned deliciously
from the back row of classrooms,
droned over by teachers
checking attendance too slowly.
Douglas would brag
about cruising his car
near sidewalks of black children
to point an unloaded gun,
to scare niggers
like crows off a tree,
he’d say.
My great-grandfather Luis
was un negrito too,
a shoemaker in the coffee hills
of Puerto Rico, 1900.
The family called him a secret
and kept no photograph.
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My father remembers
the childhood white powder
that failed to bleach
his stubborn copper skin,
and the family says
he is still a ﬂy in milk.
So Niggerlips has the mouth
of his great-grandfather,
the song he must have sung
as he pointed the leather and nails,
the stubbornness of a ﬂy in milk,
and all you have, Douglas,
is that unloaded gun.

Professor Lao, I would contend, is not quite right. Those of us who are lightskinned don’t pass for white; we’re just not automatically sorted into the appropriate slot. But more to the point is that Lao’s academic discourse (complete
with scare quotes and nominalizations) is insufﬁcient, lacks emotional appeal.
And though Aristotle thought it not right to sway with emotional appeals, he
knew that the greatest impact on listeners is emotional. The personal here does
not negate the need for the academic; it complements, provides an essential element in the rhetorical triangle, an essential element in the intellect—cognition
and affect. The personal done well is sensorial and intellectual, complete,
knowledge known throughout mind and body, even if vicariously.
And for the person of color, it does more. The narrative of the person of
color validates. It resonates. It awakens, particularly for those of us who are in
institutions where our numbers are few. We know that though we really are
Gramsci’s exceptions—those who “through ‘chance’ . . . has had opportunities
that the thousand others in reality could not or did not have”—our experiences are in no sense unique but are always analogous to other experiences
from among those exceptions. So more than narrating the life of one of color
so that “one creates this possibility, suggests the process, indicates the opening,” in Gramsci’s terms (Cultural Writings 132), we remember the results of
our having realized the possibility, discovered the process, found the opening,
while ﬁnding that there is in some sense very little change on the other side.
This is what Ellis Cose describes as The Rage of a Privileged Class.
As I’ve written before (“On Colonies, Canons, and Cose”), Cose explains,
mainly by way of anecdote, the reasons why African Americans in particular
continue to be angry even after having crossed over to the other side. He
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explains the ways in which little slights continue to display the racism inherent
in our society. Those “Dozen Demons” are
1. Inability to ﬁt in.
2. Exclusion from the club.
3. Low expectations.
4. Shattered hopes.
5. Faint praise.
6. Presumption of failure.
7. Coping fatigue.
8. Pigeonholing.
9. Identity troubles.
10. Self-censorship and silence.
11. Mendacity.
12. Guilt by association.

I haven’t been called a “spic” in many years (except by others of color). Yet
little things happen that betray the underlying racism that affects us all, no
matter how appalled by racism we might be. I read Anzaldúa or hooks or the
poetry of Espada or Cruz or Esteves or any other writing of color, and I know I
haven’t become clinically paranoid. I know that I’ve been poked by one of the
demons, a little triton to the ribs. Some of the slights signiﬁed by Cose are selfimposed, Fanon’s internal colonialism. Some are imposed. All can be laid bare
through the personal made public.
There’s the story of the academics of color who wrote about the
subtle ways in which they ﬁnd themselves victims of some of Cose’s
demons—exclusion, expecting less, presuming failure, pigeonholing as
“brown-on-brown” research rather than disinterested research (read:
white and classical-empirical). Someone far away reads the essay once
published and ﬁles suit for slander. The authors had never heard of the
person. This is a very funny story to people of color who have heard
it—the laughter of veriﬁcation and white-guilt gone awry.
The converse:
“Man, I loved your book [or article or essay]. I could relate. The
same things have happened to me,” told to the author time and again
wherever he travels. Identity minus troubles among Cose’s demons,
association guiltless, a new club formed.

Somehow, the spic does remain, despite all the good fortune and accolades,
not only within me, but from without. While a good academic piece would
help me to remember, rich narrative does more for the memory.
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And the precedent is old. Memoria was the mother of the muses, the most
important of the rhetorical ofﬁces. Now rhetorics of writing seem to go no further than invention, arrangement, and style, when delivery is still there, the
matter of “voice,” and memory is tied in as well, surely for people of color. It’s
as if we have accepted Plato’s prophecy that literacy would be the downfall of
memory, leading only to remembrance, so that memory in the rhetorical
canon seems all but forgotten, except as an historical artifact. And the canon of
rhetoric only seems to note the contradiction that a proliﬁc writer would write
against writing (Kennedy 42,58). But Plato’s writing is signiﬁcant because of its
genre, an attempt at representation of dialogue, of story telling, of the play.
Plato’s literacy took shape not as logocentric discourse but as a representation
of discourse in action. Though folks like Volosinov have shown that all discourse, written as well as spoken, is dialogic. Plato is maybe the coolest [yes,
coolest] of the philosophers because of the resonance of the dialogue, the possibility for humor, the clear presence of all three points in the rhetorical triangle and the unspeciﬁed (at least by Aristotle) dimension which is context. I
don’t mean to wax Platonic here, really, only to suggest that there’s something
to Plato’s notion of memory as more than recollection and to his leaning on a
written discourse that approximates orality as a means toward arriving at that
big-m Memory. The narratives of people of color jog our memories as a collective in a scattered world and within an ideology that praises individualism.
And this is all the more apparent for the latino and latina, whose language contains the assertion of the interconnectedness among identity, memory, and the
personal. There is a common saying among Puerto Ricans and Cubans: Te doy
un cuento de mi historia, literally rendered as “I’ll give you a story about my
history”: me, history and memory, and a story.
A thousand years before the ﬁrst Europeans arrived on Puerto Rico,
the native peoples of the mainland and the lesser Antilles migrated to
Puerto Rico, where they could live in relative peace, able to ﬁsh and
live off the fresh vegetation—pineapple and varieties of tuber that have
no name in English. We don’t know the names of the ﬁrst inhabitants of
Puerto Rico. Our history is the history told by the Europeans who, conferring their values on the land, took the language of the local imperial
lords. We only know the names given the ﬁrst Puerto Ricans by their
ﬁrst colonizers, the ﬁrst to raid them, the ﬁrst to enslave them, the ones
the Europeans honored by naming the region after them. These ﬁrst colonizers were the peoples of Carib. And they named the people of that
island Arawak and the culture of the Arawak was called Taino. And their
island was named Boriquén. Then came Columbus (or Columbo or
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Colón—I’m glad we’ve stopped translating people’s names, or I’d have
to walk around with the name Conqueror Newton). And then Ponce de
León. And then the priests. And we don’t really know what happened
when they spoke, what transpired between the priests of Spain and the
Boricua Arakwakas of Taino Ways.

So, to the analogous:
The scene is Peru. It’s the end of the ﬁfteenth century. Father
Valverde, a Franciscan, is speaking to the Incan philosopher-rhetorician
about the ways of the world. The Franciscan intends to be instructive,
an attempt to raise the indigenous from its ignorance. The Incan doesn’t recognize the developmental mindset and enters into dialectical
interplay. Having heard of how things work according to Father
Valverde, the Incan responds:
You listed ﬁve preeminent men whom I ought to know. The
ﬁrst is God, three and one, which are four, whom you call the
creator of the universe. Is he perhaps our Pachacámac and
Viracocha? The second claims to be the father of all men, on
whom they piled their sins. The third you call Jesus Christ, the
only one not to cast sins on that ﬁrst man, but he was killed. The
fourth you call pope. The ﬁfth, Carlos, according to you, is the
most powerful monarch of the universe and supreme over all.
However, you afﬁrm this without taking account of other monarchs. But if this Carlos is prince and lord of all the world, why
does he need the pope to grant him concessions and donations
to make war on us and usurp our kingdoms? And if he needs the
pope, then is not the pope the greater lord and most powerful
prince of all the world, instead of Carlos? Also you say that I am
obliged to pay tribute to Carlos and not to others, but since you
give no reason for this tribute, I feel no obligation to pay it. If it is
right to give tribute and service at all, it ought to be given to God,
the man who was Father of all, then to Jesus Christ who never
piled on his sins, and ﬁnally to the pope. . . . But if I ought not
give tribute to this man, even less ought I give it to Carlos, who
was never lord of these regions and whom I have never seen.
The record of this meeting at Atahualpa notes that,
The Spaniards, unable to endure this prolixity of argumentation, jumped from their seats and attacked the Indians and
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grabbed hold of their gold and silver jewels and precious stones.
(Dussel, qtd in Villanueva, “On the Rhetoric,” 645)
And when the slaves of Puerto Rico rebelled, slaves from Africa
were brought in, and the Boricuas ran inland, away from the fortressed
walls of El Morro, and the rebels acquiesced to the Spanish while trading with Dutch and English, French and Italian pirates who would ﬁnd
other ways to enter the island. This subversion became jaibería. And I
understand Angel Rama, when he says that it is in the Caribbean that
“the plural manifestations of the entire universe insert themselves” (qtd
in Smorkaloff vii). My mother’s name is Italian (the line is never lost in
the Spanish tradition, my mother becoming María Socorro Cotto
deVillanueva, and my becoming Víctor Villanueva y Cotto until I was
Americanized as Victor Villanueva, Jr.) My mother’s name: Italian. The
memory of that ﬁrst Italian? Lost.
Centuries later, I am Puerto Rican—a product of the ﬁrst migrations
of Puerto Ricans to New York in the late 1940s, though my mother
arrived through what was euphemistically called “indentured servitude,” what others called “white slavery,” as if somehow more barbaric
than the slavery of Asians and of Africans. And I assimilate. And I don’t.
But I know how to seem to be—jaibería—and the memory provided
by stories told. Memory does hunger. And it’s fed through the stories
told.

I’m trying to ﬁgure this out, somehow: who I am, from where, playing out
the mixes within. It isn’t a question for me, whether public or private discourses. I am contradictory consciousness. The discourse should reﬂect that. I
am these uneasy mixes of races that makes for no race at all yet ﬁnds itself victim to racism. The discourse should reﬂect that. I am, an American (from the
Americas), an academic, a person of color—and organically grown traditional
intellectual, containing both of Gramsci’s intellectual formations and not quite
his new intellectual. The discourse should reﬂect that. And I am in a wheatﬁeld,
attempting to pass on a memory as I attempt to gather one. Personal discourse,
the narrative, the auto/biography, helps in that effort, is a necessary adjunct to
the academic. No binary. No contradiction. Just the key to remembrance.

14 PERSONAL LANDMARKS ON
P E DAG O G I C A L L A N D S C A P E S
KATYA GIBEL AZOULAY
In order to reﬂect on my pedagogical orientation and scholarly interests I will
begin and conclude with my book, Black, Jewish and Interracial: Its Not the
Color of Your Skin but the Race of Your Kin and Other Myths of Identity (1997).
This work represents the culmination of a forty-three year work in progress
which divide into two formative periods: childhood and adolescence in the
United States and adulthood in Israel. I write this essay from a third moment –
an unfolding set of middles: middle-age in the middle of Iowa in the middle of
the U.S. In Black, Jewish and Interracial, I worked against voyeuristic expectations of an introspective narrative as well as against adding to the exhausted
topic of relations between Blacks and Jews in the United States. My speciﬁc
objective, which I now consider a guiding principle in my pedagogy, was to
unveil and theorize the abstract notion of identity as a practice and a performance whose multiple meanings are derived in the context of social interactions, themselves shaped by historical and political conditions. While I was
interested in considering some of the existential and political meanings of
racial identities in general and being both Black and Jewish in particular, the
genesis of the book originated in a dissatisfaction about premises and habits of
scholarly thinking about identities which, it seemed to me, overemphasized
individual narratives at the expense of historical and political contexts.
Some autobiographical details may serve as a point of departure: two
months after graduating from The Brearley School in New York, I made aliya 1
to Israel. Twenty one years later, I moved back to the US with my three children
and (now ex-) husband to pursue a doctorate at Duke University in Cultural
Anthropology. Intended as a temporary sojourn, almost a decade later, a feeling
of transience remains—a sentiment familiar to those who cannot give a brief
response to the question “where are you from?” I deﬁnitely did not anticipate
that ten years later I would reside in the heartland of America. It is from within
this site that reﬂections on the vocabulary of place and space offer a semantic
refuge in which to comprehend this stage of my life. Iowa is foreign territory
among people with whom I have little in common; our points of reference and
departure are radically different. As a ﬁrst generation American who emigrated
to Israel at the age of 18, I am neither and yet always both immigrant and
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native. In Iowa, unlike cosmopolitan New York City or Jerusalem, this has felt
particularly anomalous. It is a relief to ﬁnd this cognitive feel of difference articulated by scholars whose global perspective is deﬁned by their multilingual,
multicultural backgrounds rather than merely acquired and cultivated through
education. The distinction between these two ways of comprehending multiplicity lies in the roots of consciousness; as Ahiwa Ong usefully describes it,
“multiply inscribed subjects” are characterized by an “in-between consciousness of difference”(352). This is the consciousness I bring to the classroom.
I was born and raised in Manhattan to a Jewish refugee from Nazi Austria
and a Black Jamaican. My parents and grandparents did not come to America
with a desire or interest in assimilating or shedding the past. Perhaps this
accounts for the comfortable synthesis of my own multiple identities which
incorporate a politicized notion of Blackness, Jewishness as well as motherhood, among others. These identities shape perspectives which invoke memory and history and provide a context for understanding relations of power
and politics. Increasingly, I have come to realize that my presence (and not just
my persona) is often (however subtly) perceived as an obstinate interruption
precisely because it signiﬁes a refusal to comply with or submit to accepted
protocol and disciplinary procedures.
The question “where are you from?” is not a neutral one. In my case, it signals, on the one hand, involuntary migrations before my birth (which made
my birth possible) and, on the other hand, my children who evidence the contingency of reading bodies as texts: two of my children appear “white” while
my middle child is “brown.” Practically, this means that although I teach at a
predominantly white liberal arts college, on the ﬁrst day of a semester I never
assume that the white-skinned young people in my classroom are necessarily
White2 or privileged. The in-between consciousness of difference conditions
the kind of introductory information I seek from students whom I ask, “where
are your people from?” (instead of “where are you from”). This is a strategy for
immediately making salient the contextual and relational factors which deﬁne
diverse identities and knowledge students bring into the classroom even where
it might appear, visually, as if they were a homogeneous group of people. This
strategy also serves to demonstrate a theory: identity originates in and is manifested through social interactions which, in turn, are shaped and inﬂuenced
by legal, economic, political and religious institutions.
The act of identifying one’s people in the public forum of a class requires
the ability to cite genealogies and geographies as well as to ponder gaps in family histories. A few students, who rarely have the opportunity to reveal their
histories on their own terms, are visibly pleased that they can present their
background without being perceived as antagonistic. They are usually students
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of color who have either resigned themselves to silence in order to avoid being
the resident authority on people of color in a predominantly white classroom
or invoke their background in order to refute stereotypes about people of
color. Once in a while, a student whose physical appearance belies assumptions
of classmates, seems to relish the opportunity to forestall misidentiﬁcation.
Most of my students are Euro-American of English, German and Dutch background; they ﬁnd the exercise curious and more than a few are perplexed. For
the ﬁrst time they are confronted with family histories whose origins have vanished into obscurity and their bewilderment sometimes leads them back to the
stories their grandparents had forgotten about. My primary purpose is not to
act as an intermediary between the generations: I am interested in motivating
students to think beyond themselves and to grasp the connections between the
past, the present and the future. In addition, working consciously against the
prevalent trend to teach race, class and gender as separate units of study, I
organize my syllabi to reﬂect their constant intersection which, hopefully,
broadens and sharpens the way in which they engage with current political
events outside the classroom.
Beginning a semester with family histories opens the door to a broad range
of topics and cautions against universalizing from personal experience. For
example, the process through which “undesirable” European immigrants from
the nineteenth century became generic white Americans in the twentieth century is reﬂected in the different ways in which white students of English and
Scot heritage relate to the notion of assimilation than those whose ancestors
are of Eastern and Southern European ancestry. Using Mathew Frye Jacobson’s
book Whiteness of a Different Color in a course titled Anthropology of
American Culture, students learn, usually for the ﬁrst time, that from 1840 and
until 1924, Europeans were also classiﬁed by race which included Saxons,
Teutons, Slavs, Semites and Celts (Jacobson 1998). In general, American history classes do not overemphasize the signiﬁcant “fact” that the presumption
of an inherently Anglo-Saxon character reﬂects the successful colonization
ambitions of 17th century English settlers. In 1790, fourteen years after they
won their independence, the new Americans restricted U.S. citizenship to “free
white persons” but never imagined that this would invite a mass inﬂux of
European immigrants very different from themselves.
Students are amazed to read about “white-on-white” racism culminating in
the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, which closed the door on immigration, articulated
by prominent eugenicist Harry Laughlin, who testiﬁed on behalf of the legislation to the US Congress, “Racially, the American people, if they are to remain
American, are to purge their existing family stock of degeneracy, and are to
encourage a high rate of reproduction by the best endowed portions of their
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population, can successfully assimilate in the future many thousands of
Northwestern European immigrants . . . But we can assimilate only a small
fraction of this number of other white races; and of the colored races practically none” (qtd. in Jacobson 82; italics added). The majority of my students
have not been taught that the term “ethnicity” was introduced as a move away
from biologizing differences between Europeans and marks the rapid consolidation of a white identity or that the melting pot registered a belief in the biological fusion of different European races into one white race – a process
Jacobson terms “the alchemy of race.” Introducing them to Jacobson’s formidable study, directing them to the footnotes and the bibliography is a conscious effort to heighten their awareness of the enormous amount of
documented history that has been edited out from their education. Jacobson,
like a number of other scholars who have gone into the archives to retrieve
highly charged political debates from the past, serves as a model for good
scholarship that is politically engaged without being polemical.
Pan-white supremacy reigned in relation to Blacks, American Indians and
Chinese.3 Yet precisely because my students are overwhelming white and have
been socialized in predominantly white environments, I believe it is critical to
accentuate how the descendants of immigrant groups from Eastern and
Southern Europe moved from the margins of whiteness to its center.
Monolithic whiteness – in its invisibility and normativity, which is quite different from the self-consciousness of white supremacy which continues to accentuate purity—was facilitated, particularly in the North, by government
sanctioned afﬁrmative action. With the return of soldiers from World War Two
and the baby boom, government subsidies, low-cost mortgages, tax breaks and
ﬁnally the 1956 Federal Highways Act with its expansion of freeways, enabled
the construction industry to embark on a building spree and the phenomenal
growth of suburbs from which Blacks were deliberately and carefully excluded
(Hannigan 1998). The combination of social engineering and racial exclusion
in housing can be mapped out in the labor sector, in education and healthcare
to explain persistent patterns of racial inequality despite the abolition of legal
discrimination (Barrett and Roedgier 1997).
Matthew Frye Jacobson’s text serves as a prelude to Ian Lopez’s White By
Law which provides an analysis of the racial prerequisites to naturalization
(rescinded only in 1952) entitling the inclusion of all white-skinned European
immigrants but excluding Asians and most Middle Eastern applicants regardless of skin color or anthropological taxonomies (Lopez 1996). The laborious
efforts deﬁning race are marvelously accented by the exclusionary effect of the
combined 1790 naturalization act and its 1870 amendment which extended
citizenship rights—by law, but not in practice—to “aliens of African nativity

Pers onal Landmar ks on Pe dagog ical Lands capes

281

and to persons of African descent” which excluded those who were neither
“white persons” nor “of African descent.”4
From a pedagogical perspective, Jacobson and Lopez provide students with
a deeper understanding of the process encapsulated in the cliche “race is a
social construction;” i.e. they come to appreciate the intense labor invested in
racing people. When students discuss the formation of class consciousness
among Kentucky miners a few weeks later, particularly after viewing Matewan
(dir. John Sayles, 1987) and Grapes of Wrath (dir. John Ford, 1940), they are
better prepared to notice, and then to interrogate, the naturalized linkage of
whiteness and civility which presumes the synonymity of white and “middleclass.” This leads to the corollary revelation, quite evident in Grapes of Wrath
(and unusually salient in the representations of ice-skater Tonya Harding,
whom they remember), that to be poor and white is to be less than white—to
be disposable or “trash”—and to be a person of color and middle class is to
become “just a human being.” As we near the end of the semester, most of my
students appreciate, without my commentary, that the model of the “human”
invoked is white by default. They are more attuned to the vocabulary used in
their social circles, on the news, in the movies and they notice the carefully
crafted advertising images on television, CD covers, in magazines and newspapers – and for the ﬁrst time, these predominantly white students are able to
discern the routinization of difference: there are human beings and there are
Blacks, Asians, Latinos.
I could have my students read essays that more directly tackle questions of
“race relations.” For instance, Patricia Williams’ excellent essays in Seeing A
Color-Blind Future: The Paradox of Race which opens with an anecdote about
three nursery-school teachers insisting that her son was color blind. After a visit
to the opthamologist, Williams discovers that, as a result of their well-meaning
but misguided intentions, he had “resisted identifying color at all.” She writes,
“the very notion of blindness about color constitutes an ideological confusion
at best, and a denial at its very worst” (4). Instead of Williams, however, I tend to
choose texts which analyze the roots and phenomenon of inequality with more
subtlety precisely because I am more often than not, the ﬁrst black professor
these students have encountered up to that point in their lives (there are four
black professors in different departments at my college and a small number of
students deliberately try to take a course with at least one of us). I know they
anticipate discussions about race—but I also realize that they come burdened
with assumptions and stereotypes: race is about people of color and blacks are
rappers, basketball players, poor people. Many are quite comfortable with generalizing phrases like “the white patriarchial system”—but if asked to explain it,
they are at a loss. They are even more surprised when I take it out of their
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vocabulary for the duration of the semester. In order to avoid the tension that
arises when white students contemplate their own racialist biases, encouraging
them to grapple with the complexity of racism, classism and sexism from a
broader, less subjective perspective seems preferable. Selecting texts which make
whiteness visible in a narrative style that seems disengaged, facilitates a greater
appreciation for the arguments that equality cannot occur without strategic
intervention and that a color-blind world cannot be willed into being by insisting on the pretense that we are all “just” human beings.
It is obvious that the choice of material and teaching methods are informed
by a silent autobiography which integrates interactive and lecture strategies to
engage students with ways in which race-based identities and experiences are
neither “natural” nor a manifestation of biological differences. Instead they
have been conditioned by and constructed through struggles whose battleﬁelds
included courtrooms as well as socializing institutions such as school, church
and work. This places the issues of power and privilege within a wider time
frame and beyond the superﬁcial boundaries conjured up by attention to perceived cultural differences, where culture serves as a metonym for race. For most
Jewish Americans whose ancestors immigrated from Europe and for whom
white skin has provided inconspicuousness, racial identity is delicate as they
confront the slippage between whiteness and Jewishness with a Jewish professor
who is Black and easily draws on experiences from Israel to illustrate points
under discussion. For African-American students, loosening American hegemony on deﬁnitions of Blackness invites a recognition that it is a constructed
category which in turn requires, as Stuart Hall noted in 1989, acknowledgment
“of the weakening or fading notion that ‘race’ or some composite notion of race
around the term black will either guarantee the effectivity of any cultural practice or determine in any ﬁnal sense its aesthetic value” (New Ethnicities 443).
For the majority of white Christian students, most of whom are from the
Mid-West, critical engagement with race and racial identities interrupts (at least
for the semester) the benign security of white normativity as most of them
learn for the ﬁrst time that “white skin”—looking white—has historically not
guaranteed legal recognition of being white (Jacobson 1998; Kaplan 1949;
Thomas 1997). They learn about the manner in which the analytic construct
ethnicity was adopted into the social sciences in order to move away from
speaking of racial differences between Europeans while consolidating a white
identity, regardless of class differences, in opposition to Blacks, American
Indians, Mexicans and Asians. The signiﬁcance of vocabulary becomes important in unveiling habits of thought which have been entirely erased from both
academic and popular discourse. Retrieving the history of the terms “race” and
“ethnicity” serves to underline the multifaceted manner in which opportunities
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available to immigrants incorporated as “white” Americans was purposely
denied to “native” people of color in general and Americans of African descent
(of any color) in particular.
A few years ago, I introduced a course titled “Postmodernism and
Anthropology” and used the ﬁrst third of the semester to walk my students
through David Harvey’s The Condition of Postmodernity and Jean Francois
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition. These were followed by essays which interrogated the analytical utility of the concept “postmodernism.” The challenge
was in keeping students focused on the debates and reﬂections which shaped
the emerging discourse in the 1980s, weaning them away from a vague collective assumption that postmodernism was mainly about giving voice to the
silenced Others—aka people of color, women of all colors and poor people.
Postmodernism, an elusive concept, is inseparable from late twentieth century capitalism and alludes to the conditions and production of knowledge in
highly industrialized and super technological societies. As a conceptual point of
reference, it is about language games and rhetorical skills: asking students to
restrain their impulse to make judgements about exponents of postmodernism
was a pedagogical strategy that represented an intellectual exercise to discipline
them: “bracket your intuitive reactions until you can map out the arguments of
this text.” Yet their distaste for postmodernist discourse intensiﬁed the more
adept they became at deciphering texts and demystifying the author’s linguistic
prowess. By mid-semester, many noticed a pattern: theorists advocating—and
sometimes critiquing—postmodernism were themselves assembling a body of
canonical ﬁgures and self-referential texts predominantly authored by white
men and white women and failed either to mention, or did so only in passing,
black thinkers who had raised similar issues more than a hundred years earlier.
Women like Phyllis Wheatley, Sojourner Truth, Ida B. Wells, Anna J. Cooper had
already interrogated the politics and power of experts in the production of
knowledge which percolates into the public sphere as commonsense or circulates within medical circles and among policy makers and informs legislative
decisions. We ended the semester with Hanif Kureshi’s ﬁlm, Sammy and Rosie
Get Laid (UK 1987) in order for the students to experience a cinematic version
of the explosion of difference in which whiteness does not serve as a norm
(Chatterjee 1996). Kureshi, whose parents are, respectively, Pakistani and
English, offered them an opportunity to experience the inadequacy of traditional analytic constructs (race/ethnicity/nationality) and required a discussion
which disentangled questions of political power and privilege from vague references to the ambiguous notion of “culture.”
One of the decisions I made after teaching Postmodernism and
Anthropology, was to eliminate certain key terms from my students’ vocabulary
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for the 14 weeks they are with me. One of these words is “culture.” Noting that
in all my classes, students use the word as a synonym for society, race,
ethnicity—in other words, any time they want to politely refer to what/whom
they perceived as different from themselves—I now ask them to specify whatever they are talking or writing about. If the reference is to values, attitudes,
behaviors or social practices, then they need to state this; if they are speaking
about racial difference, they are asked to specify what these are. By closing the
short-cuts which code words facilitate, my objective is to encourage students to
think more carefully and therefore more critically about the ways in which they
think about the world around them. A careful selection of readings which provide a new conceptual framework to move beyond essentialist notions, helps
ease the difﬁcult transition for students to make for they are not accustomed to
reading carefully and often they rehash opinions rather than acquiring a more
informed perspective from which to engage with past or current events.
Ultimately, it is an empowering experience for students who are in the classroom in order to learn—in the old- fashioned sense of discovering, revising and
reﬁning ideas with new information and analyses. I do want them to be aware
of, and to question, the implications behind the false homogeneity of everyday
vocabulary such as “African-American,” “white,” “diaspora” or “middle-class.”
I entered the ﬁeld of cultural anthropology when the politics of representation was being confronted more directly. Who gets represented, what gets
selected and given attention, what remains in the shadows and festers while
new rhetorical strategies are reﬁned in texts which are read, evaluated and validated by a small circle of privileged capitalists (capital here being both symbolic and cultural as well as economic) (Behad 1993). These are issues
anthropologists were forced to confront precisely because, as a discipline,
anthropology remains an inquiry rooted in the delineation and objectiﬁcation
of an Other. This objectiﬁcation is not in itself violent—it is the tendency to
universalize the unmarked author which is an act of violence. And yet, despite
its popularity, the notion of “textuality” and fashionable emphasis of “texts”
conceal the fact that texts do not speak back. An imagined notion of popular
culture and textual analysis remains inadequate without a conceptual framework that persistently interrogates the space of theoretical procedures and the
conditions of theory’s claims (D. Scott 1992).
Viewing the world as a text can be a strategy which actually disempowers
and reinforces the marginal positions of people who have been kept out of the
center. As Jonathan Friedman, in describing the “agonistic relation of anthropology to the contested realities of formerly silent others,” points out, “the
ideas that culture can be negotiated and that invention is a question of sign
substitution, a kind of cognitive exercise in pure textual creativity, are linked to
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a structure of self and of culture that is perhaps speciﬁc to capitalist modernity. The notion of culture as code, paradigm and semiotics is very much a
product of modern identity. Some of the cynical dismissal of other peoples’
constructions of their pasts is merely a product of modernist identity in
defence of itself ” (855).
Embodying diversity entails living comfortably with contradiction and dissonance. This contributes to theory-making and also necessitates political
commitments to social justice, which explains my attraction to scholarship
that goes against formula and dogma. I actively seek out material that assists
me in directing students to question the assumptions behind their knowledge
so that they can sharpen their ability to notice and therefore question presuppositions underlying texts they read. My physical presence challenges many of
the concepts which dominate and constrain scholarship on “ethnicity”, “race”
and “culture” as well as the history behind these analytical constructs: what is
the history of these words whose meanings are taken for granted until, on
closer examination, they are shown to be contested and convoluted? Until students have acquired a broader base of information, I make an effort to guide
them away from an over-reliance on the personal precisely, as Joan Scott
argues, because of the self-evident assumptions embedded in the notion
“experience” (J. Scott 1992). Only when students can contextualize personal
experience, are they in a position to perceptively employ their own embodied
genealogies and subjective histories as resources.
If the business of exploring the tensions and contradictions of concepts has
been seductive, caution mandates an explicit recognition that some insightful
analyses employ metaphors which render comprehensible events and phenomena in particular ways for particular purposes to the beneﬁt of particular persons. Take the popular metaphor ﬂuidity—for whom is identity “ﬂuid?” What
do the metaphors of absorption and solvency convey and imply for communities with claims to self-determination. And for whom are borders and boundaries “porous?” The concrete material reality is that those who wait for entry
visas and exit permits, will ﬁnd little enlightening about the vocabulary of
“porousness” when their request is deferred. When my oldest son, Gabriel, was
born, I tried to register him at the U.S. Consulate in East Jerusalem so he would
have the advantage of dual citizenship. The clerk smugly informed me that my
child was not entitled to American citizenship since I had left the States without
the necessary ﬁve years after my fourteenth birthday, and his father was a foreigner. Bewildered, I left without argument but halfway down the street, the
spirited rage of a 22 year-old pushed me back to demand—loudly—to see the
Consul. Standing across from President Gerald Ford’s photo, an inch taller in an
Angela Davis Afro, I adamantly declared, “I am an American citizen and
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demand to speak with my Consul!” It was the ﬁrst time in my life that I had
occasion to even think these words.
The Consul—a stocky white man with a Marine crew-cut—emerged from
his ofﬁce as the clerk and I engaged in an escalating exchange (“he’s busy and
you can’t see him;”“watch me”). With a conciliatory manner, he invited me into
his ofﬁce. After reviewing the ﬁle, he patiently explained the constitutional
statute on inheriting citizenship. The law was amended shortly before my
daughter, Dorit-Chen, was born—now one needs only two years after the 14th
birthday—so she has U.S. citizenship but the changes were not retroactive.
When I moved back to the States for graduate school, my father had to ﬁle an
afﬁdavit for my husband and two sons so they would have the privilege of permanent residence, the coveted green cards (which are, in fact, not green). When
my husband and I divorced, his pending application for citizenship was halted
and he had to resubmit despite the fact that we had been married for 22 years.
Married to an American he could ﬁle after three years in the country; single, he
had to wait at least ﬁve years and is now caught in the backlog of applications.
I have simpliﬁed an arduous and frustrating process: borders, boundaries
and access to citizenship are concrete constraints on one’s autonomy and
mobility. When a mean-spirited clerk or an archaic law stands between the
applicant and the visa, the barriers are anything but metaphorical constructs.
In subtle and invisible ways, experiences like standing on lines in the U.S. consulate, traveling on an Israeli passport to Jamaica and Germany, and living in a
working-class neighborhood in Jerusalem inform my perspectives as much as
the identities of Blackness and Jewishness.
Given my interest in the manner in which audience can alter the meaning of
ideas, the question of porousness and ﬂuidity can also serve as a useful example
for the ways in which seemingly similar theoretical insights can communicate
radically different ideas. For instance, when identity is understood as a process
articulated in the context of social interactions and political contexts, the reference to ﬂuidity does not imply ﬁction or invention but rather addresses the complex subjectivity which includes, but is not overshadowed by, conscientious
commitments to group-based identities. However, when the concept of identity
is analytically disassembled without respect for the signiﬁcance of the complex
ways in which people position and are positioned in relation to other social
beings, then the metaphor of porousness can be disabling if not paralyzing. Here
I tend to agree with David Scott’s critique of the manner in which theory is taken
for granted as a “narrative that was authored (and authorized) the hegemonic
career of the West.” Despite my own dismay with the use of culture as a metonym
of race, Scott correctly questions the motives behind the drive to discredit the
culture concept: “this recognizably ‘anti- essentialist’ characterization of ‘culture’
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as mobile, as unbounded, as hybrid and so on, is itself open to question: for
whom is ‘culture’ unbounded—the anthropologist or the native?” (375f).
The presence and voice of a professor shapes the intellectual orientation and
practical issues of selecting subject matter and organizing syllabi. For instance,
in 1995 I was invited to Grinnell College to rejuvenate the Afro-American
Studies Concentration. Looking at the available offerings across the general curriculum, I broadened and reorganized the structure of the program under the
title Africana Studies introducing two bookend courses, Foundations of
Africana Studies and a Senior Seminar. The Foundations course registers the
inﬂuence of my biography which fostered a pedagogical inclination emphasizing the complicated histories of people in the African diaspora. This introductory course highlights the signiﬁcance of interrogating the intersection of
“blackness” as an experience and as a trope, and the grammar of roots and
routes which characterizes—and thus summons—a broad interdisciplinary
approach to studies about people of African descent. This translates into a
course which, though focused on the experiences of Black people in the United
States, constantly questions the ghettoization of Black people in the academy
through texts such as Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the
Literary Imagination and excerpts from Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic.
The effort to use theory—and not be used by theory—requires stepping
into the dirt (to borrow from Stuart Hall) of tension and contradiction without being paralyzed by anxiety. This means valuing and validating any source
which helps to reconceptualize and reformulate questions with the speciﬁc
purpose—however utopian it may seem in these cynical times—of making the
world a more humane place (Hall Race). Critical thinking refuses to be imprisoned by discipline and control. In this sense, intellectual creativity needs to be
tempered by the contradictions of real lived experiences. My personal background produced and reﬂects a predisposition to question judgments, evaluations and conceptual frameworks of those who write from perspectives they
presume are universal even where they include disclaimers of this position in
their introductions. For example, the acquisition of another language
(Hebrew) for everyday use, along with immersion in Israeli life, fostered a persistent and conscientious recognition of the suspect nature of all translation—
a consciousness about the gaps in communication which result from being
positioned differently. From the mid-1980s, my articles critiquing Israeli relations with pre-Mandela South Africa as well as dismissing vacuous, though
popular, analogies between the two countries appeared in The Jerusalem Post
and New Outlook (written while I was Coordinator on South Africa on the
Foreign Affairs Committee of RATZ, the Civil Rights Party of Israel) but it was
the essays on ethnic discrimination and elitism in the Israeli Peace Camp
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which foreshadowed my growing frustration with the gap between political
rhetoric and social activism.
In Israel, after acquiring the credentials necessary to secure a recognized
public voice, I witnessed processes of exclusion which became sensible only
later in graduate school.5 French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu remains instructive: “movements of rebellion on the part of the privileged are extraordinarily
ambiguous: these people are terribly contradictory and, in their subversion of
the institution, seek to preserve the advantages associated with a previous state
of the institution” (In Other Words 45). One personal example concretely illustrates Bourdieu’s insight.
In the Fall of 1982, I approached a social scientist who is also a founding
member of Israel’s largest peace group, Peace Now. At the time, we resided in
Neve Yaacov, a working class Jerusalem neighborhood with a large population
of Georgians (from the USSR) and Jewish Israelis of North African background. Asked whether it was possible to organize activities in this neighborhood, the professor recoiled in horror, “we don’t go to those places.” Both she
and I were American-born Israeli women. The parents and older siblings of my
Israeli-born (ex)husband emigrated from Morocco in 1949 and our social network was primarily composed of Israelis of middle-income and Mizrahi background.6 The social scientist moved in academic circles which, at the three main
universities, are still predominantly Ashkenazi. Most of the people in her social
network frequently travel between the States and Israel on academic or politically-oriented visits. Such trips often include speaking engagements focused on
the Middle East conﬂict and Israeli foreign policy. Their proﬁciency in English
and visible positions in the peace movement also make them convenient
resources for the foreign press which in turn enhanced their visibility.
Beginning with the election of Menachem Begin, prejudice against Mizrahi
Jews by people described as “leftists” because they favored territorial compromise with Palestinians was a sensitive topic in Israel although it received little
attention among American Jews who tend to be poorly informed on the country’s domestic issues. For instance, the chair of a powerful non-partisan feminist lobby featured regularly in radio and newspaper interviews, often invited
American Jewish women to speak out against the oppression of Palestinian
women. At the same time, and despite the fact that her reputation as a feminist
was built on advocating afﬁrmative action for women, she repeatedly stated
her distaste for the “levantization” of Israeli society. In a newspaper interview
in The Jerusalem Post in July 1986, she described Israel as a lovely country until
the Moroccan Jewish immigration: “As far as interpersonal relations are concerned, (things) took a turn for the worst, I remember, in the early 1950s, when
the Moroccan immigration began. Until that point, there wasn’t any violence.
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But the North Africans really pulled knives . . . Of course, I must confess that at
that time I had almost no contact with people from the Edot Hamizrah (Eastern
Jews), I never even took a bus, so this wasn’t a phenomenon I personally encountered” (25 July 1986; italics added).
A Moroccan colleague from Hebrew University responded, condemning the
stereotype of North Africans as criminal deviants (7 August 1986). Not only did
the professor not retract her statement, she reiterated her perspective (4
September 1986). Three years later, she responded—in her capacity as chairperson of the Israeli Women’s Network—to my op-ed in The Jerusalem Post chastising elitism among women in the peace camp with the following comment: “what
is most disturbing about Ms. Azoulay’s article is the totally unsubstantiated accusations of elitism and ethnic exclusivity. It is in the nature of leaders to lead and
perhaps unfortunately, to be ahead of and different from their fellow men and
women. To interpret this as being elitist or a sign of rejection of those one hopes
to lead is reverse snobbery of the very worst kind” (20 July 1989, italics added).
The same summer, following considerable debate over whether Reshet, a
new umbrella for feminist peace activists, should concern itself with the issue, I
organized a symposium, “Identities in Israeli Society and Peace: the Place of
Mizrahi Women in Political Activities.” The event was held at Tel Aviv
University through the sponsorship of the Forum for Women’s Studies. As a
result, it momentarily generated academic recognition to the topic and, in
Bourdieu’s currency, symbolic capital. The discussions focused on Mizrahi
Jewish women in an attempt to directly confront the obvious absence of
Mizrahi women in the peace camp. Six college educated, articulate Mizrahi
women, all of whom have been involved in political activities for a number of
years, presented papers to a forum of 153 women and 5 men (most of whom
were not Mizrahi) on a hot Thursday evening in Tel Aviv.
The size of the audience exceeded expectation and was viewed by Reshet as
a success. Most of the Ashkenazi women, the main audience, had never
engaged with women with a speciﬁcally Mizrahi consciousness, convinced that
there were no Mizrahi women with the necessary skills who could assume central roles in the organization. Strategically, the symposium demonstrated the
possibility of dramatically altering the image of yet another peace group which
looked like, and spoke to a predominantly elite Ashkenazi audience. The
potential existed for bringing together Mizrahi women and Ashkenazi women
with a network of powerful contacts through family connections and with
media and political parties, as well as among philanthropists and professional
activists abroad. These connections trace a speciﬁc social and class position,
thus networking was not merely a metaphor, but an efﬁcient and convenient
means of empowerment and advancing a particular cohort of women.
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These Mizrahi women represent 60% of Israeli Jews, relate to, work with
and are sensitive to a working class sector whose marginalization and resentment often led to support for political parties intransigent on the PalestinianIsraeli conﬂict (Lederer-Gibel 1984). Unlike their Ashkenazi sisters, the
Mizrahi women who addressed the symposium linked their politics to both
domestic social issues and the Palestinian-Israeli conﬂict. They viewed these as
interconnected, part of a political process through which an image of Israel as
a western nation has been constructed.
The possibility of a joint effort between these two groups of women within
the coalition of Reshet remained hypothetical. The association of academic and
professional credentials exclusively with political insight and expertise severely
reinforces structural inequities, reproducing overlapping ethnic and class discrimination. But it was lack of symbolic capital, rather than academic credentials, that was the greatest impediment to propelling educated Mizrahi women
into pivotal positions even in newly-formed “leftists” women’s organizations.7
1990 was a turning point and in October, I submitted an application to one
doctoral program abroad. Then, a few weeks before I left for Duke University, a
group of Mizrahi activists requested a meeting with Tikkun publisher and editor Michael Lerner, then organizing a major peace symposium in Jerusalem.
During the meeting, he asked me to participate in the plenary. The plenary
papers were later published in Tikkun with the exception of the one which
focused on both peace and ethnic chauvinism although (as The Jerusalem Post
favorably noted) it was greeted by “thunderous applause.” I relate this anecdote
in order to highlight the lesson I internalized about how events are written and
erased even as they are in process. The frustration of being thus canceled has
been channeled into an acute awareness of the many situations in which new
voices, insights and directions are censored by people vacillating over altering
the structures of power unless they have secured their own position and
explains why I am attracted to interrogating the process through which particular narratives are privileged over others, by whom and why. Herein lies the
reason why my students are encouraged to historicize events—to return to
sources and their contexts in which particular ideas and people were actively
promoted while others were conscientiously concealed.8
When I returned to the States, I was not prepared for the extent to which
1970s demands for, and resistance against, the inclusion of people of color in
courses and on faculty continue. Focusing on race as a central theoretical and
pragmatic subject of study continues to challenges many white faculty and
administrators who perceive themselves as raceless and their actions as
unmarked by the inﬂection of their racialized positions (Azoulay 1998; Dovidio
1997; Mills 1997).9 As a social scientist interested in group relations in the U.S.,
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I privilege race as a signiﬁcant social fact which needs to be at the center of
analysis. From this perspective, to study the invention of the Negro—the invention of Africa and Africans—obliges an inquiry into the invention of Man and
Whiteness; the invention of the West (Trouillot 1991). Here too, the constraints
of racial categories and their corollary stereotypes surface as objects of study in
my classroom.
Interest in the question of Black and Jewish identities in the context of the
United States begins with my own socialization, but it also emerged from a
renewed curiosity about Euro-American notions of “interraciality.” I left the
States when “Black is Beautiful” anticipated a moment of political transition
but returned to celebrations of an ahistorical biraciality where Black had been
displaced by the hyphenated African-American and demands for faculty of
color and curricular diversity echoed those of my youth.
Dissatisfaction with public conversations on fragmented anxiety-laden
multiple identities motivated my initial research focus. I wanted to accentuate
the conditions that make it possible for individuals who embody and thus
inherit membership in different socially marked groups to identify with both
groups and thereby name their identity in the language of coupling rather than
contradiction or fractions. I intentionally distanced myself from providing
idiosyncratic experiences that satisfy a voyeuristic desire for the exotic or the
traditional search for insights into race relations via a purient fascination with
the products of interracial sex (Yu 1999).
Consider the language of biracialism which silently obscures and yet
saliently evokes the multiracial history of American Blacks. In the seventeenth
century, English legislators in the colony pondered the status of children of
Englishmen and Negro slave women. Was the child slave or free?—not was the
child black or white. The question was settled rather quickly by changing
English laws of inheritance and introducing status through maternal
descent—a child was bond or free according to the status of the mother. With
the abolition of indentured servitude and the institutionalization of slavery
only for people of African descent, slavery and the stigma of color were formally linked. By the mid-nineteenth century, the stigma of inferiority associated with blackness was given scientiﬁc legitimacy which enabled the language
of species and hybrids. Nineteenth century racial classiﬁcations introduced the
discourse of black and white species whose sexual encounters produce hybrids
updated in today’s vocabulary of interracial couples. Many of the children
whose mothers are not Black/Afro-American increasingly identify as biracial
and mixed race without grasping that these terms testify to a legacy of scientiﬁc
racism which is stronger than the disclaimers that race is a social construction.
For instance, despite the plethora of newspaper and popular journal articles
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celebrating multiracialism, racial blending does not forecast a color-blind society although, in a throwback to the melting pot metaphor of fusion, it does
expand the boundaries of probationary whiteness for children of interracial
unions. Increasingly, the absence of recognizable signifers of blackness lends
itself to racial ambiguity which facilitates the individual’s right to control
information about herself. This, in turn, serves to shield the individual from
discrimination and to diffuse the stigma of blackness by accentuating identities
with greater social currency (Goffman 1963). In this context, accentuating
biraciality, instead of blackness, suggests that “(w)ith the pinning of racial
hope upon blood mixtures in such a literal way, there comes a sneaky sort of
implied duty to assimilate—the duty to grab on to the DNA ladder and hoist
oneself onward and upward” (Williams 1997, 53).
Although I want students to understand that race is a social construction
which we reproduce with each invocation, I do not want them to imagine that
we can merely wake up one morning and claim to be raceless. (Appiah 1992;
Azoulay 1996). The tendency of the media to present biraciality, multiracialism
and multiculturalism as a barometer of national moral health presumes a biological component to racial groups in which fusions are the prescription to
their dissolution and an antidote to racism. But, as Carol Camper, editor of
Miscegenation Blues: Voices of Mixed Race Women writes, “We should not be
forced into a ‘closet’ about White or any other parentage, but we must recognize
that our location is as women of colour.” Her political position is underscored
by the selections of essays in her book which do not include “the idea that racial
mixing would be the so called ‘future’ of race relations and the future of
humanity . . . I strongly disagree with this position. It is naive. It leaves the race
work up to the mixed people. It is essentially a racist solution” (1994, xxiii).
As we move into a new millennium, theorizing and historicizing race
should not be deployed against the efﬁcacy of race-based communities of
meaning (Outlaw 1996). Therefore, it is of crucial importance that students
understand the processes which constitute the social construction of race in
particular and other socio-political units of analysis. Unfortunately, too often
they learn to use code words (such as “social construction”) without a clear
understanding of what they encapsulate and for this reason are unable to
export them into in-depth analyses of topical political issues.
While writing Black, Jewish and Interracial, I found it useful to step outside
the limitations of normative western Christian bounds which informed almost
all the academic and political texts I was reading. I returned to a Jewish
source—Genesis, the story of Creation in Hebrew Scripture—in order to
rethink “identity” in a way that cohered with my experience. The creation of
complementary and complimentary domains resonated with Stuart Hall’s
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notion of the logic of coupling: the conjunction “and” without polarity and
opposition (Minimal Selves 29). Although attracted to philosophical explications on identity, the solipsism of Descartes’ pronouncements—the inadequacy of “I think therefore I am” resolved by “I cannot doubt that I am
doubting”—seemed to honor the self in isolation. As Levi-Strauss commented
in response to Sartre’s claim, “Hell is other people,” an identity which presumes the primacy of self is easily sociologized into a collective “we” who
assume the right to reshape the world in its own image (BJI 38). That year,
during the Passover Seder, I realized that while Benedict Anderson’s Imagined
Communities was interesting, the annual recounting of the Exodus already recognized the effort required in maintaining a collective sense of identity among
a disparate group of individuals whose self-interests often bring them into
conﬂict with each other. In sum, the in-between consciousness of difference
provided a foundation from which to revisit rather than reproduce ideas about
racial identities in the United States.
Philosopher Adrian Piper’s reﬂection resonates well: blacks who refuse to
accept a subordinate role and expect to be treated with respect as valuable people “reveal their caregivers’ generationally transmitted underground resistance
to schooling them for victimhood” (25). How exciting, in this context, to be
introduced to Michel Foucault’s appendix to The Archaeology of Knowledge,
“The Discourse on Language,” when he writes, “It is always possible one could
speak the truth in a void; one would only be in the true (dans le vrai), however,
if one obeyed the rules of some discursive ‘policy’ which would have to be reactivated every time one spoke” (224). And yet, crossing disciplinary boundaries
inheres a sense of empowerment precisely because these boundaries are regulated, governed and controlled by procedures, rules and gatekeepers. My family
history is complicated only when deﬁned against the norms of homogeneity.
Consequently I accentuate the complicated histories of people, the emergence
of diasporic communities, and the signiﬁcance of interrogating political signiﬁers. This approach lends itself toward uncoupling those hyphenated identities
currently channeled into and imprisoned within hyphenated departments:
those marked areas of studies—African-American studies, Asian-American
studies, Latino Studies which reinforce, rather than challenge, the equation
and primacy of Anglo-American studies as authentically American.
There are many new voices on the academic scene who do not ﬁt the
imposed traditional categories of ethnicity, race, and nationality. Although
they—like me—may assert a particularistic identity in the public sphere, their
in-between experiences and genealogies motivate and direct their scholarship
toward an interrogation of traditional lines of inquiry and processes through
which disciplinary canons have been instituted and institutionalized. Their
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repertoire of courses and syllabi selections as well as research projects reﬂect
intellectual inquiries that have been shaped and crafted from the advantage of
multiple perspectives.
In conclusion, an insight from South African writer Andre Brink has significant relevance for how I perceive my vocation, teacher and scholar, as a practice. Reﬂecting on the distinction between an act that is a commitment—it
obligates—and a gesture—which is merely a performance for an audience—
Brink notes that the political distinction is profound: “An act, implies involvement in the whole chain of cause and effect; it leads to something; it has direct
moral or practical bearing on the situation in which it is performed; and
thereby it commits the (wo)man who performs it. The heroic rebel, in other
words, is committed to rebellion not against but toward something.” (61)
Rather than dismissing canonical legacies, interventions to reveal their archaeology witness efforts toward highlighting the personal fusions and cross-cultural diffusions that underlie any and all academic pursuits. My education and
life experiences have led to the conclusion that one goal of any teacher should
be to guide students toward valuing knowledge learned in the classroom and
ﬁnding a way to put it to practical use in their daily lives. It is a deceptively
modest objective.

NOTES

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

Jewish immigration to Israel is referred to as aliya and quite literally means
to go/rise up. One goes up to Israel and Jerusalem – every other geographical
movement is just to go or to go down.
I am here using a capital W to indicate white as a racial identity and not
merely an adjective.
At different moments, discrimination against Mexicans, Japanese and Hindu
Indians reinforced a generic sense of whiteness. However, it should be noted
that despite negative attitudes towards Asians in general, the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 was the only legislative ruling to explicitly name a
nationality for the purpose of their speciﬁc exclusion.
Chap. CCLIV, sect. 7, An Act to amend the Naturalization Laws, Forty-First
Congress, July 14, 1870.
In 1988, two feature articles on my activities, (see Tom Segev, “The Raymond
Suttner Affair,” Haaretz, 23 September and the Jerusalem weekly Kol Hair, 30
September) importantly helped highlight the case of detained South African
lawyer, Raymond Suttner. At the time I believed that extensive attention to
South African Jews who were anti-apartheid activists was needed in order to
buttress criticism of Israeli foreign relations with the apartheid government.
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6.

7.
8.

9.
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Over time, cynicism has displaced naivete as I realized that all government
policies are dictated by pragmatism and not principle. The military contracts between Israel and Pretoria continue—only the signatories changed.
Mizrahi—which explicitly refers to the East—is used more frequently than
Sepharadim for Jews from Afro-Asian countries. While the term was initiated by political concerns, historical accuracy encouraged it’s incorporation
into daily use.
See Ayala Emmett’s informative chapter, “East Confronts West: What the
Left Eye of Israel Does Not See” (1996, 133-170).
As in my book, I refer to Bourdieu’s statement from Homo Academicus about
the temptation “to adopt the title A Book for Burning, which Li Zhi, a renegade mandarin, gave to one of those self-consuming works of his which
revealed the rules of the mandarins’ game. We do so, not in order to challenge those who, despite their readiness to denounce all in inquisitions, will
condemn to the stake any work perceived as a sacrilegious outrage against
their own beliefs, but simply to state the contradiction which is inherent in
divulging tribal secrets and which is only so painful because even the partial
publication of our most intimate details is also a kind of public confession
(Bourdieu 1988,5).
In 1997, George Yancy interviewed William Jones, founder of the ﬁrst formal
Committee on Blacks in Philosophy, whose reﬂections on institutional
rigidity in the American Philosophical Association of the 1970s saliently resonate as accurate for the academy of the 1990s: “We have found that oppressors go through three denials. They would describe the present situation
such that the labeling of oppression is inaccurate or inappropriate. You can
use internal criticism to have them relinquish the ﬁrst denial. But then
they’re going to move to the second denial, Well I’m not the cause. But then
again, through internal criticism, we get them to relinquish that claim. So,
they admit that there is oppression, that they are culpable, and that there is
something that must be done to correct this oppression. But this is where the
third denial emerges. The oppressor will select a method of correction that
will not correct. The APA did not see the oppression in their structures or in
their policies because they were not looking at it from the angle of analysis
that would reveal such things as oppression.” (Yancy 1998).

1 5 T H E A N X I E T Y A N D N O S TA L G I A
OF LITERACY
A Narrative about Race, Language, and a Teaching Life
MORRIS YOUNG
February 1, 1973
Speech evaluated—Missing central incisors.
No apparent speech defect; however omits initial /s/ in blends (st, sw).
Difﬁculty could be due to missing teeth.
Good stimulability—Recheck. Waiting list.
J. Takano, Speech therapist

I look up from my chair at the stranger who has come to take me to an unfamiliar
classroom. My legs dangle over the chair seat, feet not reaching the ﬂoor as I prepare to hop off. The building this classroom is in is different from my school—
more sterile and hospital-like with the long corridors and chairs placed outside
doors along the hall. In the yard there are no swings or jungle gyms to play on, a
strange absence if this was indeed another school. As we enter the classroom, I
notice the walls are not covered with kiddy cartoon ﬁgures or alphabet letters or
big funny pictures like my kindergarten classroom. And it’s dark. Not pitch black
but more gray and gloomy as if a storm were approaching this room alone.
The walls are hospital green—not quite the blue-green of the ocean but not
grass green either; more the pale mint of tooth paste. The furniture is familiar
with kid-size tables and chairs. Easels stand on either side of the table—one with
a paper pad and markers propped up on it, the other holds a felt-covered board
with felt letters, numbers, and shapes that stick to it.
Mom and Dad wait on the other side of the closed door as I sit across from a
young woman. She looks like a teacher but is friendlier than the teachers I knew
back at my kindergarten. She asks me questions, has me pronounce words and letter-sounds, and read a little. I do as I am told, unsure why I am being drilled this
way, especially when everything is so easy. I know my alphabet—A, B, C, D, E, F,
G, H, and the rest. I read a little—“See Spot run” or some other simple sentence.
And I answer all of her questions—“How old are you?” “I am six. My birthday
was last month. I go to Kapalama School.” Why was I pulled away from Saturday
morning cartoons (though I remember vaguely being bribed with the promise of a
chocolate covered wafer bar)? Why was I in another classroom far away from my
regular school that was just next door to my home?
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January 1, 1974
Speech eval.: Spacing bet./teeth—Slightly distorted /s/. Often omits /s/
in blends. Difﬁculty with /l/. Enroll for therapy.
J. Takano, Speech therapist

I walk up to the main ofﬁce building, leaving behind the rest of my classmates
in Room 34. This has become a weekly routine as I miss story hour every Tuesday
to meet with Mrs. S. But Mrs. S is nice and I don’t mind talking with her. It’s those
worksheets that annoy me. Why do I need to ﬁll the sheet with L’s and S’s? Why do
I have to practice the “ST” and “SW” sounds when I can do them already? But I
go to speech therapy and I bring home the worksheets to show Mom. “Look Mom.
Listen Mom. S S S S S. ST ST ST ST ST. L L L L L.” I continue to practice even
when my missing tooth makes the air whistle through the gaps. Then I stop going
to speech therapy. I don’t remember why. It just seemed to stop. I stayed in Room
34 and sat for story hour with my classmates on Tuesdays now. And sometimes I
would stop by the main ofﬁce building on my way home and say “hi” to Mrs. S.
I look back at this time and wonder how much this early experience with language has shaped my life? Is it just coincidence that the study of language has
become part of my professional life? Why did I become engaged with language rather
than alienated like so many other students who may have had similarly “negative”
experiences? Or was it a negative experience? Despite the “scariness” of being evaluated and the potential for resentment as I was sent off by myself on those afternoons,
I was comfortable with language and perhaps even amused at the treatment I was
receiving. Why was there so much interest in me? What about those other kids who
seemed to have the same “problems” but did not receive the same attention I did?
April 18, 1974
Speech re-eval. No further therapy recommended.
J. Takano

Here is the ﬁrst clue that my life would be shaped by language:
Born today, you are an intellectual by nature. Your head rules your heart almost
exclusively and you make all decisions without emotional involvement. Such an
approach to life is good when it comes to furthering your career, but it could prove a
drawback in your personal relationships. No one likes to feel that he is friends with a
machine. You have a great gift for the written word and often do better in your relationships with others if you can communicate by letter rather than face-to-face.
“Your Birthday—By Stella” (21 January 1967).

As I read this horoscope thirty-two years later, clipped and saved by my
mother, I am amused by the “accuracy” regarding my interpersonal skills, and
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am amazed by the ﬁnal line’s attention to “a great gift for the written word.” I
had never seen this horoscope until I began rummaging through the File, the
personal record my mother kept on each one of her children. The File is selective and includes many of the expected things: report cards, notices of achievement, important school and personal records. But then there is also a hodge
podge of items that illustrate a life ﬁlled with literacy. Among my favorites are
the programs from the pre-kindergarten story-hour at the neighborhood
library and my ﬁrst library card.
Now with the kind of predestination indicated by the horoscope, it is no
wonder that I have become a writing teacher (though I still ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
call myself a writer) who researches literacy practices, and ﬁnds himself writing about writing in these pages. And as I reﬂect back on my life it is not surprising that some of my most vivid memories from my childhood are about
language. Before I started kindergarten I attended story hour at the neighborhood public library where I would receive the aforementioned handmade program that listed the stories for the day and an animal shaped nametag. My
opening memory about that Saturday morning speech evaluation is often
replayed in my head as I look out at my classes everyday and speak publicly
with them. On a family vacation when I was twelve, I found myself in New
Orleans at an open market looking at some used comic books (my passion at
the time) when the burly man who ran the stand looked at me accusingly and
said in a gruff voice, “Don’t you understand English?” as he pointed aggressively to a “no reading” sign. I only stared back at him, speechless, knowing that
somehow my Asian features and dark skin had marked me as illiterate in his
eyes. I am not sure why these memories stay with me. Perhaps because these
were encounters with language I have internalized them and have become
aware of the everyday uses of language and their contexts. Or I recall these
experiences now because at the time they occurred I didn’t understand their
implications. Wasn’t story hour just fun? What was a speech pathologist? Did I
look as if I didn’t know English? Did I look foreign? Or, as my horoscope suggests, perhaps language was simply part of my destiny.
In these memories, I see Sylvia Scribner’s three metaphors for literacy—
Adaptation, Power, and State of Grace—often the common tropes that drive
our narratives about literacy. I see Adaptation in my experience with the
speech pathologist where I needed (or was expected) to modify and develop
my language skills to participate fully in school. Literacy as Power is clear when
my English language skills were conﬂated with my race by that man who ran
the comic book stand and acted to disempower me by questioning my literacy.
And perhaps I am experiencing literacy as a State of Grace now since I am able
to make language my career and experience the promise of literacy—a good
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education and a good job. There are variations in these stories about literacy,
but usually recognizable characters, themes, and actions emerge to create a
familiar cultural script. This script naturalizes experiences and creates master
narratives of transformation and success that seem like easily achievable and
desirable goals. These stories can evoke nostalgia, recuperating meaning for
those who want to remember their literacy experiences in uncomplicated ways
and who seek conﬁrmation of their place in society. However, these stories can
also create anxiety because they can further marginalize those who have
already been marked as Other by privileging one story over another. In the stories I tell here I explore the anxiety and nostalgia of literacy in my own life, not
to prove myself or to share myself. Rather, I consider my own struggles with
literacy and identity in order to acknowledge the struggles of others who have
often found themselves unsure, confused, and immersed in the contradictions
of their lives and literacy.
In his book, The Call of Stories, Robert Coles explains that “one keeps learning by teaching ﬁction or poetry because every reader’s response to a writer’s
call can have its own startling, suggestive power” (xix). As a teacher, I value the
emphasis that Coles places on pedagogy and how a teacher’s own learning can
inform his or her practice. As a reader and student of literature I also believe
that Coles is right when he suggests that the “call of stories” plays a very important role in a reader’s life. When stories are read there is an attempt, whether
conscious or unconscious, to make a connection between stories and personal
lives. Those narratives about education, about literacy and language, hold even
more sway because memories about these types of experiences (whether negative or positive) resonate with a bit of “truth,” offering readers at least a glimmer of familiarity if not outright identiﬁcation with these stories.
However, there is also a danger in the way stories can be used. The attraction
to stories is due partly to attempts by readers to see aspects of their lives in them;
to read the narrative of another’s life is to sometimes read (or attempt to read)
the narrative of one’s own life. But it is this very desire of the reader that can be
exploited; stories can be employed in ideological projects that act to advance
particular views rather than to engage the readers in their own self-examination.
Harold Rosen suggests that readers keep these “basics of narrative” in mind:
1. that it matters which stories we work with and that remembering and comprehending are especially related to the power of a story to engage with the world of
feeling and thought in the listener;
2. that receiving a story is an exploration by the receiver(s), not a set of responses to
someone else’s questions in right/wrong format;
3. that we should ask why we should remember a story and not simply what we
remember;
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4. that the most constructive way of examining the hold a story has is for it to be presented in a propitious context and to be retold in an equally propitious one. (229)

Rosen’s “basics” provide not only a way to approach stories, but also a way to
approach the use of story in our culture. In these guidelines he recognizes the
interestedness in the telling and use of story. Rosen proposes a set of critical
methods that readers of story must utilize in order to understand how a story is
working beyond the narrative structures of plot, character, and setting, and in
our own larger structures of culture and society. These guidelines seem like
common sense since they build upon a reader’s own interest in reading story.
And yet the need to articulate this critical approach to reading suggests that for
some reason readers are more often uncritical in their reading and that the
potential of stories in their lives becomes a danger if it acts to ﬁll a void through
diversion rather than to help them create their own meaningful narratives.
Stories can provide a sense of belonging, can appeal to a desire to belong, or
even to conﬁrm a belief that individuals do not quite ﬁt in. While the power of
story is that it can bridge differences and appeal to many, this is also its danger.
As Rosen notes:
The very universality of narrative contains its own surreptitious menace. Stories are
used to manipulate, advertise, control, above all to soothe, to massage us into forgetfulness and passivity. They are, in the original sense of the word, diversions. (236)

The universality of narrative acts to create a community, and I would also
suggest, to create an audience. But while community can provide a sense of
purpose through the production of common practices and goals, it can also
result in a sense of reality with a very limited view: whatever or whomever falls
outside the parameters of the community simply is not part of the story.
Raymond Williams’s deﬁnition of community is similar to Rosen’s description
of story as soothing, “massag[ing] us into forgetfulness and passivity”:
Community can be the warmly persuasive word to describe an existing set of relationships, or the warmly persuasive word to describe an alternative set of relationships. What is most important, perhaps, is that unlike all other terms of social
organization (state, nation, society, etc.) it seems never to be used unfavourably, and
never to be given any positive opposing or distinguishing term. (66)

The persuasiveness of story and community can act in the erasure of subjects who do not ﬁt easily into either. In the attempt to create a universal and
unifying narrative, stories can erase those minor narratives that tug and pull at
the margins and bring into question the universality of a story. Minor narratives are either dismissed as unimportant or too radical, or are “rewritten” to
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appeal to the larger culture, making sure that the unfamiliar becomes familiar
even if it means relying upon stereotype or other overdetermined representations. As Jerome Bruner argues, “The function of the story is to ﬁnd an intentional state that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a
canonical cultural pattern” (49-50). Thus in our culture, stories about education and literacy are often read as stories about becoming American, about the
transformation from cultural Other into legitimate American subjects. And as
Janet Carey Eldred points out, despite the controversy over cultural literacy in
curricular matters and readings of conﬂicts between literacies, “the myths of
self-reliance and of the self-made man who transcends his environment, who
succeeds despite his origins, still bolster critical readings” (“Narratives” 696,
emphasis added). No matter what ideological or political project is at hand,
the trope of literacy as transformation or conversion—or to return to Sylvia
Scribner, literacy as a State of Grace—occupies an important place in the
American consciousness because it brings us back to those nationalist fantasies
of self-reliance and success through hard work that have been part of our
country’s imagined narrative history and character. This is the National
Symbolic suggested by Lauren Berlant, where the production of fantasy and
the use of traditional icons, metaphors, rituals, and narratives “provide an
alphabet for a collective consciousness or subjectivity” (20).
A familiar literacy ritual found in the American classroom in one form or
another is the worksheet. Whether these worksheets are the mimeographed
dittos of a past era, mass-produced workbooks that accompany basal readers,
or new interactive computer programs, they often operate under the illusion of
scientiﬁc validity. As Patrick Shannon argues, this type of work “maintains the
myths among poor and minority students that they are solely responsible for
their difﬁculty in learning to be literate and among middle and upper class students that they are literate simply because they can pass basal tests and other
standardized tests” (631). This literacy ritual thus performs a socializing function as students are either made responsible for their own (lack of) social position or are rewarded because of their social position. Students learn what it
means to be a good citizen by performing the appropriate labor and completing their own individual (though culturally scripted) narrative of progress.
As we know, the project of schooling for citizenship begins early. Here is
another artifact from the File (Figure 1) that is an example of my own
schooled literacy being reinforced by institutional practices. The two-page
worksheet is dated Oct. 30. There is no year but I suspect it is something I
worked on in kindergarten or ﬁrst grade. Some of the clues: my written
answers are in block print and not cursive; and a classmate I knew only in
kindergarten and ﬁrst grade is named.

like reading.

something

house

44. The last book I read was in school.
45. My mother helps in my homework.
46. Reading in junior high school is hardwork.
47. My father thinks reading is good
48. I read better than Scott.
49. My father helps me with my reading
50. I would like to read better than my brother.

21. When I ﬁnish high school I am going to college.

22. I’m afraid of dogs

23. Comic books are funny to read.

24. When I take my report card home I see if I have a good grade

25. I am at my best when I study.

43. My eyes see good

20. I hope I’ll never be a police man.

is good

19. I wish people wouldn’t hit me

18. To me, homework

42. Every single word is not a combond word.

compound

41. Special help in reading means tooters. tutors

pictures

16. On weekends, I like Miles to come and play.

17. I don’t know how to take picher s

40. I’d read more if I had a new book.

15. I like to read about fire truck

fﬂies

39. I wish someone would help me catch butterflys.

14. People think I am a good boy

38. I look forward to going to Miles houes.

37. Reading science is fun

are good to read

36. I wish I could have a boat.

12. Going to college meanslots of work

13. To me, books

35. I often worry about my fish.

34. For me, studying good

9. I feel bad when I am mad

11. I wish mother gave me a new book

33. I would like to be a fire man

8. I can’t understand why I cant play with chalk

10. I wish teachers gave me good work

32. I like to read when it is day

7. School is fun and good.

house

31. I wish my father makes a playhoues.

29. The future looks good
30. I feel proud when I am good

chase

28. When I read math I think

write

6. I wish my parents knew I want to have a football.

you half to be a man.

27. I’d rather read than wirte

26. My brothers and sisters are good

5. My idea of a good time is playing chace.

4. To be grown up

3. I get angry when somone takes someing.

2. When I have to read, I want to play.

1. Today I feel

Figure 1
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On the worksheet there are ﬁfty prompts that are to be completed by the students. There are the standard, “Today I feel . . .” and “I get angry when . . . .” But as
part of the ideological project of schooling there are also prompts like “School is
. . . ,” “I wish teachers . . . ,” “Going to college . . . ,” “To me, books . . . ,” and “I’d
rather read than . . . .” There are a number of these prompts that act to reinforce
schooling in a positive way. And the completion of these prompts are often glowing portrayals (for a 5-6 year old) of school. Now I admit I was probably wellprepared for school. I had much older siblings who did well in school, my Mom
had worked as a teacher’s aide before I was born, and there were tons of books
and magazines around the house. So when I read over these worksheets I am not
surprised at my answers—I was socialized to be a “good boy” (see #14) and to
reproduce the positive attributes of school, literacy, and family. The worksheet
acts to write the standard literacy narrative, prompting students to rehearse the
“school is good” mantra and perhaps transforming students to believe this.
Patrick Courts argues that the basalization of literacy teaching and learning
has diminished literacy by its attention to decontextualized language learning
and creation of an artiﬁcial performance by the students. As Courts points out,
worksheets become an instance of literacy that exists for itself:
Either you must ﬁll in the blank (or does the blank ﬁll you in?—they have lots of
blanks) or you must identify the correct or incorrect answer by circling it, or drawing
an X through it. In addition to all of this, students will ﬁnd that learning to spell
involves copying the deﬁnition; and learning to write involves writing a sentence or
two using the word they copied ﬁve times and looked up in a dictionary. . . . In surprisingly few cases does one ﬁnd kids reading in order to have fun or to learn something because they are too busy reading in order to read. And to the extent that they
write at all, they are writing-to-write; they are practicing correct punctuation and
usage and business letters—getting ready for the day shift, so to speak (Courts 47-48)

While Courts’s description of the classroom critiques our culture’s capitalist
impulses to prepare workers for an existing labor market, I ﬁnd that his own
belief in education is perhaps overly romantic. Certainly it would be nice to
have “fun” or to learn something simply because of curiosity or joy or pleasure.
However, the idea that education and learning are unquestioned positive and
enlightening experiences has its own ideological underpinnings. As my own
experience has shown, I can take such enlightenment ideals for granted
because of my middle-class upbringing and my parents’ belief in the cultural
value of education.
I ﬁnd my own worksheet actually very clever because of what I see as its ideological project of promoting good schooling. And I hope that students at an early
age can have these positive, perhaps less heavy-handed, literacy experiences. But
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when I read over these questions and prompts I also wonder about the students
who could not comprehend prompts #12 or #21 because going to college seemed
like a very remote possibility. Or about those students who could not expect to
get a new book as I did in prompts #11 and #40. Or who did not have parents
who were available to help with homework (see #45 and #49).
How do students feel when faced with a worksheet like this that asks them
to draw upon literacy and educational tropes that while seemingly familiar in
our expectations of American Culture—that is, white middle-class culture—
may not be familiar in their daily lives? Hawai’i writer Lois-Anne Yamanaka
captures this anxiety about not being a part of white middle-class culture in
her novel about growing up in the islands, Wild Meat and the Bully Burgers:
I don’t tell anyone, not even Jerry, how ashamed I am of pidgin English. Ashamed of
my mother and father, the food we eat, chicken luau with can spinach and tripe
stew. The place we live, down the house lots in the Hicks Homes that all look alike
except for the angle of the house from the street. The car we drive, my father’s
brown Land Rover without the back window. The clothes we wear, sometimes we
have to wear the same pants in the same week and the same shoes until it breaks.
Don’t have no choice. (9)

In this expression of anxiety, the character Lovey Nariyoshi, a working
class/poor Japanese American girl, recognizes how language and class are often
conﬂated in our culture. To counter this anxiety Lovey creates a nostalgic scene
of what she understands American culture to be:
Sometimes I secretly wish to be haole [white]. That my name could be Betty Smith or
Annie Anderson or Debbie Cole, wife of Dennis Cole who lives at 2222 Maple Street
with a white station wagon with wood panel on the side, a dog named Spot, a cat
named Kitty, and I wear white gloves. Dennis wears a hat to work. There’s a coatrack
as soon as you open the front door and we all wear our shoes inside the house. (10)

For me, this scene captures the tension between the anxiety of being a marginalized subject and the nostalgia for an unfamiliar life that has informed an
understanding of what it means to be American, to be average or normal, to be
literate.
The moist air sits on my skin as I walk slowly through the New Orleans streets.
Gray colors the sky and the ground as tiny puddles mirror back the dark clouds.
“Mom,” I whine,”Can’t we go back to the hotel? It’s sooooo hot.”
Mom looks down, “We should look around—we’re only in New Orleans for a
couple of days.”
A bead of sweat moves down her forehead as she tries to be positive. I drop my
head and follow her, Dad, and my sister Genny, as we wind through the open air
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French Market. God why is it so hot? The humidity is worse than Hawai’i. The
streets are dirty, and there’s a ﬁshy smell from the docks a few blocks away.
“This French Market is soooo boring,” I complain to Genny. “It’s only fruits and
vegetables—we can see this stuff anywhere.”
Genny pats my head. She looks tired too but she trudges on through the crowds
trying to look interested. This family vacation has lasted too long I think to myself.
We started two weeks ago in Seattle and made our way across Canada, down the
East Coast, and now New Orleans. Why can’t we just go home, to my comic books
and friends? This is grown-up stuff. I’m twelve and I’m stuck on the mainland
without anything to do and no one to hang out with. My own family is holding
me hostage.
“Hey, look over here,” Genny calls to me.”
I drag myself over to a table she’s standing next to. I’m expecting to see some
New Orleans thing—voodoo dolls, pralines, or some such junk. I look down at the
table and there are stacks and stacks of comic books. Not just newer comics, but
lots of old ones too. Maybe I can ﬁnd some X-Men or Legion of Superheroes, those
really old ones that cost $2.00 at the collector’s store. I’m excited as I start to riﬂe
through the stacks. No I have that one. What’s with all of these old Superman’s?
Isn’t there anything good here?
“Hey boy!”
I don’t look up.
“Hey boy! What’cha doing there?”
I slowly raise my head and look over to where the voice is coming from.
“Hey! Can’t cha read English? Don’t cha know English?”
A ﬁnger wags in my face as I follow where it points to: “No Reading Comic
Books” warns the sign.
I look back at the man behind the ﬁnger. He’s staring at me with contempt. His
plaid shirt is pulled over a big belly and he leans toward me as he squints. I pull
back, not sure how to respond. “Of course I know English,” I think to myself, “Why
do you think I’m looking at the comic books?” But I remain silent, unable to
speak, unable to prove that I know English. I turn my back and walk away, feeling
a little frightened and a little indignant. Who is he to ask if I know English?
I meet up with Mom, Dad, and Genny who are a few stalls down looking at
some souvenirs.
“Didn’t you buy something?” Dad asks.
“No, there wasn’t anything good,” I reply meekly. I turn back to look at the old
grouch at the comic book table. What was wrong with me? Why did he think I
didn’t know English? Did I look—foreign? I continue to shufﬂe after Mom, Dad,
and my sister wondering if we all looked foreign, wondering if others on the mainland didn’t think we were American.
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Up to now I have only provided glimpses of my life through my literacy
experiences. Let me set some of the conditions of my own narrative-inprogress, creating a clearer but also more complicated portrait through history, story, and theory. I was born and raised in Hawai’i, on the edge of
downtown Honolulu in the working-class neighborhood of Kalihi. Perhaps
another sign of predestination was my home on School Street just next door to
the elementary school I attended. This school had been an English Standard
School much before my time but it was a distinction that was often remembered by teachers as well as my family. The English Standard Schools were part
of a two-tier public education system that existed from 1924-1948 that separated students based on the quality of their speech, leading to de facto racial
and class segregation. This system emerged during the height of the
Americanization campaigns of the teens and twenties and was aimed at separating the children of immigrant laborers from Asia and the Native Hawaiian
population from the children of Hawaii’s growing white middle class who
could not afford the elite private academies. Even today, the legacy of the
English Standard School has an impact as debates about the use of Standard
English, complaints about pidgin-speaking students, and concerns about the
poor quality of public schools continue in Hawai’i.
I rehearse this short history because the creation of racialized subject positions is a primary condition in the production/emergence of my literacy narrative and in the cultural discourse about literacy and education. I do recognize
that writers who have been marginalized in other ways (i.e., gendered, classed,
queered, Othered, etc.) also produce narratives in response to the ways they have
been constructed by and/or excluded from dominant culture. However, I focus
on racialized writers in particular, partly because this is my own position but also
because these writers ﬁnd themselves so ideologically infused by dominant culture and carrying so much cultural baggage that they are more susceptible to
being read as non-citizens, often as “foreigners” in their own land. Though the
expected impulse is to prove proﬁciency (even expertise) in Standard English
(note my Ph.D. in English and my specialization in literacy practices), there is
also an impulse to resist Standard English, or at least to resist the imposition of
Standard English by dominant culture. My own racialization becomes a way for
me to reconﬁgure the literacy narrative as a strategy for resisting appropriation
by a dominant American culture. Instead of undergoing a metaphorical naturalization to American citizenship by proving my literacy in Standard English
beyond a doubt, I choose to denaturalize Standard English in order to unpack
the ideology that accompanies our belief in the promise of literacy. In the story
written by dominant American culture racialized subjects are included only
marginally, reduced to cultural Other, or presented as “good Americans” who
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have successfully assimilated—think of the ways Frederick Douglass and Richard
Rodriguez have been represented in mainstream culture. George Lipsitz’s concept of “counter-memory” inverts this story, and cultural Others begin to use
local moments in order to critique larger master narratives of history and culture
(213). The inversion of Standard English, not the dismissal of it, begins the
process of analyzing literacy tropes and how they operate in literacy narratives.
My New Orleans story is not uncommon. In his introduction to A Different
Mirror: A History of Multicultural America, Ronald Takaki recounts his own
experience with being “foreign”:
I had ﬂown from San Francisco to Norfolk and was riding in a taxi to my hotel to
attend a conference on multiculturalism. Hundreds of educators from across the
country were meeting to discuss the need for greater cultural diversity in the curriculum. My driver and I chatted about the weather and the tourists. The sky was
cloudy, and Virginia Beach was twenty minutes away. The rearview mirror reﬂected
a white man in his forties. “How long have you been in this country?” he asked. “All
my life,” I replied, wincing. “I was born in the United States.” With a strong southern
drawl, he remarked: “I was wondering because your English is excellent!” Then, as I
had explained many times before, I explained: “My grandfather came here from
Japan in the 1880s. My family has been here, in America, for over a hundred years.”
He glanced at me in the mirror. Somehow I did not look “American” to him; my eyes
and complexion looked foreign.” (1)

Why is there an expectation of foreignness? If we were to continue the story,
the cab driver, now defensive, might insist that he does detect an accent since
traces of Takaki’s Hawai’i accent may slip through. However this would open
up another set of expectations and constructions as the trope of Hawai’i relocates Takaki. Every day in our culture we see examples of how language, literacy, identity, and race are often connected, constructed, and talked about in
often problematic ways. The Asian markings of Takaki’s body deﬁnes him as
foreign despite any other signiﬁer that would mark him as American. His use
of Standard English, his credentials as an academic at an elite university (The
University of California, Berkeley), his expertise in American history, seemingly will not supersede his racialized body.
Here is another example. When United States Senator Alphonse D’Amato
mocked Judge Lance Ito on a radio talk show by using an exaggerated Asian
accent reminiscent of Japanese villains in old World War II movies, he displayed an attitude that often constructs Asian Americans as less than literate
and as less than full citizens in America. The New York Times reported:
In a rapid-ﬁre conversation with the radio talk show host Don Imus on Tuesday, Mr.
D’Amato sharply criticized and belittled Judge Lance Ito over his handling of the
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Simpson case and used an exaggerated Asian accent, like that of villainous Japanese
characters in old World War II movies, in talking about the Judge . . . “Forever and
ever, because Judge Ito will never let it end,” Mr. D’Amato said in his version of a
Japanese accent. “Judge Ito loves the limelight. He is making a disgrace of the judicial system. Little Judge Ito. For God’s sake, get them in there for 12 hours; get this
thing over. I mean this is a disgrace. Judge Ito will be well known. And then he’s
going to have hung jury. Judge Ito will keep us from getting television for the next
year.” (6 April 1995)

While we might give the cab driver in Ronald Takaki’s story the beneﬁt of
the doubt since his interaction with Takaki was probably limited and overdetermined to start, it is harder to dismiss Senator D’Amato’s willingness to construct Judge Ito as a Japanese caricature with a pronounced “foreign” accent.
Ito had been seen and heard on television often. His position as a judge seemingly provided an authority and legitimacy that located him securely as an
American citizen. And yet D’Amato felt he had license to portray someone
with an Asian body as a foreigner with a recognizable marker of foreignness,
an accent, as well as the use of “Yellow English.”
I look at these different scenes because they illustrate the complicated representations of literacy and race that exist in our culture. The ability to participate in public discourse, to be perceived as fully literate (and without an
accent) often becomes a marker of citizenship and legitimacy. Our culture’s
discourse of literacy (the ways in which we talk about and deploy literacy), its
inherent construction of race, and the implications for the teaching of writing
are problematic not just because literacy is often constructed in uncomplicated
terms, as an unquestioned public good; rather, the discourse about literacy is
also problematic because it is often coded as a way to talk about race, citizenship, and culture in America by raising the specter of crisis.
According to John Trimbur, the idea of a national literacy crisis entered into
the nation’s popular consciousness with the Newsweek story “Why Johnny
Can’t Write” (December 8, 1975). The tone of the story by Merrill Sheils certainly invokes crisis. Education at all levels is questioned, the threat to the labor
pool is emphasized, and the cultural life of the nation is at risk:
If your children are attending college, the chances are that when they graduate they
will be unable to write ordinary, expository English with any real degree of structure
and lucidity. If they are in high school and planning to attend college, the chances are
less than even that they will be able to write English at the minimal college level when
they get there. If they are not planning to attend college, their skills in writing English
may not even qualify them for secretarial or clerical work. And if they are attending
elementary school, they are almost certainly not being given the kind of required
reading material, much less writing instruction, that might make it possible for them
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eventually to write comprehensible English. Willy-nilly, the U. S. educational system
is spawning a generation of semiliterates. (58)

This opening paragraph to the story does not only describe a perceived crisis, it participates in the making of a crisis by playing on the anxieties of parents who not only had to worry about the economic and political difﬁculties of
the 1970s, but now had to consider the “poor” education their children were
receiving. If their children were not being taught the very basics of reading and
writing, what could parents expect for their children’s future when the outlook
at the time was already bleak?
The conﬂation of very different issues into a single literacy crisis is also problematic. Sheils draws together issues about writing instruction, language politics, literary culture, and discourse communities without ever discussing fully
the complexities of any of these single issues much less the construction of
them as all about “good writing,” or in this case, “poor writing.” As Trimbur
points out, the construction of a crisis is meant to provide an explanation for
events and conditions that have shaken the conﬁdence of a culture, “resolv[ing]
in imaginary ways actual tensions, anxieties, and contradictions” (281).
Just as Benedict Anderson suggests the “imagined community” as a way of
organizing relations among diverse subjects, this imagining of crises is also a
way to organize relations and to draw together a community. Citizenship and
its attendant practices (such as literacy) becomes a way to both create and
resolve these imagined crises, to enforce dominant practices as well allow the
more subtle powers of hegemony to operate. In the case of both citizenship and
literacy, subjects are made to desire these conditions and yet are also made to
suffer the exclusionary consequences when citizenship or literacy is unavailable
to them. Henry Giroux describes this process and appropriately emphasizes its
pedagogical aspects: “The concept of citizenship must also be understood partly
in pedagogical terms as a political process of meaning-making, as a process of
moral regulation and cultural production, in which particular subjectivities are
constructed around what it means to be a member of a nation state” (7). Renato
Rosaldo suggests a term, the “polyglot citizen,” which is extended by Mary
Louise Pratt to describe the “changing realities in the U. S., notably the arrival of
large, new immigrant populations,” but to also account for the realities of a
polyglot history of the United States (“Daring” 6). The polyglot citizen, in
Pratt’s construction, is “a point of intersection of multiple threads that weave in
and out to make the dense fabric of society” (“Daring” 8).
The use of an autoethnographic moment, to build upon Mary Louise Pratt’s
deﬁnition of autoethnography, allows these Othered subjects to theorize their
subjectivities through their literacy practices as well as the literacy practices and
expectations of the metropolis. That is, these subjects can interrogate literacy by
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investigating how they are situated and how they participate in constructing representations of literacy. This autoethnographic moment within the literacy narrative is a way for the tension between nostalgia and anxiety to be reconﬁgured
as a productive and no longer debilitating act. Talking about literacy is a complicated and often quite frustrating experience because the term “literacy” is just as
ambiguous as it is powerful. When it is invoked, it is used to describe a standard
in our larger society (perhaps most often manifested in our educational institutions), a standard that is never clearly deﬁned and often relies heavily on
“Western” assumptions and contexts and the modernity of nations. Literacy
becomes a marker of membership, and those who can demonstrate this membership gain both access to and privilege in the dominant structures of power.
Those without membership often face economic and political disadvantage, limiting their participation in the community in various ways. The implications of
literacy, then, are greater than just acquiring reading and writing abilities that
meet the community’s “standards”: literacy often becomes the marker of citizenship and this assignment of legitimacy is often “required” to enjoy the full beneﬁts of citizenship or even of basic human rights. The incentive for individuals to
be identiﬁed as literate is great; for individuals to question literacy is a great risk.
First Day, First Semester, First Year, First Job
I enter the classroom nervously, surveying the room and trying to maintain some
semblance of authority. I am beginning my ﬁrst full-time teaching position and my ﬁrst
class is ﬁrst-year college composition. Twenty-three fresh faces stare back and I worry
about learning all of their names. As I scan down the roll sheet I notice there are two
Kristins, a Kristine, a Kirsten, and two Jeffs. Everyone looks alike to me except for one
young African American woman. I take attendance, trying to burn faces and names
into my brain. I ask students to introduce themselves: where are they from, what are
their interests, why are they here? I try to assure the class that I’m experienced, have my
Ph.D. from a prestigious university, and can identify with them since I’ve lived in the
Midwest for six years. Then I go into my routine about being from Hawai’i, that faraway place that evokes dreams of Paradise—I exploit my “exoticness” to gain some cultural capital in this class. After reading through the syllabus and asking for questions, I
dismiss class. Only ﬁfteen more weeks in the term. Only forty-three more class meetings.
I hope they like me. No, I hope they respect me. Please, I hope they learn something.
Third Week, Second Semester, First Year, First Job
I enter the classroom to the strained humming of the Hawaii Five-0 theme song—
dada da da daaaaaaaa da. . . . John, a student from my ﬁrst semester course welcomes
me with this tune everyday. Its become my theme song, a way to prepare me mentally,
and to signal the start of class. It’s the second term and I’m teaching a Composition and
Literature course, the second part of a year sequence writing requirement. I survived the
ﬁrst semester—I enjoyed the ﬁrst semester.
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This week the class is preparing for its ﬁrst essay assignment. Last semester students
generated essays around various topics and responded to a wide range of texts: essays,
magazines, television, music, lived experience. This term they focus on reading and
responding to written texts. As a form of practice and demonstration I bring in a sample
essay for them to work on. I want them to read and respond in productive ways and I
provide something that is similar to the writing assignment I just gave them. The only
directions: they should give this essay the same attention they would to a classmate’s
essay—treat this like a workshop paper. Afterwards, I plan to go over the essay with the
class, partly to model a way of responding but also to illustrate how I evaluate writing.
This time the practice essay is something I had written as a sophomore in college. I
must admit that when I looked over the essay with the instructor’s comments and the
ﬁnal grade of “B,” I was a little embarrassed to use it in class. Terms weren’t deﬁned, the
thesis was a little shaky, and I didn’t provide page number citations for the quotes I used
from The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. But as I reread the essay, I saw some originality in an underdeveloped idea that actually seemed to have something interesting to
say. I saw some rhetorical ﬂourishes, a nicely turned phrase, and even some sophisticated
sentence structure. There was something to the essay. I did get a “B” (revised up from a
“C+” I think) but the instructor was tough and intelligent, and extremely generous as a
teacher and person—the kind of teacher I hoped to be. I felt pretty good about that “B”
and what I felt was a wake-up call from the empty “pretty” writing I had been doing.
There were problems with the essay but also some good points as well. A good essay for
the class to critique—a piece that needed work but also a piece that had something there.
“The introduction is boring.”
“There’s no thesis—maybe if the ﬁrst couple of paragraphs were combined.”
“The author seems to have some good ideas but it also seems like he’s just trying to
sound smart.”
“This is at best a C paper.”
I stared back at the class, grinning because I was embarrassed about the essay, but
perhaps also because I saw myself in these students. The conﬁdence, the assured evaluation of the essay’s quality, the real belief that they knew what “good” writing looked like.
That was all me as a college freshman and sophomore. Until I did get a “C” on that essay
and everything in my world seemed to fall apart. The skill I had the most conﬁdence in,
the ability that I felt was most natural had let me down. What now? Could I even get a
“B” for the course? I was literate, even intelligent. Why (in my mind) was I failing?
Rereading my sophomore writing and hearing other students respond to it forced me
into their place once more. I was not always the “professional” writing teacher. I did not
always have the “authority” that I suppose I do now. I was a student trying to write
essays I thought were smart and interesting. And perhaps they were smart and interesting—to me—but they were also in need of revision and lots of work. When I respond to
writing now I cannot help but think of that teacher who dared to give me a “C.” He was
generous, understanding, and tough, and taught me to approach writing in a different
way. I begin to take risks.
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First Class, First Week, First Semester, Second Year
A new year and a new class. This time I am another writer in a roomful of writers,
cramming the night or morning before class in order to bring a draft to our writing
groups. Teacher and student, the lines are blurred as everyone writes, shares, revises,
and learns. Another risk.

As a writing teacher, I often ask students to think about the experiences that
have brought them to this point in their lives—college—and how these experiences have shaped who they are, how they think, why they believe, and what
they write. I also ask them to think about their literacy: what is literacy? What
does it mean to them? How do they know they are literate? I do not ask them to
write about their personal lives though some choose to do so. And I do not ask
them to reveal intimate or private moments though some do because a particular experience is necessary in their making of meaning. What has become
apparent to me the more I teach is that our lives are so intertwined in our learning that whatever we do in the classroom both as teachers and students has
some reference, no matter how small, to an individual’s lived experience.
In my case, I cannot help but address my lived experience in my teaching
everyday. As an Asian American who was born and raised in Hawai’i, the difference in/of my life is in front of me as I look at my classes and usually see students who do not look like me. I understand this. Hawai’i is a state where
63.1% of its population is Asian/Paciﬁc American and whites are the minority
at 33.4%. Contrast this to Ohio, where I presently live and teach: 87% of the
population is white; 1.1% is Asian American. At the university where I teach,
93% of the student population is white and 7% non-white. I cite these statistics not to lament about the lack of diversity, especially since no place in the US
can match Hawai’i for its varied population. However, I do raise these ﬁgures
because of what it has meant for my classroom. In 10 courses I have taught so
far, I have had 18 students of color out of 242, slightly better than the 7%
minority population at the university. But when you break down these courses,
I have had classes with minority enrollments of 1, 4, 0, 1, 0, 2, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0, 1, 1,
0, and 1. What does it mean for these students to be in a situation where they
are often the lone student of color? What does it mean to me when I am the
only person of color in the classroom? And what does it mean to both my students and myself when I am perhaps the only teacher of color many of these
students may ever have?
It means I am tired. Tired not because of the teaching but because of the
extracurricular work I feel I must do. While I have never been directly challenged in my classroom about my “agenda” (read Race) or my qualiﬁcations
(read Afﬁrmative Action hire), I still work very hard to not let others assume
anything about me. When people ask what I do, I tell them I teach writing and
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literature, not English, because they may assume that means English as a second language (or is this my own fear?). On the ﬁrst day of class when we all
introduce ourselves, I often say I have lived in the Midwest for a number of
years before revealing I was born and raised in Hawai’i. I make it clear I earned
my doctorate in English from an elite university. And I assure the students that
I have taught many writing classes. Just as I see in front of me a sea of mostly
white faces, I am sure they are looking back at me and my dark features, their
Asian American (if not only Asian) teacher.
But when I look out at those mostly white faces, I also see “diversity” (a
problematic though perhaps necessary term) and work hard not to categorize
these students who have been labeled members of J. Crew U (or now,
Abercrombie & Fitch U). When these students write, they bring their lives into
their work, analyzing, arguing, or narrating about their culture and their place
in it. My work as teacher is to work with these students as they make and shape
meaning in their lives. I can only hope my presence as a person of color is part
of this meaning making and shaping even if just a tiny bit.
In my memories about language, I have tried to uncover the pervasiveness
of the ideology that has formed my anxieties and fueled my nostalgia for my
literacy, whether achievements or shortcomings. I want to offer one last scene
that perhaps illustrates the ideological force of Standard English and Asian
American anxiety to a point of absurd indulgence. One evening I was in the
video store with a friend looking over the rental possibilities when one box
cover caught my eye. It was a Hong Kong action movie that starred two
actresses whom I recognized from another action ﬁlm I had recently seen. That
was partly why I took a closer look, but under the movie credits at the bottom
of the box was what really caught my attention. It read: “With Yellow English
Subtitles.” I was amazed. I called my friend over and declared to her that this
video was racist. I could not believe how blatant the video producers were in
advertising that Yellow English was a feature, if not highlight, of the movie. Of
course I refused to rent the tape; my friend did rent it. The next day after
watching the video, she promptly called me and explained that “Yellow English
Subtitles” meant the subtitles were yellow so they would show up on the screen
better. “Oh” was my only utterance.
I describe this scene because it illustrates the power of ideology and the discourse of literacy. The problem, however, was that it was my own ideological
project which was driving this reading of literacy and race on the video box
cover. Because of my own immersion into the discourses of literacy and race I
had become hyper-sensitive to those possible eruptions of racialized representations of literacy. It seemed if it wasn’t Alphonse D’Amato and Lance Ito in the
middle of an uproar over racial stereotypes and accents, then it was a much
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publicized debate about Ebonics and the Oakland School Board’s policy on literacy. If it wasn’t someone approaching me and inexplicably beginning to speak
in Japanese then it was another complaint about the use of Pidgin in Hawai’i
and the lack of standards in the schools. As Thomas O. Beebee says, “The ideology of genre is all around us” (3). I take this to mean that generic conventions
are always already set up waiting to be activated. Ideology drives genre when
there are investments in reading cultural texts and culture in speciﬁc ways.
However, this raises an important question for me. While I can see my own
expressions of anxiety about literacy and race in my willingness to read beyond
generic conventions in order to fulﬁll my own needs, what is it that allows
other genres to exist which are blatantly racialized if not racist? What allows
the National Review (24 March 1997) to portray President Clinton, VicePresident Gore, and Hillary Rodham Clinton as racialized Asian subjects with
the stereotypical features of buck teeth and Fu Manchu facial hair? Why does
golf sensation Tiger Woods become the center of so much attention because
his racial identiﬁcation is a contradiction for so many people: he is coded as
African American; he is “actually” more Asian American (one-quarter Thai,
one-quarter Chinese, one-quarter Caucasian, one-eighth African American,
and one-eighth Native American) (Leland and Beals 59, 60).
These questions about racial identity and the discourses our culture uses to
talk about race create much anxiety not only for dominant culture but for all
subjects who often only have their identities to hold on to. While we must
work to make the ideologies which drive (the seemingly neutral/natural) discourses about literacy and education visible, to see how literacy and citizenship
are intertwined with race and class, we can also assert agency, to act upon these
discourses as James Berlin describes:
Of equal importance, the subject in turn acts upon these discourses. The individual
is the location of a variety of signiﬁcations, but is also an agent of change, not simply an unwitting product of external discursive and material forces. The subject
negotiates and resists codes rather than simply accommodating them. (78-79)

While there are ideological projects that allow for racist formations both as
part of hegemonic cultural practice or as a more radical expression, marginalized subjects can and must respond. As I have begun to argue in this essay, the
writing of narratives becomes an important strategy for marginalized subjects
in their negotiation of and resistance to the discourses of dominant culture.
The use of story (and not simply to resist or invert dominant culture) creates
the possibility of expressing a fuller experience.
In Neil A Lewis’s New York Times article (5 May 1997) about critical race
theory, he focuses on storytelling as a primary feature that allows individual
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experiences or parables to provide different contexts for the interpretation and
understanding of minority lives. Professor Kimberle Crenshaw, a proponent of
critical race theory who was interviewed for the article, says that storytelling
aims at “challenging versions of reality put forward by the dominant white culture” (Lewis A11). However, critics of critical race theory ﬁnd the use of storytelling to be weak scholarship because it reduces complex issues to personal
experience:
But for Professor Sherry, “storytelling doesn’t bear the slightest pressure once
you start to examine it.” Such storytelling, she said, starts with conclusions, “and
when you start with conclusions, it’s all too easy to make arguments that won’t withstand any scrutiny.”
Her co-author and colleague at the University of Minnesota, Daniel A. Farber,
who, like Professor Sherry, is white, said another problem with storytelling, especially personal narratives like the one by Professor Banks, is that when someone
challenges a story, “you’re not just criticizing someone’s scholarship, but you’re
attacking their life, something that goes to the heart of their identity.” Dr. Farber
added, “That can make a dialogue very difﬁcult.” (Lewis A11)

While I certainly agree with Dr. Farber that dialogue can be very difﬁcult,
dialogue has often been difﬁcult for marginalized subjects forced to enter a
public discourse that has constructed them and yet rarely allowed them to participate in meaningful ways. That is, while marginalized subjects are often portrayed in the American Story, their own stories are either naturalized, reduced,
or even erased in order to maintain the ideological and genre requirements of
America.
The point that opponents of critical race theory miss is that storytelling creates a fuller picture of the American experience. I share some of my own stories here not to authorize this project or to use my personal life as a shield from
attack. Rather, I use my stories to provide a context for this discussion about
literacy and for the ways I do research and teach.
A former student once offered a deﬁnition of literacy that I have always
found compelling: “[Literacy] meant the ability to stay healthy, thus survive
and succeed, by being honest and open about the way I feel” (Nye and Young
69). In the scenes of literacy I have provided here this deﬁnition is at work.
While writers/characters often contend with deﬁnitions and representations of
literacy and race constructed by dominant culture, they also come up with
alternative deﬁnitions of literacy which allow them to survive and succeed. In
my work when I have read the literacy narratives of others I have gained an
increased awareness of the complexities in representing and constructing culture and identity, the complexities of reading lives, and the complexities of life.
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When I examine the literacy artifacts from my own life, reread my stories, and
begin to write my own literacy narrative, I see both the virtue and the danger in
my performance as an elementary student some twenty-odd years ago, as a college sophomore a dozen years back, and as a teacher today. How can I not be
nostalgic, as I’m sure my mother was whenever she placed something in the File,
as I look back at what I achieved at ﬁve or six years old and consider the cumulative effect of these collected literacy moments. No wonder I am a professor of
English and teach writing or courses on the teaching of writing. But I also feel an
anxiety because of the contradictory experiences in my life that have told me that
despite my literacy I am open to being questioned and challenged or to being
held up as a model of assimilation. Perhaps it is my destiny as my horoscope told
me to live a life with words. In writing my own literacy narrative here, I have
begun to understand the many layers of experiences and the many layers of culture which make up my life. It is this understanding and these experiences which
become the foundation for my life as a teacher and a scholar as I continue to read
the literacy narratives in my classroom and in our culture and to write my own
life’s story.

NOTE

This essay was written and workshopped in my Advanced Composition
course in the Fall 1998. I thank the following students for their feedback and
honesty: Jennifer Dobbins, Nick Hiltunen, Mike Leesman, Jon Masica, Carrie
Ostermeyer, Melissa Quigley, Jami Riley, Megan Saulnier, Shelly Siemering,
and Drew Stricker.

16 WHERE I’M COMING FROM
Memory, Location, And The (Un)making of National
Subjectivity
CHRISTOPHER CASTIGLIA

In memory of my father, Joseph Anthony Castiglia.

My father didn’t finish high school and my grandfather, a first-generation
Sicilian immigrant, left school even sooner. Very little prepared me for my life
as not only a college graduate but a college professor, except my sense that my
passage through higher education somehow ﬁnished a journey started almost
a century earlier by my grandfather. In my family, the worst insult was “caffon” (“greenhorn”), a label that summed up a state of ignorance, at once academic (awkward grammar, bad spelling) and national (an inability to adapt
to pot-melted “American” culture, a habitual repetition of “Old World” practices and beliefs). By attending college (much less graduate school), I set out
to eliminate the last traces of “greenhorn” in my family tree, learning the
lessons that would make me not only more learned, but a better American,
ﬂuent in the national lexicon.
That lexicon, as I quickly discovered, consisted in a series of abstractions:
not only the notoriously ill-deﬁned generalities of America political discourse
(truth, justice, liberty), but abstractions away from other, previous forms of
identiﬁcation and belonging. I was learning, among other things, to forget: to
distance myself from my family and its awkward adjustments to the New
World, away from my body and the traces it bore of that history, away from the
collective sense of self. The process of “abstraction” began long before I entered
the Ivory Tower, with my grandfather’s passage through Ellis Island, with my
father’s decision to move from his parents’ home and settle in a more “mainstream” suburb, in our increasing participation in the national economy. The
essay that follows begins to tell that story.
While those “historical” thresholds have been well analyzed within literary
and cultural studies, however, the role academia itself—its disciplines and its
disciplined desires—plays in mediating between the ethnic and the national,
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the collective and the individual, the emotional and the rational, the particular
and the abstract, has remained far less scrutinized (the ground on which critics
stand always being the last explored). Yet the process of learning to forget
involves learning a way of thinking, of valuing, and of composing, and those
ways are structurally connected to the nationalizing discipline of “good” citizens. By learning to think and write in a certain way I was learning to operate
in the national lexicon, the outcome my family and I hoped for. Yet at the same
time, less legibly, I was learning to forget the source of that desire, the beginnings of that process, and in so doing I denied other, potentially productive
models of belonging, other means of making sense of the world, of composing
my “self.”
In the essay that follows, I want to argue for the importance of making
those (only ever half-forgotten) alternatives more visible, more critically central, within academia, using not only the stories of our movements through
national pedagogy in order to understand as content the ways citizens must
embody the interests of the nation-state, but also to analyze how the styles of
academic writing—abstract, analytical, dispassionate—serve those interests as
well. The reintroduction of the “personal” into scholarly essays potentially
serves both ends, creating a hybrid of styles—emotional and analytical, particularized and generalized, distancing and collectivizing—that saturate the lived
experiences of so many Americans and that are separate only in the disciplinary how-to’s of the national/academic pedagogy.
Nationalism both requires and presents itself appositionally to the “particular.” It requires competing cultural speciﬁcity, for only when emotion, collectivism, or particularity become the involuntary effects of certain (raced,
gendered, sexed, classed) bodies can abstract knowledge be a privilege of others. At the same time, nationalism requires that members of those groups
always believe themselves somehow inferior, marginalized, or incapable citizens. Locked in “identities” they must (but cannot, fully) disavow to enter full
citizenship, members of particularized (hyphenated, gendered) communities
exist in a liminal position that can potentially take the self-shaming form of
national longing. But that liminality can also give rise to challenging forms of
hybridity, and I am arguing for personal criticism as a potent form of strategic
combination and culture-crossing. Not surprisingly, personal criticism has
been taken up primarily by those with the most to gain from challenging and
altering the forms of national belonging.1 While national citizens are said to
occupy a publicity characterized by abstract and disinterested principle, the
“personal” is supposedly private, particular, and embodied. Those furthest
from full citizenship are, not coincidentally, most closely associated with
“balkanizing” cultural identities, with private domestic spheres, and with the
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markings and excesses of their bodies: women, gay men and lesbians, people of
color, immigrants, the poor, the disabled. Members of those identity categories
have taken up personal criticism in compelling and challenging ways to refuse
the false divisions of body and mind, deriving and inventing, memory and theory. At the same time, its best practitioners use personal criticism to stress the
mediated nature of the “personal,” questioning the transparency of self-knowledge. In so doing, personal criticism, like much poststructural theory, potentially deconstructs—and, unlike much poststructural theory, powerfully
reconstructs—the national subject. Our “personal” lives (which is to say, our
lives) are the place where national subjectivity is made and unmade, giving rise
to an anxious tension that might be said to be the normative state of national
affect. In our prose, academics have tended to bifurcate that process, crediting
either the making or unmaking, normativizing or subverting, of citizenship,
and in a parallel (but usually unrecognized) way, our style of analysis has
effected similar splits between the personal and the analystic. By bringing
those styles together I hope to suggest the complex dangers and pleasures of a
family’s movements into and away from national subjectivity, and thereby to
suggest an academic approach for those forced to live within the “personal.”
R O C K Y N AT I O N A L I S M

I grew up in Emerson, New Jersey, a suburb of New York City and a typical
“bedroom community.” In contrast to the public production of capital, the bedroom community is supposedly private, a secluded place of rest and repose. But
what kind of bedroom contains not the solitary slumberer or even the tranquil
family, but an entire community? If my hometown was a bedroom, it contained
multitudes, and not all eyes were sleeping: as the term “bedroom community”
suggests, the privacy of the suburb is collective and, therefore, highly scrutinized. Moreover, the generic term “bedroom community,” by rendering distinct
townships interchangeable, suggests a linkage between suburbs and sameness
that, however ﬁctional, is the pride of the bedroom community, the source of its
citizens’ mutual knowledge and shared interest. Sameness requires the surrender of particularized distinction to generalized abstraction, and suburbs
encourage such surrender in their inhabitants. In these bedrooms, the community maintains a watchful eye over the private lives of citizens, turning the
peaceful resident of the bedroom community into a disembodied cipher, a representative of abstract values—fair play and hard work, duty and liberty—
rather than a dreaming, drooling, snoring subject.
The suburb might be said to form a nation threshold, on one side of which
is affective loyalty and on the other a disembodied abstraction (“citizenship”)
that allows bodies to circulate interchangeably within the national rhetoric.
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Attaching affections experienced as private and particular to abstractions that
promise a “sameness” that becomes the precondition of public belonging, suburbs are a nationalist training ground. Not surprisingly, the two things most
ex-suburbanites can say of their hometowns is that they were indistinguishable
from all others, and yet they inspired ﬁerce civic pride. A particular pride in an
interchangeable abstraction: this affective state is, ﬁnally, the birth of national
emotion. That identiﬁcation with abstractions ultimately puts the nation-state
at the service of rhetoric (“the public”) and not of individual citizens (who
become “private interests”) matters little compared to the entitlements (legal
coverage, institutional power, geographic prestige) that citizenship confers.
In saying that national abstractions remove the state’s obligation to particular citizens, I don’t mean to imply that national “ideals” don’t serve the interest
of particular citizens. Access to national abstractions and the citizenship they
generate is, like virtually every form of access in the United Stated, economically determined. Despite its claims to generic—and hence, presumably,
democratic—sameness, Emerson’s marked neighborhoods reveal the economic basis of national status. The town’s high- income neighborhood was
called Soldier Hill, ostensibly in reference to a Revolutionary War battle fought
in the vicinity. In contrast, the town’s lower income neighborhood, Frog Town,
put residents so far from universal citizenship that they were hardly human at
all. While lower income residents were naturalized, then, its wealthier residents
were nationalized (the heart of the neighborhood was a ﬁeld with a ﬂagpole
that ﬂew the Stars and Stripes). “Universals,” as Emerson’s internal divisions
demonstrate, are deﬁned in relation to localized particulars, and if some citizens become “public” through identiﬁcation with universalizing abstraction,
other (quasi)citizens bear the “private” burden of hyper-embodiment.2
As will often happen in bedrooms, economic privilege and regulated conformity to interchangeable abstraction arose as self-generated desire at the
level of our most cherished pleasures. A highlight of my youth was the March
1974 opening of the Paramus Park Mall one town over. Through the familiarity of its stores’ names and the regularity of its architecture, its musak and controlled climate, Paramus Park endorses on the level of its physical structure the
interchangeable sameness that is reportedly the deﬁning characteristic of bedroom communities. Like its shoppers, however, Paramus Park represents
sameness as distinction, packaging mass-produced fashions as indicators of
individual style and character. Even Paramus Park’s standardized architecture
promises a different kind of sameness. As the area’s ﬁrst enclosed mall,
Paramus Park offered new attractions, especially the central food court overlooking a two-story tiered waterfall, unsoiled by the ﬂock of paper birds hanging perpetually suspended above. The waterfall, by virtue of its status as
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impromptu wishing well, rendered consumption not only natural but metaphysical: by “throwing away” money, the mall promises us, we purchase something as intangible and satisfying as a wish, a desire. My family’s favorite
dinner spot was the mall’s franchised creperie, The Magic Pan, where we
could, while enjoying a family dinner, watch hundreds of others, carrying the
same bags and doing the same things we did. This remembered vista suggests
the connections between mass-production and the “nature” in/of the mall, the
“Park” betraying the suburb’s claim to organic sameness as an innocent emanation of afﬁnity.3 At the time, however, I experienced it as a natural enjoyment, for the mall, with its cascading waters, tree-lined corridors, and origami
birds, soothingly naturalized uniformity and consumption.
As a scrutinized location for merging, through an economic nexus, “private” desire and “public” conformity into the sameness of knowledge and the
oneness of interest, bedroom communities, like their malls, are national productions.4 That my hometown is named Emerson adds a particular layer of
national irony to this sleepy suburb. The community in which being “different” was tantamount to being a communist or, worse, a bad consumer, took its
name from America’s philosopher of independence, self-reliance, and individual transcendence.5 On our way to becoming true Emersonians, our most
deeply-held belief was that, as we came to identify with the scripts of nation,
we would lose the excesses of our particular bodies so as better to merge into
the “oneness” that is the precondition of belonging. The dream of most of the
boys in my high school class was to be on the football team, the Cavaliers,
working out every day until their bodies became trim instruments of town
pride, their distinction ironically marked by donning uniforms. These were the
sons of second and third generation Italian Americans and Eastern European
Jews who understood well the incentives to trim off what one was born with in
order to achieve the American Dream, even when that dream amounted to little more than not getting picked on in the locker room. On fall afternoons,
crowds of Emersonians poured out to worship these living products of routine
discipline, personiﬁcations indeed of their hometown.
Even though I didn’t play football, the dream of translating my marked,
excessive body into abstract citizenship nevertheless suffused what was, for me,
the most “private” space in that bedroom community: my particular bedroom.
On the wall over my bed was a poster of Sylvester Stallone as Rocky Balboa, the
media idol of the bicentennial year. An out-of-shape Italian-American boxer
who gets a shot at the heavyweight title when he’s selected to ﬁght the champ,
Rocky was for me a hero who transcended the squalor of his ethnically marked
friends and family to participate in the national culture that promises economic success and fame if one can erase one’s past and eliminate competing
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loyalties. Little wonder that Rocky appealed to the Castiglias’ oldest son. My
mother worked as a self-taught bookkeeper for a large machinery manufacturer, while my father slowly made his way from butcher and truck driver to a
salesman for and eventual president of a wholesale hardware ﬁrm. While my
parents worked, I lived with my grandparents in their house decorated with
framed jigsaw puzzles of The Last Supper and occupied by aunts and uncles
with names like Chappie and Pippi who sat at a large table in the basement and
screamed at each other in broken English over meals that seemed to melt into
one another. By the time I entered high school, my parents had acquired a suburban home is Emerson, and my father, expelled in eighth grade for throwing
a classmate out the schoolroom window, became the town’s mayor. Like Rocky,
he had worked from his ethnic roots to the American Dream: the leader of all
Emersonians, he had become a Representative Man.
Continuing in my parents’ footsteps, I enacted my ethnic disloyalty by
applying to college, writing out my applications on my bed, under the eyes of
my hero. My plan to go to college was the great secret of my adolescence, but I
had internalized communal scrutiny and mine was the open secret the whole
town shared. In attempting to differentiate myself, I continued the same paradoxical logic that drove my parents’ lives; I imagined, as they did, that
Americanness waited always around the next corner, in that mysteriously elusive public sphere of entitlement that I would enter if I could only learn the
national idiom.6
At the end of the movie, Rocky realizes that he has been used by promoters
who have no real intention of letting him win the title, at which point he is
unable to return to his old friends who, in any case, have acknowledged their
own ethnic shame by cheering his rise into a national symbol. We ignored this
ending, however, to our own detriment. Having momentarily reached his
dream, my father lost his bid for a second term in the year of Reagan’s reelection, his business during the Bush presidency, and his Emersonian house in the
ﬁrst year of Clinton’s term. I too achieved and lost my dream: having been
accepted to Tufts University, I declined the offer, unable to tell my parents I was
going to an elite private school. Eventually, after attending a state university for
a few years, I transferred to the kind of privileged institution I dreamed of
attending and did gain a greater proximity to national knowledge. As a result
of the road that began in that bedroom (community), linking national belonging and “private” affect, today I enjoy the beneﬁts of education, but the satisfaction I imagined would come remains elusive, as one can see from the fact
that in writing this essay I continue to “trade in” (in both senses) my family to
earn academic credentials. The search continues. For me as for my parents, the
desire for full citizenship keeps us all working for something that exists solely
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as a promise, an incentive, that took its being only in our moments of desire, as
what we lacked.
S LY S E X UA L I T Y

If my bedroom registered and reinforced my national desire, it was the site of
other, less predictable if equally emblematic desires as well. Besides my Rocky
poster, my walls were decorated with scores of Playbills. To the right of my bed
was a record player and along one wall ran my record collection, comprised of the
soundtracks of Broadway musicals. Holding a candle in place of a microphone, I
would croon broken-hearted laments or belt out-show-stoppers, but only when
the house was empty: staying home from football was one thing, staying home to
rehearse “Some Enchanted Evening” was quite another. At ﬁfteen I was a major
homo—or at least a homo major—learning the lessons that would allow me to
imagine other belongings that would take me (I believed) out of the suburbs and
the life (marriage, children, lucrative career) it seemed to require. Lying in bed at
night so I could stare at his overdeveloped pectorals, I made Stallone the object of
my desiring gaze, turning Rocky into my own private knock-out.7
What’s a boy to do? On the one hand, my hero promised the privileges of
ethnic transcendence and disembodied citizenship. On the other hand, the
same hero occasioned a knowledge of my body that marked me as “different,”
as deviant, and as dangerous. Once, on Room 222, a boy was being picked on
by his classmates because he had VD. “What’s VD?” I asked my parents, but all
my mother said was, “Watch the show.” Her response told me that VD had
something to do with sex, and from the show I gathered that sex led to
ostracism and, in the viewing scenario, family silence. If that’s what VD led to,
what would come of masturbating with Stallone? That boy on TV became the
focus of everyone’s gaze, his diseased, abnormal body—which is to say, his
body—constantly on display while his tormentors became increasingly invisible, taking the ﬁnal form of anonymous grafﬁti on his locker. Karen Valentine
may have saved him eventually, giving her English class an essay assignment
instructing them that sex was really love and that love was natural or that tolerance was groovy. I don’t remember. What stood out for me was the shame of
his embodiment, a lesson I had already begun to learn in my own school during, say, “war ball,” the game we played weekly in gym class, in which the loser
is the person standing alone, his body bombarded by rubber balls ﬁred from
across the gym by anonymous enemies. My classmates became anonymous by
targeting a (more often than not, my) body, for only when deviants are
embodied can the citizenry achieve effective abstraction, become normal to
the point of oneness. Far from the disembodied cipher of national belonging,
then, I, like the boy in Room 222, was undeniably embodied.
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Growing up in Emerson, I learned through my body that the ontological stability of the suburb’s most fabulous and destructive ideal—“community”—and
its constituent abstraction relied on the marking and (at least fantasized) banishment of bodies, an exile that took literal form in the Hudson River, which
separated us from the decadent city, home to the suburb’s nightmare “others.” 8
Despite its fantasies of group-coherence-through-banishment, however,
“queers” were always at the heart of the suburb, not just because, as the liberation slogan runs, “we are your sons and daughters,” but because, as my story
suggests, the popular culture that mediated suburban life was also the “stuff ” of
urban queerness. I’ve come to realize that precisely such mediations—records,
radio, television, theater, movies, malls—not only created suburban repression,
but also brought me suburban relief.9 Instead, my national memories are ﬁltered through movies, television, and records, proving Berlant’s point about the
mediated nature of modern citizenship. If the disembodied citizens of the bedroom community had their transparent eyeballs on my body, my embodiment
became the source of mediated pleasures that revised the disciplined regularity
I experienced in my everyday life.
My favorite teacher in high school was Ed Peretti, the chorus director, who
taught us the scores of Pippin and Man of La Mancha and cast me as Pappy
Yokum in my ﬁrst musical, Li’l Abner. Mr. Peretti gave me a way to think about
and to resist the relationship between my body and the “ﬁctive ethnicity”
inscribed upon it. If chorus is itself a ﬁtting symbol of the “community,” creating
harmony out of potential discord, Mr. Peretti, by introducing me to musicals,
was offering distinctly dischoral materials. Musicals are notoriously conventional
affairs: if you can’t tell the entire plot from the ﬁrst ten minutes, you’re not really
watching a musical. At the most predictable moments, however, an actress (men
never have big numbers on Broadway; women, not men, are the embodied subjects par excellence) steps out of the plot and delivers a showstopper, a term that
indicates the disruptive quality of the performance. These numbers present the
body as a register of unconventional longings: No longer a set piece in a routine
script, the actress becomes, for a moment, a spectacular exception, whose presence as longing body—where else is that breath-grabbing music coming
from?—will force us to clap, to cry, to stand and shout—in short, to remember
that we, too, have bodies.10 Not surprisingly, my favorites continue to be concert
reenactments of musicals that include the audience reactions: the surprised
gasps, the ecstatic cheers when, say, Angela Lansbury comes on stage, making my
listening part of the performance, linking performance and sensation into an
“imagined community” that would reassure but not reincorporate me.11 By relying on the kindness of strangers, I used the pleasures of my body to turn aside,
for a moment, the admonishing glower of the community in my bedroom.
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Such mediated encounters quickly became the core of my imaginative life
in Emerson, enabling me to ﬁnd in the midst of regulated disembodiment the
creative possibilities of my own and others’ bodies. I began to meet men who
desired other men, not in the urban Sodom but in the Paramus Park Mall, the
suburb’s emblematic core. These encounters were remarkably comforting,
opening up realms of imaginative adventure that made my adrenaline pump
and kept my mind busy for days afterward. What mattered to me in these
encounters, which rarely involved any talk, was not “knowing” others like me
in the model provided by the suburb (establishing a conformed “sameness”
that allows mutual knowledge), but exactly their difference, which became an
opportunity to invent, to pose, to perform. My identity, therefore, was not “discovered” within my “self ” or across the river in the city, but in the mediated
cultural forms that brought people together without making them one: the
mall’s actual, rather than its virtual, function.
If I learned the lessons of embodiment in Emerson, I also learned this: if the
promise of “freedom”—of transcendence that would free me into the disembodied abstraction that was my natural self—was a constant source of disappointment, the pleasures that came from what Lauren Berlant calls performing
unfreedom—acting within and against, but not outside, the forms of cultural
determination at hand—became the most satisfying and reliable source of
agency I’ve found.12 Such revisions acknowledge our perpetual conﬁnement
within national rhetorics (“unfreedom”) while also demonstrating that those
rhetorics may be re-articulated (“performed”) to draw attention to their failed
promises and ulterior motives and to assert a public agency for those who rearticulate them. In advocating “unfreedom” as a powerful form of agency I do
not want to underestimate the physical locations and deployments of power
that sometimes make movement a necessity of survival. But Americans have
too often believed that movement in itself constitutes agency, misrecognizing
dislocation as transformation or freedom. My story is, however, not of a move
from oppression to liberation, from suburb to city, from family to college, or
from body to nation (or back again to subculture), but of mediation between
symbolic orders (suburban, urban, national, sexual), that allows me to use one
order to read and, to a certain degree, to resist the other. The suburbs are an
historic articulation of the nation; they do not precede or “reﬂect” America. It
is in places like Emerson that “ﬁctive ethnicity” is formulated, taught, enforced,
and perhaps most importantly, contested. I had to go home to begin this
exploration of liberal community and its discontents, of resistance and alternative social formations, of ontological ﬁctions and the preconditions of
national belonging. My efforts to “transcend” Emerson seem to me to have
demonstrated the strongest hold of its values upon me; maybe only when I
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stayed put, when I felt most stuck in my bedroom in my ethnic family’s splitlevel in an all-American suburb, that I was able to become most “other” to
myself, to imagine different narratives of what life could be, of where and how
I could belong.
HOME SCHOOLING

The gesture of “staying put”—of performing unfreedom rather than engaging in the ﬁction of transcendence—turns out to be easier said than done. As
I’m writing this, my mother telephones. “Are you cooking?” she asks, sensing
the distraction in my voice. “No,” I reply curtly, “I’m writing.” She begins to
apologize, says she’ll call back. I hesitate and then click on “save.” “No, it’s okay.
I can come back to it.” She tells me about the antics of her grandchildren, sales
at the local supermarket, the terminal illness of a cousin I’ve never met, the
sauce she’s making for dinner. Not much response is called for: I giggle, cluck
my tongue, express mild surprise. Eventually she runs out of news and it’s my
turn, but the censor clicks on: I’ve had a tough day writing. I attended a lecture. I proposed a panel for a professional conference. None of this, I think,
would mean a thing to her; I worry that she would think that my life sounds
pretty boring, if not to say easy, not equal to the frustration I express. Not that
my mother would give me any basis for these fears; she would respond the way
she would to eating play-doh, missing a sale on boneless chicken, making
marinara sauce: she would ﬁnd a way to translate. It’s I who wonders how
important my work is, why I’m doing it. So I say, “Nothing new here,” and leave
it at that. What I’m really saying is: my life is so different from yours that you
couldn’t possibly understand; I have no way to express myself to you. I assert
her failure to transcend along with me (thereby claiming my own successful
transcendence), my failure to ﬁnd a way back.
So I still want to leave them behind, to use academic forms to turn my family and the other people of my childhood into two-dimensional ﬁgures of discipline and deconstruction. Even while disavowing the push towards national
abstraction, I repeatedly position the details of my parents’ everyday lives (Play
Doh, marinara sauce) against the “explanatory” abstractions of academic theory (“interpellation,” “discourse”). For better or worse, my sense that academia
could teach me the national idiom—would transform a private body into a
privileged abstraction—was for the most part right.
Once I chose academia, the road led to an increasing belief in the national
myths of originality and heroic individualism, discovered in my chosen “ﬁeld”
rather than in the prairies of a manifest destiny. Yet those myths too often lead,
as the American Adams and Eves of yore discovered, to crippling sensations of
competition and isolation. At a recent MLA panel, someone read a story from
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local paper in which a hotel clerk remarks that he doesn’t understand academics: we don’t spend a lot of time eating or sleeping with one another, he
claimed; we just go back to our hotel rooms alone and cry. This remark elicited
laughter from the audience, but also groans of recognition and defensive
explanations: the horrors of the job market, betrayal played out on panels and
in coffee shops throughout the conference. Such glosses fail, however, to recognize these phenomena as systemic components of the larger, isolating effects of
academic culture and a good deal of criticism.
I saw this very clearly when I asked a colleague to read an early draft of this
essay. “Why are your footnotes so nice?” he asked. “I know you. You’re pretty
skeptical. But I’d never know that from your footnotes. Get rid of them.
They’re too nice.” In many ways it was the feedback I hoped for, suggesting that
my intellectual debts are not as overwhelming as I had claimed. Entertaining
the possibility of changing my text, however, I realized that I had not experienced the footnotes as admissions of debt at all; indeed, they were a comfort, a
source of pleasure. The footnotes formed a countertext to my argument itself,
for even while leaving my family behind, even while using the essay to criticize
the values of community, I was reconstructing those values in the footnotes.
The impulse to eliminate uncritical footnotes is one of the many conventions
that tie academia to Americanization. Footnotes that acknowledge academic
connection—rather than stressing critical distance—smack of collectivism,
while “derivativeness” (the worse quality academic prose can possess) carries the
whiff of Ellis Island. Deriving (coming from somewhere else) retards one’s emergence as the individualistic self that is the true American citizen. Since one is selfmade, not deﬁned by one’s relatives or competing ethnic loyalties, being in
conversation with others, agreeing and witnessing rather than contesting and
debating, is suspect, a hindrance towards Americanization no less than a sign of
academic laziness. Despite my academic training, however, I did derive from
some place—or rather, from some places, for the Americanizing suburb I called
home was only one of many locations of my childhood: my ethnic family and
my queer love of show tunes were also homes to me, and their inﬂuence—as well
as their competitive jostlings—shape who I am, how I can belong in the world.
My great-grandmother, Barbara Ciardella, lived along the railroad tracks in a
rowhouse with faded green awnings and a steep front stoop, much like those of
her predominantly Italian-American neighbors. In the morning she would put
on a pot of coffee that simmered all day, serving a steady procession of friends
and family who came to sit at her table, talk to her occasionally in Italian (she
spoke no English) and watch the soap operas or, in season, the Yankees. But
most of all they gossiped. All visitors, male and female, young and old, passed
around stories seemingly without point, punctuated with emotional highlights,
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that everyone already knew. Over coffee and cookies, for hours at a time, among
constantly changing players, they established lines of afﬁliation and familiarity.
This was the backdrop to a distinct early memory: I was having enormous
difﬁculty learning math, and these guests of my great-grandmother’s paused in
their gossip long enough to write out problems for me, wrestling with long
division themselves so as to help me along. When I solved these problems successfully, they clapped and cheered, our glory collective and expressive. When I
failed, my great-grandmother’s woeful moans, when the situation was translated to her in hushed tones, made me resolve to try harder next time, for their
sake as well as my own. This was another kind of education, a competing
model of belonging, although a harder one to recall.
In evoking memory’s capacity to articulate an instability within the presumed coherence of national identity and its abstractions, its models of belonging, and its academic rationalizations, I don’t want to naturalize memory or its
subsequent expression in personal criticism as transparent “experience.” Rather,
personal criticism can demonstrate the ﬁctive nature of identity, memory, and
collective belonging, without mitigating their power either to destabilize
national ﬁctions or to pose enabling alternatives. To return again to my greatgrandmother’s kitchen: the Ciardellas were well aware of the ﬁctive quality of
the memories that served as the basis of their connections, at least as indicated
by one piece of family lore. My great-grandmother had two sons who died, one
soon after the other. My great-grandmother’s grief upon the death of the ﬁrst
son was so extreme that when her second son died, the family took up the task
of writing her letters “from” the second son. I became haunted by this story of
my aunts and uncles keeping their sibling alive through the years, textually.
When my great-grandmother died, her children and grandchildren stopped
coming together, and I lost this communal connection. I mourn that loss, and if
this text can revive them a while, so be it.
In the end, my extended family proved more adaptable to my “difference” than
I could have anticipated. When I ﬁnally did graduate from that elite New England
college, my whole family made the trek to graduation. My father, crying, told me
it was the proudest day of his life. When I was worried about coming out to my
family, my brother invited over a gay member of his fraternity who told me how
my brother had made a speech to the whole house saying that making the frat safe
for gay men made it safer for all their differences; my grandmother, who upon the
birth of each of her grandchildren crocheted an elaborate tablecloth to give as a
wedding present, gave my partner and me my tablecloth when we bought our
house. To be sure, these efforts inscribe me in the heteronormative discourses
(marriage, home-ownership, homosocial bonding) that structure their lives; yet
my family’s efforts to transform those discourses—their own performances of

Where I ’m Coming From

329

unfreedom—have, in many ways, allowed me my life. Even in the course of their
suburbanization, what my family retains, as memory, from competing models of
social organization and belonging—a willingness to incorporate newcomers into
the family; a raucous and at times indecorous sense of humor; a trust that our
bonds can withstand a heated discussion; that open displays of affection, by men
as well as by women, are healthy—has in many ways made me a poor academic
(too hungry for community, too quick with tactless speech), but has also brought
other forms, other styles, to this essay. My family stays in touch, mediates our
lives, induces me to use the “save” function. If Americanness was only half
achieved, other forms of belonging were only half deserted.
There’s the hope.
P U B L I C I N T E L L E C T UA L S , P E R S O N A L C R I T I C I S M

The power of personal criticism to upset the nationalizing functions of academic discipline became strikingly clear to me when I began delivering early
versions of this essay, provoking a mixture of anger and despair best summed
up by one scholar: “If you’re right,” he exclaimed, “then everything I’ve always
believed is wrong, and you might as well put me on a shelf like a can of
Campbell’s soup.” This odd metaphor for “out-datedness” drew less on the
shelf-life of minestrone than on the art of Andy Warhol, whose famous
Campbell’s Soup silkscreens suggest not only the mass production of contemporary desire (“um-um good”), but, when Warhol used the same style in his
multiple-panel portraits, of “personal” identity. With his images of riot police
and electric chairs, Warhol extended his exploration of identity under Fordist
capitalism to include the disciplines of the state as well.
Thinking about this scholar’s unlikely metaphor, I’ve come to believe that
my essay troubled him not because it revealed anything startling, but because
it was uncannily familiar, suggesting how the life narratives of academics, like
Warhol’s silkscreens, are composed through the repetitious overlay of the
national, the economic, and the personal. The dismayed scholar was resisting
the recognition that he is, like me, invested in those very structures—capitalism, the state, other people’s identities—upon which academia supposedly
grants a transcendent perspective. He is, in short, a can of Campbell’s Soup.
The academic desire to segregate “the personal” from “the professional”—to
keep identity “private”—is part and parcel of broader cultural currents: If the
public is taken in American civil discourse as a synonym for the national, then
the private or personal become the nation’s other. From right-wing outcries
against governmental regulation of “private” enterprise to liberal protests
against state intervention in “personal” choices (sexuality, abortion, physicianassisted suicide), a wide and often contradictory range of “private” experiences
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is presented as an enclave against the nationalized public. These distinctions
especially occur in discourses of the body and its markings: race, gender, class,
and sexuality. Insofar as the “personal” may be said to be over-located within
the discourses of the body, that privatized body is dis-located from the national
public. The Warhol allusion suggests that my interlocutor was especially troubled, however unconsciously, by the specter of that most private of marked citizens, the American queer (why Warhol and not, say, Lichtenstein?), claiming a
structural relation to the national public and its academic institutions.
Academia would never be so vulgar as to adopt the terms of the popular
press or of explicitly nationalist literature. Yet the obsession with drawing
absolute and value-laden distinctions between public and private—and with
marking those distinctions by setting limits on the body—has found an academic inﬂection in debates over personal criticism. The association of much (particularly Leftist) scholarship with the private (its “jargon”) and with the bodily
discourses of race, sex, and gender (the “p.c.”) has occasioned a vigorous effort
to create a public—and yes, even national—scholarly position, evidenced by the
renewed call for “public intellectuals” (where have we been all along, if not in
public?). In this effort to claim a public academic status, personal criticism has
often been a scapegoat, irrationally distinguished from rigorous (read: abstract,
disinterested) scholarship. The call for public intellectuals corresponds with the
rise—and disavowal—of personal criticism, just as the creation of a national
public correlates with the abjection of marked “private” bodies.
In defending personal criticism against these charges, however, I also urge its
practitioners to avoid making “personal” synonymous, not only with “private,”
but also with “individual.” Our stories are never private or only our own. As
Michael Berube argues, “one’s understanding of one’s observations has been
formed by the various historical forces that have formed the landscape that
makes those observations possible” (1065). If personal criticism does not shed
light on what Berube calls “intersubjective relationships,” but pauses on selfabsorbed fascination with the particular, it misses the opportunity to challenge
the self-determined autonomy of one’s “personal” story and to analyze the
academy’s role in the workings of state interpellation. The theoretical promise
of personal criticism lies in its potential demonstration of how the subject circulates between public and private spheres, abjection and entitlement, the state
and the subject, subject positions and global economies. Such circulations
undermine clear distinctions between the national public and the experiential
private, and it is precisely that deconstructive circulation—articulated not from
a transcendent and abstract position but from an experiential and implicated
one—that comprises personal criticism’s potential to challenge, not only what
Nancy K. Miller calls “the nationalism of the ‘I’” (xix), but nationalism itself.
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NOTES

A fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities made this
essay possible, as did the generous support of the staff of the Newberry
Library. This essay was truly a community project, for many friends encouraged me, read drafts, and offered invaluable commentary. For those loving services, I want to thank Lisa Brawley, Robert Caserio, Anne Dalke, Allen Frantzen
Leigh Gilmore, Kim Hall, Sasha Hemon, Jean Howard, Joe Janangelo, Paul Jay,
Kate Jensen, Rachel Kranz, Tessie Liu, Dana Nelson, Jean Pedersen, Gerry Reed,
Mary Kay Reed, Mary Beth Rose, Carl Smith, Julia Stern, Priscilla Wald, and
Peggy Waller. David Bleich and Deb Holdstein improved the essay with their
enthusiastic and insightful editing. Above all, I thank Chris Reed for making
the “personal” a splendid place to live.
1.

2.

3.

4.

I am thinking of such works as Getting Personal (Nancy K. Miller), French
Lessons (Alice Kaplan), Crossing Ocean Parkway (Marianna Torgovnick),
Alchemy of Race and Rights (Patricia Williams), Leaving Pipe Shop (Deborah
McDowell), Alias Olympia (Eunice Lipton), Colored People (Henry Louis
Gates, Jr.), A Life in School (Jane Tompkins), BorderLands (Gloria Anzaldua),
My American History (Sarah Schulman), and Cures (Martin Duberman).
My thinking here owes much to Lauren Berlant’s argument that the nation’s
“norms of privilege require a universalizing logic of disembodiment, while
its local, corporeal practices are simultaneously informed by the legal privileges and—when considered personal, if not private—are protected by the
law’s general proximity” (“Queen,” 470).
Several commentators note the mall’s blurring of public and private spaces,
especially as the mall replaces the traditional downtown shopping area.
Lizabeth Cohen argues that the mall’s appropriation and commercialization
of public space means that a “free commercial market attached to a relatively
free public sphere (for whites) underwent a transformation to a more regulated commercial marketplace . . . and a more circumscribed public sphere
of limited rights” (1099). In contrast to Cohen, who uses the regulated “private” space of the mall to naturalize the “freedoms” of public space outside
the mall, I am arguing that the public sphere and the private sphere are
coterminous and mutually structuring, not distinguishable “opposites.”
It seems nearly impossible for critics writing about suburbs not to nationalize them, as is evident in the subtitle to Kenneth Jackson’s classic study,
Crabtree Frontier: the Suburbanization of America. Neil Harris similarly
nationalizes malls when he claims, “In joining modern pleasure in large,
unadorned surfaces to an older, baroque theatricality, the best of these
buying machines remind us, once again, that the commercial spirit has
nourished much of our most interesting American design” (288). Without
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denying the commercial spirit behind the design of malls, I want to suggest that the architectural designs of the malls generate, not simply reflect,
the national character and the “commercial spirit” that Harris sees as
motivational—and hence prior—entities.
Emerson, incorporated in 1903, was originally named Etna, but its mail was
being delivered to a town of the same name in New York; a name change was
necessary, but ﬁrehats had already been ordered with an emblazoned “E,”
and so the town changed its name in 1909 to Emerson. I am grateful to town
historian Bill Wassman for the details of this story. The name change is perhaps ﬁtting: Christopher Newﬁeld argues that Emerson endorses “corporate
liberalism,” a belief that the principle social pleasure is submission to an
amorphous and unappealable power before which both personal action and
collective democracy lose all effective agency. Given Newﬁeld’s analysis, perhaps the naming of my hometown was not ironic at all.
I am building here on Etienne Balibar’s theory of “the nation-form.”
Subjects, Balibar argues, are formed as part of a “ﬁctive ethnicity,” a national
collective, purportedly possessed of a common ancestral “nature,” that dissolves all competing localities and identiﬁcations. That idealized projection
is productive, however, of a haunting dissatisfaction—a misrecognition—
characterizable as “desire.” Such a desire—for a belonging never quite
achieved, a recognition never quite completed—is necessary to the state,
insofar as it produces both voluntary labor and patriotic striving. My desire
was not only overdeternmined, then, it was doomed from the start, ironically in similar ways to how my parents’ had been. Although my access to
disembodied logic as an academic seemed to resolve my embodied status as
a queer, both “identities” functioned to foreclose my options for national
belonging, and paralleled how my parents’ lack of education and desire for
upward mobility disqualiﬁed them. As Lauren Berlant argues, “excesses to
the norms of body and language” mark “American failures, citizens unﬁt to
proﬁt from their talents in a national symbolic and capitalist system”
(“Infantile” 502). My parents’ newly bourgeois bodies, like my queer body,
their undereducated language, like my overeducated language, placed us
outside the national norm that fueled all our desires in the ﬁrst place.
Rocky may not have been, as I imagined, my private fantasy after all, either
sexually or socially. I was startled, watching Saturday Night Fever recently, to
see the same Rocky poster on the bedroom wall of John Travolta’s character,
himself a notable Italian American hero who leaves his ethnic Brooklyn family for his new life with a name-dropping social climber in Manhattan. The
use of the poster in that ﬁlm indicates that others have seen its symbolic
value for Italian-American boys with social ambitions. The same scene, in
which John Travolta parades around in a pair of tight black briefs, extends
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the homoerotic potential of the poster through Travolta—whose sexuality,
the subject of endless speculation, has formed its own open secret—to the
male viewer, indicating that the sensational effects caused by Stallone’s body
enjoyed a wider circulation than I imagined.
I have focused on queerness as the suburban “other,” but the most suppressed suburban category of difference is race. One of the central misconceptions of the suburbs is that by moving farther from the city, citizens
become more white, and hence more American. At the heart of white ﬂight
is white fright: a fear that one’s privileges, stolen from others and enjoyed
compulsively (activities projected onto the urban black or Hispanic criminal
and drug addict), will continue to be haunted by the suburb’s projected
“others.” Kenneth Jackson reports that African Americans comprised only
8.7% of the 54.1% of the suburban population of New York’s metropolitan
area in l980. Lizabeth Cohen notes that between 1950 and 1960, the population of the ten largest U.S. cities shrank, with three whites moving out for
every two non-whites who moved in. Arguing that the suburbs subtly
reversed the gains of the Civil Rights movement, Cohen concludes that “suburbanization must be seen as a new form of racial segregation in the face of
a huge wave of African American migration from the South to the North
during the 1950s (1059). When I called the borough clerk of Emerson to
ﬁnd out how many African Americans live in Emerson now, she informed
me that the township does not keep numbers on “such things,” a statement
that testiﬁes to the white hegemony of my hometown.
The irony of suburban racism is that it reproduces the snobbish exclusion that ﬁrst forced the Protestant elite out of the cities to escape exactly the
immigrant populations who now project the same stereotypes upon African
American and Hispanic city dwellers that were initially projected onto them.
This irony was brought home to me on a recent visit to my parents. Driving
home from the airport, my father noted that the roads were dangerous
because of black ice. My mother, mishearing, assured him that there wouldn’t be many black guys on the roads of those suburbs. My mother’s mishearing arose from my father’s strong Italian-American accent (the rendering of
“c” as “g,” the extension of sibilant “s” into “z”). The very linguistic traits that
marked them as “racial” to me translated, for my mother, into an assertion of
their white privilege in relation to the “black guys” who could never, as they
had, escape the city for the suburb.
Lauren Berlant notes a shift in national education from monumental to technological culture; “global media formations,” she argues, “are the real citizenheroes” (“Infantile,” 504), not the founding fathers enshrined in Washington
D.C. Although I along with my ninth grade class made the national pilgrimage to the Capitol Berlant writes of, I can’t remember a thing about it.
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Michael Moon discusses his identiﬁcation, as a fat “protogay” boy in rural
Oklahoma, with the excessively embodied opera divas, “radiating authority
and pleasure,” he saw pictured in Look magazine (“Divinity,” 215). Both
weight and sexuality, as types of “excessive” embodiment, incite ridicule, and
hence are violations of the abstract body at the core of American citizenship.
Building on Benedict Anderson, I am claiming a form of memory here that
acknowledges the national pressures to forget (one’s family past, one’s bodily
sensations) requisite to the forming of imagined national communities, but
also works against that pressure by forming national media into subcultural
countermemory.
Berlant writes that Harriet Jacobs, Frances Harper, and Anita Hill “represent
their deployment of publicity as an act made under duress, an act thus representing and performing unfreedom in America.” Such performances “represent their previous rhetorical failures to secure sexual jurisdiction over
their bodies, challenging America to take up politically what the strongest
individualities could not achieve” (“Queen,” 458).

1 7 T H E P E R S O NA L A S H I S TO RY
RICHARD OHMANN
When I summon up remembrance of my early teaching years, lively courses
and ﬁne students swim to the surface, but chieﬂy a feeling of inadequacy bordering on desperation. A 23-year-old standing in coat and tie before privileged
18-year-olds, I took attendance with gravity, carefully announced that papers
would be due or would be returned at the end of the hour, passed around a list
of conference times, said OK, please turn to Orwell’s essay, and withal sought
to prolong the safe time during which there could be no question who was in
charge. I knew the script. They knew the script.
“Mr. So-and-so” (no ﬁrst names; students were “Mr.,” I was “Mr.,” our
famous professors were “Mr.,” this was Harvard) “Mr. So-and-so, what is the
assumption behind that ﬁrst sentence?” My lesson plan spoke through me, but
would it speak through Mr. So-and-so? If yes, back to the script, but suppose
he got it wrong: should I put the same question to Mr. Such-and-such and
keep going until someone hit the answer that matched my plan? Kindergarten
stuff. Come back to Mr. So-and- so? Try to ﬁgure out the nature of his mistake?
Tease the right answer out of him? Suppose he didn’t know what an assumption was? Suppose he hadn’t read that part of the assignment? A bad breakdown in the script. Do I reprimand him? By what authority? Suppose he wasn’t
listening? Doesn’t care what an assumption is? Can’t see why he should be
studying logic and rhetoric instead of writing like Thomas Wolfe or playing
squash? A worse breakdown, especially if he should through an intonation or a
gesture or glance at his friend in the next seat open up such vistas of indifference. Suppose, worse still, that he is unhappy, homesick, afraid, needs me to be
something other than a nervous teaching fellow, trying to make it through this
difﬁcult hour, on script?
The hour might—usually did, I guess—include moments when learning
happened. Certainly there were times I thought I had something to teach: how
to explicate “The Unknown Citizen,” or which introductory paragraphs on a
dittoed sheet from students’ essays were stilted or superﬂuous, and which purposefully taut. I remember one or two times (doubtless there were more) when
students talked with animation to one another and to me, and the class felt
more like a conversation among smart people about matters of serious interest
than like a test of my skill at impersonating a professor. But the high point of
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the hour was that of its cresting toward a close—of astonished realization that
I could once again surf onto the beach with my hoax intact. Then the lowstakes busyness of giving out the next assignment, returning or collecting
papers, perhaps sympathetically granting an extension, assuring a dutiful student that his missing next Wednesday’s class would not leave him in too deep a
hole. Human exchanges. Then out the door and the rest of the way back to a
life I could recognize as my own. Buoyantly if the class had gone “well,” with
shame or relief if not. Two days or ﬁve days or a week before I had to stare
down humiliation again.
How I spent those intervals: reading for orals, working on my dissertation,
drinking with friends, being domestic. Work or play—at ﬁrst with ease of
mind, with teaching anxiety at a distance. It came nearer each day.
Procrastination, then panic. Grading papers helped. A practical step, a manageable duty. But it, too, could let the spectre into my study if I relaxed my
guard. Sure, I was way ahead of most freshmen (but not of a precocious few) in
my command of grammar, usage, diction—the comp teacher’s trade secrets.
On the other hand, why did I seem to be spattering as many “dics” and “grs”
and “trs” and “awks” on each batch of themes as on the batch before? “Work
harder on organization,” I would write, but hadn’t I said that last time? And
when I peeked at my grade book before settling on a judicious C+, depressing
to see that I had given him C+ last week, too, and every week except for the
beginning-of-semester D-, which had terrorized him into paying attention.
What was I teaching, really?
Back to panic, and a quick end to “the sad account of fore-bemoaned
moan” allusively promised in the opening sentence of this essay. When panic
got the better of avoidance, I began what I thought of as preparation for
class—an activity so excessive and so poorly attuned to the challenge of helping students improve their reading and thinking and writing that there should
be another term for it: depreparation? pedagogical disablement? I read tomorrow’s text as if it were Talmud, amassing enough commentary to ﬁll a semester’s class hours and put the most rabbinical of students to sleep. A few years
later, in my ﬁrst regular job, the problem shifted: now I often taught about
daunting Great Books (Homer, the New Testament, Dostoevsky), already
encrusted with commentary I had no time to learn while trying to keep one
chapter or book ahead of my students. Either way, nights-before developed
along the same pattern. A gathering awareness that I could never build my
teacherly fortress high enough; 1:00 am, 2:00 am, I’ll ﬁnish in the morning,
can’t sleep, guzzle a quart (truly? so memory tells me) of cheap sherry, destroy
consciousness; set the alarm for 5:30, shatter my coma with its ringing; waken
consciousness again with a Molotov cocktail of coffee, shower, and fear; cobble
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together a disorderly sheaf of teaching notes; proceed grimly to class, do the
opening rituals, and launch my professor act one more time.
To be sure, another part of my memory says it can’t have been that dismal.
Some students told me how much they thought they had learned from my
classes. A few hung out in my ofﬁce, seemed to value my conversation and even
advice, became friends. The director of the freshman writing course, Harold C.
Martin, visited my class, read my comments on papers,1 said I was doing ﬁne.
Later he made me “head section man,” then invited me to collaborate in the
making of two text books.2 I came to Wesleyan (my ﬁrst and only regular job)
trailing clouds of pedagogical glory. Tenure was quick and easy, though I wonder still if I would have made the grade had my judges paid even the most perfunctory attention to students’ views of my teaching. There was no scheme of
assessment in the early 1960s. Hearsay ruled. Wesleyan promoted those making a mark in scholarship, and assumed their teaching to be commensurate.
We were “scholar-teachers,” with the teacher part in rhetorical boldface, but
the scholar part dominant in tenure case law. No surprise, that, to anyone
familiar with academic folkways and the economy of institutional prestige.
“Scholarship.” The word resounds with dignity, implies solidity and permanence. (“Scholarship sublime,” mocked Gilbert and Sullivan.) By contrast,
“teaching” suggests interminable activity, pushing a boulder up the mountain,
never reaching the top. The end of a course: respite, free time for scholarship.
The end of a career: a fading hologram of Mr. Chips, while one’s scholarship
endures, in print, on one’s curriculum vitae (a telling phrase), and in the ediﬁce of knowledge—monuments of unageing intellect. These hyperboles seem
to me to capture something powerful in the ethos I learned without being
exactly taught. Scholarly writing was to be my real career. I was to pursue truth
and get it into print when I found it. Fantasy whispered that I might become a
hero of the intellect. Short of that, my fresh and yet solid contributions to
knowledge would, along with the learning that grounded them, earn me
repute and fund my authority.3
It is a common criticism of the academic institution that the privileging of
research devalues teaching. I am after a related but different point: that one’s
authority as a teacher is supposed to derive from one’s effort and achievement
in research. That relation may hold pretty well in a research seminar for graduate students and post docs in biochemistry. And indeed it worked for me in
similar settings: giving an MLA paper was a breeze compared to teaching an
English 101 class. But universities house many renowned chemists who fail in
introductory courses, and they at least “know” the whole ﬁeld of chemistry,
while for my generation (and to an extent still), advanced study and research in
English added scarcely a tittle to one’s authority as a composition teacher. In a
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liberal arts college like Wesleyan, there were in fact very few settings where
advanced training and research translated into classroom authority. I was, in
the early 1960s, amassing scholarly credentials at a good pace, while ﬂoundering
in my courses in spite and because of the extravagant labors I have described.
Now clearly, something was askew in the expectations we bright boys had
for unity of academic being. The ideology of research as guarantor of good
teaching collapses for the reason just stated, and for a still more obvious one:
scholarship and teaching are very different social relations. Among many
dimensions of difference I will stress two. Getting ahead in research and publication is a matter of pleasing, impressing, and often contending with one’s
peers and elders; teaching is chieﬂy a relation with less entitled juniors. And:
scholarly intercourse takes place over spatial and temporal distances, through
measured exchanges and with the personal mediated and defended by professional conventions and crafted styles; teaching, except in the mass-production
format, happens live and on the wing, with the instructor’s plan and persona
open to a thousand unpredictable responses (including dreaded indifference)
and needing constant adjustment. The teaching moment can yield ease and
even exhilaration, but neither those pleasures nor the enlightenment of students can be had by transposing relations of scholarship into the classroom.
To do so literally is impossible. Students are not journal referees or fellow
specialists. Students are right there with you; they talk back in the middle of the
exposition rather than framing a decorous response after it’s over (and of
course you need them to talk back). So no teacher tries to be an expert with students in the modes of authority and discourse he or she has painstakingly
learned through apprentice scholarship. But since those are the modes that have
made you an authority—earned you the right to be teaching—the impulse to
rely on them is powerful. How else do you signify and enact that right?
On this account, it’s not that teaching is personal and scholarship impersonal. No social practice can be entirely one or the other. But we screen and
project ourselves differently in these two practices. Scholarly conventions—and
I resume the past tense here—scholarly conventions demanded the etiolation
or bracketing or erasure of much that pertained uniquely to the individual presenting research. Out of bounds were, for example, the writer’s gender (though
we have learned since that it was unmarked and so male), his age and physical
characteristics, his life history, the labor and conﬂict and perhaps uncertainty
that went into production of the written or spoken text, how the writer was
feeling at the moment (I’m cold and a bit edgy right now, but it’s unseemly for
you to know that), how the reception of his writing mattered to him beyond
acceptance of its contribution to certiﬁed knowledge, and so forth. He might
imply such information through style; probably he couldn’t help conveying
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some of it to the canny reader. But the conventions largely forbade its explicit
communication, restricting the scholarly persona to a disembodied fund of old
and new knowledge, mobilized in accepted forms of argumentation and circulated among other such disembodied personae.
In class it was a struggle to wall out so much of the personal, but it also seemed
both proper and safe. Physical appearance was ineradicable, but we did our best
by wearing the professorial uniform. I, like most, ﬂattened the social ﬁeld by
being Mr. and calling students Mr. or Miss. Although during my early teaching
years the legal barriers against sexy literature were beginning to crumble (Lolita,
Tropic of Cancer, The Group, Naked Lunch, etc.), and although a style of reading
all texts as sexual (via phallic symbols and the like) was wildly and naughtily popular, silence was to shroud our own sexualities—and, needless to say, the erotics
of teaching. Political conviction, autobiography, family? I thought it permissible
to voice anti-fascist or anti-communist sentiments, speak of having met a poet
whose work we were studying, or accept congratulations on a newborn child, but
beyond such admissions of a life outside the classroom lay risky terrain.
A remembered incident: I was teaching about seventeenth century poetry,
which necessitated a good deal of annotation on everyday Christian theology. A
student asked if I believed these things. With no pause to think through the
implications of one or another reply, I said I couldn’t talk about that, but would
be glad to discuss it with him outside of class.
In fact I disbelieved Christianity across a cool distance. Neither ambivalence
nor sensitivity on the subject had anything to do with my reticence, which proceeded automatically, in response to a novel question, from the rules of impersonality as I had learned them.4 Only my professional self, stripped down for
intellectual work, was to be present in class. And of course I was tacitly asking
students to abstain, reciprocally, from the personal. No sloppy revelations here,
please; we’re practicing objectivity together. Did I want their approval? Their
affection? Certainly; but I could not be a person who wanted affection at the
same time I was being a teacher.
It is embarrassing yet also therapeutic to write these things, to write personally.5 Retrieving experience and posing its authenticity against the dissembling
and the public half-truths we let pass in accommodating our individual lives to
myths of professional solidity: these are by now common manoeuvres. And
when put forth in writing, such disclosures usually enable and are enabled by
another common manoeuvre: my experience is not after all just personal.
Maybe its idiosyncrasies, explored with a psychiatrist, would have come
together in a healing story of neurosis. But read another way—almost always
privileged—they tell a more social narrative, showing how the teller is like
other people so situated, not distinct from them.
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As I recalled my experience of teaching earlier in this essay, I found myself
easing into the second mode, giving weight to the “so situated,” providing social
coordinates for my discomfort, intimating ways in which it might be understood
as exemplary.6 I referred it to the way academic authority was constructed, to the
valuation of scholarship over teaching, and in general to professional ideology,
which (especially then) muted the personal and charged experience with certain
kinds of tension. Other elements of my social location surely helped constitute
that experience. I will not explicate, just mention a few topoi for analysis.
Maleness: the drive to be emotionally invulnerable. Middle class upbringing: the
importance of scripted self-presentation, the undesirability of surprises, the
imperative never to make a scene. The 1950s: boom time, rapid expansion of the
university system, professional aggrandizement, Cold War ideology in the disciplinary form of literature freed from historical circumstance.
I could go on,7 but my aim is not to spin out such an analysis, only to
remind readers how it conventionally goes. We evoke the personal, in venues
like this one, to show how thoroughly social it was and is. The social may not
exhaust the personal; there may be a residue of pure, individual difference; but
we tell these stories to look through personal history at the ghosts of other,
similarly situated people.

But where did this convention come from? How did it establish itself in academic practice? I will approach these questions, too, through personal history:
my own is perhaps both odd enough and commonplace enough to launch a
discussion of more general interest.
Like most of my academic cohort, I maintained an easy skepticism toward the
building of US hegemony through the postwar years and the triumph of “business society.” We took Cold War pieties with a grain of salt, deplored
McCarthyism, rooted for Stevenson, sniffed at commercialism and advertising—
all from the platform of our allegiance to the best that had been thought and
known. Needless to say, we also accepted the status and advantage afforded us by
postwar economic arrangements. Some habitually but vaguely sided with workers and negroes and poor people—in my case, upbringing in a New Deal family
had taught this afﬁnity, which was then transmuted into parlor socialism by my
immersion in G. B. Shaw’s work, on the way to a dissertation. But until Michael
Harrington rediscovered poverty, it could seem that the rising tide of the economy was lifting these groups, too, along with us happy humanistic few. We
championed Culture in our daily work. Politics, beyond voting liberal, seemed
irrelevant. My one activist sally in the ﬁfties, marching against the bomb, was in
behalf of life on earth.
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Oppositional politics moved closer in the early sixties. Two colleagues of
mine at Wesleyan had been freedom riders; others ﬂew down to march at
Selma. I stayed on the sidelines, though with rising sympathy and anger.
Vietnam pushed me by degrees into politics. Why was my government entering a civil war, backing the wrong (undemocratic, corrupt) side, using my taxes
to slaughter peasants? I wrote in private rage to Congressmen, signed a public
letter to Lyndon Johnson (“Mr. President, please stop the bombing”), withheld
the portion of my income tax that went for war, turned in my draft card. The
latter two actions made me a criminal with an FBI ﬁle.8
The law and its institutions of enforcement, made and adjusted over centuries
by white men of substance, constitute people like me as good citizens. They draw
around us an invisible circle of respectability and allow us to conduct secure
lives—except when exceeding the speed limit—in no conscious relation to police
and the courts. When such a person steps outside the circle, everything takenfor-granted becomes problematic. I felt myself to be in a new and unstable relation not just to the State and the FBI but to other ordinary people (most of
whom, in 1966, would have thought me unpatriotic or worse, had they known)
and to the institutions of daily life. Its elements came unstuck.9
Mine were individual crimes, though of course not of my own invention. In
1965 I had heard that Chomsky (whom I greatly admired) and others were
refusing to pay taxes, and by 1966 many young men had burned or otherwise
unburdened themselves of draft cards. But I did not act with them or belong to
their groups, and when I did band with others in organized opposition, that
was a sharper breach from apolitical habit. I phoned antiwar colleagues and
asked them to sign a public statement of support for Wesleyan students who
refused induction; this felt very different from politicking with them about,
say, a change in graduation requirements. Prompted by a phone call from
Mitch Goodman (see the beginning of Mailer’s Armies of the Night for an
amusing account of the call he received from Mitch), I joined an action at the
Justice Department before the 1967 march on the Pentagon. At the end of the
rally, a few dozen of us (beyond draft age) ﬁled across the steps of Justice,
announced our names, and dropped our draft cards (in my case, a classiﬁcation card, since I no longer had the other) in a sack of a thousand or so cards
collected from draft age men around the country, and watched as the sack was
carried inside and given in peaceful deﬁance to an ofﬁcial. My participation in
this ritual brought me a predictable ofﬁce visit the next Monday from two FBI
agents, and some less predictable visibility. Walter Cronkite’s evening news ran
a ﬁve-minute clip of our civil disobedience, including my pass by the sack and
declaration that I was “Richard Ohmann, Wesleyan University.” This cameo
appearance led to puzzled inquiries from two of our trustees that weekend at

342

Personal Effects

the inauguration of a new president (I was by then Associate Provost), and a
call from my mother asking if I was all right—meaning was I under arrest yet
and also, I surmise, how could I have so departed from her tutelage as to make
a rude display of our family on national television?
Soon after, I helped found RESIST, an organization supporting various
kinds of resistance to the war, legal and illegal. I signed its “Call to Resist
Illegitimate Authority,” and went to work on its board. We were all on the
FBI’s radar now (my mid-1970s file included many RESIST bulletins with
every name on the masthead but mine blacked out), and some (the “Boston
Five”) were brought to trial for conspiracy. We encouraged civil disobedience
and committed it. I found myself part of an informal network helping draft
refusers and deserters leave the US, among other felonies that the FBI apparently did not detect. But self-criminalization was by then as habitual as lawfulness had been just a few years earlier. The change I felt most keenly in my
social activity and location was membership in a big, loose affiliation called
the anti-war movement, and soon the larger and looser one called simply
The Movement. In this heady, naive moment we saw it as embracing civil
rights and black power, women’s liberation, student power, youth liberation,
then gay rights, environmentalism, and so on, with a penumbra of sex rebels,
drop-out communards, drug advocates, left sectarians—everyone saying no
to the tyrannies and complacencies of the old order. In spite of deep and
ultimately insuperable rifts, around 1970 it was possible to see ourselves as
millions of people not only joined in opposition to “illegitimate authority”
but working together for a free and egalitarian society. The word “revolution” was in play.
New organizations came together, new forms of collectivity. In addition to
RESIST, I belonged for a while to SDS, worked in the New University
Conference (left and feminist academics), helped form professional radical
caucuses, checked out a couple of vanguard parties but couldn’t accept democratic centralist discipline or adherence to “the line.” We tried to live democracy,
in New Left groups: the end would be our means. At the same time, many of us
sought to subvert or reshape existing institutions such as the National Council
of Teachers of English and the Modern Language Association—that they were
malleable or even (in the case of NCTE) friendly shouldn’t have been a surprise, since many of their members had passed through the same revulsions
and illuminations as had activists from my quarter. Likewise the universities
where we worked: clearly they were part of “the system” (a common term
whose vagueness suggests the primitive nature of shared analysis at the time).
They were complicit in war-making, white supremacy, capitalist rule. Maybe
we could remake them to serve peace, justice, and ordinary people.
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Here’s the part of my experience that was odd. While positioning myself
with the disempowered and against “the system,” I had landed in its middle
echelons, propelled by the momentum of my early career. In 1966, just when
anger was spilling into protest, I took a job as Associate Provost in my college’s
administration, and became editor of College English as well as a member of
the governing committee for NCTE’s College Section, sponsor of the journal. I
thought to facilitate reform at Wesleyan (reduced requirements, more interdepartmental studies, less autocratic tenure procedures, etc.) and a critique of
the ﬁeld of English (its aping of more scientiﬁc disciplines, amassing of endless
New Critical explications, weakness in theory, inattention to its professional
folkways). By 1970, when chaotic local events had elevated me to the post of
interim Chancellor,10 I had passed through the estrangements described above.
Not reform, but radical change was my agenda. Yet at work I was charged with
holding things together against radicals like me, and as editor of CE, with sustaining the dignity of a profession whose structure and practices I now
thought carceral.
At CE the contradiction was tolerable and often productive. Colleagues
around the country were furiously rethinking literature, writing, culture, pedagogy, and professional ideals in a ﬂuid mix with power, injustice and democracy, war and peace, soon gender and sexuality. Manuscripts tumbled in. I
accepted many that more conservative editors would have found unmannerly
or outlandish. I also contracted with guest editors for clusters of articles or
whole issues on themes heretofore incompatible with a professional or scholarly context: feminism, marxist criticism, the rebellion in MLA, emancipatory
curricula in community colleges, gay liberation. These projects made CE controversial and of course offensive to some; though I published conservative
articles, too, the journal was hardly a model of “balance” through this period.
But neither was it completely out of step with thought and action in the ﬁeld,
or with the interests and concerns of NCTE’s generally populist leadership,
which at least tolerated and usually encouraged these editorial adventures.11 I
and my associate editor Bill Coley made a habit of transgression, but in the
supportive company of very many readers and contributors, also caught up in
“The Movement” or sympathetic to it.
At Wesleyan the contradiction was intense. Not that the trustees or my
administrative superiors condemned my activism or made my tenure precarious: to the contrary, they seemed ready to boost me up a notch in the administrative hierarchy whenever campus tensions heightened. A few of them hated
the war as much as I did; some demurred but sincerely endorsed the value of
academic dissent and debate; perhaps some thought my presence a palliative to
student and faculty radicals. (The word “coopt” came unpleasantly to mind.)
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The problem was one of structure, not antagonism. An academic administrator like me can put out a few ideas and rally support for them, but most of his
time and energy go to negotiation and compromise. Collect the desires and
demands of faculty members and students, try to reconcile them with one
another, see what the budget will stand, patch together a proposal, see how it
fares in committees, hope that the result will be at least an incremental
improvement. Not much leverage in the process for one’s own passions against
the weight of custom, institutional constraint, and other people’s entrenched
interests. In daily work, I was a sort of conduit.
Worse, in those frenzied years I often did crisis management. Our administration would drop all routine when protest or disruption threatened, and
huddle in endless strategic sessions. How would we respond to the black students’ occupation of a building? To the blockade of a military recruiter in the
administration building? To a sit-in at the admissions ofﬁce by Puerto Rican
students demanding that more of their number be recruited? To a midnight
assault by two black students on a white student who had written an insulting
letter to the newspaper? To women faculty members and staff demanding that
Wesleyan depart from its old, boys’ club practices? I might be put on assignment to negotiate or control damage or write a bit of judicious administration-speak to faculty and students. Given my job, this made some sense, but
always my sympathies were with the protesters, if not with a particular expression of their politics.
Sometimes the ambivalence of my position worked out all right, as when I sat
with the black students’ organization (after their takeover of a classroom building) to plan what eventually became our African American studies program; or
negotiated with the women’s group—among other things, for the hiring of a
woman associate provost, who turned out to be the admirable Sheila Tobias.12
More often the dissonance was somewhere between comical and shattering.
Toward the comical end: insisting that a Grateful Dead concert not be cancelled for fear of riot; declining to host a national SDS conference (I knew that
SDS was about to implode in revolutionary adventurism); missing a meeting
of the Student Affairs Committee, which I chaired, while in jail after doing civil
disobedience outside a Sikorsky helicopter plant; representing Wesleyan at the
inauguration of a new president at Mt. Holyoke, and standing—red-gowned,
back turned to him and the other platform dignitaries, in protest against a ceremonial address by the war criminal McGeorge Bundy; giving a talk in a rally
at Southeastern Massachusetts University against its autocratic president, and
seeing our own president, deluged with angry letters from alums, respond to
the effect that I was not representing Wesleyan, just exercising my right of free
speech. Not a bad place to work.
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Far from comical: having to decide in the middle of the night whether to
accept or reverse the Dean’s decision (he reported to me) to expel, without due
process, the black students who had beaten up the white student;13 in the conﬂict that followed, being thrown out of Malcolm X house along with the
President as we were trying to make peace; being sent to observe the blockade
of the military recruiter and being mistaken by my antiwar friends there for a
fellow blockader, with quite understandable recriminations to follow; going to
negotiate with the Puerto Rican students in the admissions ofﬁce and being
held hostage there myself. I lived uncomfortably in two polarized milieux: the
educational bureaucracy and the movement challenging its legitimacy, along
with the legitimacy of almost everything else.
A prickly contradiction it seems, even today. But I think my two-world
experience, though perhaps unusually intense, was deeply congruent with that
of many other thousands caught in the same historical turbulence. Teaching
assistants and instructors, only somewhat less than full professors and the
occasional provost, had labored to win academic authority, to master professional decorum, to build the kind of invulnerability I have described. Teaching,
we performed routines of talk, dress, gesture, and classroom order legitimated
by the bodies of knowledge that grounded our disciplines. Researching, we
enacted loyalty to those knowledges even when we sought distinction by contesting their received truths. Going to meetings, which is to say administering,
we paid tribute to the dignity of the institution even when trying to modify
it—however we might ironize its rigidities and chafe at its demands.
But by 1968 or so, those who had followed a trajectory from anger at racial
injustice or protest against the war to a conviction that our society was laced
together with bad power had come to question the solidities that underlay those
routines of daily, working life. The knowledges we professed were honeycombed with pockets of inexcusable ignorance (e.g., of women and black people), or shaped to the needs of Cold War ideology. They served technocratic
domination or (worse) surveillance, terrorism, and war. The beloved institution—the university—appeared now to be complicit as well. “Who ruled
Columbia?” and “Who ruled America?” turned out to be two forms of the same
question. Our enclave of free inquiry and emancipatory culture looked instead
like a conveyer of ideas that made Vietnam possible, and of students into predictable slots in the social hierarchy. I report these discoveries laconically, but
don’t mean to patronize them. They proceeded from feverish investigation and
analysis, driven by both political and intellectual need—a “ruthless critique of
all things existing,” in one of my favorite phrases from Marx—and they decisively altered scholarship and curriculum in all traditional ﬁelds except the sciences. That’s what the culture wars of the 80s and 90s have been about.
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Through the time of these revaluations, the unbearable tension I have
described between academic rituals and the injustice in which they were
embedded began to look systematic. At ﬁrst it read something like this: how
can I be seriously deliberating whether to put a B or a B+ on this student’s
paper while the government is napalming peasants in my name? As ruthless
critique proceeded, however, the disjunction reconﬁgured itself into a perceived unity: my painstaking enactment of the rituals enables warmaking (or
helps this student escape the draft and sends that one to Vietnam; or reinforces
the whiteness of the university system; or perpetuates the habits of male
supremacy; or greases the skids of class reproduction and makes it look fair—
and so on). The caucuses and study groups and activist organizations and
coalitions and professional insurgencies and consciousness-raising groups that
were piecing together a dissident, wholistic understanding of U.S. society and
its imperial outreach turned the analysis, inevitably, back in on the institutions
in which we worked, and on our own unexamined practices.
Of those, teaching came under the most careful scrutiny. For the ﬁrst time in
my experience groups of like-minded college teachers gathered outside the context of staff meetings to talk about pedagogy, because we saw it as political, in
the broad sense of the term newly salient.14 Every customary procedure that our
professional training had naturalized now seemed laden with political relations,
chieﬂy undemocratic: the lecture format, the inﬂexible syllabus, the canons it
transmitted, the insularity of the disciplines, the exam, the unchallengeable
paper topic, the gap between assignment and ﬁnished product wherein
“process” later took up residence, the independence of each student’s work, the
grade meted out according to immutable standards. Classroom etiquette, too:
last names, formal dress, discussion dominated by the more assertive, the
absolute distinction between instructor and student. Architecture itself spoke
hegemony. The form of the amphitheater, the lectern in front, ranks of desks
bolted to the ﬂoor, all enforced the “banking concept” of education.
As we knocked down the walls that had set apart profession, pedagogy, and
politics, a fourth “p” came forward: the personal. Famously, the women’s
movement legitimized public talk of the personal, in fact insisted upon it. That
talk was in part a refuge from and assault on domination of antiwar venues by,
well, us: by male “heavies” with “correct” political lines. But it also joined with
and fortiﬁed a critique of professional detachment and scholarly objectivity
already underway. To tell one’s own story and hear the stories of others, we
were learning, was to restore differences hidden behind the instructor and the
student and the reader. Provided with genders, class locations, and so on, these
characters now garbled the professional script in which they had been asked to
perform as universals. A pedagogy of the lyric poem, meant to open vistas of
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timeless unity, might instead work for a ﬁrst-generation student at a state college as a class put-down—the “laying on of culture,” in a phrase we took from
John MacDermott. An actual female reader of Lady Chatterley’s Lover might
not willingly take up the part assigned to her by Lawrence or by the male
instructor. The profession meant something different for an adjunct writing
teacher in a community college than for an ivied professor. Such banalities
were fresh in 1968 or so, and narratives of personal experience were as crucial
to the interrogation of professional ideology as to the making visible of male
supremacy in interstices of daily conduct.
I think it important that the personal turn of the late sixties happened in
groups of people joined by common purposes and shared anger—for me, the
MLA Radical Caucus, the New University Conference, various faculty and student groups at Wesleyan (including, later, the Women’s Studies collective),
like-minded colleagues in NCTE and around my work for College English. In
David Bleich’s term (Know and Tell, see especially pp. 13-19), ours were disclosures of previously silenced experience that showed one person’s discomfort or
inadequacy or embarrassment or pleasure to be not after all unique, not inherently private. They expanded our afﬁliations and drove our activism as they
deepened our understandings, and so helped “bring the subjective and the collective categories of experience together” (16). Sure, I recall explosions of runaway bitterness, indulgent confession, unusable ego—including my own. But
the personal mode settled into movement process because it raised consciousness, and because it knit people together by clarifying the social relations in
which we found ourselves and by hinting at how they might be changed.
Not that disclosure and political resolve automatically charted the way to
worthwhile change. To speak only of teaching—my point of departure in this
essay—the furious experimentation of the years around 1970 threw up a number of strategies that were largely stylistic. Wearing blue jeans to class instead of
dresses or suits, using ﬁrst names, meeting in informal spaces, sitting in circles
or on the ﬂoor: these signalled eagerness to renegotiate authority in the classroom but did not forge new contracts, and by themselves led to “grooving in
the grass”—structureless, feel-good pedagogy. Other strategies collided with
invisible walls outside the classroom and the university itself. Take grading.
Everyone saw that grades were invidious, poor incentives for learning, incompatible with serious collaboration, and (especially when linked to the military
draft) consequential beyond anything intended by the award of a C rather than
an A. So instructors tried no grades, pass-fail grades, giving all As, grading by
lottery, self-grading, peer grading, and doubtless many other arrangements. All
failed because students needed grades because in turn employers and graduate
programs and draft boards required them. Our assignment was not just to
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teach and to generate certiﬁcates of learning, but to rank students for purposes
of social sorting—the “reproduction,” as we later would say, of class and race
and gender systems. No socialism in one classroom, then, and we had to ﬁnd
other ﬁelds of battle.
This aside, in my view the ferment around teaching yielded healthy and
lasting results. A democratic revolution in the U.S. was not one of them, but
more democratic relations of instruction and better pedagogies did ensue.
Collaborative learning, small group work, peer tutoring, ﬂexible syllabi,
responsiveness to the capabilities and needs and social positions that actual
students bring with them to class, critical reﬂection on the learning process as
it goes along, a humanizing of the instructor and demystifying of his or her
authority (not abandonment of it), and many strategies to help students take
responsibility for their own learning. The shift will seem old hat to likely readers of this volume because it has been most decisively achieved in women’s
studies, in writing instruction, and to a lesser extent in literature.
These pedagogical discoveries certainly transformed my own relation to
teaching. Even the grooving-in-the grass phase was therapeutic in loosening
rigidities of authority that had earlier caused me such confusion and discomfort. Teaching became a ﬁeld of innovation, not an inﬂexible heritage of conventions. I could try new formats, decenter my precious authority, let down
defenses, rethink the ways learning might happen. This was possible because I
now felt teaching must respond to political as well as professional urgencies—
Vietnam cried out in every classroom—and paradoxically, those urgencies
made it far more personal than before. Still more important, I believe, was the
conviction that even in my own classes I was working daily with many student
and faculty allies (and of course against powerful antagonists), not striving to
meet some heroic standard of individual performance.
Teaching never became easy for me, but challenge, imagination, achievement, and sometimes joy ﬂowed into it. Stress came now from feverish but
cheerful overwork, not helpless repetition of my defensive professional routines. There were small collaborative victories, institutions built, 15 pedagogies
developed over time (see “Teaching as Theoretical Practice,” chapter 8 in my
Politics of Letters), the irreversible movement by thousands of colleagues in
English and American studies to demystify and remake the literary canon. All
this amounted to a cumulative and cooperative project, very different from the
desperate scramble to escape each semester and turn with relief to the “real”
work of scholarship.
About which a word, now, because the upheavals of c.1970 and the assumption of historical agency they provoked made for an entirely different relation
between teaching and scholarship from the one I described earlier in this essay.
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Those on the left came to see research and writing as charged with political
urgency. In caucuses and collectives we intensively reexamined scholarly practices, their theoretical underpinnings, their historical construction, and their
institutional housing. (See Kampf and Lauter [1972] for such an effort, in
which I had a small part.) Many of us now took up research that aimed to
question disciplinary givens and set new directions. Black studies, women’s
studies, working class studies, and gay and lesbian studies were the most visible
expressions of that project, which not only created new subjects and won reputability for them, but changed what could reputably be thought and written
about the traditional subjects, The engaged scholarship that ensued has of
course been a scandal to the right, and a main battleﬁeld of 1990s culture wars.
It was an intellectual liberation for us, and in my view for the disciplines.
Be that as it may, the transformation brought my own teaching and research
together in a refreshing and unanticipated way. From about 1972 on, almost
everything I wrote answered directly or indirectly to a felt political imperative.
In my teaching (I was lucky to be at a ﬂexible college), I transited from English
literature to American culture, and from a formalist to an historical outlook,
furiously learning about economic and social theory along the way. Politics
informed my teaching, and my teaching now became the basis of new research
and writing.16 I left behind my specialized training in linguistics and literature,
taught what I studied, and studied what I needed to know to teach.
What I knew always trailed my need to know. And what I knew was always
provisional, always in formation. This meant that my authority in class—earlier
so precariously and often irrelevantly derived from scholarly credentials—now
rested more on the openness of an inquiry whose difﬁculties I could happily
admit, and to which students could contribute questions and insights that
taught me things, as well as secure knowledge of their own, especially when the
subject was mass culture, about which they inevitably knew more than I, at least
experientially. So the social relations of scholarship and teaching overlapped
and grew closer. The authority generated as the class moved along was as much
as I wanted, and was the more satisfying because collaboratively built.17
Did these changes bring on a personal turn in my scholarship as well?
Certainly not of the sort that academic feminist writing took, in the early seventies. I did not “speak bitterness,” as the phrase went, about indignities and
slights and oppressions that invaded my daily life from systemic inequality:
how could I, or anyone situated as I was on the privileged side of most social
boundaries? But I did let anger ﬂow into my writing from the place it now
occupied in my political life: this was a departure from the scholarly conventions I had previously learned, which permitted no tone more personal than
huffy indignation at the stupidity of an intellectual antagonist. English in
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America barely contained the rage that drove its composition—rage at war and
oppression, of course, but also at what I took to be the complicity of my own
discipline and its institutions. In criticizing these (“exposing” might better
characterize what I thought I was doing), I did also give some authority to my
own experience, and admitted more personal anecdote than I would have
thought permissible before. After that (1976), I adopted a rather conversational academic style that felt personal to me at least in leaving behind the fortiﬁcations of tonal distance and disciplinary authority we had all used to guard
our collective, professional capital. And more recently, taking advantage of the
indulgence granted elderly folk, I have laced several articles with reminiscence.
(Does experience somehow gather credibility and a claim on polite attention
as it grows hoary?) This is by far my most personal essay,18 and, since it unsettles me, I doubt I’ll prowl farther along this path. In any case, the most important way in which I imagine my scholarship of the last 25 years to have been
personal is by following imperatives of the movements in which I claimed
membership. The personal is the political, yes, and I want to emphasize how
social it has been for me, how saturated with afﬁnities and alliances and conﬂicts both real and (no doubt) fanciful.

At the beginning of the last section I hoped that its ﬁrst person story would
ground “a discussion of more general interest.” That, I now attempt, with
abundant reservations about what may be justly concluded from any such
account—reservations, that is, about whether I’ve written anything of use to
other people, these last many pages. What I’ve meant to do is historicize the
personal turn that many academics have taken since 1970. But by means of my
own history as I choose to tell it, or maybe can’t help telling it? What presumption lies in that strategy: that my experience has been paradigmatic, that I can
in this way represent the many people assembled from time to time, without
their consent, inside my “we.” I’m suspicious of the personal even as I practice
it, about which more later.
But ﬁrst, to draw out the inferences I want from this story: the rules of college teaching and academic writing began changing, around 1970, under pressure from activists in feminism and other movements, to admit a good deal
more of personal experience and feeling than had been respectable or even tolerable before. The thinking behind this pressure was simple. Movement people
identiﬁed rhetorics of impersonal authority with the lies our leaders told us
about Vietnam, with the crackpot rationale for war, with the complicity of the
corporate university, with cost-beneﬁt analysis that left human suffering and
harm to nature outside its equations, with social engineering that treated the
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lives of poor and non-white people as problems to be solved from above, with
male assumptions of privilege, with the bromide that in America we had no
social classes, with curricula and pedagogies driven by professional imperatives
and thus abstractly “irrelevant” to students’ needs, with scholarship that justiﬁed or took as natural the world as it was—in effect, with all that seemed ignorantly hierarchical and undemocratic in our supposedly egalitarian society. To
recognize experience and speak from it was a step toward truth and decency.
Furthermore, in the practice of dissident groups, especially feminist ones, the
personal turn at its best delivered radical insight, strenghened sisterhood and
solidarity, and helped build new institutions and ways of working together.
The speciﬁc conditions of historical possibility that enabled a liberatory
personal turn three decades ago are attenuated or gone. The ferment of rage
and opposition and experiment and discovery within which we learned to
speak truth (personal and otherwise) to power has simmered down. “The
movement” that never quite was, but whose idea stirred millions to transformative action, looks naive in retrospect about how much and what kinds of
power laced “the system” together, and about what would be required to
replace it with something better. Not that the movement disappeared: rather, it
dispersed into more specialized campaigns, whose partial victories are everywhere embedded (sometimes precariously) in U.S. society now. Women
become physicians, executives, Secretaries of State. Abortion is an embattled
right. Migrant farmworkers are powerfully organized. African Americans
attend previously white colleges and law schools in large numbers, travel where
and how they will, buy homes in suburbs, are heard from in national media
(and constructed as avid consumers in TV commercials, right alongside white
yuppies). Gay and lesbian people have meager but previously unimaginable
rights. Corporations cannot destroy the natural world with complete
impunity. Vietnam is free of U.S. occupation, and what was known for a while
as the “Vietnam syndrome” now apparently prevents us from invading countries (but allows us to bomb up to four per year) Anyone can add to this list,
and although to do so is simultaneously to realize how incomplete and disconnected the advances have been, they are not nothing, either.
And my list omits the site where movement gains have taken root most
deeply: the university—or rather, that part of it where we study the humanities
and social sciences, and where we pursue and debate “personal effects.” Here,
the change is tectonic. Look around at the various “studies” programs that
were unimaginable in 1965, each the academic sedimentation of a social
movement. Look at how we have changed the subject within traditional
ﬁelds—the texts that appear on syllabi, the questions that can be asked about
them, the vast enlargement (in the humanities) of what we take culture to be,
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the intellectual seriousness and partial autonomy of rhetoric and composition
studies, and the infusion of politics (broad sense) into all these studies. Look at
the changes in teaching and scholarship that have been my topic in this essay.
The liberal arts curriculum, understood most deeply as the texts and problematics and ways of thinking that we put on students’ and our own agendas—the
curriculum has become quite another thing in three decades, gradually transformed by the urgencies of c. 1970.
It’s almost enough to cheer up a decaying leftie. But as I was saying before
this optimistic swerve, history has left behind the conditions that brought personal experience into fruitful play back then. First, the academic movement that
changed our work has grown apart from the activism that initially inspired it.
(With many commendable exceptions, but still.) We now enact and dispute the
personal in a conversation chieﬂy among ourselves, on terms that have more to
do with academic politics or even fashion than with changing the world.
Second, “the” movement that didn’t quite happen has fragmented into largely
separate social movements, so that when the academic “I” does reach out
beyond the academy it tends to make contact with identity politics, where who
“I” am is most saliently female, or disabled, or Asian American, or gay, or. . . . In
this situation the personal tends to imply that identities are given and ﬁxed, to
reify difference, to veer away from disclosures that might strengthen a universalist solidarity or even point toward coalitions.
Third, the gains of sixties movements provoked a reaction from the New
Right. By 1964, it had already come in from the fringe (the John Birch Society,
and such) around Goldwater’s candidacy, and it took new strength from its
opposition to what the sixties came to mean for much of “middle America .”
Through the 1970s, it established right wing foundations, organized among
Christian fundamentalists, contested for power within the Republican Party,
and gradually reconﬁgured American politics. It vigorously challenged the liberal hegemony of the postwar decades, and in the process demonized the social
movements that had built momentum within that hegemony. The culture wars
of the 1990s were one manifestation of that conservative reaction, and in them
the Right took aim as much at positions won by radicals in the university as at
those won in Congress and the courts. Whatever weight the personal may still
carry in our internal conversations, it seems to me ill-adapted to a defense of
the university against charges of political correctness or of multiculturalism
grounded in identities.
And ﬁnally: since 1970 our economic system and social formation have been
passing through a fairly deep transformation. This is not a subject to be
wrapped up in a paragraph. Let me simply gesture toward globalization: the
rapid movement of capital (in a hundred new forms) around the world, the
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proliferation of new products and services, the repackaging and incessant commodiﬁcation of knowledge, the breakup of the old Fordist work force, the casualization of labor, the application of market logic to institutions of all kinds,
and so on. These forces have been at work in and on the university, needless to
say, producing there a crisis whose dimensions—from the erosion of tenure and
collapse of the old job market to the marketization of academic services and
research—are familiar enough to likely readers of this essay. Our profession
(along with medicine, law and most of the others) is in decline. The personal
turn was in part a challenge to its claims of authority, and those of the fat and
complacent postwar university. Does it still have that meaning? Do we want it
to, in our present circumstances?
Those circumstances are much on my mind: I imagine the tasks of and threats
to a democratic left at millenium’s end to be starkly different from what they were
in 1970. If I’m right, is that cause for those who share egalitarian and democratic
goals to abandon the personal, to declare it mined out and anachronistic? It’s
hard to separate that question from my own uneasiness with disclosure—doubtless evident enough to the reader of this mixed essay, so determined to become an
argument or a master narrative, so uncomfortable in its personal moments, so
burdened with its author’s male, middle class, childhood instruction in the
shame of making scenes or showing vulnerability. No wonder such a person,
even after decades of contrary instruction, tends to hear accounts of personal
experience in academic or other public discourse as outbreaks of self-indulgence
among the privileged, or competitive displays of victimization, or unsporting
claims on sympathy, and in any case distractions from the urgent work at hand.
No, I do not think the personal vein is bled dry or politically irrelevant. But
let me add two thoughts to the caveat embedded in my attempt to historicize it.
The personal itself is not a stable category, any more than the “real” in literary
representation. Conventions of privacy change. Richard E. Miller tells a nice
anecdote of his Rutgers seminar for beginning teachers of composition. By
request, he included a session on coming out as gay or lesbian in class, a topic
not just taboo but inimaginable, thirty years ago. Excited discussion, revelation,
story upon story, until one TA came out to the seminar as a Christian, and
revealed her fear of doing that in her comp section. Consternation and silence.
Miller comments that “what gets seen as merely merely personal and better left
unsaid in the academy has shifted over time and across locations. . .” (280).
Globalization and the crisis of the university have brought coming-out stories
by graduate TAs, adjuncts and other casualties of the new order, linked to organizing struggles on university campuses and in organizations like MLA. Are
there other realms of what used to be “better left unsaid” to be explored now, by
way of building new memberships and collectivities?
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Second, it is easy to understand how the word “objective” sprouted cynical
quotation marks, how “abstract” and “impersonal” became pejoratives, how
“formal,” “linear,” and “adversarial” came under censure.19 No plea, here, for a
return to the blindly self-assured, contestatory, male academic conventions of
1965. But the inheritors of sixties movements have real enemies who can’t be
conjured away by forswearing the adversarial style. We need (maybe more than
ever) new knowledge of this difﬁcult world in order to try changing it; that
knowledge will have to be in part abstract because real relations are not evident on the surface of things; and we can’t get there without working through
the impossible ideal of objectivity. (Would “fairness” and “open-mindedness”
be more acceptable terms?) The knowledge we need must be personal, too, but
will not accord epistemological privilege to personal experience. Joan Scott:
“When experience is taken as the origin of knowledge, the vision of the individual subject . . . becomes the bedrock of evidence on which explanation is
built,” and “the constructed nature of experience” becomes invisible, along
with the “given ideological systems” in which experience offers itself as pristine
and natural (Scott 777-78). For all that, the personal turn has I think been
more beneﬁcial than not. It is in any case irreversible. I hope we can keep alive
in it the social and the political, from which it has historically been inseparable, and without which it is at best incomplete and isolating.

NOTES

1.

2.
3.

Here’s a symptomatic story: one paper was a third-person account, modeled
on Henry Adams, of “the boy’s” ﬁrst walk into Harvard yard. Hal Martin
thought it was wonderful, and wanted to submit it to the alumni magazine
(which did in fact print it). I had given it a B+, and asked Hal if he thought
that a little ungenerous. Yes, he said. I changed the grade to A. Did the student beneﬁt from my exquisitely high standards? A grad student colleague of
mine, when asked why a grade was so low, would say: “For a B, you have to
write as well as I do; for an A, as well as Hemingway.” Western civilization
was safe in our hands.
Mentor and friend, Hal saw better than I what I could do, and launched my
career.
No one spoke these lessons to me and my graduate student cohort; they
were in the air we breathed. Yet in time I did actually take vows of scholarship, administered with great seriousness to inductees into Harvard’s Society
of Fellows, by such as W. V. Quine, Wassily Leontiev, and my dissertation
director Harry Levin. For example:

T h e Pe r s o n a l a s Hi s t o r y
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You will practice the virtues, and avoid the snares, of the scholar. You will be
courteous to your elders who have explored to the point from which you may
advance; and helpful to your juniors who will progress farther by reason of your
labors. Your aim will be knowledge and wisdom, not the reﬂected glamour of
fame. You will not accept credit that is due to another, or harbor jealousy of an
explorer who is more fortunate. You will seek not a near but a distant objective,
and you will not be satisﬁed with what you may have done. All that you may
achieve or discover you will regard as a fragment of a larger pattern of the truth
which from the separate approaches every true scholar is striving to descry.

A high vocation, a heady moment.
4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

11.

What a missed opportunity for discussion of literature and belief, of my and
the students’ relations to the texts we were reading and the culture we were
studying.
To have done so at the time would have been all but unthinkable, in a context such as the present one. I remember a few personal essays about teaching, for instance Theodore Roethke’s marvelous “Last Class” (College English,
18:8 [May, 1957], 383-86). But see: reminiscence was a prerogative of poets
and novelists.
In the process I became more explicitly the interpreter, as well as teller, of my
tale. It’s hard for the “personal turn” to displace lifelong habits of academic
authority.
And have done: see my “English and the Cold War.”
When I obtained it in the mid-1970s, under the Freedom of Information
Act, I was surprised to ﬁnd how many tax dollars the FBI had squandered
clipping my letters to the Middletown Press and to Wesleyan’s student newspaper, and also miffed that its agents had sized me up as a sincere but harmless protester, not a dangerous enemy of the State.
A friend stopped me on the street: his ﬁrst grade kid came home from
school with the news that I was likely to go to jail. I had tried to explain what
I was doing to my ﬁrst grade kid, and she disclosed her version of the story
in “show and tell.”
Translation: academic vice president. Since our president more or less
vacated the premises that year, I and the other vice president found ourselves
in charge, though hardly in control.
Objections from readers of CE were plentiful, and I dutifully printed those
that came in as letters. A few members of NCTE called for my ouster. But in
the twelve years of my editorship, those in the Council to whom I was
directly responsible grumbled aloud to me only once: not about unpatriotic
or marxist or feminist sallies in the journal, but about a 1974 special issue on
“The Homosexual Imagination.” Interesting.
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12.
13.
14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.
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And for a parental leave policy, the one idea too much before its time to be
enacted.
I supported the Dean. He went on to become president of a big state university. I returned to teaching as fast as I was able.
The discussion spilled out into journals, as well, particularly in English. My
own commitments are perhaps enough to explain the proliferation of articles
in CE that reexamined pedagogy under the sign of the political, but the same
interest invaded the pages of College Composition and Communication, whose
editor (William Irmscher) espoused politics very different from mine.
For instance, the student-led course, “Towards a Socialist America,” which
reproduced itself at Wesleyan through shifts in political climate, ofﬁcial
opposition, a softening of purpose and of title, over twenty years. (See
Arneson et al.) The course was accorded a surprising honor when Lynne
Cheney attacked its catalog derscription (ignorantly) on the editorial page of
the Wall St. Journal, March 14, 1996.
Selling Culture, my most learned work, germinated in a course I taught on
American mass culture (with invaluable help from undergraduate TAs) in the
late seventies, and gained momentum from several other courses that I
devised along the way—courses very far from my early training and interests.
Yes, I doled out the grades; no escape from that. Two strategies eased the
contradictions. First, I made grading a subject of explicit discussion, often in
the context of power and social reproduction as these topics came up in the
course. Second, in comments on papers I excused myself from the task of
explaining the grades I had given. I credited students with having taken seriously an intellectual challenge and written something they stood behind, not
just having tried to please me in an academic exercise. (This working
premise was of course not always correct.) I framed my comments as
responses to their ideas, often critical but not according to some paradigm of
A-ness or C+-ness to which I had privileged access. If they wanted to know
why I had assigned the grade I had, and how to get a better one, they could
come and talk with me about that. Few did. And I came to take intellectual
as well as teacherly pleasure in reading sets of papers.
Even so, I can hear the muse chiding: look at what you’ve left out—family,
friends, health, sex, disaster, guilt, pleasure, everything really personal. True. By
comparison with, say, Jane Gallop (whom I admire), I’m a timid hand at this.
For a lexicon inﬂected this way, see, e.g. Freedman et al., especially the introduction and the essays by Frey and Jane Tompkins. I agree with them but want
to save some of what they object to, in both intellectual and political work.
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